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ABSTRACT
B efore  1949 tenancy ex isted  in various form s and d egrees  in Kiangsu. 
Although such relationships w ere elim inated by  the land re fo rm  o f 1950-52 
and despite  the s a c r if ic e  o f  so c ia l gains in the in terest o f e con om ic  advance, 
the econ om ic  im pact o f this f ir s t  stage o f  agrarian re fo rm  was m in im al.
The Mutual Aid Team  M ovem ent was the f ir s t  attempt to achieve 
g rea ter  co -o p e ra t io n  in agricu ltu re . H ow ever, becau se  of its inherent 
lim itations its appeal was confined to the p o o re r  peasants and it fa iled  to 
attract those w hose potential contribution  to agricu ltural grow th was greatest. 
A m ore  rad ica l change was the creation  o f  agricu ltural p r o d u ce r s 1 c o -o p e r a ­
tiv es . Until 1955 these existed  in re la tive ly  sm all num bers, but betw een 
m id -1955 and m id - 1956 an extraord in ary  upsurge o f activ ity  o ccu rre d  w hich 
led  not m e re ly  to the rapid s e m i-s o c ia lis t  co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  o f  agricu lture 
but indeed to its fu lly -s o c ia lis t  co llectiv iza tion .
An exam ination o f quantitative ind icators  o f ag ricu ltu re 's  p erform an ce  
in Kiangsu during these years suggests that institutional change fa iled  to 
generate the grow th that had been hoped fo r . The rate o f  growth o f output 
o f  the m ost im portant crop s  during the 1950’ s (e sp e c ia lly  the F irs t  F ive 
Y ear Plan p eriod ) was ex trem ely  disappointing. P rod u ctiv ity  leve ls  rem ained 
low  and there continued to ex ist alarm ing gaps in both production  and co n ­
sum ption betw een d ifferent parts o f  the p rov in ce . At the m ost genera l leve l 
there was a c le a r  e con om ic  d ichotom y betw een the re la tiv e ly  prosp erou s 
areas o f south Kiangsu and the m ore  backw ard and d e p ressed  regions o f 
the north .
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M ore su rprisin g  is the evidence o f declin ing production  o v e r  the 
lon ger run. Output o f  a num ber o f m a jor  c r o p s , p a rticu la r ly  when view ed 
in p er capita  te rm s , was low er  in the 1950's than in the 1930 's. In this 
case  there w ere how ever two s u cce sse s  to be set against the fa ilu res ; a 
m ore  rational cropp ing pattern was introduced throughout the p rov in ce  and 
the production  o f r ic e ,  the m ost im portant food  c ro p , showed an upward 
trend.
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A ll o f  the b a s ic  re se a rch  connected  with this thesis  was com pleted  
during the tenure o f  a R esea rch  F ellow sh ip  at the C on tem p orary  China 
Institute o f  the School o f O riental and A frican  Studies betw een 1969 and 
1973. P r o fe s s o r  Stuart R. Schram  was Head o f the Institute during the 
f ir s t  three o f  those years and he encouraged m y studies in m any w ays.
I am p a rticu la rly  gratefu l to him  fo r  having given m e the opportunity to 
v is it  cen tres o f  C hinese studies in the United States, Hong Kong and Japan 
fo r  the f ir s t  tim e.
M y debt to m any lib ra r ie s  is  enorm ous. H ow ever, sp ecia l m ention 
should be m ade o f the H oover L ib ra ry  at Stanford U niversity , the L ib ra ry  
o f the H arvard -Y ench in g  Institute in C am bridge, M ass. and the O rienta lia  
S ection  o f  the U .S . L ib ra ry  o f  C on gress in W ashington, D .C . During an 
extended stay in Hong Kong I gained m uch from  being able to use the 
fa c ilit ie s  o f  both the U n iversities S erv ice  Centre and the Union R esea rch  
Institute. In Tokyo I p ro fited  from  v is its  to the National D iet L ib ra ry  o f 
Japan and the Toyo Bunko C o llection . In London D r. B ill B ru gger, M ateria ls 
O ffice r  at the C on tem porary  China Institute until 1972, facilita ted  the purchase 
o f variou s C hinese-language and other m a teria ls .
D r. C h ristopher H owe, Head o f  the C on tem porary  China Institute 
s ince  O ctober , 1972 and R eader in E con om ics  at the School o f O riental 
and A fr ica n  Studies has always listen ed  sym pathetica lly  to m y prob lem s 
and been the sou rce  o f  fr ien d ly  advice. I am p leased  to pay the debt o f 
gratitude w hich I owe him .
I have been  fortunate indeed to have had P r o fe s s o r  Kenneth W alker,
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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Head o f  the D epartm ent o f E con om ic  and P o lit ica l Studies at the School 
o f O riental and A fr ica n  Studies, as m y su p erv isor  during the last five  
y e a rs . I am deep ly  gratefu l fo r  the help and guidance he has given both 
as teach er and frien d . His constant encouragem ent has m ade the w riting 
o f  this thesis  not on ly  an e a s ie r  but also a m ore  agreeable  task.
PR EFAC E
The aim o f this study is threefo ld ; f ir s t , to d e sc r ib e  the institutional 
changes in agricu lture  which took p lace under the auspices o f the Chinese 
Com m unist P arty  in Kiangsu prov in ce  and to exam ine th eir  im pact upon 
agricu ltural produ ctiv ity  in that p rov in ce . Second, to tra ce  quantitative 
trends in agricu ltural production  during the years in  w hich these changes 
w ere taking p la ce , analyzing them  in term s o f e co n o m ic  as w ell as 
institutional fa c to rs . F in ally , to m ake a com p a rison  betw een agricu ltural 
production  in the 1930's and the 1950 's.
Two aspects o f  the study should be s tressed ; the f ir s t  is that it is 
a study o f a single p rov in ce ; the secon d , that it attempts to bridge the 
w atershed o f  1949, the year when the P e o p le 's  R epublic o f China was 
establish ed .
During the last two decades m ost studies o f the C hinese econ om y by 
W estern  sch o la rs  have been  conducted at the leve l o f the whole o f  China 
and one o f  the reasons that prom pted the d e c is io n  to undertake a 
p rov in cia l study was the b e lie f  that a deeper understanding o f the p ro ce ss  
o f e con om ic  (m ore  sp e c if ica lly , agricu ltural) developm ent in China m ight 
be gained by exam ining, in depth, a single p rov in ce . H ow ever m uch o f 
a com m on p la ce , it rem ains an im portant truth that China's vast geograp h ­
ica l area  and consequent regiona l d iv ers ity  c a r r y  the danger o f m aking 
aggregate studies m islead in g . This is not, o f co u rse , to deny the value 
of the w ork  done in recent y e a rs , but it is to suggest that we have now 
reached  a point w here investigations o f the organ ization  and structure o f 
p rov in cia l e con om ies  can be expected  to throw usefu l light on the findings
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o f w ork already ca rr ie d  out at the national le v e l.
D oubtless, strong reasons could be found to support the ch o ice  o f 
any p rov in ce  in China as a ca se -s tu d y  and fo r  Kiangsu there is certa in ly  
no lack . H isto r ica lly , K iangsu assum ed a p lace o f sp ec ia l im portance 
in the Chinese econom y; this was true o f the econ om y b e fo re  1840 (the 
"feu d a l” econ om y, follow ing the Chinese Com m unist in terpretation ), 
when it rem ained overw helm ingly  agricu ltural and the ch ie f e con om ic  aim 
o f the governm ent was to ensure adequate revenue through agricu ltural 
taxation (that is , gra in  tribute); and in the "se m i-fe u d a l, s e m i-c o lo n ia l"  
phase o f e con om ic  developm ent after 1840, when despite  the continuing 
heavy agricu ltural b ia s , contact with W estern  nations exposed  China to 
new in fluences and led  to the em ergen ce  o f a new kind o f  econ om y, 
typ ified  by  the tre a ty -p orts  s e c to r . In the present century, the natural 
conditions o f  K iangsu and the structural changes w hich have taken p lace 
in the p rov in cia l econ om y m ake it an ideal focus fo r  an analysis o f m any 
o f the prob lem s encountered in China's recent e con om ic  developm ent; 
fo r  exam ple, the e ffects  o f  urbanization  on the agricu ltu ra l s e c to r  and 
ru ra l-u rban  re la tion s ; the im pact o f  industria lization ; the question of 
"surplus la b ou r" in agricu ltu re ; and the p rob lem  o f m aintaining a c o r r e c t  
balance betw een the production  o f food  grains and e con om ic  c ro p s .
F inally , an im portant con sideration  has been that r ich  sou rces  o f in fo r ­
m ation on the agricu ltura l s e c to r  are available fo r  K iangsu both be fore  
and after 1949.
The secon d  point con cern s the attempt to span developm ents b e fore  
and after 1949. C lea rly , any judgem ent o f the econ om ic  achievem ents o f
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China’ s new governm ent p re -su p p oses  som e assum ed le v e l o f  developm ent 
b e fo re  1949. H ow ever, our knowledge o f rural e con om ic  conditions and 
developm ents in this e a r lie r  p eriod  rem ains p itifu lly  d e fic ien t. Some 
attempts have been  m ade to a ssess  developm ents in the 1950's by com paring 
them  with conditions in the 1930 's, but fo r  a va rie ty  o f reasons none o f 
them  has been  en tire ly  sa tis fa ctory . It is hoped that by  being able to 
con s id er  in g rea ter  depth a w ider range o f sou rce  m ateria ls  than is p oss ib le  
in a study o f all China, we m ay be able to throw light on the nature and 
d irection  o f agricu ltura l developm ent betw een the 1930's and the 1950 's.
The arrangem ent o f  the thesis is as fo llow s; the in trodu ctory  chapter 
prov id es som e n e c e s s a r y  background in form ation  by  d escr ib in g  the 
h is to r ica l and natural setting o f  K iangsu. The three chapters in P art One 
then exam ine the institutional changes which took p lace  in the agricu ltural 
s e c to r  o f  the p rov in ce  betw een 1949 and 1957. Land re fo rm  is view ed 
against the traditional tenurial and land-ow n ersh ip  system  and the 
subsequent em ergen ce  o f m utual-a id  team s, agricu ltura l co -o p e ra tiv e s  
and co lle c tiv e s  is con s id ered  both in its h is to r ica l and econ om ic  context. 
H ow ever, em phasis is p laced  throughout on an assessm en t o f the econ om ic  
im plica tion s o f  the institutional r e fo rm s .
Part Two co m p rise s  two chapters which analyze agricu ltural d ev e lop ­
m ent in m o re  quantitative te rm s . In the f ir s t , the p eriod  from  1949 to 
1957 is  con s id ered  on its own. Total leve ls  o f aggregate production , as 
w ell as the output o f im portant individual c ro p s , are presented  and from  
these p er capita  estim ates are d erived . W here p o ss ib le , an indication  o f 
changing leve ls  o f  land and labour produ ctiv ity  is given . In d iscu ssin g  the
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trends which em e rg e , attention is drawn to regiona l d ifferen tia ls  within 
the p rov in ce .
In the final chapter, a b r ie f  account o f the d ifficu lties  o f  in terpreting 
p re -w a r  agricu ltura l data p reced es  an attempt to d erive  estim ates of 
total and p er capita  output, and average y ie ld s , o f se le cte d  crops  grow n 
in Kiangsu during the 1930 's. This form s the basis  o f  an assessm en t of 
lon g -ru n  developm ent as shown by  the changing le v e l and structure o f 
agricu ltural produ ction  in the p rov in ce .
CH A PTE R  ONE
Introduction
I K iangsu: The H istor ica l Setting
In view  o f its favourab le s tra teg ic  and econ om ic  position  in the rich
and fe rt ile  v a lle y  o f the low er  Yangtze, it was inevitable that Kiangsu^ ^
should assum e an im portant p lace in Chinese h is to ry . A  usefu l concept
in this resp e ct  is the "K ey E con om ic  A re a "  used  by Chi C h 'a o -tin g  in
(2 )his study o f the regiona l basis  o f cen tra l pow er in p re -18 40  China.
Chi points out:
" . . . the unity o r  cen tra liza tion  o f state pow er in China could only 
m ean the con tro l o f an econ om ic  area w here agricu ltu ra l p ro d u c ­
tiv ity  and fa c ilit ie s  o f  tran sport would m ake p o ss ib le  the supply 
o f a grain  tribute so predom inantly su p erior  to that o f other areas 
that any group w hich con tro lled  this area had the key to the conquest 
and unity o f  all China. It is  areas o f this kind which m ust be 
designated as the K ey E con om ic  A rea s . 11 (3)
Until the p eriod  o f  the Six D ynasties (222 - 589 AD ), China's K ey 
E con om ic  A rea  com p rised  the C hing-W ei basin  and low er  Y ellow  R iver 
va lley  in north  China. H ow ever, during this p eriod  a r iva l area  began 
to em erge  in the fo rm  of the low er Yangtze V a lley  (including Kiangsu) 
and by  the T 'ang D ynasty (618 - 906 AD) this had b ecom e  the undisputed 
new K ey E con om ic  A rea  o f  China - a p osition  w hich it m aintained until 
1840, the end-date o f  C h i's  study.
This shift in C hina's e con om ic  cen tre  o f  grav ity  was re fle cted  in
K iangsu, w here after the fourth century AD, south K iangsu (that is ,
the area  south o f  the Yangtze) em erged  as the m ost im portant econ om ic
region  in the p rov in ce , d isp lacing north Kiangsu w hich had hitherto held
that p osition . A nother indication  o f  the grow ing im p ortan ce  o f the area
was the establishm ent o f Nanking as the capital o f the E astern  Chin
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D ynasty (317 - 419 AD). But perhaps the single m ost sign ificant d ev e lop ­
m ent was the con stru ction  during the Sui Dynasty (589 - 617 AD) o f  the
Grand Canal, linking the Y ellow  R iver with the Hwai and Yangtze R iv e rs ,
(4)and stretch ing fro m  the capital in the north to H angchow, in Chekiang
p rov in ce . This w aterw ay was con stru cted  in o rd e r  to tran sport grain
fro m  the r ich  southern p rov in ces  to the capital and it rem ained the
p rin cipa l line o f  com m unication  betw een north and south until the present
(5)
century. M o re o v e r , it passed  through the whole o f  K iangsu; entering
fro m  Shantung, it flow ed  sou th -east to H w ai-an, then south to Y ang-chou
and Chinkiang (re sp e c tiv e ly  situated on the northern  and southern banks
o f the Yangtze), ^  and continued southwards around Lake T 'a i Hu out o f
(7)the p rov in ce . In view  o f the cru cia l im portan ce o f the canal, it was
natural that the p rin cipa l stations along its cou rse  should develop  into
prom inent c it ie s . Thus H w ai-an fu lfilled  a s tra teg ic  ro le  until this
century, when its position  was usurped by H sti-chou, situated at the
( 8 )in tersection  o f  two im portant ra ilw ays. Chinkiang and Y ang-chou
occu p ied  positions o f s im ila r  im portan ce and Y ang-chou , in p articu lar,
(9)grew  into a great c o m m e rc ia l city .
Astonishing evidence o f the rapid r ise  o f the low er  Yangtze V a lley
to a position  o f e con om ic  p re -em in en ce  in China is a fforded  by  the fact
( 1 0 )that during the T 'ang D ynasty, " .  . . the land tax o f  Kiangnan had
already reached  the alarm ing p rop ortion  o f n ine-tenths o f  the total land
tax o f the cou n try".  ^  ^ H ow ever, it would be w rong to think o f the
Yangtze V a lley  as an integrated  unit at this p eriod ; rath er, it com p rised
a num ber o f  sm a ll units lo o s e ly  linked together. Not until the twelfth
and thirteenth cen tu ries  did the region  finally  em erge  as a coh esive  unit.
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B y this tim e, it was the r ich est reg ion  in the w hole o f China - "an area
o f surplus crop s  and w oven good s, producing r ic e ,  s ilk , tea  and fish
( 1 2 )products in abundance". ' At the sam e tim e, the e co n o m ic  im balance 
betw een north and south K iangsu becam e m ore  pronounced and as the 
p ro sp e r ity  o f  the south grew , so the econ om y o f the north fe ll  into a 
secu la r  d eclin e . As we shall se e , this d ichotom y rem ained one o f  the 
m ost strik ing ch a ra cte r is t ics  o f the p rov in cia l econ om y  w ell into the 1950 's.
The im portan ce  o f the low er Yangtze region  in gen era l and o f south 
Kiangsu in p articu lar was underlined by the ch o ice  o f  Nanking as the 
capital o f the Ming Dynasty on its inception  in 1368. Although the capital 
was la ter  m oved  to Peking, Nanking rem ained the secon d  city  in China 
and indeed, a fter the foundation o f the Chinese R epublic in 1912, its 
fo rm e r  p re -em in en t ro le  was r e -a s s e r te d .
During the Ming D ynasty, strong encouragem ent was given to the
extension  o f e con om ic  c ro p s . Cotton and silk  cocoon s  w ere  being produced
in the low er Yangtze region  as ea r ly  as the Sung D ynasty (960 - 1126 AD)
but not until the Ming did la r g e -s c a le  expansion get under way. By the
late sixteenth and ea r ly  seventeenth cen tu ries , coasta l areas o f south
(13)Kiangsu had developed  into national centres o f p rodu ction . S im u l­
taneously , there was a rapid developm ent o f handicraft and textile
in d u stries , Sung-chiang becom in g the m anufacturing centre o f  cotton
(14)textiles  in China and Nanking and Soochow  o f silk  te x tile s . D eve lop ­
m ent o f the textile  industry continued into the C h 'ing Dynasty (1644 - 1911) 
and, by  the ea r ly  nineteenth century "in  the belt com p ris in g  Sung-chiang, 
T 'a i-ts 'a n g  and N an-t'ung, a situation developed  w here the fie lds  o f  cotton
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crop s  w ere crow ding out the fie lds  o f staple c r o p s " .  ' It is no c o in c i­
dence that this part o f  K iangsu rem ained the single m ost im portant base 
fo r  textile  m anufactures in China during the 1950 's.
The econ om ic  penetration  o f China by W estern  nations, which began 
in the m id -n ineteenth  century, represents a v e ry  rea l w atershed in Chinese 
h is to ry  and s ign ifies  the em ergen ce  o f "m odern  C hina". One consequence 
was that the m ech an ism  o f the Key E con om ic A rea  ceased  to have any 
re levan ce ; instead, the key to the p o litica l and eco n o m ic  con tro l o f China 
lay  with the fo re ig n -co n tro lle d  t r e a ty -p o r ts . H ow ever, the position  o f 
K iangsu was little  a ffected  by the changed c ircu m sta n ces . In the follow ing 
century, its favourab le  geograph ica l situation and natural cond itions, the 
re la tive ly  developed  state o f its econ om y and, above a ll, the rapid growth 
o f Shanghai - all assu red  the p rovin ce  (o r  at least, that part south of the 
Yangtze) o f  a continuing im portant p lace in the national econom y.
The m ost im portant econ om ic  developm ents in the p rov in ce  betw een 
1840 and 1949 w ere the grow ing industria lization  and urban ization  o f 
south K iangsu, and the gen era l rural decline o cca s ion ed  by  the breakdown 
o f cen tra l authority and em ergen ce  o f regional m ilita ry  cliques and riva l 
p o litica l parties in China. Only a short sum m ary o f these developm ents 
is p o ss ib le  h e re , although som ething m ore  than c u r s o r y  con sideration  m ust 
be given  to two events which had p articu larly  seriou s  im plica tion s fo r  
K iangsu 's e con om ic  developm ent; the Taiping R eb ellion  o f 1850-64 and 
the S ino-Japanese W ar o f 1937-45.
A detailed  account o f the grow th o f Shanghai is beyond the scop e  o f
an in trod u ctory  chapter such as th is. ^  Suffice it to say that in the
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secon d  half o f the nineteenth century and esp e c ia lly  a fter 1890, the
econ om ic  developm ent o f Shanghai was ex trem ely  rapid and by the early
decades o f  the presen t century it had b ecom e the m ost im portant national
(17)centre o f  trad e , industry , banking and finance. Industrialization  was
also under way in other c ities  near Shanghai - notably W usih, Soochow ,
N an-t'ung (the on ly im portant industria l c ity  in K iangsu w hich lay north
o f the Yangtze) and C h ’ ang-chou (a lso  ca lled  W u-ch in ). In all these c ities
the em phasis was on light, con su m er industries ; o f  2 ,623  fa cto r ie s  in
( 18)Shanghai lis ted  in one so u rce , only 274 (10 .45% ) w ere  producing goods 
which did not fa ll into this ca tegory .
It is w ell-know n that the trea ty -p orts  s e c to r  was never m ore  than 
p eriph era l to the traditional Chinese agricu ltural econ om y; it w as, as 
it w ere , m e r e ly  grafted  on to the rural s e c to r . Thus, the lack  o f any 
purposefu l national e con om ic  p o licy  com bined with the dom ination o f the 
trea ty -p orts  by fo re ig n  capital m eant that any b en e fic ia l linkage e ffects  
which m ight have developed  w ere lo s t. In K iangsu, the im pact o f the 
grow th o f Shanghai and other c ities  on the rest o f  the p rov in cia l econ om y 
w ere m ain ly  re fle cted  in in creasin g  urbanization  on the one hand and 
the d eteriora tion  o f rural su bsid ia ries  on the other.
The e ffe ct  o f the growth o f m odern  industry can be b r ie f ly  sum m arized  
the appearance o f  textile  m anufactures o f fa c to ry  or ig in  on the d om estic  
m arket and the subsequent grow th o f a m odern  textile  industry had 
seriou s  im plica tion s fo r  textile  handicrafts in south K iangsu. These w ere 
highly developed  and an im portant sou rce  o f  in com e fo r  a la rge  part o f 
the rural population. But unable to com pete either with the low p r ice s  or
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the quality u n iform ity  o f the m ach ine-m ade produ cts , the handicraft
(19)
se cto r  fe ll into a seriou s  d eclin e . Many peasants and handicraft
w ork ers  went bankrupt and these sw elled  the in creas in g  supply o f cheap 
labour drifting into the c ities  in search  o f  w ork.
The relationsh ip  betw een industria lization  and the grow th o f urban 
population is too obvious to requ ire  com m ent. In K iangsu the developm ent 
of m odern  industry in the southern part o f the p rov in ce  caused co n s id e r ­
able d isp lacem ent o f  population, eventually making the p rov in ce  one of 
the m ost urban ized  in China. H ow ever, further con sid era tion  o f population 
growth and changes betw een the rural and urban se cto rs  is left until the 
next section  o f this chapter.
A  consequence o f the breakdow n o f centra l pow er betw een 1840 and 
1911 was a d eteriora tion  in the agricu ltural econ om y. Increasing 
corru p tion  led  to h eav ier  exactions on peasants by lo c a l o f fic ia ls ; the 
weakening o f the cen tra l governm ent resu lted  in the n eg lect o f the la r g e -  
sca le  w a te r -co n tro l w orks - the dikes and em bankm ents, the upkeep o f 
w hich requ ired  re so u rce s  beyond the capacity  o f lo c a l com m unities and 
w hich w ere th ere fo re  trad ition a lly  the resp on sib ility  o f  the governm ent.
But the c le a re s t  ind ication  o f  the seriou s  situation was the outbreak in 
1850 o f the Taiping R ebellion . This uprising had lon g -ru n  e ffects  on 
K iangsu 's econ om y, fo r  the area w orst a ffected  was the low er Yangtze 
V a lley  (the p rov in ces  o f K iangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei and K iangsi). This 
region  was the focu s o f m uch o f the fighting and was ravaged by both 
governm ent and rebe l a rm ies . Tens o f thousands o f peasants w ere k illed  
and la rge  num bers o f those that survived  w ere p re sse d  into the se rv ice
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o f the rebels  as s o ld ie rs . South Kiangsu, in p a rticu la r , was badly hit
>w th 
(2 1 )
(20 )and whole areas w ere depopulated. The follow ing data show e fa ll
in the population of two southern hsien  follow ing the R ebellion ;
Percentage
P re -T a ip in g  P ost-T a ip in g  declin e  in
population population population
L iu -h o  3 1 8 ,6 8 3 (1 7 8 1 ) 1 1 5 ,1 5 5 (1 8 8 2 ) 63 .9
L i-sh u i 2 3 0 ,6 1 8 (1 7 7 5 ) 3 7 ,1 8 8 (1 8 7 4 ) 83 .9
D evastation on this sca le  led  to a grave shortage o f labour in certa in
parts o f  south K iangsu. At the sam e tim e, lo s s e s  to w orking capital
(farm  to o ls , bu ild ings, se e d s , draft anim als) m ust also have been heavy
so that even those fa rm e rs  who survived  the uprising w ere often
im p overish ed  and lacked  capital fo r  rehabilitation  and renew ed d eve lop -
ment.(22>
The shortage o f  labour com bined with the attraction  o f  the fe rt ile  land
encouraged  im m igration  from  other parts o f K iangsu and fro m  other
p rov in ces  once the rebels  had been  defeated. F rom  Hupei, whole v illages
uprooted  th em selves and m oved  into the em pty reg ion  o f  south Kiangsu to
estab lish  fa rm s ; im m igration  also got under way fro m  Hunan, Honan
and o f co u rse  north Kiangsu. H ow ever, labour shortages continued and
r e c o v e r y  was slow ; even in the 1890’ s o ffic ia ls  w ere  m em oria liz in g  the
(23)e m p e ro r  on the la rge  amounts o f land that rem ained uncultivated.
Indeed, so great was the d estru ction  caused by the Taiping R ebellion  that
even in the 1950’ s its e ffects  could  still be seen . 1953 population figu res
fo r  Chekiang, Anhwei and K iangsi are all low er  than those fo r  1850. Of
all the p rov in ces  in the low er Yangtze V a lley , K iangsu alone had re co v e re d
(24)fro m  the depopulation. The figures fo r  Kiangsu are as fo llow s ;
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Total population Total population P ercentage
in 1850_______  in 1953__________  change
4 4 .1 5 5 .0 0 0  4 7 ,4 5 6 ,6 0 9  + 7 .5
But the 1953 figu re  includes Shanghai and there can be no doubt that
the reason  fo r  K iangsu 's population growth was the rapid urbanization
which o ccu rre d  in the century after 1850. Thus, i f  Shanghai's population
is excluded in 1953, the exp erien ce  o f Kiangsu is  the sam e as that of the
other p rov in ces ;
Total population Total population P ercentage
in 1850 in 1953 change
__________________  (ex c l. Shanghai) _____________
4 4 .1 5 5 .0 0 0  4 1 ,2 5 2 ,1 9 2  -6 .5
The end o f  the C h 'in g  Dynasty, fa r  from  revers in g  the p ro ce s s  o f
agricu ltural d ec lin e , served  p rin cip a lly  to exacerba te  it. A ll sem blance 
o f cen tra lized  pow er was now lo s t . The breakdow n o f la r g e -s c a le  w ater- 
con tro l w orks continued and at the hands o f the variou s w arlord  a rm ies , 
d estru ction  o f c ro p s , item s o f fixed  and working capital and human and 
anim al lives  o c cu rre d  on a wide sca le . Tenants in crea sed  in num bers 
and w ere exposed  to the w orst e x ce sse s  of the on e -w a y  tenurial re la tion ­
ship. The w arlord s  abused what pow er they had; taxes w ere g r o s s ly  
in cre a se d , a wide va rie ty  o f new lev ies  in troduced, and peasants w ere 
com m on ly  com pelled  to pay taxes yea rs  in advance in o rd e r  to provide 
funds fo r  the com peting a rm ies . K iangsu was no excep tion  to these trends
and m ost con tem p orary  investigations suggest stagnation o r  decline in
(25)the rural s e c to r . During the w arlord  p eriod  (1916 - 28) Kiansu was
m ost s e r io u s ly  a ffected  by the activ ities o f the w a rlord , Sun Ch 'uan-fang
and his r iv a ls . In 1924-25 the F irs t  and Second "K iangsu-C hekiang W a rs"
w ere fought in south Kiangsu and Sun em erged  as the dom inant m ilita ry
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figure in the p rov in ce . Not until 1927 and the advance o f the N orthern
(26) (27)E xpedition was he pushed a cro ss  the Yangtze and so fina lly  ousted
fro m  K iangsu. M eanw hile, banditry in crea sed  as m o re  and m ore  peasants
w ere fo rce d  o ff  the land through poverty  and bankruptcy.
Taxation was another heavy burden on the agricu ltu ra l s e c to r  which 
in crea sed  s till further after 1911. The follow ing data on land taxes are 
indicative o f the deterioratin g  situation:
Table I. 1; An index o f  changes in regu lar and supplem entary
taxes levied p er m ou o f  land in Kiang su and China
1 9 1 2 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
PADDY LAND:
China (average) 59 100 107 108 108 101 101
Kiangsu 65 100 116 123 117 109 103
D R Y -C R O P  F L A T LAND
China (average) 62 100 109 111 111 103 101
Kiangsu 76 100 105 104 108 98 96
D R Y -C R O P  H ILLY LAND
China (average) 61 100 108 111 111 104 101
Kiangsu 59 100 102 104 107 102 95
S ource; Chang Y u -i, Chung-kuo chin -ta i nung-yeh
sh ih -tz u -lia o , (Source M ateria ls  on M od em  
Chinese A gricu ltu ra l H isto ry ), h erea fter  CKNY, 
v o l. 3, 1927-37, pp. 9 -1 1 , citing "N ung-ch 'ing  
p a o -k a o" ("C ro p  R e p o rts " ) , v o l. 7, n o .4;
A p ril, 1939.
N ote; 1 m ou is 0. 067 h e cta res , o r  0. 1647 acres  .
E xcept fo r  the last two y e a rs , when a reduction  in the land tax was 
d e cre e d , the upward trend in taxation is c le a r ly  v is ib le .
A  m ore  s p e c if ic  illu stra tion  o f the in crea se  in taxes is  a fforded by
the fo llow ing table w hich shows the fluctuations in the in ciden ce  o f  land
tax in W usih hsien , south Kiangsu, betw een 1923 and 1934;
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Table I. 2 : The land tax in W usih hsien
Land tax p er m ou Index with
____________________  1923 = 100
1923 0 .626  ytian 100
1924 0 .726  116
1925 0 .648  108
1926 0 .986  157
1927 0 .936 149
1928 0 .962  153
1929 0 .942  151
1930 1 .118 178
1931 1.036 165
1932 0 .916  146
1933 1 .182 189
1934 0 .969  155
S ource ; Wang T 'ie n -tzu , "W u -h si B s i-h sia  ti nung-ts 'un
ch in g -ch i1' ("T h e  Rural E con om y o f P e i-h s ia  
in W usih") in  NHYK, v o l. 2, no. 11, N ovem ber 
1935; p p .15-31 .
A  d istin ction  needs to be m ade betw een "reg u la r  ta x e s "  ( cheng-shui)
and "su pplem entary  ta x e s " (fu -sh u i) . In the 1920's and 1930 's, a wide
range o f new le v ies  was in troduced, the burden o f w hich gradually cam e
to outweigh that o f the regu lar taxes . In Kiangsu, fo r  exam ple, one sou rce
lis ts  three p rov in c ia l, but 31 hsien , supplem entary taxes in the ea rly  
(2811 9 3 0 ' s . The evidence o f Chang Y u -i is even m o re  astonishing, fo r
he cites  147 "su pplem entary land ta x e s "  (t 'ie n -fu  fu -c h ia ) being lev ied  in
(29)Kiangsu at this tim e - the highest figure by  fa r  in any p rov in ce  o f China.
To these p u rely  endogenous fa ctors  m ust be added the e ffects  o f two 
sets o f external fa c to r s . F irs t , natural d isa ste rs ; these w ere com m on 
o ccu rre n ce s  in K iangsu. F o r  exam ple, betw een 1928 and 1935,
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various parts o f the p rov in ce  w ere affected  by the follow ing d isa sters ;
Table 1.3; Natural d isa sters  in Kiangsu; 1928 - 1935
1928 Drought
1929 Insect infestation
1930 F loods and drought
1931 F loods
1933 L ocust plague
1934 F loods and drought. L ocu st plague
1935 F lood s (overflow ing o f  Yangtze)
S ou rce ; CKNY, v o l. 3, op. c i t . , pp. 610 -612 .
Of co u rse , the se v e r ity  of these d isa sters  va ried  from  year to yea r; 
som etim es they w ere lo ca lize d ; at other tim es, vast areas w ere affected . 
H ow ever, north Kiangsu was p ecu lia r ly  vu lnerable to flooding and accord in g 
to h is to r ica l sta tistics  " . . . fo r  the period  o f 250 years  b e fo re  L iberation  
(1949), the H sii-H w ai areas in the low er reaches o f  the R ivers  I, Ssu and 
Shu averaged one big flood  e v ery  four yea rs , and in the s ix  consecutive
( 31 )years im m ediate ly  preced ing  L iberation , a ca lam ity  o ccu rre d  each yea r. "
F urther, " . . . fo r  the p eriod  o f 430 years b e fo re  L ibera tion , the L i-h s ia
Ho and K a o-P a o  lake area in the low er reaches o f the Hwai R iver averaged
(32)a big flood  once e v e ry  three y e a rs .
Of the natural d isa sters  lis ted  above, 1931 and 1934 w ere the w orst.
The area and population o f  Kiangsu affected  by  the floods of 1931 is not
(33)known, but Chang Y u -i states that in the eight p rov in ces  in which
flooding o c cu rre d , 100 m illion  (s ic )  people w ere a ffected , 255 m illion
m ou o f arable land subm erged  by w ater and 265, 154 people drow ned.
(34)Ch 'u  T ’in g -ju  attributes the bankruptcy o f the v illa ges  o f K iangsu 's 
s e co n d -la rg e s t  hsien , T u n g-t 'a i, to the severe  floods o f  this yea r . The
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w orst aspect o f the 1934 d isa sters  in Kiangsu was probably  the drought; 
in the T 'a i Hu B asin  in the south o f the p rov in ce , fo r  exam ple, the
w a te r -le v e l in som e r iv ers  fe ll to re co rd  leve ls  and one dried  up
, (35 ) com plete ly .
The second  external e ffe ct , the im pact o f the w orld  econ om ic
d ep ress ion  o f  the 1930's on K iangsu, can be b r ie f ly  su m m arized . As
one w riter  put it;
"The slow ed down dem and fo r  agricu ltural exports and the entry 
o f a great volum e o f fo re ig n  r ic e , wheat and cotton  resu lted  in a 
d ra stic  p r ice  drop  in agricu ltural produ cts . Betw een 1930-34 the 
p r ice  o f  r ice  in Kiangsu p rov in ce  dropped by m ore  than half; the 
peasants engaging in silkw orm  culture went bankrupt, as they w ere 
not able to net enough to c o v e r  the expenses o f p roduction , and it 
was im p oss ib le  to count those who had abandoned th eir  fie lds o f 
m u lb erry  plantings. "  (36)
D espite som e signs o f r e c o v e r y  in the two o r  three years  im m ediately  
preced ing  the outbreak o f the S ino-Japanese W ar, the yea rs  after 1911 
gen era lly  seem ed  to be w itnessing the breakdown o f the K iangsu econom y.
In the agricu ltural s e c to r  the m ost seriou s  m anifestations o f the d e te r io ­
rating situation w ere the grow ing im poverishm ent o f fa rm ers  and the 
in cre a se  in tenancy. Im poverishm ent o f fa rm e rs  was re fle cted  in the 
exhaustion o f  v illa ge  finance and the in creasin g  n e ce ss ity  to enter into 
usurious loans. T rad itiona lly , cred it had been available from  a va riety  
o f s o u rce s ; m on ey -ch a n g ers ; paw n-shops; s o c ie t ie s  form ed  voluntarily  
by peasants, each  investing m oney into a cen tra l fund and rece iv in g  in 
return the right to b orrow  from  it; banks and co -o p e ra t iv e s  (though in 
gen era l, banks benefited  on ly the r ich er  fa rm ers  and cred it co -o p e ra tiv e s  
n ever re a lly  took root in the countryside). H ow ever, as the rural situation
grew  w orse  and whole v illa ges  w ere threatened by  bankruptcy, m ost of
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these sou rces  d ried  up and peasants w ere fo rce d  to negotiate loans with 
individual r ich  households in the v illa ges  (e sp e c ia lly  lan d lord s). Inevit­
ably, the term s o f such loans w ere onerous and th is, com bined with the
(37)fact that loans w ere ra re ly  m ade fo r  productive p u rp oses , further 
aggravated the situation.
We m ay conclude this h is to r ica l survey  by giving a v e ry  b r ie f  account 
o f the events o f the S ino- Japanese W ar in K iangsu. F o r  not only did these 
ensure a strong base fo r  the Chinese Com m unist P arty  in the p rovin ce  
follow ing the defeat o f Japan, but they also had im portant im plication s fo r
(38)
K iangsu 's agricu ltural developm ent after 1949.
A fter the outbreak o f w ar in 1937, there w ere  a num ber o f  Com m unist 
m ilita ry  and gu erilla  units operating in south K iangsu, the m ost im portant 
being part o f the New Fourth A rm y. In the e a r ly  yea rs  o f  the w ar, north 
K iangsu rem ained under the con tro l o f the Kuom intang. H ow ever, in late 
1939, expansion o f  C om m unist influence north o f  the Yangtze began to take 
p lace  and clash es betw een the Kuomintang and Chinese Com m unist fo rce s  
f irs t  o c cu rre d . In 1940, Japanese action in south K iangsu su cceeded  in 
pushing the C om m unist fo r c e s  northw ards a cross  the Yangtze and la ter 
in the sam e yea r , heavy m ilita ry  action betw een Han T e - c h ’in, Com m ande 
o f the Kuomintang a rm ies , and Kuan W en-w ei and C h 'en  Yi, in charge o f 
the Com m unist fo r c e s ,  resu lted  in a d ec is iv e  Com m unist v ic to ry . By 
S eptem ber, 1940, the Com m unists held all north K iangsu east o f the
(39)Grand Canal.
The end o f  1940 saw the re -org a n iza tion  o f the Com m unist fo r c e s  and 
the establishm ent o f the N orth Kiangsu Specia l A dm in istrative  C om m ittee.
This was an event o f con siderab le  s ign ifican ce , fo r  it m arked . . the
fir s t  step in bringing the c iv ilian  population o f north  Kiangsu into the
(41)Com m unist w ar e ffo r t " . D espite attempts by the Japanese to c lea r
the area, north Kiangsu th erea fter rem ained in Com m unist hands fo r  
the rest o f  the w ar.
The im portan ce o f these events fo r  the purposes o f this study is  two
fo ld . F ir s t , the su cce ss  o f the Chinese Com m unist P arty  in north Kiangsu
provided  them  fo r  the f ir s t  tim e with a strong base in the p rov in ce , from
(42)
which they could operate after the w ar. But m ore  im portant, continued
con tro l o f the area  after 1945 enabled the P arty lead ers  to begin  im p le ­
m enting land re fo rm  in north Kiangsu as ea rly  as 1946 - three years b e fore  
the form a l establishm ent o f the P e o p le 's  R epublic o f China. The exp erien ce  
so gained can on ly have benefited  the adm inistration  when it began to
(43)execute its new agrarian  p o lic ie s  in the rest o f  the p rov in ce  after 1949.
II K iangsu: The Natural and E con om ic Setting
(44)F o r  purposes o f e con om ic  analysis, K iangsu is best seen  as one
of the three p rov in ces  o f the low er Yangtze V a lley  (the others are Anhwei
and Chekiang). T rad itionally , h is to r ica l and econ om ic  ties betw een these
prov in ces  have been  c lo se  and after 1949 the econ om ic  unity o f the area
(45)was recogn ized  by  the creation  o f the East China E con om ic  R egion.
The relationsh ip , in term s o f area and total population, betw een
(46)Kiangsu, the East China E con om ic  R egion and China during the 
late 1 9 5 0 ' s is shown in the follow ing table:
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Table I. 4; Total and arable area and total population in 
Kiangsu, the East China E con om ic  Region 
and China in 1957
China
Population , _ a
(m illion s) 656 • 63
Total su rfa ce  
area (m illion  ^
square 9. 56
k ilom etres )
A rab le  area 
(m illion  1 1 2 .6 °  
h ecta res)
S ou rces;
East
China
110. 97'
0 .3 5
14. 35
Kiangsu
(in cl.
Shanghai)
52. 13a
0 . 11
6 .2 4
Kiangsu
(e x c l.
Shanghai)
4 5 .2 3 a
a State Statistical B ureau, W e i-ta  ti
sh ih -n ien  ( Ten G reat Y e a r s ) , Peking,
1959; p. 6 and p. 9.
b N ai-ruenn Chen, C hinese E con om ic
S tatistics , Edinburgh U niversity  P r e s s ,
1967, p. 123, Table 1 .1 .
c W e i-ta  ti sh ih -n ien , op. c i t . , p. 113.
d D .H . P erk in s, A g ricu ltu ra l D evelopm ent
in China, 1368-1968 , A ldine Publishing C o. , 
C h icago, 1969; p . 236.
e Sun C hing-chih , op. c i t . , p. 53 
Although som e m ight question the exact m agnitude o f  these figu res , 
the o v e ra ll pattern is not in doubt. The richness o f the East China 
E con om ic  R egion  in gen era l and o f  Kiangsu in p articu lar em erges  c le a r ly . 
Thus, East China, with on ly 3 .7%  o f China's total su rfa ce  area, n e v e r ­
theless contains about 17% o f  its total population. S im ila rly , Kiangsu 
accounts fo r  46 .98%  o f the total population o f East China (40 .76%  if  
Shanghai is excluded), but has on ly 31.43%  o f the re g ion 's  total land area. 
The reason  fo r  such d ifferen tia ls  lie s  in the re la tive ly  high cultivation 
index o f the low er Yangtze V a lley . In the three p rov in ces  o f  East China 
taken as a w hole, approxim ately  27. 5% o f the land area  can be cultivated
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and in Kiangsu the corresp on d in g  figure is w ell o v e r  50%.
H ills and plains are the dom inant topograph ica l feature o f the East 
China R egion . C lim atica lly , the whole area fa lls  roughly into the te m p e r ­
ate zone, although regiona l variations betw een north  and south are co n ­
s id era b le , with a gen era l tendency fo r  tem perature and ra in fa ll to in crea se
as one m oves southw ards. A concom itant feature is a re la tive ly  long
(47)
grow ing season  so that in m ost areas dou b le -crop p in g  is fe a s ib le . '
Of sp ec ia l im portan ce is the Yangtze R iver , which flow s through the centre 
o f the region : not on ly does this provide a vita l com m unications link with 
cen tra l China, but its su bsid ia ries  also fo rm  a dense r iv e r  netw ork, 
im portant fo r  transportation  and irr iga tion . The secon d  m ost im portant 
r iv e r  in the reg ion  is the Hwai, flow ing through cen tra l Anhwei and into 
north Kiangsu. This r iv e r  has been m ost notable fo r  its vu lnerability  to 
sev ere  flooding and consequent threat to agricu ltural p roduction  o v er  a 
wide area. It was fo r  this reason  that the con stru ction  p ro je c t  to con tro l 
the Hwai was a ccord ed  a high p r io r ity  in agricu ltural investm ent plans 
after 1949.
In view  o f the high population density o f East China, it is not su rpris in g  
that the la rg e s t  p rop ortion  o f arable land has been devoted to food  gra in s, 
with r ic e  holding a p re -em in en t position . In 1957, the last yea r o f  the 
F ir s t  F ive Y ear Plan (F F Y P ), output o f r ice  was 62% o f  total grain  p r o ­
duction in the East China R egion  and represen ted  22% o f  China's total r ice
(48).output. Wheat was the secon d  cro p , though it was highly co m m e rc ia lize d
and m o stly  used as a raw m ateria l fo r  flo u r -m illin g  in the c it ie s . Other 
g ra in s, such as sw eet potatoes, b a rley , corn  and m a ize , w ere also grow n,
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e sp e c ia lly  in the northern  parts o f the region  w here the clim ate was 
c o o le r  and d r ie r . Taken as a w hole, in 1957, food  grain  output in East 
China was 16.7%  o f  total national output and was used ch ie fly  fo r  consum ption
(49)within the region .
T rad ition a lly , e con om ic  crop s  have been w idely  planted - e sp e c ia lly  
raw cotton , hem p and m u lb erry  trees  (fo r  raising s ilk w orm s). T extile 
handicrafts w ere establish ed  e a r ly  and in the nineteenth century, d ev e lop ­
m ent o f a m o d e m  textile  industry also got under way. In the 1950's textiles 
rem ained one o f  the m ost flourish ing in du stries , its g ro ss  value output 
accounting fo r  32% o r  total regional industria l g ro ss  value output in 1957.
It produced  40% o f China's cotton  goods; m ore  than 60% o f its w oollen
(50)goods; and o v e r  50% o f silk  produ cts .
So m uch fo r  the im m ediate geograph ica l and e con om ic  setting o f 
K iangsu. Kiangsu its e lf  is a coasta l p rov in ce , lo ca ted  at the low er reaches 
o f the Yangtze and Hwai R iv e rs . T opograph ica lly , it contains a v e ry  
la rge  area o f plains and in the southwest co rn e r  and at its northern  
boundaries a few  h ills  and uplands. These la tter , h ow ever, are on a 
sm a ll sca le ; K iangsu 's highest peak, Y tin -t'a i shan, is only about 2, 000 
feet high. Although recent data are not available, the follow ing table 
(based on a p re -w a r  so u rce ) probably  gives a fa ir ly  accurate p ictu re  o f 
how the total su rfa ce  area  in the p rov in ce  was d istributed  in the 1950 's;
Table I. 5; D istribution  o f  the total su rfa ce  area o f K iangsu 
into three topograph ica l ca te g o r ie s ; 1933_______
T opograph ica l ca tegory  P ercen tage o f total su rfa ce  area 
__________________________   in each  ca tegory________
Plains
H ills and uplands 
W ater
- 2 7 - TO TA L
8 6 . 1 
6. 7 
7 .2  
100 . 0
S ource; HB, op. c it. , p. 8.
The data presented  e a r lie r  in Table 1.4 suggest the cru cia l im portance
o f the relationsh ip  betw een total area  and arable area . Only 12% o f
China's vast su rfa ce  area was cultivated in the late 1950 's, com pared  with
alm ost 30% in East China (Anhwei, Chekiang and Kiangsu) and over  50%
in Kiangsu. On this basis  Kiangsu was one o f  the r ich est p rov in ces  in the
(51)whole country. M ore o v e r , fo r  all the e con om ic  im balance that existed
betw een north  and south, the cultivation seem s to have been m uch the sam e
in both halves o f the p rov in ce :
Table 1.6; The relationship  betw een total and arable area
in north and south Kiangsu______________________
North of Yangtze South o f  Yangtze
Total su rfa ce  area
(m illion  m ou) 115 .60 47 .40
Total arable area
(m illion  m ou) 65 .21 26 .19
Cultivation index 56.40%  55.70%
S ource: HB, op. c i t . , pp. 6 -8  and pp. 23 -24 .
It is  true that these figu res show the situation in the ea r ly  1930 's,
not the late 1950 's. But the average cultivation index o f  58% cited  by a
Chinese sou rce  in 1958 suggests that only a re la tive ly  sm all change had
(52)taken p lace  in the intervening 25 y ea rs . N everth e less , it is a pity
that su b -p rov in c ia l in form ation  is not available to show how far the 
d ifferen tia l betw een north and south had w idened. A  p r io r i , we should 
expect that the grea ter  scop e  fo r  land reclam ation  north o f the Yangtze 
had perm itted  a m ore  rapid expansion o f arable area than was p oss ib le  
in the south.
\
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The geograp h ica l relationship  betw een Kiangsu and the Yangtze and
Hwai R ivers  is  a sign ificant one, fo r  w hereas the Yangtze has tended to
(53)benefit the surrounding econ om y through the p ro v is io n  o f  transport 
and irr ig a tion  fa c il it ie s , the im pact o f  the Hwai has been  la rg e ly  negative. 
S pecia l m ention should also be m ade o f the T 'a i Hu w ater system , c o m ­
p risin g  all the r iv e rs  and stream s south of the Yangtze (and s o -c a lle d  
after the T 'a i Hu Lake, the la rg e s t  in this region  with a su rface  area of
about 2 ,250  square k ilo m e tre s ). The T 'a i Hu B asin , in fa ct, has the
(54)h ighest r iv e r  density  in China and the advantages afforded  by this 
netw ork fo r  ir r ig a tio n  and tran sport are obvious: ir r ig a tio n  is p oss ib le
v irtu a lly  everyw h ere and e v ery  v illa ge  is a cce ss ib le  by  boat. The m ain 
threats to agricu lture  in this region  are the nature o f  the terra in  and the 
p resen ce  o f the Yangtze: in p articu lar, ex trem ely  flat land around T 'a i 
Hu m eans that the w ater flow  is sluggish  and w hile in  drought p er io d s , the 
Yangtze aids agricu lture  by providing supplem entary irr ig a tion , in tim es 
o f heavy rain , there is  a con siderab le  danger o f overflow in g  and flooding.
A lluvia l so ils  are m ost com m on ly  found in K iangsu and the m ost
im portant use to w hich they are put is the grow ing o f r ic e  (e sp e c ia lly  in
the fe r t ile  regions o f  south Kiangsu and L i-h s ia  H o). F urther north, but
south o f the defunct bed o f  the Y ellow  R iver , the so il tends to be sandy
and suitable fo r  cotton  o r  r ice  cu ltivation. In the n orthernm ost region ,
the m ost com m on  so il con sists  o f a com bination  o f sand and clay: this is
said  to be h ighly fe rt ile  and suitable fo r  the grow ing o f variou s c ro p s ,
including cotton  and wheat. In the h illy  areas o f the southwest and along
*
the northern  b o rd e r , is  found a brow n earth o f low  fe rt ility . F in a lly , the 
coasta l areas contain la rge  expanses o f  re la tive ly  u n fertile , saline so il
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which is not favourable to crop  cultivation.
With its long coastlin e and dense netw ork o f r iv e r s , s trea m s, canals
and lak es, it is  not su rpris in g  that the m ost im portant m eans o f transport
(56)and com m unication  in Kiangsu was w ater. The m ost im portant w a ter ­
ways w ere , o f co u rse , the Yangtze and the Grand Canal: the f ir s t  linking
the coasta l p rov in ces  with cen tra l China and the secon d  serv ing as one o f 
the m ost im portant n orth -south  trunk lines in the country. In addition, 
there w ere m any sm a lle r  canals betw een the im portant c it ie s  which, 
together with the dense netw ork o f r iv e rs , facilita ted  in tra -p rov in c ia l 
com m u nications. Only in the m ost n orth erly  part o f the p rovin ce  w ere 
there few er w aterw ays.
The m ore  developed  state o f  the south Kiangsu econ om y and in 
p articu lar, the h igher degree  o f  industria lization  and urbanization  w ere 
re fle cted  in the uneven distribution  o f railw ays and road s. The m ost 
obvious need was to link the industria l centres o f south Kiangsu and this 
is p r e c is e ly  what the Shanghai-Nanking Railway (opened in 1908) achieved. 
Starting in Shanghai, it passed  through Soochow , W usih, C h 'ang-chou  
(W u-ch in ) to Nanking and from  its inception , it was an im portant trading 
and co m m e rc ia l route. Another line ran south fro m  Shanghai to Hangchow, 
thereby  provid ing a through -route to the southern p rov in ces ; and part o f 
the long T ie n ts in -P 'u -k 'o u  R ailw ay also ran through Kiangsu. In the north 
o f the p rov in ce , the final section  o f the Lung-H ai R ailw ay, com ing from  
Shensi and Honan, ran east a cross  north Kiangsu to L ien -ytin -kang, in te r ­
secting the T ie n ts in -P 'u -k 'o u  line at H sti-chou.
The im balance betw een north and south Kiangsu was m ost c le a r ly  seen
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in the p rov is ion  o f roads, fo r  w hile north Kiangsu com p rise d  70% o f the
total p rov in cia l land area, it accounted fo r  only 25% o f road m ileage
b e fo re  1949. M ore o v e r , the roads in this area w ere m uch in fe r io r  to
those south o f the Yangtze. As in the case  o f the ra ilw ays, the busiest
w ere those w hich linked the c ities  in the south, although even in the 1930's
a road (o f s o rts ) ran fro m  near Y ang-chou, on the Yangtze, north to
H w ai-yin  and Shu-yang, w here it m et another road from  H sii-chou .
(57)Total road m ileage  in 1950 was 4 ,627  k ilom etres .
We m ust now give som e con sideration  to the grow th and distribution  
o f population in K iangsu. In Appendix B we have attem pted to derive  
estim ates o f tota l, urban, rural and agricu ltural population in Kiangsu 
(including and excluding Shanghai) fo r  every  yea r betw een 1949 and 1957. 
T h ese , we b e lie v e , o ffe r  a reasonably  accurate p ictu re  o f  the dem ographic 
changes that w ere taking p lace betw een the establishm ent of the P e o p le 's  
R epublic o f  China and the end o f the F F Y P . F o r  a detailed  account o f 
population changes in these y e a rs , th e re fo re , re fe re n ce  should be m ade 
to these estim ates .
F o r  the p resen t, how ever, we are m ore  con cern ed  with lon g er-ru n  
tren d s. How rapid ly  did population grow  betw een the 1930's and 1950's 
and how does this rate o f growth com pare  with those o f  e a r lie r  p e r io d s ?  
How rapid ly  was urban ization  taking p lace within K iangsu? These are 
the questions we shall ask h ere . But it needs to be em phasized  that in 
o rd e r  to answ er them , data fro m  a wide va riety  o f so u rce s  which often 
cannot be co rro b o ra te d  m ust be used . A ccord in g ly , the figu res shown 
in the follow ing tables should not be con sid ered  defin itive , although it
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is  hoped that the trends w hich they reveal w ill give a fa ir ly  accurate 
p ictu re  o f the grow th and structural changes in the population o f  K iangsu.
The f ir s t  table sets out available estim ates o f total population in 
Kiangsu (including Shanghai) fo r  se lected  years betw een 1850 and 1957:
Table I. 7: E stim ates o f population in Kiangsu
(including Shanghai): 1850 - 1957
Total
population
(m illion s)
Index with 
1873 = 100
Index with 
1926 = 100
1850 44 .155 167. 9 122.6
1873 26 .300 100. 0 73. 2
1893 28.400 108. 0 78. 8
1913 33.700 128. 2 93 .6
1926 36.020 136.9 100. 0
1933 3 8 .500a 146.4 106. 9
1947 4 0 .943b 155.7 113 .8
1949 43 .596 165.8 121. 0
1953 47.672 181. 3 132 .4
1957 52.130 198.3 144 .9
S o u rce s :
1850 Ho P in g -ti, op. c i t . , p. 246.
1873 CKNY, v o l. 3, op. c it. , pp. 907-908 . See
D .H . P erk in s, A gricu ltu ra l D evelopm ent in 
China, 1368-1968, op. c it. , p. 212, Table A . 5.
1893 Ib id .
1913 Ib id .
1926 China Yearbook 1929-30, citing an estim ate
m ade by  the M aritim e C ustom s.
1933 See note a below .
1947 See note b below .
1949 See Appendix B.
1953 Ib id .
1957 W ei-ta  ti sh ih -n ien , op. c it. , p. 9.
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N otes ;
a The starting point fo r  the 1933 figu re  is Liu and
Y eh 's estim ate o f  34 .9  m illion s  (T .C . Liu and 
K .C . Yeh, The E conom y o f the Chinese M ainland; 
National Incom e and E con om ic  D evelopm ent, 1933- 
1959, P rin ceton  U niversity  P r e s s , 1965; p. 178,
Table 51). But this excludes Shanghai fo r  which an 
estim ate m ust th ere fore  be m ade. In the above 
table, on the basis  o f the 1926 Shanghai population 
o f  3, 259, 114 m ade by the M aritim e C u stom s, a 
figure fo r  1933 has been obtained by pro jectin g  
forw ard  on the assum ption o f  a sim ple  average rate 
o f  growth o f 1. 5% p. a. This g ives a population o f
3 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0  fo r  Shanghai in 1933. Thus, K iangsu 's 
total population is 34. 9 + 3 .6  = 38. 50 m illion s .
b The 1947 figure shown in the table is  from  Ho P ing-ti,
op. c i t . , pp. 94 -95 , citing China Y earbook  1948.
But this m ay be an u n d e r -e st im a te . F o r  one thing, 
estim ates given in various editions o f the China 
Y earbook appear to be on the low  side. M ore 
sp e c if ica lly , the Shanghai population included in the 
1947 estim ate is given as 3 ,8 5 3 , 511; yet Sun Ching- 
chih, op. c i t . , p. 82, cites a figu re  o f  5, 200, 000 fo r  
1948. If Sun is c o r r e c t , the Shanghai in form ation  
contained in the China Y earbook m ust be too low .
The wide gap betw een the 1947 and 1949 estim ates 
presented  in Table 1.7 give fu rth er support to this 
argum ent.
K iangsu 's total population grew  rapid ly  during the hundred years 
after 1850, e sp e c ia lly  in the latter part o f the p er iod . Between 1873 - 
1926 the ov e ra ll in cre a se  was 36 .9% , im plying a sim ple  average rate 
o f grow th o f 0 .7%  p. a. But in the subsequent th irty yea rs  the growth 
rate m ore  than doubled so that by 1957 there was a furth er 45% rise  
in total population.
Although in form ation  on the d istribution  o f  population within Kiangsu 
is not available, som e indication  can be given o f  the broad  d iv is ion  
betw een north and south on the basis  o f  hsien  data fro m  the ea r ly  1930 's. 
Thus:
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Table I. 8: The d istribution  o f  total population betw een
north and south Kiangsu; 1932_______________
R egional population 
as percentage o f  
total population
Kiangsu north o f Yangtze 59. 0
Kiangsu south o f  Yangtze 
(but excluding Shanghai 
and Nanking) 30. 8
Shanghai and Nanking 1 0 . 2
TO TAL 100 . 0
S ou rce; H B, op. c i t . , pp. 9 -10 .
When set against the e a r lie r  estim ates o f  total and arable area, 
the relative  p ro sp e r ity  o f south Kiangsu b ecom es apparent. P o ssess in g  
le ss  than 30% o f  both total su rface  and arable area, it n everth eless  
contained m ore  than 40% o f the population. M o re o v e r , in view  o f the 
rapid urban expansion in the area betw een the 1930’ s and 1950 's, there 
can be little  doubt that data fo r  1957 would show a furth er dem ographic 
shift tow ards the south.
The m ost notable exp ression  o f  urbanization  was the growth o f 
Shanghai. As the follow ing figures indicate, this took p lace v e ry  
rapid ly  once the p resen ce  o f W estern  nations in China had been firm ly  
established;
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Table I. 9: Population growth in Shanghai; 1865-1957
Shanghai
population
Index with 
1865 = 100
Index with
1926  = 100
1865 690, 000 100.00 21. 17
191 0 1, 185,859 171.86 36 .39
1926 3 ,2 5 9 ,1 1 4 472 .34 100.00
1933 3 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 521 .74 110.46
1948 5, 200, 000a 753 .62 159 .55
1949 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 724 .64 153.42
1953
L.
6 ,0 2 6 ,0 3 0 873 .34 184.90
1957 7 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0  
S o u rce s :
1043.48 2 2 0 . 9 2
1865 Sun C hing-ch ih , op. cit. , p . 82.
1910 D. K. L ieu , op. cit. , p. 
op. c it. , p. 86.
243. See also HB,
1926 China Yearbook 1929-30, op . c it . , citing 
the M aritim e C ustom s.
1933 Table I. 7.
1948 Sun C hing-ch ih , op. c it. , p. 82
1949 Appendix B.
1953 Ibid.
1957 C .B . H owe, E m ploym ent and E con om ic Growth
in Urban China 1949-1957, C am bridge U niversity 
P r e s s , 1971; p. 34, Table 11.
Notes
a Sun's figure contrasts sharp ly  with an estim ate 
o f  4, 423, 000 d erived  b y  M. Ullm an in his C ities 
o f  Mainland China: 1953-58, W ashington, U .S.
D epartm ent o f  C o m m erce , Bureau o f the C ensus, 
1961. H ow ever, acceptance o f U llm an's figure 
would seem  to im ply  an unreasonably  high rate 
o f  growth fo r  Shanghai betw een 1948-53.
The 1953 census data gave a slightly  higher popu­
lation fo r  Shanghai; 6 ,2 0 4 ,4 1 7 . (See T 'u n g -ch i 
kung-tso t'ung-hsttn (S tatistica l W ork R ep ort), 
h erea fter  TC K TTH , N ovem ber 1958, "Com m unique 
o f  the R esults o f the Population  Census o f the 
W hole Country}' p. 2. ) But fo r  reasons o f  c o n s is ­
ten cy  we have p re fe rre d  the estim ate derived  in 
Appendix B. In any case , the d ifferen ce  betw een 
the two is v e ry  sm a ll.
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Shanghai's population in crea sed  m ore  than tenfold  in le s s  than a
hundred y e a rs . But in contrast to the exp erien ce  o f  K iangsu as a w hole,
the p eriod  o f  m ost rapid grow th was b e fore  1926. Betw een 1865 and
1926 the sim ple  average rate o f population grow th in the city  was 6 .1%
p. a. , w hereas in the th irty yea rs  after 1926 it slow ed  down to 3. 9%.
There w as, how ever, renew ed expansion after 1949 and during the F irs t
Plan p eriod , Shanghai's population rose  by 19. 5%, com pared  with 7 .9%
(58)fo r  the rest o f  the p rov in ce .
If Shanghai provided  the m ost outstanding exam ple o f  urbanization
in K iangsu, the grow th o f other c ities  was by no m eans insign ificant.
C on sid er , fo r  exam ple, the in crea se  in population o f  the next four la rgest
c ities  in the p rov in ce :
Table I. 10: Population growth in Nanking, W usih, Soochow
and H sti-chou; 1938-1958
N anking 
Wusih 
Soochow  
H stl-chou
1938 1953 1958
440 .000 1 ,0 9 1 ,6 0 0  1 ,4 1 9 ,0 0 0
272 .000  581,500 613 ,000
388 .000  474 ,000  633 ,000
205 .000  373 ,000  676 ,000
TO TA L 1 ,3 0 5 ,0 0 0  2 ,5 2 0 ,1 0 0  3 ,3 4 1 ,0 0 0
Source :
1938
1953 & 
1958
F rom  M. Ullman, op. c i t .
E rnest Ni, D istribution  o f  the Urban and Rural 
Population o f Mainland China; 1953 and 1958, 
U .S . Bureau o f the C en su s, i960 , p. 17.
In other w ord s , betw een 1938 and 1953 the population o f these cities  
in crea sed  by 93. 18% (an average rate o f growth o f 6. 22% p. a. ) and in 
the five years betw een 1953 and 1958, by  a further 32. 6% (6. 51% p. a. ). 
It is perhaps becau se Shanghai grew  so rapid ly  in the e a r lie r  part o f the
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century that in recent decades the expansion o f other c it ie s  such as 
those shown above has contributed m ore  to the p ro ce s s  o f  urbanization.
We m ay conclude this d iscu ss ion  o f dem ograph ic change in Kiangsu 
by sum m arizing the changing relationship  betw een rural and urban 
population betw een the ea r ly  1930's and the end o f the F F Y P . The 
relevant in form ation  is set out below ;
Table I. 11; The d istribution  o f total population betw een 
cities  and countryside in K iangsu____________
Total population 
(including Shanghai)
Urban population
Urban as percen tage 
o f total population
R ural population
Urban population 
(excluding Shanghai)
S o u rce s ; 
1933
1933
3 8 .5 0 0 .0 0 0
6 .0 4 0 .0 0 0
15.7
3 2 .6 4 0 .0 0 0
2 .4 4 0 .0 0 0
1957
52 .130 .0 00
1 2 .925 .0 00
25. 0 
3 9 ,2 0 4 ,4 7 5
5 ,7 2 3 ,1 4 8
D erived  from  in form ation  in HB, op. c it. , 
p. 11 and Table 1.9 .
1957 Appendix B.
The rates o f  in cre a se  o v e r  the entire p eriod  im p lied  by  these figures 
are as fo llow s ;
Rural population:
Urban population (including Shanghai) 
Urban population (excluding Shanghai)
+ 2 0 . 11% 
+ 113.99%  
+ 134. 56%
C lea rly , the grow th o f  urban population was v e r y  rapid indeed and 
far in e x c e s s  o f that o f the rural population, which in crea sed  on average 
by on ly 0. 84% p. a. In fa ct, by 1957 Kiangsu had b ecom e the m ost highly
urbanized p rov in ce  in the whole country.
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(59) The urban concentration
was p a rticu la rly  apparent in the south, w here 43% o f  the total population
(60)w ere liv ing in c it ie s . The im plication s o f this expansion w ere v e ry
seriou s ; fo r  in addition to m eeting its own needs and providing raw 
m ateria ls  fo r  the developing in d u stries , the agricu ltura l s e c to r  o f Kiangsu 
had to supply an in crea s in g ly  la rge  surplus fo r  the grow ing urban 
population.
Other im plica tion s o f the high degree  o f urban ization  in the p rovin ce  
m ay be b r ie f ly  su m m arized . F ir s t  the prox im ity  to la rge  c ities  led  to 
the in creas in g  com m ercia liza tion  o f agricu ltu re . Second, the ex istence 
o f a thriving urban s e cto r  o ffe re d  peasants a constant tem ptation to m ove 
away fro m  their v illa g e s , but p a rticu la rly  when tim es w ere bad. Thus, 
la r g e -s c a le  ru ra l-u rb an  m igration  o ccu rre d  both b e fo re  and after 1949. 
F in a lly , the grow th o f  c ities  provided  new investm ent opportunities fo r  
landlords in the years b e fo re  1949 and during the 1930's m ore  and m ore  
o f them  becam e involved  in co m m e rc ia l and industria l ven tu res. A 
concom itant o f  this was an in creasin g  tendency, at least in south Kiangsu, 
tow ards absentee lan d lord ism .
The relationsh ip  betw een population and arable area  is o f cou rse  a 
cru cia l one and the follow ing table shows that betw een the 1930's and 
1950's ava ilab ility  o f  land fo r  farm ing becam e an in crea s in g ly  seriou s 
p rob lem  in Kiangsu;
- 38 -
Table I. 12; Changes in the availability o f arable 
land in Kiangsu_______________________
1933 1957
Total arable land area 
(mou)
Rural population
A rable area p er head 
o f rural population (m ou)
9 1 ,6 8 1 ,5 8 0  
32 ,4 6 0 ,0 0 0
2.81
9 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  
3 9 ,2 0 4 ,4 7 5
2 .4 0
S ource ; Population data fro m  Table I. 11.
See below , Tables V . 3 and VI. 3
The figu res indicate that per capita availability o f arable land in
the rural s e c to r  fe ll by  15% betw een the two p e r io d s . Although the
absolute decline o f  0 .41  m ou (about one-fifteenth  o f  an a cre ) looks tr iv ia l,
where holdings are a lready tiny the lo ss  m ay be v e ry  sign ificant. On
the other hand, the m an-land ratios calcu lated  above are fo r  the rural,
not agricu ltura l, p o p u la tio n ^ ^  and while the downward trend presum ably
applied equally to the la tter, its sm a ller  s ize  would have resu lted  in a
higher per capita  average. This is borne out by Sun C hing-ch ih  who
cites  a "rough  a v era ge" o f 2 .6  m ou o f  arable land p er  head o f  agricu ltural
(62)population fo r  the late 1950 's.
H ow ever, such average data are m islead in g . B e fore  1949 tenancy 
was com m on  and land was d istributed  v e ry  unevenly among the rural 
population. D em ographic fa ctors  also affected  the s ize  o f  land-holding; 
along the Yangtze, w here population was m ost dense, p er  capita 
availab ility  o f arable land was often little m ore  than one m ou, w hereas 
in the fa r  north o f the province it m ight be as high as three o r  four m ou.
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Ill The A gricu ltu ra l E conom y in Kiangsu; A R egional Analysis
In the b road est term s it is p oss ib le  to distinguish two regions
within K iangsu, divided by the fo rm e r  Hwai R iv er . To the north the
(63)p rov in ce  fa lls  into the 'N orth China re g io n 1, with hot, humid 
sum m ers and co ld , long w in ters . Rainfall is low  and unpredictable, 
but the long fr o s t - f r e e  p eriod  (210-240 days) perm its  a g row in g -sea son  
o f about eight m onths. The poverty  o f the region  and the p oor state o f 
com m unications m eant that the supposedly typ ica l ce llu la r  pattern o f 
Chinese agricu lture  was m ore  in evidence here than in other parts o f 
the p rov in ce . Natural conditions have favoured  the cultivation  o f 
w inter wheat, sum m er kaoliang (sorghum ) and m ille t , soyabeans, m a ize , 
sw eet potatoes and cotton.
South o f the Hwai Kiangsu is part o f the 'L ow er  Yangtze re g ion ', 
ch a ra cter ized  by  hot, m oist sum m ers and co ld , d ry  w in ters . The fr o s t -  
fre e  p eriod  extends fro m  late M arch into e a r ly  D ecem b er and gives a 
grow ing season  o f  about nine m onths. D ou b le -crop p in g  is com m on ly  
p ra ctised  here  and the m ost im portant crop s  have been  sum m er r ice  and 
w inter wheat, b a r ley , soyabeans and cotton.
But such a sim ple  d iv is ion  as this con cea ls  m any im portant ch a ra c te r ­
is t ic s  w hich w ill help us to understand the nature o f  agricu ltural d ev e lop ­
m ent in Kiangsu during the 1950's .  In the rem ain der o f this chapter,
th e re fo re , we shall go beyond this d ichotom y and exam ine the agricu ltural
(64)s e cto r  o f the p rov in ce  in term s o f five  econ om ic  re g io n s :'
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(1
(2
(3
(4
(5
T 'a i Hu R egion
Nanking - Chinkiang h illy  Region 
T 'un g-yang R egion  
L i-h s ia -h o  R egion 
H stl-chou - H w ai-yin  R egion
(1) The T 'a i Hu R eg ion ; with its fe rtile  s o il , developed  irr iga tion
fa c il it ie s , ready sou rces  o f  natural fe r t iliz e rs  fro m  the m any r ivers
and lak es, m ild  c lim ate , conditions here  favoured  agricu ltural
op eration s. This was in fact the m ost productive and m ost stable
agricu ltural reg ion  in Kiangsu. The high population density  provided  an
(67)abundant supply o f labour to the agricu ltural s e c to r  and led to an 
intensive pattern o f cu ltivation  and the sim ultaneous developm ent o f 
su bsid ia ries  (e sp e c ia lly  fishing and silk  production ). The dense w ater 
netw ork m ade tran sport re la tive ly  easy  and enabled the rura l s e cto r  to 
b ecom e m ore  co m m e rc ia lly  orien ted . A gricu ltu ra l and su bsid ia ry  
products w ere shipped to the c ities  (notably Shanghai and W usih) w here 
they could be exchanged fo r  industria l goods.
About 70% o f the land in T 'a i Hu was cultivated, the m ost com m on 
pattern being d ou b le -crop p in g  o f  r ice  and wheat. The m ultip le cropping 
index was put as high as 194% in 1957. As a r ice -p ro d u c in g  area,
T 'a i Hu has been  o f  f ir s t  im portan ce; in 1957, fo r  exam ple , it contributed
(69)m ore  than 25% o f K iangsu 's total r ice  output. M o re o v e r , m ost o f
the r ice  was o f the h igh -quality , non-glutinous va rie ty . The continued
im portan ce o f r ice  production  in T 'a i Hu is indicated by  the fact that in
the late 1950's paddy fie lds  represented  84% o f the re g ion 's  arable
(70)area.
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The secon d  m ost im portant c ro p  was w inter wheat, which was sown 
im m edia te ly  after the r ic e  h arvest. H ow ever, becau se  o f  the em phasis 
on r ic e  production  its cu ltivation  was neg lected  and the sown area  was 
con sid era b ly  sm ellier than that o f r ic e . In the 1950's at lea st, such 
n eg lect was re fle cted  in low  yields per unit area .
Other agricu ltu ra l activ ities m ay be su m m arized  m ore  b r ie f ly . T 'a i
Hu was an im portant production  area fo r  rape (one o f  the ch ie f sou rces
o f o il in the rura l s e c to r ) . In the southeast co rn e r  o f the reg ion , w here
the ground is  h igher, and along the Yangtze cotton  was also trad ition a lly  
(71)planted. But although yie lds w ere high, cu ltivation  o f  this crop
rem ained on a sm all s ca le . In the suburbs o f c it ie s  such as Soochow  
and W usih, vegetable production  becam e quite im portant after 1949 and 
in K 'un -shan  and W u-chiang hsien  a s im ila r  expansion  took p lace to m eet 
the needs o f  Shanghai. The grow th o f these c ities  a lso  encouraged  the 
developm ent o f  anim al husbandry, e sp e c ia lly  the rearing  o f  pigs and 
poultry.
F in a lly , m ention should be m ade o f the h igh ly -d eve lop ed  fre sh -w a te r
fish ing industry in T 'a i Hu; o f  tea and fru it produ ction  (peach es, loquats,
s tra w b e rr ie s ); and o f the rearing o f  s ilkw orm  co co o n s  - a su bsid ia ry
(72)occupation  w hich has a p a rticu la rly  long h istory .
(2) The N anking-Chinkiang h illy  R eg ion ; situated in the south­
w est c o m e r  o f K iangsu and m ostly  south of the Yangtze, 78% o f K iangsu 's 
h ill area  was concentrated  in this reg ion . C lim atic  conditions riva lled  
those o f T 'a i Hu, but becau se  m uch o f the cultivated land was on h igher
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ground, dependence on rain fall alone fo r  irr iga tion  m ade the region  m ore
(73)sub ject to drought. B y contrast, the low e r-ly in g  farm  land com p rised
diked fie lds  which becau se  o f  their low  elevation  and p oor  drainage w ere
subject to flood in g . As a resu lt, agricu ltural production  was below  that of
(74)the T 'a i Hu region . F o r  exam ple, 1932 data revea l that this area was 
producing som ething le ss  than 55% o f T 'a i H u's r ic e  output and around 48% 
o f its wheat output.
M ore than 80% o f arable land in this region  was devoted to food  crops  -
a h igher p rop ortion  than in any other part o f the p rov in ce . The ch ie f food
crop  was r ice  fo llow ed  by wheat, b a r le y  and oats; som e soyabeans w ere
(75)also planted. T rad itionally , e con om ic  crops  w ere o f  little  im p ortan ce ' 
although som e expansion o f the econ om ic  crop  area  was envisaged in the 
1 9 5 0 's .
In the diked fie lds (about 20% o f the total arable area) s in g le -crop p in g  
o f  r ice  was gen era lly  p ractised  but e lsew here d ou b le -crop p in g  was com m on , 
being ca rr ie d  out on som e 60% o f the arable area. U sually, r ice  was 
d ou b le -crop p ed  with wheat, although in areas p a rticu la rly  susceptib le  to 
drought the pattern m ight be wheat with soya. R ice  yields w ere second  
on ly to those o f  T 'a i Hu. H ow ever, yields o f wheat and other w inter crop s  
w ere low  becau se  o f  ca re le ss  cultivation techniques and genera l n eg lect.
Although conditions w ere favourab le, su bsid ia ries  such as animal 
husbandry and fishing rem ained re la tive ly  undeveloped.
(3) The T 'ung-yang R egion; lying m ostly  north o f the Yangtze but
south of the T 'ung-yang canal and including the whole o f N an-t'ung Special
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D istr ict , this was a r ich  agricu ltural area  with a clim ate s im ila r  to that
o f Tai Hu. Population density  here  was the h ighest in the whole prov in ce :
indeed, the average figu re  o f 615 person s per square k ilom etre  fo r  N an-t'ung
(76)S pecia l D istr ict  m ade it one o f the m ost den sely  populated areas o f
(77)China. As a resu lt o f the high m an-land ratio and because o f the
intensive and ca re fu l cultivation techniques, c rop  y ie lds w ere high and not
(78)far  below  those o f  T 'a i Hu.
(79)The cultivation  index in T 'ung-yang was v e ry  high. In gen era l,
the p roportion  o f  arable area taken up by  food  grains (around 60%) was 
le s s  than e lsew h ere  in Kiangsu and m uch grea ter  em phasis was p laced  on 
the cultivation  o f  industria l c r o p s . M oreov er , com p a ra tive ly  little  r ice  
was planted in the reg ion , wheat and other d ry  crop s  such as m aize  and 
b a r le y  being grow n instead.
The T 'ung-yang reg ion  has been m ost notable fo r  its econ om ic  crop s  -
above all, cotton . in the late 1920's and ea r ly  1930's it produced
(81)perhaps 55% o f K iangsu 's raw cotton  and contained m ore  than 50% o f
the total cotton  area . Although the suitability  o f  the reg ion  fo r  the cultivation
o f h igh -value econ om ic  crop s  was what had or ig in a lly  attracted large num bers
o f peasants to settle  in T 'un g-yang , full em ploym ent o f  the agricu ltural
population was not guaranteed and severa l hundred thousand cotton fa rm ers
w ere fo rce d  to leave N an-t'ung S pecia l D istr ict  and m ove to the Y en -ch 'en g  -
F ou -n ing area . In the 1950 's, as m any as 10% o f the hsien  population
(82)along the Yangtze w orked in Shanghai.
Another resu lt o f  the high population density and cultivation  pattern 
based  on e con om ic  crops  was that s e lf-s u ff ic ie n cy  in food  grains was never
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achieved and the rural population was fo rce d  to re ly  on im ports  from  other 
areas. A fter 1949 rapid expansion o f the econ om ic c ro p  area continued, 
but by 1956-57 the p rob lem  o f food  supplies had b ecom e so acute that plans 
w ere m ade to reduce the sown area under cotton in o rd e r  to in crea se  grain 
p r o d u c t io n /83)
(4) The L i-h s ia -h o  R eg ion ; this low -ly in g ,fla t reg ion  north of the 
T 'ung-yang Canal but south o f the old Hwai R iver was trad ition ally  su sce p ­
tib le to seriou s  natural d isa ste rs . Above all, it was subject to the vagaries 
o f the Hwai R iver which presented  a constant threat to agricu ltural production . 
A concom itant o f these unfavourable natural conditions was a low m ultiple 
cropping index, a lack  o f draft anim als and w orking capita l, and p oor 
cultivation techniques. As a resu lt, in the 1930's L i-h s ia -h o  was co n tr i­
buting only about 12-13%  o f K iangsu 's total r ice  and wheat output and 8-9%  o f
(84)its cotton output.
But after 1949 construction  of w a ter-con tro l w orks (in  particu lar the
/ o 5 \
Hwai R iver C ontrol P ro je c t )  tran sform ed  the reg ion  into one of the 
potentially r ich est areas of the p rov in ce . It was anticipated that im p ro v e ­
m ents in cultivation techniques, including m ethods o f  irr ig a tion , fe r t il iz e r  
application, s e e d -s e le c t io n , etc . , would contribute to the creation  o f a 
high-output, d ou b le -crop p in g  paddy and wheat area. P ro g re s s  w as, how ever, 
slow  and in 1957 unit area paddy yields w ere only 314 chin per m ou - b a re ly  
55% o f the T 'a i Hu le v e l. N everth e less , som ething o f  the h o p ed -fo r  
expansion in L i-h s ia -h o  is indicated by the fact that target yields fo r  1967
/o/\
w ere 900 chin, the attainment o f which requ ired  an in crea se  o f 187% 
in ten y e a r s .
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But if  top p r io r ity  was given to food  c ro p s , the planned expansion of
raw cotton  was also sign ificant. By the late 1950's the T 'ung-yang and
L i-h s ia -h o  regions together contained 65% of K iangsu 's total cotton acreage
(87)and w ere producing 63% o f  the p ro v in ce 's  total cotton output. M o r e ­
o v e r , along the coasta l area  o f L i-h s ia -h o  stretched  o v e r  one m illion  m ou 
o f w aste land suitable fo r  reclam ation  and con vers ion  to cotton fie ld s .
One final agricu ltural activity  deserv ing m ention, s ince it has a long
h is to ry  in the reg ion , is salt production . K iangsu was the leading p rodu cer
o f salt in China and o f the 19 salt fie lds  in the prov in ce  11 w ere situated
in the L i-h s ia -h o  reg ion . Thus, the eleven  years betw een 1921 and 1931
(88}
on average, 56% o f total exports fro m  Kiangsu cam e fro m  L i-h s ia -h o .
(5) The H sti-chou - H w ai-yin  R eg ion ; this last econ om ic  region  was
loca ted  north o f the old  Hwai R iver in the two Specia l D istr icts  o f Hstl-
(89)chou and H w ai-yin . 'P e r v e r s e ' natural conditions, a low  rate o f land
utilization  and backw ard cultivation techniques all con sp ired  to make this
(90)the p oo re st  area in Kiangsu, constantly threatened by natural d is a s t e r s .v
In view  o f the h ostile  natural environm ent it is  not su rpris in g  that production
(91)
was low  and unstable, nor that it was the least den sely  populated region  
in the p rov in ce . In the late 1950's H w ai-yin  S pecia l D is tr ic t  had an a g r i­
cu ltural population o f 4 .825  m illion s and a total arable area  of 17 .8  m illion
(92)m ou; per capita  availability  o f arable land was th ere fo re  3 .68  m ou 
(con sid era b ly  h igher than the p rov in cia l average). In term s o f the a g r i­
cu ltural labour fo r c e  the figure was 6 .9 8  m ou, an im p o ss ib ly  heavy burden
(93)when set against the tim e constraints o f farm ing op eration s.
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But if  the econ om ic  base o f the region  was p oor , its potential fo r  rapid 
developm ent was v e ry  con sid era b le . P ro g re ss  after 1949 m ay be regarded  
with optim ism  o r  p e ss im ism . On the one hand, thanks m ain ly to im p ro v e ­
m ents in w ater con tro l the rate o f  agricu ltural grow th in Hstf-Hwai exceeded
that o f any other part o f the p rov in ce . F o r  exam ple, unit area  grain  yields
(94)ro se , on average, by  50% during the F irs t  Plan p eriod . On the other
hand, techn ica l exp ertise  was lacking and standards o f  cu ltivation  rem ained 
p oor  so that it was still one o f  the low est-output and m ost unstable areas. 
A verage yields o f food  grains w ere only on e-fifth  to on e -th ird  those o f 
south Kiangsu.
W ell into the 1950's v irtu a lly  all the arable area  com p rised  arid  land
(95)m ost suitable fo r  the cultivation o f drought-to lerant d ry  c ro p s . D ouble­
cropping was not w ell developed , though a pattern o f three crop s  (usually 
wheat fo llow ed  by  soya  o r  m aize  and sw eet potatoes) e v ery  two years  was 
com m on . During the Second F ive Y ear Plan p eriod  (1958-62 ) it was anti­
cipated that further w a te r -co n tro l m easu res would fin a lly  rem ove flood  
threats com p lete ly  and by im proving irr iga tion  fa c ilit ie s  tran sform  the 
region  into a new dou b le -crop p in g  r ice  and wheat area. At the sam e tim e, 
the sown area o f  cotton was gradually extended and plans w ere m ade fo r  
the developm ent o f H sii-H wai into one o f the m ost im portant cotton areas 
in the p rov in ce .
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N otes to Chapter One
(1) Only in the Ch 'ing Dynasty (1644-1911) did the p rov in ce  b ecom e 
known as K iangsu. On the e a r lie r  h istory  o f the p rov in ce , see 
Bureau o f F ore ig n  T rade, M in istry  o f Industry, China Industrial 
H andbooks; K iangsu, herea fter H B, Shanghai, 1933; pp. 3 -4 .
(2) Chi C h 'a o -tin g , K ey E con om ic A reas in Chinese H isto ry , A llen  and 
Unwin Ltd. , London, 1936. R eprinted 1963 by P aragon  Book Reprint 
C orp . , New Y ork.
(3) Ib id . , p. 5.
(4) Although the key econ om ic  area shifted southwards to the low er 
Yangtze V a lley , the p o lit ica l cen tre  o f gravity  rem ained in the north.
(5) The total length o f  the Grand Canal within K iangsu was 800 li_ (one li 
being approxim ately  on e-th ird  o f a m ile ). See H B , op. c i t . , p. 13.
(6) A ccord in g  to the s tr ic t  rules o f the W ade-G iles Rom anization  System , 
Chinkiang should be w ritten C hen-ch iang. H ow ever, in the case  o f 
p rop er  nam es which are a lready w ell-know n in a fo rm  other than 
W ade-G iles  ( fo r  exam ple, K iangsu instead o f  C h ian g-su ), our p ra ctice  
throughout this thesis w ill be to retain the 'p op u lar ' fo rm . H ence, 
Chinkiang.
(7) A  m ap o f  Kiangsu w ill be found in Appendix A.
(8) Chi C h 'a o -tin g , op. c i t . , p. 118, m akes the point that the section  o f 
the Grand Canal fro m  H w ai-an to Y ang-chou c r o s s e d  te r r ito ry  which 
was " . . . the m ain battlefie ld  betw een North and South China. F or  
cen tu ries , b e fo re  ra ilroad s changed the situation, the great stra teg ic  
value o f the city  o f H w ai-an , guarding the northern  term inus o f  the 
canal, was o v e r  and o v er  again dem onstrated  by h is to ry , c le a r ly  
indicating the cru c ia l position  which the canal occu p ied . "
(9) Its im portan ce as a co m m e rc ia l centre seem s to have been  established  
as ea r ly  as the T 'ang Dynasty, fo r  reports  speak o f  la rge  num bers o f 
fo re ig n e rs  (P e rs ia n s , A ra b s , K oreans) having been  k illed  there in 
760 AD. (R eisch au er  and Fairbank, East A sia ; The G reat T rad ition , 
Houghton M ifflin  C o. , B oston , 1958; p. 2 1 7 .) Another sou rce  states 
that during the T 'ie n  Pao reign  o f the T 'ang (742 - 755 AD), the 
population o f  Y ang-chou reached  460 ,000 , m aking it the la rgest city
in China. See Sun C h ing-ch ih , Hua-tung t i -c h 'u  ch in g -ch i t i - l i  
(An E con om ic  G eography o f East China), S cien ce  Publishing H ouse, 
Peking, 1959- An English translation  o f this is  available in Joint 
Publications R esea rch  S erv ice  (h erea fter , JPRS), no. 11 ,438 .
(10) The term  "K iangnan" (lite ra lly  "south o f the R iv er  /~Yangtze7") is 
a confusing one; in the present context it obv iou sly  re fe rs  to the 
p rov in ces  o f  the low er  Yangtze V a lley  (K iangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang
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and K iangsi). A fter  1949 it is  also used m ore  n arrow ly  to m ean that 
part o f K iangsu lying south o f the Yangtze.
Chi C h 'a o -tin g , op. c i t . , p. 125.
Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 2.
In the Sung-chiang and Shanghai reg ion s , over  50% o f  the arable area 
was planted under cotton  and in som e individual a rea s , the figure was 
as high as 70%. See Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c it. , p. 21.
In addition to its fam e as the city  with the m ost beautiful w om en in 
China, Soochow  was an im portant trading, financial and industria l
cen tre . E con om ica lly , it was m ost noted fo r  its dyeing and weaving
o f silk  and accord in g  to Sun, "the northeastern  half o f  the town o f 
Soochow  was com p lete ly  occu p ied  by  handicraft w orkshops o f  the silk  
textile  industry , run on a v e ry  la rge  production  s ca le  and concentrating 
great num bers o f  em ployed w ork ers with sp ecia l techniques. " Sun 
C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 22.
Ib id . , p. 22.
F o r  an account o f the growth and industria l developm ent o f Shanghai 
see D .K . L ieu , The Growth and Industrialization  o f  Shanghai, China, 
Institute o f P a c ific  R elation s, 1936, e sp e c ia lly  chapter 2. Sun Ching- 
chih, op. c it. , a lso contains usefu l in form ation  and data.
A v e ry  full su rvey  o f industria l and other e con om ic  activ ities in Shanghai 
during the ea r ly  1930's is given in H B, op. c i t . , pp. 73 -96 .
Ib id . , pp. 89 -92 .
W hile it was textile  handicrafts (e sp e c ia lly  cotton) that w ere m ost 
se r io u s ly  a ffected , the growth o f  m odern  industry had s im ila r  e ffects  
on other su bsid ia ry  activ ities in the rural s e c to r .
The exception  was the Sung-chiang region  w hich was p rotected  by its 
p rox im ity  to Shanghai.
Cited by  Ho P in g -ti, Studies on the Population o f  China, 1368-1953 , 
H arvard U niversity  P r e s s , C am bridge, M a s s .,  1959; p . 241.
A third e ffe ct  o f the Taiping R ebellion  was to in troduce a sp ecia l kind 
o f  tenurial relationsh ip  in south Kiangsu - nam ely , the d iv is ion  o f land 
betw een landlord  and tenant on the basis  o f "su rfa ce  r igh ts" and 
" s u b -s o il  r igh ts" .
See, fo r  exam ple, Ho P in g -ti, op. c i t . , p. 244, citing a m em oria l o f 
Liu K 'u n -i, G overn or-G en era l o f  Kiangsu and Anhwei. In the sam e 
p assage , Ho re fe rs  to a g en try -sch o la r  who advocated the purchase and 
use o f  W estern  fa rm  m ach in ery  in south Kiangsu as a m eans o f o v e r -
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com ing the labour shortage - one o f the e a r lie s t  r e fe re n ce s , one would 
assum e, to agricu ltural m echanization  in Kiangsu.
(24) Taken fro m  Ho P in g -ti, op. c i t . , p. 246, citing Yen C hung-p 'ing, 
Chung-kuo ch in -ta i ch in g -ch i shih t 'u n g -ch i tzu -lia o  hsttan-chi 
(S elected  Statistica l M ateria ls o f M odern Chinese E con om ic H isto ry ), 
Peking, S cien ce  Publishing H ouse, 1955. The figu res  fo r  the other 
three p rov in ces  are as fo llow s ;
1850 1953 P ercentage
  _____  change
Chekiang 3 0 ,0 2 7 ,0 0 0  2 2 ,8 6 5 ,7 4 7  -2 3 .8
Anhwei 3 7 ,6 1 1 ,0 0 0  3 0 ,3 4 3 ,6 3 7  -1 9 .3
K iangsi 2 4 ,5 1 5 ,0 0 0  1 6 ,7 7 2 ,8 6 5  -3 1 .4
The population o f the entire low er Yangtze V a lley  declined  by 14% 
betw een 1850 and 1953.
(25) The m ost detailed  su rvey  o f  rural conditions in Kiangsu is contained in 
H sing-cheng-y iian  nung-ts 'un  fu -hsing w ei-ydan -h u i (The Rural 
R e co v e ry  C om m ission  o f the E xecutive Ytian), C h ian g-su -sh en g nung- 
ts 'un t ia o -c h 'a  (A Rural Survey o f  Kiangsu P ro v in ce ), C om m ercia l 
P r e s s , Shanghai, 1934, h erea fter  CSSNTTC.
(26) The N orthern E xpedition was the m ilita ry  cam paign launched by Chiang 
K ai-shek  in 1926 in an e ffort to d estroy  the w arlord s  o f north and south 
China and re -u n ify  the country. This goal was achieved with the 
occupation  o f Peking in spring, 1928.
(27) The d isastrou s e ffe ct  o f Sun's arm ies on north K iangsu 's rural econ om y 
is hinted at in Lu K uo-hsiang, "S u -pei w u-h sien  chih k a o -ta i"  (H igh- 
in terest Loans in F ive H sien o f North K iangsu"), in Nung-hang ytteh-k'an 
(M onthly Journal o f the F a rm e rs ' Bank o f China), h erea fter  NHYK,
vo l. 1, n o . l ;  M ay, 1934; pp. 25 -29 .
(28) CSSN TTC, op. c i t . , p. 63.
(29) CKNY, v o l. 3, op. c i t . , p. 16, citing Chou Fang, "Chung-kuo t 'ie n -fu  
fu -ch ia  ti ch u n g -le i"  ("T y p es  o f  Supplem entary Land T a x es") in Tung- 
fang tsa -ch ih  (E astern  M isce lla n y ), vo l. 31, no. 141; July, 1934.
(30) E sp e c ia lly  in north Kiangsu; after 1194 AD, the Y ellow  R iver broke 
its southern bank and flow ed southward taking the channel o f the Hwai 
R iver as its new co u rse . In so doing, it posed  a constant threat o f 
flooding in the low er  Hwai V a lley  and north Kiangsu.
(31) Hsti C h ih -ch 'an , "The Outlook fo r  W ater C on serva n cy  in North K iangsu" 
in T i - l i  ch ih -sh ih  (G eograph ica l K now ledge), h erea fter  TLCS, F ebru ary , 
1958; p. 54.
(32) Ib id . , p. 54.
(33) In CK N Y, v o l. 3, op. c it. , p. 611.
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(34) Ch'u T 'in g -ju , "T u n g -t 'a i hsien  nung-ts 'un  k a i-k 'u a n g " ("T h e  Rural 
Situation in T u n g-t 'a i H s ie n ") in NHYK, v o l. 2, no. 10; O ctober, 
1935; p p .27 -29 .
(35) Hsti C h ih -ch 'an , "W ater C on servan cy  in T 'a i Hu" in  TLCS, F ebru ary , 
1958; p p .157-160.
(36) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op . c i t . , p. 25. The leaves o f the m u lb erry  trees  w ere , 
o f c o u rse , used to feed  the ca terp illa rs  which spun the cocoon s from  
which the raw silk  was obtained.
(37) This is not to suggest that m ost peasant loans w ere  used fo r  cerem on ia l 
obligations such as funerals o r  weddings (as has been  em phasised  by 
som e w rite rs ); a m ore  com m on reason  was s im p ly  to obtain food  fo r  
su rviva l.
(38) The account that fo llow s is based la rge ly  on Chalme rs A . Johnson, 
Peasant N ationalism  and Com m unist P ow er; The E m ergen ce  o f 
R evolu tionary China, 1937 - 1945, Stanford U n iversity  P r e s s , Stanford, 
C a liforn ia , 1963. See esp e c ia lly , chapter 5, "T he New Fourth A rm y 
and the N orth K iangsu B ase . "
(39) Ib id . , p. 136.
(40) S u -pei lin -sh ih  h sin g-ch en g w ei-y ttan -hu i.
(41) Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 142.
(42) B efore  the S ino-Japanese W ar, the Chinese Com m unist P arty had never 
assum ed a p osition  o f any im portance in north Kiangsu. One Com m unist 
unit in N an-t'ung did m eet with som e su ccess  in 1930, but it was sh o rt­
lived . Peasant rebe lliou sn ess  and national con sciou sn ess  w ere both 
lacking in p re -w a r  north Kiangsu and yet by 1942 the reg ion  was en tire ly  
in Com m unist hands. It is no co in cid en ce  that after 1949, K iangsu was 
adm in istered  as two separate units - the North K iangsu A dm inistrative 
R egion  and South Kiangsu A dm inistrative R egion  - a re fle ction  o f  the 
advances m ade in the north of the p rov in ce . Not until N ovem ber, 1952 
was Kiangsu re -u n ited  and adm inistered  as a single p rov in ce .
(43) See below , chapter 2.
(44) Although trad ition a lly  an in tegral part o f  K iangsu, after 1949 Shanghai 
was given a sp ec ia l status which in m any ways set it apart from  the 
rest o f the p rov in ce . E con om ic ties betw een Shanghai and Kiangsu 
rem ained c lo s e , but from  an econ om ic  point o f  v iew  the two w ere treated  
as separate planning units. In 1958, the Shanghai M unicipality becam e 
even m o re  im portant as m any hsien from  Sung-chiang S pecia l D istr ict 
w ere absorbed  into it.
(45) This should not be confused with the East China G reat A dm inistrative 
A rea  (com p ris in g  Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, K iangsu and Shantung)
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w hich ex isted  betw een 1949 and 1954. A dm in istra tive , not econ om ic , 
reasons w ere resp on sib le  fo r  the creation  o f this la rg e r  unit.
(46) In o rd e r  to avoid confusion , it should be noted that 'E ast C hina ', as 
used la ter  in this th es is , w ill be taken to include Anhwei, Chekiang, 
K iangsu and F ukien . Any exceptions to this w ill be m ade c le a r  in the 
text.
(47) D ou b le -crop p in g  m eans the grow ing o f two crop s  in one year. T r e b le - 
cropping is also p ra ctised  in Chekiang, but not in Kiangsu w here the 
length o f the f r o s t - f r e e ,  grow ing p eriod  is too sh ort. Note that " fe a s ib le "  
m eans on ly  that it is p oss ib le  in term s o f  natural conditions - it is 
assum ed that other n e ce ssa ry  fa ctors  (labour, w ater, draft anim als,
e tc . ) are all available in the requ ired  am ounts.
(48) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 5.
(49) Ib id . , p. 5.
(50) Ib id . , p. 4.
(51) In term s o f the cultivation  index (arable area divided by total area 
m ultip lied  by  100) Kiangsu would appear to be the r ich est p rovin ce  in 
China. See, fo r  exam ple, Ho P in g -ti, op. c i t . , pp. 125-126, Table 30.
But the grea ter  p o ss ib ilit ie s  fo r  double- and tre b le -c ro p p in g  further 
south need to be taken into account and on this b a s is , p rov in ces  such 
as Fukien and Kwangtung would em erge  above Kiangsu.
(52) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 53.
(53) Thanks to the elevated  em bankm ents along the low er Yangtze in south 
K iangsu, it has been  p oss ib le  to som e extent to avert d isastrou s floods 
in this area.
(54) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 10, points out that in m any p laces h ere , 
there is a r iv e r  o r  stream  every  100 m e tre s .
(55) A full account o f the ch a ra cte r is t ics  o f the T 'a i Hu R egion  and the p rob lem  
o f w ater con tro l is  given by Hsti C h ih -ch 'an  in T L C S , F eb ru ary , 1958,
op. c i t . , pp. 157-160. Hstl a lso points to the dangers which arise  from  
the fact that the southeast c o rn e r  o f the basin  b o rd e rs  on open sea; in 
o rd e r  to p rotect against inundation and consequent sa lin ization , s e a ­
w alls m ust be constantly strengthened.
(56) F or  a v e ry  detailed  d escr ip tion  o f the transportation  network in the 
1 9 3 0 ' s and 1950 's , see HB, op. c i t . , Book 10, chapters 1-3 ; and 
Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c it. , pp. 72 -81 .
(57) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 79. The sam e sou rce  g ives road m ileage 
fo r  1957 as 7, 052 km . - an in crea se  o f 52. 4% o v e r  1950.
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These figu res are fo r  the four years betw een 1953 and 1957. See 
Appendix B .
In 1957 the urban population represen ted  on ly 14.2%  o f the total 
Chinese population. See Liu and Yeh, op. c i t . , p. 212, Table 67.
Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 28.
The rural population is la rg e r  than the agricu ltura l population by the 
num ber o f  people living in the countryside, but not engaged in a g r i­
cu ltural pursu its. These would include cra ftsm en , sh op -k eep ers , 
itinerant p e d d la rs , etc.
Sun C h ing-ch ih , op . cit. , p. 53.
See J. L . Buck, Land U tilization in China, Shanghai, 1937. R eprinted 
by P aragon  Book R eprint C orp . , 1964; pp. 2 3 -91 .
This regiona l c la ss ifica tio n  is based  on that in M echanization Bureau 
o f the M in istry  o f  A gricu ltu re , Chung-kuo nung-yeh ch i-ch ieh -hu a w en- 
t 'i  ( P rob lem s o f A gricu ltu ra l M echanization in China), h erea fter  
CKNYCCHW T, Paoting, 1958, p. 231. F or  a lis t  o f the hsien  in each 
region  and a m ap o f all five , see Appendix A.
N otice that i f  Shanghai w ere included as a separate region , there 
would be s ix  econ om ic  regions in the p rov in ce . But the M unicipality 
played a p eriph era l ro le  in agricu ltural developm ent during the 1950 's, 
its p r im a ry  function being to supply vegetables (and som e grain) to its 
urban inhabitants. In 1958 vegetables represen ted  o v e r  60% o f Shanghai's 
total sown area  (see  Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , pp. 89 -91 ).
In 1957 m ore  than 30% o f the arable area in T 'a i Hu was pumped and 
irr ig a ted  by p ow er-d riv en  m ethods, making it the m ost advanced 
reg ion  in China. Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. cit. , p. 91. See also chapter 5 
below .
P lentifu l supplies o f n ightsoil w ere also available from  the large  cities  
in the area .
Ch 'eng Lu-yang et a l. , " C h iang-su -sheng Su-H si t i-ch 'tt  nung-yeh 
ch 'tt-hua ( "A  C la ss ifica tion  of A gricu ltu ra l R egions in Soochow  and 
W usih, K iangsu P ro v in ce " ) , in T i - l i  hstteh-pao, v o l. 25, no. 3, June,
1959, p. 184, states that availability  o f arable land p er  head o f the 
agricu ltura l population in the Soochow -W usih  area  (which com p rised  
a la rge  part o f T 'a i Hu) was 1. 8 m ou; and the arable area per head 
o f the agricu ltu ra l labour fo r c e  was 4 .0  m ou. H ow ever, talk of an 
"abundant" supply o f  labour m ust be set against the w ork which the 
labour fo r c e  had to c a r r y  out and we shall show la ter  that when view ed 
in these te rm s , the "abundance" o f  labour turns out to be m ore  
m yth ical than rea l.
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(68) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c it. , p. 91. Ch'eng Lu-yang et a l. , op. c i t . , 
give a MCI o f "about 190%" fo r  Soochow -W usih . H ow ever, these high 
figu res m ay on ly apply to the end o f the F F Y P  p eriod ; in Jen-m in  
j ih -  pao (P e o p le d  D a ily ), h erea fter  JM JP, 2 /2 /5 6 ,  "K iangsu 's  
A gricu ltu re  Has U nlim ited P oten tia l", it was pointed out that by 
im plem enting a c ro p  rotation system  o f food  gra in s, cotton and green  
fe r t il iz e r s  and prom oting d ou b le -crop p in g , the M CI in T 'a i hsien , 
w here conditions w ere the sam e as in T 'a i Hu, had been  ra ised  from  
137 to 191.
(69) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op . c i t . , p. 91.
(70) Ch 'eng Lu-yang et a l. , op. cit. , p. 189.
(71) Data in HB, op. c i t . , pp. 201-205 suggest that T 'a i H u's contribution
to total p rov in cia l cotton output m ay have been around 11% in the ea rly  
1 9 3 0 's . Investigations undertaken by the Chinese Cotton M ill O w ners ' 
A ssocia tion  and the S tatistical Departm ent o f  the L eg isla tive  Ytian 
revea led  the fo llow ing resu lts ;
(72) D espite the w artim e d estruction  o f m any m u lb erry  o rch a rd s , T 'a i Hu 
rem ained the m ost im portant area raising s ilk w orm s fo r  cocoon s  in 
China in the 1950's .
(73) Twenty to th irty  days without rain resu lted  in drought in this region .
(74) HB, op. c it . , pp. 143-144 and 158-159.
(75) Only 2% o f total cotton  output cam e from  h ere  in the ea r ly  1930 's. 
Ib id . , pp. 201 -205 .
(76) Hu Huan-yung "T he Population D ensity o f  N an-t'ung Specia l D is tr ic t "  
in T i-li-h stie h  p a o , v o l. 24, n o . l ,  F ebru ary , 1958.
(77) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 109, gives an average p er capita  arable 
area  o f  1 .6  m ou. The sam e figure is cited  by Hu Huan-yung, op. c i t . , 
fo r  N an-t'ung.
(78) In 1957 average y ie lds o f paddy and ginned cotton  w ere 500 chin p er m ou 
and 50 chin p er  m ou re sp e ctiv e ly , com pared  with 570 chin and 60 chin 
fo r  T 'a i Hu. See Hu Huan-yung, op. c it. ; and Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. cit.
1 chin is 0. 501 kg. o r  1. 1023 lb s .
P ercentage contribution  
to total output
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
10. 56 
12 . 60  
9. 41 
18. 00 
13. 50
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(79) Hu Huan-yung put N an -t'ung 's  cultivation index at 68%.
(80) Other industria l crop s  included jute, sw eet b a s il, pyrethrum , 
indigo, e tc .
(81) This is  the figure suggested by data in HB, op. c it . , pp. 198-205.
(82) This in form ation  is  taken from  Hu Huan-yung, op . c i t .
(83) H sin-hua jih -p a o  (New China D a ily ), h erea fter  HHJP, 2 0 /4 /5 7 , p. 2, 
"N an-t'ung S pecia l D istr ict  Adjusts the Sown A reas  o f  Cotton and 
F ood G ra in s". See also be low , chapter 5.
(84) F rom  data in HB, op. c i t . , pp. 143-144, 158-159 and 203-205 .
(85) F o r  a b r ie f  d escr ip tion  o f the Hwai R iver C ontrol P r o je c t  see T.
Shabad, C hina's Changing Map (R evised  E dition , Methuen and C o. Ltd. , 
London, 1972), pp. 17-18 . The program m e envisaged  the construction  
o f  detention r e s e r v o ir s ,  dams and d ikes, dredging and - m ost im portant 
fo r  K iangsu - the building o f  a new outlet to the Y ellow  Sea, running 
a cross  N orth Kiangsu from  Lake H ung-tse.
(86) H HJP, 2 1 /1 2 /5 7 , p. 2, "P lans fo r  the D evelopm ent o f A gricu ltu re  in 
the Six Main R egions o f Kiangsu. "
(87) Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 109-
(88) D erived  fro m  H B, op. c it. , p. 301.
(89) H sti-Hwai was situated on the dow nstream  stretch es  o f fou r r iv e rs ; 
the Hwai, I, Mu and Ssu. During the rainy season  betw een July and 
S eptem ber, when 60-70%  o f the annual rain fall o c c u rr e d , these r ivers  
rose  rap id ly  to flood  the surrounding cou n tryside. Subsequently, as 
the w aters subsided , the r iv e r  beds tended to d ry  up and since the su b ­
su rface  w ater lev e l was low  and not p ro p e r ly  u tilized , drought also 
o ccu rre d .
(90) The 3 5 years betw een 1906-1940 saw 12 d isastrou s  flo o d s . A fter  1945 
flooding o c cu rre d  fo r  five consecutive  y e a rs . See Sun C h ing-ch ih , 
op . c i t . , p. 114.
(91) Sung C h ia -t 'a i et a l. , "C h ian g-su -sh en g  H w ai-yin  chuan-ch 'ti nung-yeh 
ch 'tl-h u a" ("T h e  A gricu ltu ra l R egions o f H w ai-yin  S pecia l D istr ict , 
K iangsu P ro v in ce ")  in  T i - l i  hstteh -pao, v o l. 25, no. 2, A p ril, 1959,
p. 122 state that in 1949 average per capita availab ility  o f food  grains 
in H w ai-yin  was only 180 chin.
(92) Ib id . , p. 134, Table 1.
(93) See below , chapter 5. A lso  K. R. W alker, "O rgan ization  fo r  A gricu ltu ra l 
P rod u ction " in A. E ckstein , W. G alenson and T .C . Liu (e d s .) ,
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E con om ic  Trends in Com m unist China, Edinburgh U niversity  P r e s s , 
1968;  e sp e c ia lly  pp. 4 09 -4 1 3 .
(94)  Sun C h ing-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 115. M o reov er , desp ite  seriou s  natural 
d isa sters  in 1954,  a bum per h arvest was still ach ieved.
(95)  Hsti-Hwai was the m ost im portant d ry  crop  area  o f the p rov in ce . In 
the ea r ly  1930 's  it produced  about 30% o f total wheat output in Kiangsu 
but le ss  than 1% o f  r ice  output. See H B, op. c it. , pp. 143-14 4  and 
158 -15 9 .
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PA RT I
Institutional C h a n g e  in the A gricu ltu ra l S ector
CH APTER TWO 
Land R eform  in Kiangsu: 1946-1952
I Introduction
(1) The institutional fram ew ork  o f agricu lture b e fo re  1949:  ^ ^
Land ow nership  in Kiangsu was v e ry  unequal b e fo re  1949. In ves­
tigations conducted by the Rural Rehabilitation C om m ission  in four hsien 
in d ifferent parts o f the p rovin ce  betw een 1928 and 1933 revea led  that
w ell o v e r  half o f landow ners had holdings sm a lle r  than 10 m ou (1 .6 5  
(2 )a cre s ). B y con trast, farm s o f 15 acres o r  m o re  w ere  ex trem ely  ra re . 
In addition there w ere large  num bers o f landless peasants; in C h 'ang-shu
h s ien , fo r  exam ple, alm ost eight out o f every  ten peasants had no land
,   ^ . (3)o f th eir  own.
Tenancy was one way o f alleviating land hunger and it existed  to som e 
extent throughout the p rov in ce . If anything, it seem s lik e ly  that the 
p roportion  o f  peasants com pelled  to farm  land as tenants was in creasin g  
during the decades b e fo re  1949. As conditions in the rural s e c to r  d e te r i­
orated , m ore  and m ore  peasants sought cred it to tide them o v e r  their 
d ifficu ltie s . In the absence o f  organ ized  financial institu tions, the m ain
sou rce  o f such help was the lo c a l m on ey -len d er  to whom  they "p led ged "
(4)o r  "m o rtg a g e d " ' their land in return fo r  a p roportion  o f  its value. 
F a ilure  to repay the loan within a stipulated period  involved the peasant 
in fo r fe itu re  o f his ow nership  rights and a decline to the status o f outright 
tenant o r  land less la b ou rer .
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The pattern o f  tenancy in Kiangsu was a com p lex  one. In the north
o f the p rov in ce  it was m ost prevalent in the hsien  b ord erin g  the Yangtze
(5)and in the coasta l a reas . ' In the central northern  area  and along the
b o rd e r  with Shantung, w here conditions w ere p oor  and com m unications
undeveloped, few er peasants rented land and ow n er-occu p a tion  was m ore  
(6 )com m on .
A p r io r i  reasoning would suggest a high rate o f  tenancy south o f  the
(7)
Yangtze. It is true that one post-1949  sou rce  stated that the land­
lord s  o f  this reg ion  (com p ris in g  2% o f  the total population) owned about 
(8)40% o f the land. But it would be w rong to conclude fro m  this that a
corresp on d in g ly  high in ciden ce o f tenancy existed  throughout Kiangnan.
On the con trary , regiona l variations w ere v e ry  sign ificant. F o r  exam ple,
in form ation  published in the ea r ly  1930's indicated that the average rate
o f tenancy fo r  the whole area  was only 25. 48% and that in 13 out o f 24
south Kiangsu hsien  the p roportion  o f agricu ltural households farm ing
(9)
land as outright tenants was le ss  than 20%. Such low  rates o f tenancy,
apparently at varian ce  with a p r io r i  reason ing, w ere in fact the lo g ica l
product o f  a set o f  h is to r ica l and econ om ic  conditions p ecu lia r  to south
Kiangsu. In p a rticu lar , the p ro ce s s  o f industria lization  and urbanization
seem s to have attracted wealth away from  the purchase o f land into m ore
(10)p rofitab le  investm ents in trade, industry and a n cilla ry  s e r v ic e s .
The case  o f M eiji Japan has shown that w here landlords are p r o g r e s s ­
ive a high rate o f tenancy can c o -e x is t  with a rapid rate o f agricu ltural
growth.^ ^  H ow ever, the evidence fo r  p ro g re ss iv e  landlords in Kiangsu
( 12)would appear to be en tire ly  lack ing. T heir resp on s ib ilit ie s  w ere
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lim ited  to the co lle c tio n  o f  rents fro m  their tenants and the paym ent o f 
taxes to the governm ent. The relationship  betw een landlord  and tenant 
was governed  by  e co n o m ic , not so c ia l (fa r  le ss  eth ica l) con sid era tion s , 
but econ om ic  in terest did not extend as far  as ca rry in g  out land im p ro v e ­
m ents o r  agricu ltu ra l investm ent. The growth o f la rge  c ities  m ade
relations even m ore  rem ote by in creasin g  the tendency tow ards absentee 
(13)lan d lord ism .
Rents in Kiangsu w ere paid as a fixed  amount, in kind o r  cash , o r  as
a p roportion  o f output. F ixed rents in kind, which serv ed  the in terests
(14)o f both landlord  and tenant, w ere m ost com m on  and re fle cted  the
fe rt ility  o f  m uch o f  the p rov in ce . Cash rents w ere a lso  frequently  found
as was to be expected  in a prov in ce  w here som e d egree  o f  e con om ic
m odern ization  had taken p lace  and w here econ om ic  crop s  w ere w idely
grow n. South o f  the Yangtze a kind o f in term ediate system  existed  w hereby
rent was fixed  in kind but could be converted  at the d iscre tio n  o f  the landlord
to a cash  paym ent. S h are -crop p in g  was le ss  com m on , being found m ainly
in the north w here it o ffe re d  som e protection  against p oor  and unstable
(15)harvests engendered by adverse natural cond itions.
On average, rents in Kiangsu absorbed  40-50%  o f a tenant's annual
production , although there w ere lo ca l variations depending on area, the
quality o f  the land and the nature o f the rental system . In gen era l, rent
leve ls  w ere h igher in the north than in the south, a fact w hich re flected
not on ly  d ifferen t s o c io -e c o n o m ic  conditions but also a p e rv e rse  relationship
(16)betw een rents and land produ ctiv ity .
At a gen era l le v e l the w elfare  im plication s to an individual peasant
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o f having to hand o v e r  40% o r  m ore  o f  his farm  output each year are
e a s ily  appreciated . Attem pting to quantify the e con om ic  im plication s is
a m ore  d ifficu lt task, though an im portant one i f  we are to understand
the attraction  o f  a program m e o f land red istribu tion . In this connection
an analysis o f the in com e and expenditure p er m ou o f land fo r  a tenant
fa rm e r  and an ow n er-cu ltiva tor  in a d is tr ic t  o f W usih hsien  in the m id -
(17)1930’ s is  o f  sp ecia l in terest. It revealed  that rent accounted fo r
43 .45%  o f the tenant's annual p er m ou expenditure. The on ly com parable
obligation  on the ow n er-cu ltiva tor  was the paym ent o f  taxes , but these
absorbed  le s s  than 30% o f his expenditure. In any ca s e , the absolute sum
involved was a m ere  0. 969 ytian p er  m ou com pared  with the rent o f 13. 134
•yilan (per m ou). F o r  both ca teg or ies  incom e and other costs  w ere the sam e,
Yet when total in com e was com pared  with total expenditure, the ow n er-
cu ltivator em erged  with a surplus o f 11. 186 ytian p er m ou while the tenant
su ffered  a d e fic it  o f -0 . 979 ytian. Although in form ation  was not provided
in the orig in a l a r t ic le , p resum ably  only the p o ss ib ility  o f subsid iary
(18)earnings m ade the tenant's e con om ic  position  v ia b le .
It is  obvious that without the need to pay rent a tenant's ability to
(19)
undertake net investm ent would be m uch im p roved . ' The econ om ic
m eaning o f this was w ell brought out in an in teresting a rtic le  com paring
expenditures by tenants and ow n er-cu ltiva tors  on variou s item s o f  working
capital ( fo r  exam ple, to o ls , fe r t i l is e r s ,  draft an im als, h ired  labour) in 
(20 )C h 'i-tung h s ie n . A ll such expenditure p rom ised  to contribute s ig n i­
fican tly  to in cre a se s  in produ ctiv ity . Yet only a quarter o f  all tenant
households w ere  spending anything on animal husbandry, h ired  labour
(2 1 )and fe r t i l iz e r  pu rchases and in every  case  the average expenditure
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p er tenant household was substantially low er than that o f  o w n e r -cu lt iv a to rs . 
Rent and su bsisten ce  requirem ents took 91% o f tenants' total household 
expenditure so that on ly  9% was le ft fo r  productive investm ent (including 
rep lacem en t investm ent). But fo r  ow n er-cu ltiva tors  the absence o f a 
rent burden not on ly perm itted  them  to spend m ore  on subsistence but 
also le ft them  a m uch grea ter  amount to use fo r  production  p p oses .
This b r ie f  su rvey  o f the institutional fram ew ork  o f  agricu lture
b e fo re  1949 is su fficien t to show that there was a strong case  in favour
( 2 2 )o f som e kind o f agrarian  re fo rm  in Kiangsu. M o re o v e r , the o n e ­
sidedness o f  tenurial arrangem ents ensured that m any peasants would 
respond with enthusiasm  to a p rogram m e which rea lloca ted  land to the 
land less and land-hungry. To the extent that it rem oved  econ om ic  c o n ­
straints inherent in the tenancy system , it could also be expected  to have 
a favourable e ffe ct  on agricu ltural e ffic ien cy .
But was institutional change enough? Was it su ffic ien t to rem ove the
e con om ic  as w ell as the s o c io -e c o n o m ic  constrain ts upon r ise s  in produ ction ?
F or  tenancy was not the on ly obstacle  to sustained agricu ltural growth
in the p rov in ce . An equally seriou s  p rob lem  was the absolute shortage
(23)o f re so u rce s  such as to o ls , draft anim als and even labou r. N or was
land in unlim ited supply, as the ch a ra cte r is t ica lly  sm all operational
(24)holdings ind icated . In these c ircu m stan ces  the e ffects  o f rea lloca tion
w ere lim ited . In addition, while som e peasants would w elcom e p o lic ie s
o f red istribu tion , others (the r ich  peasants) would see  them  as a threat
(25)to th eir  econ om ic  position . A ll these con sideration s should be borne
in m ind when we exam ine the im plem entation o f  and re fo rm  in Kiangsu.
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(2) Land re fo rm  in K iangsu b e fore  1949:
Com m unist activ ity  in Kiangsu p r io r  to the S ino-Japanese W ar was
notably ch ie fly  fo r  its absence. Peasant agitation and dem ands fo r  rent
reduction  did o c cu r  sp o ra d ica lly  and w ere said to be led  by  m em bers  o f
the Chinese Com m unist P arty  (C C P ). Such a case  o c c u rr e d  in I-hsing
(26)hsien  (south Kiangsu) in 1927, but these w ere iso la ted  outbreaks which
n ever developed  on a wide s ca le . In the 1930's suggestions that land
should be purchased  fro m  landlords and red istributed  to p oor  peasants
w ere also dubbed "C om m u n istic" although the connection  with the CC P and
(27)C om m unist id eo log y  was m ore  im agined than rea l. It was not until
the S ino-Japanese W ar that the Com m unist P arty  started  to operate on
any sca le  in the p rov in ce . The m ost sign ificant event was the retreat in
1940 o f Com m unist gu erilla  fo r c e s  a cro ss  the Yangtze; soon  afterw ards
north Kiangsu becam e an im portant C C P base and rem ained such
/ 2 8)after the defeat o f the Japanese in 1945. It was in this context
that land re fo rm  cam e to be im plem ented in north Kiangsu e a r lie r  than 
in other parts o f the p rov in ce .
During the w ar years agrarian  re fo rm  in north K iangsu fo llow ed  the
re la tive ly  m oderate  p o licy  o f  "D ouble R eduction" being fo llow ed  e lsew h ere 
(29)in China. ' The resu lt, we are told , was th re e -fo ld ; production  in crea sed ,
rural liv ing standards im proved  and the anti - Japanese front becam e stron ger
and m ore  unified . As ea r ly  as 1944 an investigation  o f 431 hsiang in five
hsien  o f  the Y en -ch 'en g  - Fou-ning region  revea led  that the num bers o f
p oor  peasant and landlord  households had fa llen  w hile m iddle peasant
(31)num bers had in cre a se d . Translated  into econ om ic  term s this pointed
to a defin ite im provem ent; landlords represen ted  the n on -produ ctive
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(even  cou n ter-p rod u ctive ) elem ents o f rural s o c ie ty  and a fa ll in their 
num bers was to be reckoned  an econ om ic  gain. P o o r  peasants w ere by 
defin ition  those fa rm e rs  who lacked land and essen tia l w orking capital 
and who w ere  th e re fo re  a d ep ressin g  influence on the agricu ltural s e c to r . 
T h eir declin ing im portan ce could on ly be a re fle c t io n  o f  the in creasin g  
im portan ce o f other m ore  productive c la sse s  (in this ca se , m iddle peasants).
A single exam ple m ust su ffice  to show the resu lts  o f agrarian  re fo rm
during these ea r ly  y e a rs . In the Y en -ch 'en g  - F ou -n ing reg ion , a report
cited  the case  o f  a peasant household o f  eight p erson s which had p rev iou sly
owned no land but rented 13 m ou o f  in fe r io r  land. A fter  the im plem entation
o f rent reduction  in 1942 this household was able to buy eight m ou o f  land
o f its own and by 1943 it was also raising two p igs . In this way what had
orig in a lly  been  a tenant household was tran sform ed  into a se m i-ow n er
(32)cultivating household . v '
F o r  the w ar yea rs  as a w hole, a su rvey  o f  2, 500 households in 11
(33)hsien  o f  "cen tra l K iangsu" showed the follow ing percen tage changes
in the com p osition  o f  rural s o c ie ty  betw een 1939 and 1945;
Table II. 1 Changes in the relative  im portan ce o f 
various rural c la s se s  in north Kiangsu 
betw een 1939-45
As percentage 
o f rural 
population
1939
As percen tage 
o f rural 
population
1945
P ercentage
change
H ired agricu ltural 
labou rers  
P o o r  peasants 
M iddle peasants 
R ich  peasants* 
Landlords
3 .2 4  
46. 75 
32. 07 
13. 69
4 .2 5
2. 44 
33 .39  
41.79* 
19. 03
3. 35
- 24 .69
- 28 .58  
+ 30.31 
+ 39.01 
- 2 1 .1 8
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* Obtained by deducting the total fo r  the other four ca teg or ies  from  
100. 00.
S ou rce; SPJP, 3 0 /6 /5 1 , op. c i t . , p. 4.
The two investigations cited  by  the ’North K iangsu D aily ' and a llegedly  
represen tative  o f conditions throughout north K iangsu indicate that co n ­
siderab le  changes in the c la s s -co m p o s it io n  o f ru ra l s o c ie ty  w ere taking 
p la ce . From, an econ om ic  point o f  view  the changes w ere  c le a r ly  d e s ira b le . 
M iddle peasants w ere  rep lacing p oor peasants to b ecom e  the m ost 
im portant c la ss  (n u m erica lly ) in the countryside, while the num bers o f 
h ired  agricu ltu ra l la b o u re rs , p oor  peasants and land lords w ere all fa lling. 
S ignificant too , was the in cre a se  in the relative  im portan ce  o f rich  
peasants.
H ow ever, the o v e ra ll situation was probably  not as favourab le as
the data above suggest. CC P con tro l was w eaker in som e areas than in
others and there w ere  parts o f north Kiangsu w here agrarian  re fo rm
p o lic ie s  w ere  ca rr ie d  out m uch le ss  thoroughly o r  even not at all. In
addition, rent and in terest reduction  often m et with the determ ined
opposition  o f  the landlord  c la s s , who used variou s m ethods ranging from
m ere  cunning to open sabotage to prevent the im plem entation  o f the new
(34)p o lic ie s . ' In the fa ce  o f such opposition  p oor  peasants w ere frequently
unwilling to give active support to the CC P and sp ec ia l organ izations had
to be fo rm ed  to m ob ilize  them  against the reca lc itra n t lan d lord s. The
m ost im portant o f th ese , the "P easan ts ' National Salvation A sso c ia tio n "
(35)and "Rent Investigation C o rp s "  w ere the foreru n n ers  o f  the Peasant
A ssocia tion s  o f  the 1950's and fu lfilled  m any o f  the sam e ro le s . F or
exam ple, when landlords refu sed  to reduce rents, the P easan ts ' National
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Salvation M ovem ent (which co m p rised  m ain ly p oor  and m iddle peasants) 
would send rep resen tatives  to organ ize  and guide the peasant m a sse s .
It usually  on ly  requ ired  the A ssocia tion  to m ake the la rge  landlords reduce 
their rents fo r  the sm a lle r  ones to fo llow  suit. But in cases  w here land­
lo rd  opposition  continued, 'stru ggle  m eetin gs ' w ere organ ized  and land­
lord s  w ere d ire ct ly  con fronted  by  th eir  tenants.
A further com p lica tion  at this tim e was the peasan t's  frequent 
ign orance o f  the im p lica tion s o f CC P p o lic ie s . One peasant in north 
Kiangsu hearing that the P arty  was about to estab lish  itse lf  in his area, 
took  the m on ey  and grain  he had accum ulated and consum ed the whole lot
(31in the b e lie f  that " . . . under com m unism  w hatever is you rs is also m ine. "
N everth e less , these ea r ly  re fo rm s  w ere g en era lly  a s u cce s s . Living 
standards w ere  im p roved  fo r  a la rge  num ber o f  peasants; e con om ic  c o n ­
ditions in the countryside w ere m ore  favourab le; and a firm  foundation was 
laid  fo r  the land re fo rm  cam paigns o f  the 1950's .
A fter  the su rren d er  o f  the Japanese the latent co n flict  betw een the 
Kuomintang (N ationalist) and Chinese Com m unist arm ies  erupted into c iv il 
w ar and in the sum m er o f 1946 the C om m unist-held  areas o f  north Kiangsu 
cam e under attack. It was at this point that the e a r lie r  m ore  m oderate 
p o lic ie s  o f  rent and in terest reduction  began to be rep laced  in parts o f 
north K iangsu by  outright land con fisca tion  and red istribu tion . The ch ron o ­
lo g y  o f  events during the p ost-w a r  years is confused  although it seem s
reasonable to suppose that the cou rse  o f events w hich o c cu rre d  e lsew h ere
(37)in China was repeated  in north Kiangsu. In any ca s e , w hatever the
p r e c is e  tim ing, "double redu ction " was now rep laced  by  the p o licy  o f
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giving "land to the tille r " . (38)
The p rin cipa l strands o f the new land p o licy  are e a s ily  sum m arized :
fir s t , rent and in terest reduction  rem ained the n e ce s sa ry  p re lim in aries
to land con fisca tion  and continued to be ca rr ie d  out in all a reas . Next
cam e the "settling  o f  a ccou n ts" which involved the con fisca tion  o f land
(39)belonging to "en em ies  and tr a ito r s "  and its red istribu tion  to peasants 
with little  o r  no land o r  their own. Land was not always fo r c ib ly  taken; 
in parts o f north K iangsu, fo r  exam ple, m any landlords and P arty m em bers  
o r  cad res  from  landlord  backgrounds w ere reported  to have voluntarily  
handed o v e r  all land that was not requ ired  to support th em selves o r  their 
fa m ilie s . One o ffic ia l o f the 'K iangsu-Anhw ei B o rd e r  R egion  G overnm ent1
presented  1 ,333 m ou o f  land fo r  red istribu tion , retaining only 60 m ou fo r
(40) , , ,his own fa m ily  o f f i v e .v Land which had p re v iou s ly  been  le ft uncultivated
(huang-ti) was a lso given to peasants to farm .
Betw een the sum m er o f 1946 and autumn o f 1947 deviations from  the 
o ffic ia l line and v io len ce  in the im plem entation  o f  land re fo rm  w ere at 
th eir  greatest throughout China. To what extent this pattern was fo llow ed  
in north Kiangsu it is  d ifficu lt to say although there are certa in ly  indications
(41)that this was a p eriod  o f  f ie r c e  struggle betw een landlords and peasants.
C on tem porary  rep orts  speak o f the C om m unist-held  areas in the north o f
(42)the prov in ce  launching a "gun in one hand, abacus in the o th er" struggle 
against the land lords and o f "b itter , hard and f ie r c e "  confrontations 
betw een landlords and tenants.
The situation was in fact a com plicated  one. In som e areas the
su p rem acy  o f  the C C P had rem ained unchallenged, land had been con fiscated
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and rea lloca ted  and a new pattern o f c la ss  relations was em erg in g . In
oth ers , rent reduction  had been  rev e rse d  after re -o ccu p a tio n  by the
Kuomintang fo r c e s  and as a resu lt, despite the re -es ta b lish m en t o f  C C P
(43)con tro l, " . . .  land relations rem ained con fu sed ". F in a lly , there w ere
areas w hich had always rem ained  in Kuomintang hands and w here land re fo rm  
had n ever been  ca rr ie d  out. H ere landlords continued to c o lle c t  high rents 
and con cen tration  in landow nership was still m uch in ev id en ce .
Idea lly  we should like to give som e quantitative ind ication  o f  the
im pact o f  the p re -1 9 4 9  agrarian  re fo rm s  in K iangsu. H ow ever, such data
are a lm ost to ta lly  lack ing and the on ly re fe re n ce  to the num ber o f peasants
who had been  involved  in land re fo rm  states that betw een 1946 and 1949 an
area  containing 4, 000, 000 peasants had fu lly  im plem ented  land re fo rm  in
north K iangsu. N everth e less , this is a usefu l in d ica tor  o f the achievem ents
o f these yea rs  fo r  it ind icates that even b e fore  K iangsu was com p lete ly
under the con tro l o f  the C C P , o v e r  20% o f north K iangsu ’ s agricu ltural
(44)population had a lready  com pleted  land re fo rm .
In the late 1940's south Kiangsu fe ll rap id ly  into the hands o f the 
Chinese C om m unist fo r c e s .  By N ovem ber 1948, C C P  con tro l throughout 
China extended to the northern  banks o f the Yangtze. In A p ril, 1949 the 
arm ies  c r o s s e d  the r iv e r  and Nanking was " lib e ra te d " . On M ay 27th 
Shanghai a lso  fe ll  and by  June 2nd, 1949 the w hole o f  K iangsu was in the 
hands o f  the C C P. The stage was now set fo r  the next phase o f  the 
agrarian  re fo r m s , the im plem entation  throughout the p rov in ce  o f  a 
th orough -going  land re fo rm .
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II The Land R eform  M ovem ent in Kiangsu; A  C h ron olog ica l A ccou n t.
(1) The d ire ct iv e s  o f the C entral G overnm ent and the East China 
M ilita ry  A dm in istration
The th eoretica l fram ew ork  within which land re fo rm  took p lace  in
Kiangsu was provided  by  the 'A grarian  R eform  Law o f  the P e o p le 's
(45)R epublic o f China' , prom ulgated  by the C entral G overnm ent on 30th
June, 1950. This provided  fo r  the con fisca tion  and r e q u i s i t i o n ^ ^ )  o f
rented land and other p rop erty  belonging to landlords (excep t that used
fo r  industria l and co m m e rc ia l p u rp oses) and land owned by  r ich  peasants
w hich was in e x ce ss  o f  that which they cultivated th em selves  o r  with the
help o f h ired  labou r. The con fisca ted  land and p rop erty  w ere to be d is tr i-
(47)buted to lo c a l peasants who owned "little  o r  no land" o f  th eir  own.
Other section s dealt with m ethods o f im plem enting land re fo rm  and the 
treatm ent o f sp ec ia l land p rob lem s.
A lm ost sim ultaneously  other laws w ere passed  to help  in the sm ooth 
w orking o f the A grarian  R eform  Law; fo r  exam ple, the 'D ecis ion s  co n ­
cern ing the D ifferentiation  o f C lass Status in the C ou n trysid e ' and the
i
'G en era l Regulations G overning the O rganization  o f P easan ts ' A ssocia tion s
(both prom ulgated  in the sum m er o f  1950). S pecia l regulations governing
land re fo rm  w ere  also issu ed  fo r  the large  adm inistrative regions o f China
as w ell as fo r  p ro v in ce s . Thus, in F ebru ary , 1950 the C om m ittee o f  the
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East China M ilita ry  A dm in istration  (E C M A )V passed  the 'Regulations
fo r  Rent R eduction  in the V illa ges  o f the N ew ly L ibera ted  A reas o f  East 
(50)C hina ', the f ir s t  docum ent that was d ire ct ly  relevant to the land re fo rm  
program m e in Kiangsu.
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By this tim e rent reduction  had already been in corp ora ted  into the 
(51)'C om m on P ro g ra m m e 1' as an essen tia l p recon d ition  to the im p lem en ­
tation o f  land re fo rm  in the 'n ew ly -lib era ted ' reg ion s . In m any ways the 
p rov is ion s  fo r  rent reduction  in East China w ere s im p ly  a restatem ent o f 
the p rin cip les  that had been  fo llow ed  b e fore  1949. Rents w ere to be 
reduced  by  25% o r  30% and a rent ce ilin g  o f 3 5% o f the output o f the m ain 
crop  in a 'n o rm a l'y e a r  was im p osed . Advance paym ent o f rent and other 
exp loitative d ev ices  w ere abolished . A ll debts betw een peasants and land­
lo rd s  o r  " o ld -s ty le "  r ich  peasants in cu rred  b e fo re  1949 w ere annulled.
Other p rov is ion s  dealt with the d istribution  o f supplem entary crop s  and 
the question  o f exem ption  fro m  rent reduction  fo r  ce rta in  ca tegories  o f 
ren tiers  such as w o rk e rs , revo lu tion a ries , w idow s, orphans, etc .
But in other ways the rent reduction  regulations struck  a new and 
su rpris in g  note. F o r  exam ple, in spite o f the c le a r  aim  o f lessen in g  the 
exploitation  w hich resu lted  fro m  the tenancy system , any hint o f extrem e 
an ti-land lord  sentim ent was en tire ly  absent fro m  the docum ent. Indeed, 
A rtic le  Two em phasized  the continuing ow nership  rights o f the landlords 
after rent reduction  had been  im plem ented and the lega l obligation  o f  tenants 
to pay rent. Land belonging to landlords who had run away was to be 
leased  out fo r  them  in absentia by the hsien  governm ent and the rent
(52)(ap p rop ria te ly  reduced) retained fo r  the ow ner until he returned. '
C lea rly  it was hoped that alienation on a wide sca le  cou ld  be avoided and
(53)rent reduction  ca rr ie d  out as sm ooth ly as p o ss ib le . 7
The f ir s t  statem ent o f  a t im e-ta b le  fo r  the im plem entation  o f land 
re fo rm  on East China cam e in an ECM A d irectiv e  published in M arch ,
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1950. It stated that w here p rep a ra tory  w ork  had been  com pleted , the
con fisca tion  and rea llo ca tion  o f  land could begin  a fter the 1950 autumn 
harvest. E lsew h ere  it should be delayed until late 1951 o r  even 1952.
As our la ter  analysis w ill show, in the context o f  what actually happened, 
the em phasis on a re la tive ly  long t im e -h o r izo n  was notew orthy.
One o f  the preoccu p ation s  o f the planners throughout the land re fo rm
cam paigns was how to ensure that production  a ctiv ities  w ere  not h indered
by the institutional changes that w ere taking p la ce . In 1950 this was a
p a rticu la r ly  im portant con sid era tion  since natural d isa ste rs  had badly
affected  h arvests  in m any parts o f East China. In south K iangsu m o re  than
(55)4, 000, 000 m ou o f  land w ere  flood ed ' and in the north 17, 000, 000 m ou 
w ere flooded  with the consequent lo ss  o f 1 ,  000 m illion  chin o f  food  g r a i n s .
In these c ircu m sta n ces  it was essen tia l that land re fo rm  activ ities  should 
not d isrupt n orm al agricu ltu ra l w ork . Thus, the M arch  d irectiv e  em phasized  
the c r it ic a l im p ortan ce  o f  the spring p eriod  fo r  agricu ltu ra l operations 
and the need fo r  the c lo s e s t  co -o rd in a tion  betw een r e lie f  and production  
w ork and the preparations fo r  land re fo rm .
The c ru c ia l p rep a ra tory  tasks at this tim e w ere to investigate lo ca l
con d ition s, tra in  cad res  and spread  the aim s and p o lic ie s  o f land re fo rm
to all c la s se s  o f  rural so c ie ty . Not until this had been  com pleted  could
(57)rep resen tative  experim ents take p la ce ' to p rovide  actual exp erien ce  
o f  land re fo rm . Throughout these preparations the lega l rights o f lan d ­
lo rd s  w ere  rea ffirm ed  although it is  sign ificant that a w arning was also 
issu ed  against ille g a l landlord  a ctiv ities , such as land tra n s fers  o r  the 
d e libera te  d estru ction  o f p rop erty .
(54)
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This d ire ct iv e  provided  the guidelines fo r  land re fo rm  and production
activ ities  throughout spring and sum m er and the next ECM A d ire ct iv e , w hich
was con cern ed  with agricu ltu ra l production  p o lic ie s  during the autumn and
(58 ^w inter o f  1950-51, did not appear until S eptem ber, 1950. Though short
this docum ent is  o f con s id erab le  in terest fo r  its in form ation  on the co u n ter ­
produ ctive  e ffects  w hich land re fo rm  was continuing to have. B ecau se o f 
the uncertainty about what and how m uch land they would re ce iv e  during 
red istribu tion  m any peasants w ere s im p ly  letting th eir  agricu ltura l w ork 
lapse and in som e p la ces  even ceasing to cu ltivate the land at all. The 
lo g ic  o f th e ir  action  (o r  inaction ) was c le a r ; i f  the land w hich they cultivated 
was subsequently rea lloca ted  together with its output to another peasant, 
the orig in a l peasant's  e fforts  would have been w orth nothing. Just how 
seriou s  a p rob lem  this was it is d ifficu lt to say; but it was certa in ly  seriou s
enough fo r  the ECM A to set down s p e c if ic  p rov is ion s  to guarantee that
(59)peasants re ce iv e d  the output o f the land they had t illed . In this way
it was hoped that the n eg lect o f  agricu ltural w ork  cou ld  be stopped.
On 26th N ovem ber, 1950 the ECM A C om m ittee prom ulgated  the
(60 )'R egulations on the M ethods o f Im plem enting Land R e form  in East C h ina 'v 
and it is  to this im portant docum ent that we m ust now turn. In som e 
re sp e c ts , it is  tru e , the p o lic ie s  it set out s im p ly  fo llow ed  the p rov is ion s  
o f  the A grarian  R e form  Law; but in other w ays, through d ifferen t em phasis 
o r  the am plification  o f  certa in  aspects o f  the parent law , it took on a c le a r  
identity o f its own.
A seriou s  d ilem m a w hich con fronted  the C C P during the land re fo rm  
cam paigns arose  out o f the con flictin g  aim s o f pursuing the new land
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p o lic ie s  and protecting industry and trade. The need to ensure that 
industry and trade w ere disrupted as little as p oss ib le  m eant that som e way 
had to be found o f  im plem enting land con fisca tion  without affecting land­
lo r d s ' participation  in industria l and co m m e rc ia l a ctiv it ie s . This p rob lem
(61)had already rece iv e d  attention in the e a r lie r  d ir e c t iv e s ' and as was to 
be expected  in a reg ion  w here the industria l and urban se cto rs  w ere highly 
developed , a con sid erab le  amount o f  space was devoted to it in the East 
China Land R eform  R egulations.
In gen era l the regulations fo llow ed  A rtic le  F ou r o f  the A grarian  
R eform  Law in calling fo r  the protection  o f  industry and trade, including 
en terp rises  run by landlords and p rop erty  in the v illa ges  (other than land) 
w hich belonged to industria lists  and m erch ants. But m ore  interesting w ere 
som e qualifications which w ere added to the rule that land and p roperty  
owned by  landlords should be sub ject to con fisca tion . F o r  exam ple, draft 
anim als used fo r  handicraft production  o r  transport w ere  to be le ft untouched 
and on ly those too ls  w hich w ere used s p e c if ica lly  in agricu ltu ra l w ork w ere 
to be taken fro m  lan d lord s. The sam e d istinction  betw een agricu ltural and 
n on -agricu ltu ra l em ploym ent as a c r ite r io n  fo r  con fisca tion  was applied 
to surplus buildings owned by  lan d lords. A final p ro v is io n  also stipulated 
that all landlord  p rop erty  in the c ities  should not be m ade available fo r  
red istribu tion .
If the landlords held a k ey  position  v is -a -v is  industry  and trade,
within the agricu ltu ra l s e c to r  its e lf  one o f the m ost sen sitive  prob lem s
( 62^
was the treatm ent o f r ich  peasants. In e con om ic  term s the position
o f this group was p a rticu la rly  im portant. With m ore  re so u rce s  at their
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d isp osa l than m ost peasants not on ly did they tend to be the m ost e ffic ien t 
fa rm ers  but by the sam e token they w ere also able to undertake net in v est­
m ent in agricu ltu re . H ow ever, a c o r o lla r y  o f this was that th eir  holdings 
w ere la rg e r  than those o f m iddle and p oor peasants and in som e cases  they
even rented out land. In the context o f  a land re fo rm  they w ere
(64)obv iou sly  in a vu lnerable position . But fro m  the point o f view  of the
agricu ltural econ om y it was in the in terests  o f the governm ent to retain
their support and a ccord in g ly  after 1949 a new p o licy  was advocated to
(65)"p re se rv e  the r ich  peasant e con om y ". Thus, A rtic le  Six o f the
A grarian  R e form  Law had ca lled  fo r  the protection  o f " . . . land owned by
( 6 6 )r ich  peasants and cultivated by them selves o r  by h ired  labou r . . . "  
and even perm itted  r ich  peasants to continue renting out sm all amounts o f 
land. To a la rg e  extent this was a lso the line fo llow ed  by the ECM A. 
H ow ever, it is  o f som e in terest that the su b -section  dealing with the 
treatm ent o f land rented out by r ich  peasants was d iffe ren tly  w orded in 
each  docum ent.
In the A grarian  R e form  Law the relevant section  stated that:
"If the portion  o f  land rented out by r ich  peasants o f  a s e m i­
landlord  type exceed  in s ize  the land tilled  by th em selves  and 
by  th eir  h ired  labou r, the land rented out should be re q u i­
sitioned. " (67)
The equivalent passage in the ECM A docum ent w as:
"In requisition ing land rented out by r ich  peasants o f  a s e m i­
landlord  type in the new areas , i f  the land cultivated by a r ich  
peasant h im se lf and by  h ired  labour is sm a lle r  than the average 
amount o f land p er  capita  fo r  a p articu lar area, then he should 
be perm itted  to retain  an amount o f  land (including that cultivated 
by h im se lf) equivalent to the average per capita  fo r  the area . " (68)
The sign ificant point o f d ifferen ce  in these two statem ents seem s to
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lie  in the assum ptions behind each . In the f ir s t  it is  assum ed that the 
requ isition  o f r ich  peasant land w ill on ly  be ca rr ie d  out in sp ec ia l c ir c u m ­
stances (that is ,  w here the amount o f land rented out exceed s  a certa in  
area ). B y con trast, the assum ption behind the secon d  appears to be that 
land rented out by r ich  peasants is  n orm a lly  su b ject to requ isition  and 
that on ly  in sp ec ia l conditions w ill a r ich  peasant be able to retain  such 
land.
If this in terpretation  is c o r r e c t  the d ifferen ce  in w ording is an 
in teresting re fle c t io n  o f som e o f the lim itations on land re fo rm  in the 
East China reg ion . The e con om ic  benefits o f land rea lloca tion  depended 
on the average amount o f land available to each  peasant. One o f the features 
of East China agricu ltu re  was a high m an-land ratio and a corresp on d in g ly  
high dem and fo r  con fisca ted  land. G iven that the amount o f land that could  
be taken fro m  land lords was fixed  and that there was little  p o ss ib ility  o f 
extending the arable area , the on ly  way o f obtaining m o re  land fo r  
rea llo ca tion  was b y  encroach ing  upon that owned by  the r ich  peasants.
Even a b r ie f  analysis such as this suggests that conditions in East 
China w ere su ffic ien tly  d istin ctive  to requ ire  changes in em phasis and 
rev is ion s  o f  som e aspects  o f  the A grarian  R e form  Law . N everth e less , 
the East China regulations rem ained essen tia lly  m od era te  and pragm atic .
The con fisca tion  and rea llo ca tion  o f land should cause as little  d isruption  
as p o ss ib le . If the p oor  and m iddle peasants w ere  to be the rea l b en e ­
fic ia r ie s  o f land re fo rm , in ter fe ren ce  with the r ich  peasant econ om y was 
also to be kept to a m inim um ; and in certa in  c ircu m sta n ce s  even the in terests  
o f  the landlords w ere  to be p rotected . In the agricu ltu ra l s e c to r  every
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e ffo rt  should be m ade to ensure that land re fo rm  preparations did not 
in ter fe re  with produ ction  op eration s.
This em phasis on caution d e serv es  sp ecia l m ention  in view  o f the
v e ry  d ifferen t tone o f the ECM A d irectiv e  'On C om pleting Land R eform
Ahead o f  T im e ' prom ulgated  by the East China B ranch  o f  the C C P on 5th 
(69)D ecem b er , 1950. Up to this point the approach to land re fo rm  had
been  one o f  gradua lism ; w here conditions perm itted , land con fisca tion  and
distribution  w ere  to take p lace  during the w inter o f 1950-51; but if
p reparations w ere  not su fficiently  advanced there should be a postponem ent
until the fo llow ing  w inter o r  even la ter . Now h ow ever, the new d irectiv e
suddenly dem anded that except fo r  parts o f Fukien and north A n h w e i^ ^
". . . the whole o f  the East China R egion  should str iv e  to b a s ica lly  com plete
(71)land re fo rm  by  A p r il, 1951. "
This change was o f  cou rse  re fle cted  in the plans fo r  north and south
K iangsu and we shall exam ine the reasons fo r  it in m o re  detail when we
com e to d iscu ss  land re fo rm  in these areas. F o r  the p resen t it is
su fficien t to note that the East China Bureau o f the C C P C entral C om m ittee
(72)attributed the d e c is io n  to C hina's recen t entry into the K orean  W ar.
China was com ing under attack from  the United States and its a llies  and
". . . inside and outside the country co u n ter -rev o lu tion a ry  elem ents are
(73)intensifying th eir  su bversive  a ctiv ities . M o re o v e r  E ast China
occu p ied  a s tra teg ic  d efen sive  p osition  and yet " im p e r ia lis t  fo r c e s  and
(74)Kuo m int apg rem nants "  had still not been en tire ly  elim inated  fro m  the area.
In this situation on ly i f  land re fo rm  w ere a cce lera ted  and rapid ly  com pleted  
could the e a r lie r  ach ievem ents be consolidated  and any new eventualities 
be fo re s ta lle d . ^
H ow ever, p ress in g  though these external fa c to rs  m ay have been,
it seem s lik e ly  that it was the c r it ic a l state o f the land re fo rm  cam paign
its e lf  that fo rce d  the planners to re v ise  their e a r lie r  gradualist approach
in favour o f  m o re  rapid con fisca tion  and rea lloca tion . In N ovem ber, 1950
a con feren ce  on land re fo rm  in East China had a lready  r e fe r re d  to p rob lem s
w hich had em erged  during the cam paign. L andlords had not been  slow  to
use the m oderate  tone o f  the e a r lie r  d irectiv es  to th eir  own advantage and
had a lleged ly  engaged in a wide range of sabotage a ct iv it ie s , including the
(75)tra n s fe r  o f  land, d estru ction  of p rop erty  and arson . They had
com m itted  m u rd ers  and beatings and w ere engaged in variou s su bversive
activ ities  designed  to underm ine governm ent p o licy . The situation was
exacerba ted  by  the frequent fa ilu re  o f  cadres to im plem en t land re fo rm
(76)p rop er ly : som e w ere  accu sed  o f  "com m a n d ism " o r  fo r  m onopolizing
all a ctiv it ie s , others  w ere  c r it ic iz e d  fo r  their va cilla tin g  and ca re le ss  
attitudes.
C le a rly  the situation was seriou s  enough to w arrant a change in the
(77)tim e -ta b le  fo r  land re fo rm . This was the b a s ic  d e c is io n  taken at the
N ovem ber con feren ce  and it was echoed  by the new tone in the D ecem ber 
d ire ct iv e . In con trast to the e a r lie r  em phasis on con cilia tion  the new 
docum ent was m o re  v itu perative , returning to the m o re  extrem e language 
o f the p re -1 9 4 9  y e a rs . In creasing  re lian ce  was p laced  on m a ss -m o b iliza tio n  
as the k ey  to the e lim ination  o f the "feudal pow er o f  the landlord  c la ss  in
the v il la g e s " . This was the context in which land re fo rm  in East China
. . .  i • (*78)p roceed ed  to its con clu sion .
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(2) Land re fo rm  in north Kiangsu:
P rep a ra to ry  w ork  fo r  land re fo rm  got under w ay in the "new ly
lib e ra te d "  areas o f  north K iangsu in the spring o f  1950. Throughout
the spring and su m m er m onths som e 11, 000 cad res  w ere  trained in
(79)p reparation  fo r  the com ing cam paigns. A fter  fin ish ing th eir  training
they w ere sent to all parts o f  the reg ion  to c a r r y  out the w ork o f  c o - o r d i ­
nating land re fo rm  and production  re lie f  w ork (this was the p eriod  when
north K iangsu was s e r io u s ly  a ffected  by natural d is a s te r s ) . S im ultaneously
(80)the cad res  ca rr ie d  out propaganda w ork , set up Peasant A ssocia tion s  
and g en era lly  strengthened the organ izational base  in the cou n tryside.
There fo llow ed  co n feren ces  at w hich this w ork and the exp erien ce  it had 
provided  w ere analyzed and d iscu ssed .
During August and Septem ber sm a ll areas w ere  ch osen  fo r  the 
im plem entation  o f land re fo rm  on an experim ental b a s is  and betw een 
August and the end o f  O ctober such tr ia ls  w ere  conducted in 43 " r e p r e ­
sen tative" hsiang. P r o g re s s  at this stage was slow  and cautious, in 
accord a n ce  with the d ire ct iv e s  o f  the ECM A. But in N ovem ber p rep a ra tory  
w ork m oved  to a h igher le v e l and land d istribu tion  began to get under way 
o v er  a w ider area  o f  north K iangsu. By the end o f  that m onth preparations
had been  b a s ica lly  com pleted  and in the two sou th ern -m ost S pecia l
(81)D istr icts  o f north K iangsu (N an-t'ung and T 'a i-ch o u ), 146 hsiang 
w ere  rep orted  to have com pleted  the con fisca tion  and rea llo ca tion  o f 
land.<82>
The rep orts  on w hich the above ch ron o log ica l account is based  give 
no hint that p rep a ra tory  w ork  had gone other than sm ooth ly  and accord in g
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to plan. A gainst this background another a rtic le  w hich appeared in the
secon d  w eek o f D ecem b er  is th ere fo re  o f  sp ecia l in terest fo r  the indication
(83)it g ives o f  outstanding p ro b le m s . It revea led  that two sh ortcom in gs
in p a rticu la r  w ere  threatening to underm ine the future p ro g re ss  o f  land 
re fo rm  in the reg ion . The f ir s t  (a lso  noted in ECM A docum ents) was 
inadequate m ass  m ob iliza tion  against "feudal pow er and the rem aining 
ob sta cles  to land r e fo r m " . A ction  was not being taken against the
su bversive  a ctiv ities  o f  the land lords and peasants in som e areas even 
showed "boundless len ie n cy "  tow ards those who w ere  gu ilty o f  such acts. 
As a resu lt, desp ite  the regulations w hich had been issu ed  to regulate
/ o c \
landlord  su bvers ion , opposition  by  this c la ss  continued to threaten 
the m ovem ent.
The secon d  p rob lem  arose  out o f the e x ce ss iv e  dem ands o f the 
Peasant A ssocia tion s  and their tendency tow ards " c lo s e -d o o r
/ Q / \
se cta r ia n ism ". This m ay have gone som e way to explaining the
in e ffectiven ess  o f  m ass m ob iliza tion  in som e a rea s , fo r  it was adm itted 
that the adoption o f  m em bersh ip  c r ite r ia  that w ere too re s tr ic t iv e  had 
alienated certa in  ca teg or ies  o f peasants w hose support was urgently  
needed fo r  the s u cce s s fu l im plem entation  o f land re fo rm .
It was at this point, against the background o f  the K orean  W ar and 
grow ing internal p ro b le m s , that the North Kiangsu A dm in istra tion  issu ed  
a d ire ct iv e  ca llin g  fo r  an a cce le ra tio n  o f land re fo rm  in the area . It is 
in teresting  that the docum ent gave m uch m ore  attention to the im m ediate 
p rob lem s being encountered  in the agricu ltura l s e c to r  than to the potential 
threat posed  by the K orean  W ar, supporting the e a r lie r  p rop os ition  that
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the m o re  rapid pace o f  land re fo rm  was ch ie fly  the produ ct o f endogenous 
fa c to rs . S ign ificantly  it was em phasized  that " . . .  all le v e ls  o f  le a d e r ­
ship m ust re co g n ize  the new ch a ra cter  and new m ethods o f  land re fo rm
under the changed c ircu m sta n ce s . They m ust bew are o f  and o v e rco m e
(87)old , n arrow -m in d ed  ideas o f  e m p ir ic ism  . . . " .  It was planned that 
during the w inter o f 1950-51 75% o f the new areas would com plete  land 
re fo rm  leaving the rem aining 25% to do so during the spring o f 1951.
In other w ord s , within about four m onths it was anticipated that land 
re fo rm  in north K iansu would be com pleted .
The actual regulations fo r  im plem enting land re fo rm  w ere published 
( 88 )on 18th D e cem b er . They w ere  arranged in three section s  c o r r e s p o n ­
ding to the "o ld  lib e ra te d " , the "reh ab ilita ted " and the "new ly lib e ra te d "
(89)areas o f  north K iangsu. In those areas w hich had rem ained under
CCP con tro l throughout the m iddle and late 1940's the con fisca tion  and
rea lloca tion  o f  land had a lready  taken p lace and the m ain  con sideration
was now to ensure that the ow nership  rights o f  the peasants who had
re ce iv ed  land w ere  p rotected  and that no attempt was m ade to take the
land away fro m  them . Although an obvious p ro v is io n  this was a lso a
sign ificant one, fo r  a la ter  part o f  the north K iangsu regulations m akes
it c le a r  that this kind o f illeg a l con fisca tion  had resu lted  in the d is -
(90)p o ss e s s io n  o f m iddle peasants.
O ther a rtic le s  dealt with the d istribution  o f  land and "m ovab le
(91)
p ro p e r ty "  w hich had been con fisca ted  but not yet d istribu ted .
P r io r ity  was to be given to p oor  peasants, d em ob ilized  so ld ie rs  and 
unem ployed w ork ers  fro m  the c ities  but sp ec ia l attention was a lso  drawn
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to " .  . . m iddle peasants who have been w ron gly  attacked . . . (and) . . .
those r ich  peasants and land lords who have too little  land and are unable
(92)to m ake a liv in g " . W here too m uch land had been  rea llo ca ted , it
could be red istribu ted  again as long as the peasant vo lu n tarily  d isc la im ed  
his rights to it. In gen era l, all u n resolved  p rob lem s relating to land, 
such as the ow nership  o f paths o r  ponds lying adjacent to the new ly- 
acqu ired  plots o f two peasants, w ere to be settled  in a ccord a n ce  with the 
p rin cip les  o f  benefiting production  and prom oting s o c ia l unity.
A ll in a ll, the p rov is ion s  fo r  the old  areas seem  to have been 
ch a ra cter ized  b y  an em phasis on con cilia tion  that is m o re  rem in iscen t 
o f the sp ir it  o f  the e a r lie r  d ire ct iv e s  than o f  this la ter  p eriod  with all 
its p ro b le m s . It m ay be that this was related  to the g rea ter  ease with 
w hich land re fo rm  could  be im plem ented in these "o ld  lib e ra te d "  regions 
com pa red  with other parts o f  north Kiangsu. C erta in ly  the other 
p rov is ion s  show how m uch m o re  com plica ted  the situation was in those 
other m o re  recen tly  " lib e ra te d "  areas .
The "reh abilita ted  a re a s "  w ere those in w hich som e agrarian  re fo rm  
had been  ca rr ie d  out during the 1940's but w here the subsequent r e -o c c u ­
pation by Kuom intang fo r c e s  had caused the e a r lie r  d e c is ion s  to be 
re v e rse d . As a resu lt landlords and rich  peasants had taken back  the 
land and other p rop e rty  w hich had e a r lie r  been  taken fro m  them  and given 
to p oor  peasants. The D ecem b er regulations stated that all illega l 
acqu isitions m ade by  landlords w ere again to be con fiscated , as was that 
land and p rop erty  due fo r  con fisca tion  which they s t ill  retained. At the 
sam e tim e land fo r c ib ly  taken from  peasants was to be re co v e re d , and
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all sa les  o r  tra n s fers  o f  land transacted  by land lords w ere  d ecla red  null 
and vo id . Any lo s s e s  that the peasants had su ffered  as a resu lt o f  these 
transaction s w ere  to be born e  by  the lan d lord s. S im ila r  p rov is ion s  a lso 
applied to r ich  peasants who had taken the opportunity o f  Kuomintang 
occupation  during the late 1940's to r e c o v e r  th eir  lo s t  wealth.
To a la rge  extent the p rov is ion s  fo r  the "new ly  lib e ra te d "  areas 
fo llow ed  the p r in c ip les  that had been laid  down in the A grarian  R eform  
Law and the ECM A regu la tion s. L andlords w ere  to r e ce iv e  the sam e 
amounts o f land as other peasants. R ich  peasants w ere  to be perm itted  
to retain  sm a ll amounts o f  ren ted -out land as long as there was su fficien t 
to m eet the dem ands o f  the p oor  peasants and h ired  agricu ltu ra l la b o u re rs . 
If this condition  was not m et, part o r  all o f the (ren ted -ou t) land could 
be requ isition ed .
An in teresting  p ro v is io n  related  to the d istribu tion  o f  draft anim als
and to o ls . The d istin ction  betw een agricu ltura l and n on -ag ricu ltu ra l use
was again used  as the c r ite r io n  fo r  con fisca tion , but a qu a lification  was
added to the e ffe ct  that w here the production  requ irem ents o f  a lo ca lity
( 9 3 )
ca lled  fo r  a g rea ter  o r  sm a lle r  supply o f  draft a n im a ls , ' ' as long as 
p e rm iss io n  was granted by  the North Kiangsu A dm in istra tion , the p rov is ion  
o f the ECM A relating to draft anim als could be ign ored . In other w ord s , 
in certa in  c ircu m sta n ces  anim als or ig in a lly  used fo r  n on -a g ricu ltu ra l 
p urposes m ight be a llocated  to peasants fo r  agricu ltu ra l w ork . It seem s 
c le a r  that this le s s  re s tr ic t iv e  attitude to draft anim al con fisca tion  was a 
recogn ition  o f  the seriou s  p rob lem  caused by th eir  shortage in north 
Kiangsu.
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The final substantive a rtic le  dealt with land in the new areas which
had been  tra n s fe rre d  o r  d isp ersed  by  landlords (fo r  exam ple , through
sa les  o r  m ortg a g es) but w hich was subject to con fisca tion . As a gen era l
(94)p rin cip le  A rt ic le  Eight o f the A grarian  R e form  Law was cited  but in 
o rd e r  to m eet the sp ec ia l c ircu m sta n ces  o f north K iangsu, som e su p ple­
m entary p rov is ion s  w ere  added. Thus peasants who w ere  entitled to 
re ce iv e  land and who had acqu ired  land through tran saction s with landlords 
w ere  allow ed to keep this in the in terests  o f  p rodu ction . At the sam e tim e 
cash  re ce iv e d  by  the land lords in the cou rse  o f  these transaction s was to 
be su rren d ered  and d istributed  among the peasants. In ca ses  w here a 
hsien  governm ent had granted land to a peasant s in ce  'L ib e ra t io n ', ca re  
was to be taken during the rea lloca tion  to p rotect the "peasant t i l le r " ,  
even i f  his land was s tr ic t ly  schedu led  fo r  red istribu tion . F in ally , all 
sa les  o f  land betw een peasants w ere  to be le g a lly  re cog n ized  on condition  
that they did not resu lt in any peasant having a sm a lle r  amount o f cu lt i­
vated land than the average fo r  his lo ca lity .
The north K iangsu land re fo rm  regulations are an in teresting m ixture 
o f con cilia tion  and se v e r ity  corresp on d in g  to the p a rticu la r  conditions in 
each  o f  the three areas o f the reg ion . But it is notew orthy that the u rgen cy  
o f  the e a r lie r  d ire ct iv e  ca lling  fo r  an a cce le ra tion  o f  land re fo rm  is 
en tire ly  absent fro m  the docum ent. Indeed it is  m o re  ch a ra cter ized  by  
those v e ry  "n arrow -m in d ed  ideas o f e m p ir ic is m "  w hich had com e under 
attack on ly a w eek b e fo r e . In view  o f this background and the speed with 
w hich land re fo rm  was in fact com pleted  in the area , it seem s lik e ly  
that the north  K iangsu regulations w ere - even at the tim e o f  th eir  p u b li­
cation  - rap id ly  being su perseded  by  the cou rse  o f even ts.
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In D ecem b er  the land re fo rm  m ovem ent in north K iangsu entered  the
stage o f "a ll-ro u n d "  advance and by  M arch , 1951 the con fisca tion  and
rea lloca tion  o f  land had b a s ica lly  been  com pleted . A rep ort m ade by the
V ice -C h a irm a n  o f the North Kiangsu Land R eform  C om m ittee som e months
la ter  looked back  upon this p eriod  as one o f untroubled p r o g r e ss ;
"T he governm ent adopted urgent m e a su res , gave support to the 
p easan ts ' righteous stru gg le , s e tu p  P e o p le 's  C ourts and brought 
law less  landlords under con tro l. The m ovem ent m erged  with the 
'R e s is t -U . S. , S u p p ort-K orea ' and cou n ter -rev o lu tion a ry  cam paigns 
and the enthusiasm  o f the m a sses  reached  unprecedented  heights.
B lazing like f ir e  set to a d ry  tinder, the struggle system a tica lly  
developed  to b ecom e  the h igh -tide  o f  the anti-feudal m ass 
m ovem ent. "  (95)
At the end o f  1951 such a rosea te  view  o f e a r lie r  events m ay have seem ed
ju stified . H ow ever, a m o re  revealing account published sh ortly  after land
d istribution  had been  com pleted  shows c le a r ly  that the final stages o f  land
(96)re fo rm  w ere not so tr o u b le - fr e e . E rroneous tendencies among both
cad res  and peasants p ers is te d  and m ost seriou s  o f a ll, land lords continued
to show strong op p osition  to the new p o lic ie s . The slaughter o f  draft
anim als and the d estru ction  o f  fa rm  too ls  o c cu rre d  frequently . Both w ere
vita l fa c to rs  in the agricu ltu ra l s e c to r  and the potential e ffe c t  o f  th eir  lo ss
upon production  was v e r y  se r io u s . There w ere rep orts  o f landlords concea ling
a rm s, m urderin g peasants and in filtrating peasant organ iza tion s . In a
v illa ge  o f  Sui-ning h s ie n , a landlord  had m u rdered  one o f  h is perm anent
h ired  labou rers  out o f  fe a r  that this peasant would d is c lo s e  the w hereabouts
o f som e s ilv e r  d o lla rs  and opium  that he had hidden. In another ca se  a
landlord  was rep orted  to have bribed  a w ork  brigade (ku n g-tso  tui) with a
(97)
paym ent o f  2. 4 m illio n  ydan.
Such incidents continued w ell a fter the com pletion  o f land red istribu tion .
- 8 3 -
As late as August, 1951 the 'N orth Kiangsu D a ily ' rep orted  a resu rgen ce  o f  
"la w less  l a n d l o r d s T h e  fa ilu re  o f  cadres (e ith er through fe a r  o r  
in d iffe ren ce ) to take f irm  action against such elem ents was enabling them  
to take back land w hich had been  con fisca ted . The old  d ev ice  o f  concealing 
land posed  another p rob lem ; in a v illa ge  o f  T 'a i-h s in g  h sien  , fo r  exam ple, 
an investigation  conducted in A p ril revea led  that o v e r  141 m ou o f land had 
been  su cce s s fu lly  con cea led  fro m  the authorities, represen tin g  9. 58% o f the
(99)total arable area  o f the v illa g e . M ost astonishing o f a ll, in som e areas
landlords w ere s till s e c r e t ly  co llectin g  rents!
But in spite o f  these d ifficu lties  land re fo rm  was gradually  wound up. 
A fter  con fisca tion  and red istribu tion , title  deeds w ere  issu ed  to the new 
ow ners o f  the land. In the context o f the c le a r ly -e x p r e s s e d  intention o f the 
C hinese planners to m ove tow ards a so c ia lize d  agricu ltu re , such acts m ay 
appear to be little  m o re  than em pty gestu res . H ow ever, it is  not d ifficu lt 
to see that fo r  the peasants who acqu ired  land o f  th eir  own fo r  the f ir s t  tim e, 
they m ust have had a v e r y  rea l s ign ifica n ce . In any ca s e , by  the end o f  1951 
land re fo rm  in north K iangsu had been  com pleted  and even i f  res is ta n ce  had 
not been  tota lly  extinguished, the econ om ic  base o f the land lords had been 
elim inated and a new c la ss  o f sm all o w n e r -o ccu p ie rs  had em erged .
(2) Land re fo rm  in south K iangsu ;
The C hinese Com m unist fo r c e s  c r o s s e d  the Yangtze in A p ril, 1949 and 
com plete  the 'L ib e ra tio n ' o f south Kiangsu by the beginning o f June. During 
these m onths p r io r ity  was given  to bringing the m ilita ry  situation under 
con tro l and n orm aliz in g  conditions in the c ities  - a p a rticu la r ly  im portant 
task in view  o f the re g io n 's  advanced industria l s e c to r . By con trast, although
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rem nants o f Kuomintang fo r c e s  w ere s till creating d iso rd e r  and the landlords
exerting con s id era b le  pow er in the v illa g e s , rural w ork  was n eg lected . As
a resu lt, peasant d iscontent becam e a seriou s  p rob lem  and by July and
August a c r it ic a l situation had developed  in the v illa g e s . On the one hand,
natural d isa ste rs  had caused the flooding o f  m ore  than fou r m illion  m ou o f
arable land and on the oth er, "feu d a l"  elem ents w ere taking the opportunity
o f the uncertain  conditions to s tir  up trou ble . Landlords ca rr ie d  out
sabotage and other su bvers ive  activ ities  and even prevented  the establishm ent
( 100 )o f b a s ic  p o lit ica l organs in the countryside.
The im m ediate tasks o f  the C C P in south Kiangsu w ere , then, to c a r r y  
out d is a s t e r -r e l ie f  op era tion s, e lim inate the Kuomintang "ban d its" still 
roam ing the countryside and sta b ilize  the p reca riou s  situation. G radually 
this was a ccom plish ed : o rd e r  was la rg e ly  re stored  to m any o f the v illa g e s , 
the P arty  was strengthened and activ ists  began to em erge  fro m  among the 
peasants to b ecom e  ca d re s . M oreover, at the end o f  July em phasis was 
shifted fro m  the c it ie s  to the v illa ges  and cadre organ izations w ere sent down 
to the cou n trysid e . At the end o f  the follow ing m onth two "v illa g e  w ork c o r p s ' 
(nung-ts 'un  kung-tso  t 'u a n )w ere form ed  and their two thousand m em bers  
d ispatched to c a r r y  out experim ental w ork  in Wu and W usih h s ie n . W ork 
briga des  (k ung-tso  tui) o f  varying s ize s  w ere  a lso estab lish ed  in all the other 
h sien  and a furth er eight thousand cad res  m oved  to the cou n trysid e . Through 
out south K iangsu o v e r  160, 000 Peasant A sso cia tio n  m em b ers  w ere m ob ilized  
and b y  the end o f August conditions w ere ready fo r  the p rep a ra tory  stages 
o f land re fo rm  to get under way.
By S eptem ber, 1949 the situation had im p roved  con s id era b ly . As p ro p a ­
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ganda w ork  got under way and P arty  con tro l extended down to the v illa ge  
le v e l the peasants w ere  in cre a s in g ly  won o v er  to the new p o lic ie s . A ction  
continued to be taken against Kuomintang su p p orters , a n ti-flood  m easu res  
w ere s u cce s s fu lly  adopted and som e o f the prob lem s a ssocia ted  with the 
fa ilu re  o f the autumn crop  w ere o v e rco m e . The p rim e con sid era tion  in 
O ctober was produ ction  w ork  and the m aintenance o f  the sown area . Through 
out N ovem ber and D ecem b er  the "autumn le v y "  (the a cqu isition  o f grain  by  
the state fo r  storage  and distribution ) was su cce s s fu lly  com pleted .
B y the end o f  the year Peasant A ssocia tion  m em bers  num bered o v er  
2 ,2 3 4 , 000 (21. 82% o f  the agricu ltu ra l population), an in cre a se  o f  two m illion  
o v e r  the su m m er figu re .
But desp ite  the op tim ism  with w hich 1950 seem s to have opened the
situation was not without its p rob lem s. It was fr e e ly  adm itted that there
( 102 )w ere  m any d e fic ie n c ie s  in the peasant m ovem ent. The m ost noticeab le
perhaps was the uneven way in w hich the m ovem ent had developed ; in som e 
areas m ass m ob iliza tion  was w ell under way, but in others landlord  powe r 
rem ained intact. A  m a jo r  p rob lem  was peasant re lu ctan ce  to speak out 
(let alone take p ositive  action) against the land lords; this enabled the land ­
lo rd s  to use all the fa m ilia r  d ev ices  to escape rent reduction . They wept 
fa lse  tears  and feigned  p overty  to th eir  tenants, m ade loans to peasants on 
term s that would p rov id e  them  with a substitute fo r  the rent that had been  
deducted; they used  the lega l p rov is ion s  o f o ffic ia l d ire c t iv e s  to th eir  own
advantage, exaggerated  c a d r e s ’ shortcom ings and even threatened to
(103)take back land rented out to tenants. ' In som e p la ces  they w ere able
to m anipulate w hole b o d ie s , such as Peasant A sso c ia tio n s , fo r  their
own ends. To som e extent these prob lem s w ere a lso a re fle c t io n  o f
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cadre  d e fic ie n c ie s , fo r  inevitably  there w ere som e who w ere  m otivated  
by  s e lf- in te r e s t  and succum bed to b r ib e ry  and others who fe ll p rey  to 
such erron eou s tendencies as fo r c e d  co lle c tiv isa tio n  o f  labou r, e x ce ss iv e  
" fo r m a lis m " , " c lo s e -d o o r  se cta r ia n ism " and so on.
That such p rob lem s ex isted  is h ard ly  su rp ris in g . Even in north Kiangsu
s im ila r  d ifficu lties  had arisen ; yet south Kiangsu was m o re  recen tly
" lib e ra te d "  and lacked  the exp erien ce  and advantages w hich the north had
enjoyed as a resu lt o f C C P occupation  in the years b e fo re  1949- In
addition, e co n o m ica lly  and so c ia lly , south Kiangsu was a m ore  com plex
(104)reg ion  - above all becau se  o f  its im portant industria l and urban s e cto r .
A c o r o lla r y  was that thorough preparations and a gradua list approach to 
land re fo rm  w ere  even m o re  n e ce s sa ry  in the south i f  land re fo rm  w ere to 
be ca rr ie d  out s u cce ss fu lly . How fa r  such con sidera tion s  w ere acted upon 
w ill b ecom e  apparent la ter .
A d irectiv e  published tow ards the end o f M arch , 1950^ gave the 
f ir s t  ind ication  o f the planned tim e -sch ed u le  fo r  land re fo rm  in south 
Kiangsu. It stated that the red istribu tion  o f con fisca ted  land should begin  
after the autumn h arvest (1950), but on ly  on condition  that the preparations 
had been fu lly  ca r r ie d  out and the peasants p ro p e r ly  organ ized . W here 
these conditions w ere  not m et, rea lloca tion  was to be postponed until after 
the autumn h arvest o f  1951. M eanwhile p rep a ra tory  w ork  (investigations 
o f  the situation in the v illa g e s , the drafting o f  plans fo r  each  area, p ro p a ­
ganda and tr ia l land re fo rm  on a representative  basis) should sim ultaneously 
get under way. A  p o licy  o f  gradualism  was r ig id ly  upheld.
The co -o rd in a tio n  o f  land re fo rm  preparations with produ ction  w ork
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in the fie lds  was even m ore  im portant in south K iangsu than it had been 
in the north. Kiangnan was part o f the r ich est agricu ltu ra l reg ion  in the 
whole country and it was essen tia l to m aintain and in cre a s e  leve ls  o f 
p roduction  in the area . It is  sign ificant that w here land d istribution  was 
scheduled  to begin  in autumn, 1950, cadres w ere exhorted  to m ake sure 
it was com pleted  b e fo re  the spring-p lough ing p eriod  o f  the fo llow ing yea r.
N or is it co in c id en ce  that em phasis was also p laced  on the im portan ce o f 
p ress in g  ahead with the grain  levy .
In addition, the e ffe cts  o f the natural d isa sters  had not been com p lete ly
o v e rco m e . One a rtic le  pointed out that any delay in spring ploughing would
affect the autumn h arvest and so prolong the consequences o f  the d is a s t e r s .^
In those areas w hich had been se v e re ly  hit the situation was c r it ic a l and
it was M. . . not s im p ly  a question  o f  how to so lve  the p rob lem  o f live lih ood ,
(107)but o f how to save l iv e s " .
Throughout the spring and sum m er the m ovem ent seem s gen era lly  to
have gone accord in g  to plan. Investigations w ere conducted and detailed
studies m ade o f the land situation in south Kiangsu and the problem s of land
re fo rm  p o licy . B y the end o f  July 3, 600 cadres had been  trained and 20, 000
m ore  p laces w ere  expected  to be fille d  by  the autumn h arvest. Peasant
A ssocia tion s  w ere  set up in e v ery  hsiang in south K iangsu and these took
(109)the lead in production  w ork  and r e lie f  op eration s. The "b r ig a d e "
(kung-tso tu i) had a lready  started  experim ental w ork in represen tative  
hsiang and s im ila r  tr ia ls  w ere planned to get under w ay e lsew h ere  in 
August. Of co u rse , not all p rob lem s had been o v e rco m e  and in p articu lar 
landlord  op p osition  continued on a w ide s ca le .  ^ ^
N everth e less , preparations w ere con sid ered  su ffic ien tly  w ell in hand 
to p erm it the im plem entation  o f  land re fo rm  in accord a n ce  with the orig in a l 
plan and in August the south Kiangsu A dm in istration  re a ffirm ed  the d e c is io n  
to start land con fisca tion  and rea lloca tion  after the autumn harvest.^
In itse lf  this was h ard ly  notew orthy; yet it is p r e c is e ly  that the orig in a l 
plan was being adhered to that is so in terestin g , fo r  exa ctly  one month 
la ter  a new d ire ct iv e  was issu ed  announcing the d e c is io n  to com plete  land 
re fo rm  in south K iangsu during the w inter and spring o f  1 9 5 0 -5 1 .^ * ^
This new d e c is io n  was the outcom e o f  the ’F ir s t  South K iangsu Peasant 
R epresentative C o n feren ce ' held in  the m unicipality  o f  W usih betw een 
2nd-6th Septem ber and sp e c ia lly  ca lled  to d iscu ss  land re fo rm . Opening 
speeches on the cu rren t situation and future tasks w ere  made by C h 'en  
P 'i -h s ie n  and O u-yang H u i-lin  and their rep orts  w ere  subsequently
d iscu ssed  by  the con feren ce  d elega tes . Much o f  the con feren ce  was taken 
up with denunciations o f the lan d lord s; re fe re n ce  was constantly  m ade to 
th eir  exploitation  o f peasants and the resp o n s ib ility  they b o re  fo r  rural 
p overty . The sabotage and other su bversive  a ctiv ities  they had ca rr ie d
out w ere stron g ly  c r it ic iz e d . There fo llow ed  dem ands that the governm ent
adopt s tr ic t  m ea su res  to curb these activ ities  and bring the landlords
, ( 115) under con tro l.
On the final day o f  the con feren ce  four resolu tions w ere  passed . Of 
these the m ost in teresting  was one calling fo r  the com pletion  o f  land re fo rm  
within about s ix  m onths.^ ^  In one sense this was h ard ly  su rpris in g ; 
after all the ECM A and N orth K iangsu A dm in istration  had both stated their 
intention to a cce le ra te  the land re fo rm  p rogram m e. H ow ever, both these
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d e c is ion s  had been  taken after China's entry into the K orean  W ar and 
indeed it was the dangerous international situation w hich had provided  
the osten sib le  reason  fo r  the change in plan. What is  p a rticu la r ly  in teresting 
about the south K iangsu reso lu tion  is that it was taken on 6th S eptem ber,
1950; in other w ord s , b e fo re  China had entered the w ar and a fu ll three 
m onths b e fo re  the sam e d e c is io n  was m ade in the north o f  the p rov in ce .
What was the reason  fo r  this sudden change? The preoccu p ation  o f 
the delegates with the p rob lem s caused by continuing land lord  opposition  
to rura l p o lic ie s  o ffe r s  a p o ss ib le  answ er fo r  it seem s lik e ly  that th is , 
com bined  with w eakn esses in  peasant m ass m ob iliza tion , had led  to an 
im p asse  w hich was threatening the future o f the land re fo rm  m ovem ent.
The way out o f this im p asse  was to in tensify  propaganda w ork , em phasize the 
c la ss  nature o f the struggle and hope that the d ifficu lties  could be o v e r ­
com e by  pushing ahead m ore  rapid ly .
Support fo r  this in terpretation  is  not on ly  provided  by  the tone and 
content o f the con feren ce  its e lf  but a lso by  an analysis o f  the rev ised  plans 
fo r  land re fo rm  which was published on the sam e day that the new d ec is ion  
was m a d e J ^ ^  The w hole weight o f  this a rtic le  was that the future o f the 
land re fo rm  m ovem ent in south K iangsu depended on the c la ss  struggle against 
the lan d lord s. The antagonism  betw een the peasants and land lords re fle cted  
the relationsh ip  betw een the elim ination  o f "feu d a l" exp loitation  and the 
" lib e ra t io n "  o f  the ru ra l p rodu ctive  fo r c e s  and developm ent o f  agricu ltural 
p roduction . Of co u rse  c la ss  d ifferen tiation  had always been  a fundam ental 
part o f  the land re fo rm  cam paign; but to a la rge  extent, the co n c ilia to ry  
content o f e a r lie r  d ire ct iv e s  had tended to play it down. Now c la ss  struggle
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was re -e m p h a s ize d . Thus M. . . unless e ffe ctive  m ea su res  are taken . . .
s o c ia l o rd e r  w ill be d estroyed  and it w ill be d ifficu lt to im plem ent land 
re fo rm  in an o r d e r ly  and steady m anner. If law less  landlords are not 
dealt with s tr ic t ly  the p e o p le 's  len ien cy  tow ards those landlords who do
(119)uphold the laws cannot be shown. 11
The p roceed in gs  o f  a secon d  con feren ce  provide furth er evidence to
support our ana lysis. This was the Second Plenum  o f the F ir s t  S ession
o f the C on feren ce  o f  P e o p le 's  R epresentatives fro m  A ll Spheres o f South 
( 120 )Kiangsu, also held in W usih and fo rm a lly  opened on 5th Septem ber,
1950 by C h 'en  P 'i -h s ie n .
The speech es m ade by  the variou s delegates at this secon d  con feren ce  
give a c le a r  p ictu re  o f  how the land re fo rm  situation in south Kiangsu was 
v iew ed at this tim e and how s e r io u s ly  the threat posed  b y  land lord  opposition  
was taken. V irtu a lly  all the speakers repeated the accusation  that the 
landlord  c la ss  was the root cause o f  peasant p overty , backw ardness and 
op p ress ion  and fo llow ed  the exam ple o f the e a r lie r  con feren ce  in calling 
fo r  s tr ic t  m easu res  to con tro l and stop the crim in a l activ ities  o f the 
lan d lord s.
M ore in teresting  how ever w ere the attacks on the s till-p re v a le n t
( 122)b e lie f  that "south K iangsu isn 't  feu d a l". The argum ent behind this
was that s ince  urban ization  and industria lization  had reached  an advanced 
stage in south K iangsu and m any landlords w ere engaged in industria l and 
co m m e rc ia l e n te rp r ise s , the "feu d a l" ch a ra cte r is t ics  o f lan d lord ism  
evident in other parts o f  China w ere absent in this reg ion . M ore o v e r , 
not on ly  w ere  there no "b ig "  landlords in south K iangsu but landlord  num bers
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in gen era l w ere m uch few er . To a certa in  extent such attitudes w ere 
fo stered  by  those p rov is ion s  o f the A grarian  R eform  Law and other regiona l 
d ire ct iv e s  w hich had p laced  so m uch em phasis on the sp e c ia l treatm ent
(123)that landlords with industria l and co m m e rc ia l in terests  should re ce iv e .
In any ca se , the u ltim ate con clu sion  o f  the argum ent was that exploitation  
by landlords south o f  the Yangtze was o f re la tive ly  sm all im p ortan ce .
The point was m ost c le a r ly  m ade by  C h 'en  Ytin-ke in a speech  attacking 
those people who took  the attitude that peasant dem ands w ere  w rong and 
who sided with the la n d lo rd s . R epresentative Huang L i-y e h  s im ila r ly
ca lled  on con feren ce  delegates to take the standpoint o f  the peasants, not 
the lan d lord s.
The speech  m ade by Chou M e i-ch 'u  was c le a r ly  designed  to re d re ss  the 
ba lan ce. He pointed out that such slogans as "south  K iangsu isn 't
feu d a l", "there  are no big landlords in south K iangsu" o r  "south Kiangsu 
d oesn 't  have tenant households, on ly guest h ou seh old s" (k 'e -h u ) w ere s till 
being d issem inated  in e v e ry  hsien  and w ere p a rticu la r ly  prevalent in the 
c it ie s . O thers w ere  arguing that landlords w ere p r im a r ily  engaged in 
activ ities  other than those connected  with the ow nership  o f  land and that 
in any case  their holdings did not extend to tens o f thousands o f  m ou as they 
did in the north o f  the p rov in ce . A ll th is , said Chou, was m istaken; su b­
v e rs iv e  activ ities  had taken p lace  in e v ery  "d is t r ic t "  ( c h ’ i i )  o f  south Kiangsu 
and the on ly d iffe ren ce  betw een landlords in the north and south was that 
in south K iangsu they w ere a good deal m ore  cunning and adept in concealing 
th eir  true nature.
But the m ost in teresting  speech  o f  all was undoubtedly that m ade by
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O u-yang H u i-lin . He argued that the a ssertion  that south Kiangsu
was not feudal was being rep laced  by  a d ifferen t allegation  w hich suggested  
that becau se o f  heavy population p re ssu re  upon a lim ited  amount o f  land 
there was in su ffic ien t land fo r  rea lloca tion . The im p lica tion  o f this seem s 
to have been that land re fo rm  could  on ly resu lt in the em ergen ce  o f  fa rm s 
o f u n econ om ic s iz e . O u -yan g 's  rep ly  to this argum ent is o f great in terest 
fo r  it prov ided  one o f  the v e ry  few  d iscu ss ion s  o f the e co n o m ic  aspects o f 
land re fo rm . F ir s t , he pointed out that the arable area  o f  22, 500, 000 
m ou could give each  m em b er  o f  the agricu ltural population a little  o v er  two 
m ou o f  cu ltivable land. P resu m ab ly , he be liev ed  this was a v iab le  econ om ic  
unit. But such an average was m islead in g  since  in som e den sely -popu la ted  
d is tr ic ts  the average p er  capita  amount o f  land available fo r  rea lloca tion  
was substantially  le s s  than one m ou. O u-yang recogn ized  this but refu sed  
to see  any e co n o m ic  disadvantage in it, arguing instead that " . . . as long as 
land re fo rm  is  im plem ented  thorough ly, even if  peasants who have little  o r  
no land on ly  get a sm all p lot, th ey 'll s till be happy". A gain , " . . . as long 
as the feudal exp loitative  system  o f the landlord  c la ss  is e lim inated  and the 
peasants are m ade ow ners o f  th e ir  own land, the produ ction  enthusiasm  o f
the peasants can s till be ra ised  even i f  they get on ly a sm a ll amount o f land.
(128}Even on a tiny p lot, th e y 'll s till be able to achieve a bum per h arvest. " 
N everth e less , he did adm it that land re fo rm  could not so lve  rural poverty  
on its own and that after land had been  rea lloca ted  peasants would have to 
ca r r y  out fa rm  im p rovem en ts, adopting d eeper and m o re  intensive cu lt i­
vation , applying m o re  fe r t i l iz e r ,  using better seeds and organ izing  mutual 
aid.
O u -yan g 's  speech  was an ind ication  that how ever dom inant the purely
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p o lit ica l fa c to rs  m ay have been  in the land re fo rm  m ovem ent, e con om ic  
con sideration s  w ere  not w holly  forgotten . Its em phasis on the p ositive  
econ om ic  e ffects  o f  land re fo rm  also  suggests that not everybod y  was 
equally  enthusiastic about the rural p o lic ie s . In p a rticu la r  it seem s c le a r  
that som e w ere  con cern ed  le s t  the institutional changes should on ly have 
the m ost m argina l e ffe ct  on e con om ic  produ ctiv ity  b ecau se  o f south K iangsu 's 
high m an-land  ra tio . To som e extent this was a produ ct o f the b e lie f  that 
"south K iangsu is n 't  feu d a l", fo r  i f  one accepted  that there w ere few er 
landlords and no "b ig "  landlords it fo llow ed  that the amount o f  land available 
fo r  red istrib tu ion  was lim ited  (unless the planners w ere  prepared  to en croach  
upon the r ich  peasants). How fa r  Ou-yang H ui-lin  was ju stified  in his faith 
in the e con om ic  e ff ic a c y  o f  land re fo rm  in Kiangnan w ill b ecom e c le a r  when 
we con s id er  the e co n o m ic  e ffects  o f the agrarian  re fo rm s  in the final 
part o f  this chapter.
In accord a n ce  with the rev ised  p lans, the con fisca tion  and rea lloca tion  
o f land got under w ay in south K iangsu after the autumn h arvest and by ea rly  
N ovem ber, 1950 it was a lready anticipated that the en tire  agricu ltural 
population would have com pleted  land re fo rm  by the fo llow ing  spring .
The d e c is io n  to a cce le ra te  laud re fo rm  in the north had p reced ed  the 
publication  o f  the fo rm a l regulations fo r  land re fo rm  by  about a w eek; in 
the south the d iscre p a n cy  was m uch grea ter . The f ir s t  W usih con feren ce  
in e a r ly  S eptem ber had a lready m ade the d e c is io n  that land d istribution  
should be com pleted  by spring , 1951 and in its em phasis on c la ss  struggle 
had c le a r ly  m oved  away fro m  the con cilia tion  and p ragm atism  o f the parent 
A grarian  R e form  Law and other regiona l d ire ct iv e s . Yet p arad ox ica lly ,
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the land re fo rm  regulations fo r  south Kiangsu w hich appeared alm ost
(130)three m onths la te r , fa r  fro m  upholding the new line seem ed  to return
to the sp ir it  o f  the e a r lie r  phase o f  the cam paign.^ ^ ^
The south K iangsu regulations distinguished betw een landlords who 
had re fo rm ed  th em selves  and those who had not. D isp o sse ss io n  o f  the 
landlords rem ained  the m ainspring o f  the m ovem ent but it was not to be 
ca rr ie d  out b lind ly . Thus, land w hich the landlords th em selves  had brought 
under cu ltivation  sin ce  1949 was to rem ain  untouched and m em bers  o f  land ­
lo rd  fa m ilies  should re ce iv e  com pensation  fo r  any agricu ltu ra l w ork  they
had p e r fo rm ed . They w ere also to re ce iv e  land fo r  th eir  own use equal to
(132)the average p er capita  amount o f land in the p a rticu la r  lo ca lity .
The im portan ce o f  p rotectin g  industry and trade has a lready  been 
m entioned as having p articu lar  s ign ifican ce  in south K iangsu, w here the 
industria l and co m m e rc ia l s e c to rs  w ere  highly d evelop ed . The point com es 
a cro ss  stron g ly  in the fo llow ing  passage from  the south K iangsu land re fo rm  
regu la tion s ;
"O ther p ro p erties  o f lan d lord s, including th eir  industria l and 
c o m m e rc ia l e n te rp r ise s , are not to be con fisca ted . This is 
d e fin ite ly  fo r  the p rotection  o f industry and trad e . B ecau se 
la rge  num bers o f  landlords sim ultaneously engage in industry 
and co m m e rce  south o f the Y angtze, it is  d ifficu lt within a short 
tim e to d istinguish  the other p rop erties  o f land lords fro m  their 
industria l and co m m e rc ia l en te rp r ise s . If these oth er landlord  
p rop erties  are con fisca ted  th eir  industria l and co m m e rc ia l 
en terp rises  m ay also be a ffected . N aturally such oth er p r o p e r ­
ties o f  the land lords which are actually not connected  with in du s­
try  and co m m e rce  m ay also be exem pted from  in fringem ent due 
to this regu lation . This is against the in terests  o f  the p easan ts . 
H ow ever, in o r d e r  to avoid con fusion  it is better  to allow  the 
landlords to keep these p rop erties  and enable the land lords to 
invest them  in produ ction . This w ill be b en e fic ia l to the whole 
o f  so c ie ty . "  (133)
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Notwithstanding its appeal to the good o f s o c ie ty  as a w hole, this 
was a v e ry  c le a r  statem ent o f  the determ ination  to sustain  industry and 
trade even i f  it m eant forfe itin g  the aim s o f land re fo rm . In any con flict  
betw een the in terests  o f  the peasants and those o f  the m od ern  s e cto r  it 
was the la tter that should re ce iv e  p r io r ity . ^
In an e a r lie r  section  we showed that the p o licy  o f  unconditional
p reserva tion  o f the r ich  peasant econ om y would requ ire  m od ifica tion  in
regions like south K iangsu, w here the p ressu re  o f population on the land
was e s p e c ia lly  great. D ifferen ces  in the w ording o f  ECM A regulations and
those o f  the C entral G overnm ent a lready pointed to th is . If anything, the
m atter was m ade m o re  exp lic it  in the south Kiangsu regu lations:
"W ith regard  to la rge  amounts o f  land rented out by r ich  peasants, 
even i f  the amount o f such land does not exceed  the area  cultivated 
by th em selves o r  with the help o f  h ired  labou r, it m ay, if  dem ands 
are so m ade by  a m a jo r ity  o f peasants and if  the m atter is  sanctioned 
by this o ffic e  (South K iangsu A dm inistration ) be partly  o r  w holly 
requ isitioned  . . . "  (135)
This was a c le a r  departure fro m  the A grarian  R e form  Law which
had im plied  that on ly  land in e x ce ss  o f that cu ltivated  by the r ich  peasants
(136)th em selves  o r  th eir  h ired  labou rers  should be su b ject to requ isition .
A p rob lem  w hich had sp ec ia l re levan ce  to south K iangsu was the tr e a t ­
m ent o f  land w hich was divided into su rface  and s u b -s o il  rights.^  If
such land was s im p ly  con fisca ted  fro m  the landlord  (the ow ner o f  the su b­
so il right) the resu lt would be to penalize the tenant (the peasant holding 
the su rfa ce  right but s till paying a rent to the s u b -s o il  ow ner). Som e way 
had to be found o f expropriating the landlord  without expropriating  the 
tenant. The p rob lem  had a lready been  recogn ized  by the A grarian  R eform
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Law which stated that " i f  the t i l le r  p o ss e s se s  the su rfa ce  rights o f  the
land he rents, a portion  o f  land equivalent to the p r ice  o f  the su rface
rights in that lo ca lity  shall be re se rv e d  fo r  him  i f  the land is  drawn
(138}upon fo r  d istr ib u tion ". It was essen tia lly  this solu tion  that the
south Kiangsu authorities adopted. Thus, "in  adjusting land, the su rface
right o f  which has been  rented out to t i l le r s ,  a portion  o f  land equal to the
(139)value o f the su rfa ce  right should be rese rv e d  fo r  the t i l le r " .  In
other w ords d istribu tion  was to take p lace  in the usual w ay except that 
becau se o f  his p ecu lia r  status as ow ner and tenant on the sam e p iece  o f 
land, the ow ner o f  the su rfa ce  right was to re ce iv e  an additional p iece  o f  
land equal in value to that o f  this right. It was actually a m ove away fro m  
the norm al p rin cip le  governing d istribution  designed  to ach ieve the twin 
aim s o f  d isp o s se s s io n  o f landlord  and protection  o f  tenant (here r e p r e ­
sented by the su rfa ce  ow ner).
N ovem ber and D ecem b er , 1950 w ere  the "h ig h -t id e "  o f  land re fo rm  in 
(140)south K iangsu. The evidence suggests that during this p eriod  there
was som ething o f  a breakthrough in the cam paign. One rep ort indicated 
that until N ovem ber the fa ilu re  o f  the P e o p le 's  C ourts to take strong action 
against the land lords and in su fficien t m ob iliza tion  o f  the peasants had left 
the landlords s till v e r y  pow erfu l. Even w here land had been rea lloca ted
landlords had tr ied  to take it back ; and in parts o f  Wu hsien  peasants had 
not dared to cultivate the land w hich they had re ce iv e d . But by  the end o f 
N ovem ber land lord  opposition  had passed  its peak and con fisca tion  and 
rea lloca tion  o f  land m ade rapid p r o g r e s s .  ^ B y the m idd le  o f the 
follow ing m onth, 1, 157 hsiang w ere rep orted  to have com pleted  land re form ; 
546 in Sung-chiang S pecia l D istr ict ; 210 in C h 'an g-ch ou ; 143 in Soochow ;
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126 in Chinkiang and 132 in W usih hsien  .  ^  ^ This rep resen ted  43%
o f the 2 ,667  hsiang which w ere scheduled fo r  land re fo rm . Em phasis
on c la ss  struggle continued and d ire ct  confrontations betw een landlords
and peasants w ere  eng ineered . In January, 1951 m eetings o f  peasant
rep resen tatives  w ere  ca lled  at ch'tf and hsiang le v e ls  everyw h ere  in
o rd e r  to oppose those landlords who continued to oppose  the m ovem ent
(144)and a fo rm a l "stru g g le  m ovem en t" was launched. M ateria l co lle c te d
during this p eriod  becam e the evidence that was used  at subsequent tr ia ls  
held by  the P e o p le 's  C ou rts.
By 15th F eb ru a ry  land rea lloca tion  was com pleted  in 1, 983 hsiang in
12 hsien  (114 ch'tf). Another 701 hsiang w ere in the p r o ce s s  o f  im plem enting
(145)it and on ly  23 had encountered som e delay. It was now anticipated
that the w ork  o f  red istributing the con fisca ted  land would be gen era lly
com pleted  b y  the m idd le o f  M arch  and in fact, in the last w eek o f  that
m onth the 'New China D aily ' p roc la im ed  in the title  o f one o f  its leading
(146)a rtic le s  that "land re fo rm  is b a s ica lly  com pleted  in south K iangsu".
In v iew  o f the speed with w hich land had been  con fisca ted  and r e d is t r i­
buted in south K iangsu it was perhaps inevitable that som e p rob lem s should 
rem ain  outstanding. Thus cad res  continued to be c r it ic iz e d  fo r  their haste 
and c a r e le s s n e s s . Landlords s till m anaged to esca p e  the confines o f  th eir  
v illa ges  in la rg e  n u m b e r s ^ ^  and som e su cceed ed  in re co v er in g  their 
con fisca ted  land. In som e areas d isp o sse ss io n  on ly  a ffected  la n d lord s ' 
land and draft an im als, to o ls , surplus g r a in ^ " ^  and buildings w ere le ft 
untouched. In o th ers , peasants com plained that the land lords w ere s till 
b e t te r -o f f  after land re fo rm  becau se  o f  the la rge  amounts o f  good land
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they had been  allow ed to keep. M ost seriou s  o f  a ll, it was revea led  that in
som e d is tr ic ts  on ly  a m ock  land re fo rm  had taken p lace  so that the d is tr i-
(149)bution o f  land and other fa c to rs  rem ained unchanged in rea l te rm s . '
Such p rob lem s p resu m ab ly  occu p ied  the attention o f  the cad res  during 
the rest o f 1951 when land re fo rm  entered  its final phase. Checks w ere 
also m ade on the w ork  that had already been ca rr ie d  out and title deeds 
w ere issu ed  to the new landow ners. By m id -A ugust these tasks had been
com pleted  in 383 hsiang and w ork was p rog ress in g  rap id ly  in the rem aining
nning 
(151)
(150)v illa g e s . By the begi o f  1952 the land re fo rm  cam paign was
wound up in south K iangsu.
Ill The E con om ic  Im plications o f Land R eform
The final part o f  this chapter is  an exam ination o f  som e o f the econ om ic  
e ffects  o f  land re fo rm  in north and south K iangsu. C on sideration  w ill be 
given to how m uch land was rea lloca ted  and to how m any peasants; what 
was the average amount o f  land red istribu ted ; and what this a llocation  m eant 
in rea l term s o f  produ ction . The d istribution  o f  other fa c to rs  o f production  
such as draft anim als and farm  im plem ents w ill a lso be d iscu sse d .
The availab ility  and quality o f data are ob v iou sly  c r u c ia l con sideration s 
in this section . S tatistica l in form ation  is  m ore  rea d ily  available fo r  south 
Kiangsu than fo r  the north and this is re flected  in the space devoted to each . 
As fo r  the re lia b ility  o f  the published data, there seem s no reason  to be lieve  
that any o f the figu res  cited  are d eliberate  fa ls ifica tio n s . They are m ostly  
taken fro m  cu rren t lo ca l new spapers and probably  r e fle c t  the best knowledge 
available to the planners at the tim e. Although this is  no guarantee o f  their 
a ccu ra cy , in view  o f the constant e fforts  m ade by the C C P  to keep sta tistica l
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checks on the p ro g re ss  o f the land re fo rm  m ovem ent in the p rov in ce , 
it seem s reasonable  to assum e that they are fa ir ly  c lo s e  to the truth.
(1) C on fiscation  and rea lloca tion  o f  land;
The m ost com preh en sive  in form ation  on the rea llo ca tion  o f land in 
south Kiangsu was contained in a rep ort on land re fo rm  published in 
January, 1952.^ Although the figu res are fo r  on ly  24 hsien  (out o f
27 in south Kiangsu) it seem s reasonable to assum e that the p er household 
and p er capita  quantities they revea l are representative  o f  the whole reg ion . 
Som e la ter  and th ere fo re  m ore  u p -to -d a te  data are also available fo r  
S eptem ber, 1952, but certa in  am biguities make them  m ore  d ifficu lt to u s e j
A ccord in g  to s ta tistics  co lle c te d  from  the 24 hsien  , 7, 180, 537 m ou o f 
arable land had been  rea lloca ted  to 1, 519,472 peasant h ouseholds. This was 
said to have rep resen ted  66. 73% o f all agricu ltural households in the 24 hsien 
so that the total num ber o f  households m ust have been 2, 277, 045. It is also 
p oss ib le  to estim ate the p roportion  o f  arable land w hich was con fisca ted :
(154)
the total arable area  o f  south Kiangsu at this tim e was put at 25, 680, 000 m ou,
but this o f  co u rse  included the three hsien  o f K 'un -shan , W u-hsien  and T a n -t 'u .
F rom  data available fro m  another sou rce  it seem s lik e ly  that the arable area
(155)in these three hsien  was about 3 ,7 5 4 ,2 0 7  m ou. T h e re fo re , the total
arable area o f south K iangsu (excluding K 'un -shan , W u-hsien  and T an -t 'u )
w a s :
2 5 ,6 8 0 ,0 0 0  - 3 ,7 5 4 ,2 0 7  
= 2 1 ,9 2 5 ,7 9 3  m ou
- and so the rea lloca ted  land was 32. 74% o f the total arable area. This is
c lo s e ly  in line with estim ates o f landlord  holdings given  in the sam e sou rce
from  w hich the data on con fisca tion  and rea lloca tion  are taken. Thus,
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landlords (rep resen tin g  2 .48%  o f all agricu ltural h ouseholds) owned 36.68%  
( i  56)o f  all the land.
an investigation of 1, 436 hsiang in 18 south Kiangsu hsien revealed that
In o rd e r  to show a llocation  o f  land on a p er capita  b asis  an estim ate m ust 
be m ade o f  the average s ize  o f  agricu ltural household at this tim e. F o r tu ­
nately, su fficien t data are available to enable us to do th is . We know that 
the 1, 191,872 households belonging to m utual-a id  team s during the sum m er
o f 1952 rep resen ted  47 .76%  o f all agricu ltural households in south K iangsu. 
Thus, the total num ber o f  agricu ltural households was 2 ,4 9 5 ,5 4 4 . G iven 
that the agricu ltu ra l population in south Kiangsu was 10 ,290 ,000^ ^ ^ ^  the 
average s ize  o f agricu ltura l household  m ust have been;
10, 290, 000 f  2 ,4 9 5 ,5 4 4  = 4 .1 2 .
This is the figu re  w hich w ill be used in this section .
(157)
To return now to the orig in a l data. A lloca tion  o f  land in the 24 hsien  
o f  south K iangsu was as fo llow s ;
Table II. 2; R ea lloca tion  o f land in south K iangsu
Total amount o f 
land rea lloca ted  
(m ou)
N um ber o f  
peasant h o u se ­
holds rece iv in g  
land
Amount o f 
land r e ­
a llocated  per 
household
7 ,1 8 0 ,5 3 7  1 ,5 1 9 ,4 7 2  4 .7 3  m ou
* = 6 ,2 6 0 ,2 2 5  peasants.
S ou rce ; SNJP, 1 /1 /5 2 , op. c it . , pp. 2 -3 .
Amount o f 
land r e ­
allocated  
p er capita
1 .1 5  m ou
On average, each  peasant re ce iv ed  just o v er  one m ou o f  land (about 
on e -fifth  o f  an a cre ). In o rd e r  to put this into p e rsp e c tiv e , this figure 
m ay be com p a red  with the follow ing p re lim in a ry  in form ation  on land
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red istribu tion  in other p rov in ces  published in July, 1951:
Table H. 3: The average p er capita  amount o f  arable
land re ce iv ed  by  peasants as a resu lt o f 
rea lloca tion  in 4 p rov in ces  o f  China.
Honan 2 .0  - 3 .0  m ou
Hunan and Hupeh 1 .0  - 2. 5
South Shensi 1 .5  - 2 .0
N orth Shensi 4. 0
Shensi (m ountain areas) 10 .0
S ou rce ; H H JP, 2 /7 /5 1 ,  "The S u ccess  o f  the Land R eform
M ovem ent during the Past Y ear. "
The sam e sou rce  a lso prov id es a figu re  fo r  the East China region ;
Table II. 4; R ea lloca tion  o f  land in East China .
A verage amount o f 
rea lloca ted  land re ce iv e d  
_______ per capita___________
East China (Shantung,
N orth K iangsu, South 
K iangsu, Chekiang,
North Anhwei,
South Anhwei) 2. 00 m ou
S ou rce; H H JP, 2 /7 /5 1 ,  op. c i t .
It is in terestin g  that this figure is alm ost tw ice as high as the south 
K iangsu figu re  shown in Table II. 2. But it m ust be rem em b ered  that the 
East China figu re  is  an average fo r  a la rge  region  containing areas (like 
north Kiangsu and Shantung) w here the m an-land ratio was m o re  favourab le  
than in den sely -popu la ted  south K iangsu. This point is  brought out in another 
report w hich stated that while p oor  peasants and agricu ltu ra l labou rers  in 
East China re ce iv e d  on average 1. 5 - 2 .0  m ou, in individual areas the
(159)figu re  was as high as 3 .0  m ou o r  as low  as 0 .7 . It is  worth adding
that if  the p rop os ition  that certa in  parts o f south K iangsu w ere ch a ra cter ised  
by  re la tiv e ly  low  rates o f  tenancy is c o r r e c t ,  the amount o f  land available
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fo r  rea lloca tion  would have been  furth er lim ited . In any ca se , there
is no con trad iction  betw een the East China average and the low er south 
Kiangsu estim ate .
The south K iangsu figu re  o f  1. 15 m ou (see  Table II. 2 above) con cea ls  
d iffe ren ces  not on ly  betw een areas but also betw een c la s se s  o f  peasants. 
Thus, the table below  shows the d ifferen tia ls  in the p er  cap ita  a llocation  o f 
land betw een p oor  peasants (and h ired  agricu ltural la b o u re rs ) and m iddle 
peas ants;
Table II. 5 P e r  capita  a llocation  o f land to p oor  and 
m iddle peasants in south K iangsu________
A verage amount Range o f Total amount o f
o f  land rea lloca ted  rea lloca tion  land owned after
p er  capita   o f land rea lloca tion *
P o o r  peasants 
and agricu ltural
la b ou rers ; 1 .2  m ou 0 .6  - 2 . 0  m ou 85%
M iddle peasants 1.1 0 .5  - 1 .9  120%
* E x p re sse d  as percen tage o f the average amount o f 
land (p er  capita) in a lo ca lity .
S ou rce : SNJP, 1 /1 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , pp. 2 -3
(161)(In addition som e land was d istributed  to "tenant r ich  p easan ts" , 
although the amount involved  cannot have been great. )
By applying these figu res  to a p er capita  arable area  estim ate fo r  south 
Kiangsu it is  p o ss ib le  to give a gen era l idea  o f the im pact o f  land re fo rm  
upon farm  s ize :
The total arable area  o f south Kiangsu at this tim e was estim ated  to 
be 2 5 ,6 8 0 ,0 0 0  m o u . ^ ^  T h ere fore  the arable area p er head o f  agricu ltural 
population w as:
2 5 ,6 8 0 ,0 0 0  *r 1 0 ,2 9 0 ,0 0 0  = 2 .4 9 5  m ou.
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In other w ord s , i f  all the available land w ere shared  equally  among the 
agricu ltu ra l population, each  peasant in south K iangsu would get about two 
and a half m ou. H ow ever, rea lloca tion  was not equal and did not lead to 
equal landholdings. The total s ize  o f  holding o f a p oor  peasant o r  agricu ltural 
la b ou rer  after con fisca ted  land had been red istribu ted  was equal to 85% o f the 
average p er  capita  amount o f  land in the lo ca lity . So applying this figu re  to 
south K iangsu as a w hole, the average per capita  holding o f  a p oor  peasant 
after land re fo rm  w as;
85% x  2. 495 = 2. 12 m ou.
B y extension  the average farm  size  o f  a p oor peasant household  was
2. 12 x  4. 12 = 8. 73 m ou.
But each  p oor  peasant also re ce iv ed  an average o f  1. 2 m ou through the 
rea lloca tion  o f  con fisca ted  o r  requ isitioned  land. T h e re fo re , by  com bining 
all the available in form ation  it is p o ss ib le  to estim ate the average farm  s ize  
o f  p oor  peasants in south K iangsu b e fo re  and after land re fo rm ;
Table II. 6; Am ounts o f land held by p oor  peasants 
b e fo re  and after land re fo rm .
A verage amount o f land 
owned after land re fo rm ;
- o f which land re ce iv e d  
through red istribu tion :
T h e re fo re , land o r ig in a lly  
owned;
P er
capita
2. 12 m ou 
1 .20
P e r  
household 
( i . e .  s ize  o f fa rm )
8 .7 3  m ou 
4 .9 4
0 .92 3 .7 9
Put another w ay, land re fo rm  had the e ffe ct  o f in crea s in g  the s ize  
o f a p oor  peasan t's  (agricu ltu ra l la b o u re r 's )  farm  by m o re  than 130%.
S im ila rly , fo r  m idd le peasants;
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Table II. 7; Am ounts o f land held by  m iddle peasants 
b e fo re  and after land re fo rm .
P e r P e r  
household  
( i .e .  s ize  of fa rm )
capita
A verage amount o f  land 
owned after land re fo rm : 2. 99 m ou 12 .32  m ou
- o f w hich land re ce iv e d  
through red istribu tion : 1.10 4. 53
T h e re fo re , land o r ig in a lly  
owned: 1. 89 7. 79
* i. e. 120% x 2. 495 m ou.
In this ca se  the in cre a se  in farm  s ize  was a little  m o re  than 58%.
In these b road  term s land re fo rm  would appear to have held v e ry  
con sid era b le  benefits fo r  m iddle peasants and (above all) p oor  peasants 
and agricu ltura l la b ou rers  by  bringing about a substantial in cre a se  in the 
s ize  o f  th eir  fa rm s . H ow ever, a num ber o f  qu a lifications m ust be m ade; 
f ir s t , the in cre a se  in fa rm  s ize  in absolute term s was v e r y  m uch sm a lle r  
than a r ise  o f 130% m ay suggest. A gricu ltu re  in south K iangsu was s till 
ch a ra cter ized  by  v e r y  sm all fa rm s and w hatever the p rop ortion a l figures 
m ay ind icate , one o f  the prob lem s that em erged  fro m  land re fo rm  was that 
o f the sm a ll, and d eclin in g , average s ize  o f holding. This is  not to deny 
O u-yang H u i-lin 's  statem ent that even the rea lloca tion  o f  a tiny plot would 
have b en e fic ia l incentive  e ffects  on a peasant who had p re v io u s ly  owned 
little  o r  no land. But it is  to suggest that such advantages m ust be set 
against the d isin cen tive  e ffects  that cou ld  arise  fro m  other fa c to rs .
The secon d  point is  a repetition  o f  one m ade e a r lie r ; nam ely that an 
average figu re  m ay con cea l w ide varia tion s in the a lloca tion  o f land betw een 
d ifferen t a reas . This can be shown in two w ays; f ir s t ,  by exam ining what
- 1 0 5 -
happens to fa rm  s ize  when the m axim um  and m inim um  (as opposed  to the 
average) amounts o f  land are rea lloca ted  to peasants; and then by con siderin g  
the im pact o f land re fo rm  in sm a lle r  areas o f  south K iangsu such as the 
S pecia l D is tr ic ts .
Table II. 8 shows the e ffe ct  on the p er  capita  holdings o f  p oor  and m iddle
peasants o f  a llocating to them  the m inim um  and m axim um  amounts o f  land:
Table II. 8: The im pact o f  m axim um  and m inim um
allocation  o f  land on p oor  and m iddle 
peas ants._________________________________
(a) P o o r  peasants and agricu ltural la b o u re rs ;
A verage s ize  o f holding 
after land re fo rm ;
o f w hich land re ce iv ed  
through red istribu tion ;
T h ere fore  s ize  o f  holding 
b e fo re  land re fo rm ;
(b) M iddle peasan ts ;
Average s ize  o f  holding 
after land re fo rm :
- o f  w hich land re ce iv ed  
through red istribu tion :
T h ere fore  s ize  o f  holding 
b e fo re  land re fo rm ;
S o u r c e s ;
M inim um  
a llocation  
( = 0 .6  m ou)
2 .1 2  m ou 
0 .60  
1. 52
M inim um  
a llocation  
( = 0 .5  m ou)
2. 99 m ou 
0. 50 
2. 49
M axim um  
a lloca tion  
( = 2 .0  m ou)
2 .1 2  m ou 
2 . 0  
0. 12
M axim um  
a lloca tion  
(= 1 .9  m ou)
2. 99 m ou 
1. 90 
1. 09
Tables II. 5, II. 6 and II. 7.
The way in w hich regiona l varia tion s a ffect this gen era l p ictu re  can 
be illu stra ted  by  con sid erin g  the e ffe ct  o f rea llocation  in Chinkiang, Soochow
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and Sung-chiang Special Districts.  First,  the following table shows
estim ates o f average p er capita  arable land in each area;
Table II. 9: E stim ates o f arable land per head in
Chinkiang, Soochow  and Sung-chiang 
Specia l D is tr ic ts ._____________________
Chinkiang
Soochow
Sung-chiang
A gricu ltu ra l
population
3 ,1 9 1 ,3 0 0  
4 ,2 5 8 ,5 0 0  
1 ,9 9 5 ,7 0 0
Total arable 
area_____
8, 390, 000 m ou
9 .5 9 0 .0 0 0
5 .1 2 0 .0 0 0
P er capita 
arable area
2 .6 3  m ou 
2 . 12 
2. 57
S o u rce s :
Population; D erived  from  in form ation  in CKNYCCHW T,
A rable  
a re a s ;
Note;
op. c i t . , p. 207.
Ib id ., p. 207, Table 1.
A rab le  area data fo r  the S pecia l D istr icts  are 
not available fo r  1951 and the estim ates shown 
re fe r  to 19 56. Although this is  a potential 
sou rce  o f  e r r o r ,  it is  reasonable  to assum e 
that the d iscrep a n cy  betw een the two years is 
not la rge .
The average amount o f  land rea lloca ted  to p oor  and m iddle peasants 
can now be applied to these estim ates o f per capita  arable area;
Table II. 10; The average s ize  o f holding o f  p oor and m iddle 
peasants in Chinkiang, Soochow  and Sung-chiang 
S pecia l D istricts  b e fo re  and after land re fo rm .
Chinkiang Soochow  Sung-chiang
(a) P o o r  p easan ts;
A verage s ize  o f  holding 
after land re fo rm ;
- o f  w hich land re ce iv ed  
through red istribu tion ;
T h ere fore  s ize  o f  holding 
b e fo re  land re fo rm ;
85% x
2 .6 3
= 2. 24 m ou
1. 20
1. 04
85% x 
2 . 12
= 1 .80  m ou
1 . 20
85% x
2. 57
= 2. 18 m ou
1. 20
0 .6 0  0 .98  
Table continued ov e r le a f.
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Table H. 10 (continued): 
Chinkiang Soochow Sung-ch i ang
(b) M iddle peasants
A verage s ize  o f  holding 120% x 
after land re fo rm ; 2 .63 6
120% x 
2. 12
2. 54 m ou
120% x 
2. 57
= 3. 16 m ou 3 .0 8  m ou
o f w hich land rece iv ed  
through red istribu tion ; 1 .10 1 . 1 0 1 . 1 0
T h ere fore  s ize  o f holding 
b e fo re  land re fo rm ; 2 .06 1 .44 1 .98
S ou rces ; Tables II. 5 and II. 9
The w eakness o f  this table is  o f cou rse  that it assum es that the amount 
o f  land a llocated  to peasants was the sam e throughout south Kiangsu. 
H ow ever, becau se  o f d iffe ren ces  in the rate o f  tenancy and m an-land  ratio 
this cannot have been  the ca se . A cco rd in g ly  the data presen ted  above should 
be v iew ed on ly  as a v e r y  approxim ate guide to the im pact o f  land re fo rm  on 
s ize  o f  holding in d ifferen t parts o f  the region .
The point about amounts o f  land fo r  rea lloca tion  d iffer in g  betw een 
regions is dem onstrated  by  a num ber o f  con tem p orary  re p o rts . In Sung- 
chiang S pecia l D is tr ic t  each  peasant with little  o r  no land o f  his own was said 
to have re ce iv e d  2 .0  - 3 .0  m ou (o r  even m o re ), except in hsien  such as 
W usih and Yang-chung w here land was s ca rce  and p er  cap ita  a llocation  was 
corresp on d in g ly  r e d u c e d .  The situation in W usih was w ell d e scr ib e d
in another rep ort w hich showed that 127,631 m ou had been  d istributed  among 
49 ,315  households.^  This gave each  household 2. 59 m ou and suggested
a per capita  figu re  o f  on ly 0. 59 m ou.
Conditions a lso va ried  in the urban areas . A ccord in g  to data published 
in M ay, 1952 peasants in the Nanking suburbs would appear to have rece iv ed
- 1 0 8 -
alm ost the m axim um  a llocation  o f  land (1 .71  m ou p er  h e a d ).^ * ^ ) -gy.
con trast, in Shanghai 173 ,900 m ou o f arable land had to be shared by
(166)255,041 peasants so provid ing each  with an average o f  0 .6 8  m ou.
But w hatever the regiona l va ria tion s, the m ost strik ing feature to 
em erge  fro m  the data is that although the p oor  peasants and agricu ltura l 
la b ou rers  d erived  the grea test benefit fro m  land rea llo ca tion , it was the 
m iddle peasants who u ltim ately  stood  to gain m ost fro m  land re fo rm . They 
rece iv e d  le s s  land than the p oor  peasants but becau se  they a lready  had m uch 
la rg e r  fa rm s than those o f the p oor  peasants they continued to en joy  a v e ry  
defin ite advantage in term s o f fa rm  s ize  even after land re fo rm  had been 
com pleted .
In fa ct, one o f  the m ost in teresting  aspects o f  land re fo rm  in south 
Kiangsu that the data revea l is  that desp ite  the con sid era b le  in itial d ifferen ce  
in the s ize  o f  fa rm s belonging to each  c la s s , the m idd le peasants w ere 
a llocated  an amount o f land that was on ly m arg in a lly  le s s  than that given to 
the p oor  peasants. In this re sp e ct  the Chinese planners appear to have been 
pursuing a d e lib e ra te ly  n on -ega lita ria n  p o licy  in the rea llo ca tion  o f c o n ­
fisca ted  land. Other in form ation  showing that the p er  cap ita  holdings o f  
p oor  peasants and agricu ltu ra l la b ou rers  rela tive  to the o v e ra ll average 
amount o f land owned p er head o f  the agricu ltural population after land 
re fo rm  was lo w e r  in south K iangsu than in other p rov in ces  gives further 
support to this con c lu sion . ^ H o w e v e r ,  as we shall attempt to show in 
the fo llow ing p ages , this n on -ega lita ria n  p o licy  m ay have been  econ o m ica lly  
i f  not s o c ia lly  ju stified  in the conditions prevailing  in south K iangsu.
-1 0 9 -
But what was the im pact o f the rea lloca tion  o f land in rea l term s - 
that is ,  in term s o f  the extra  production  it could p rov id e  the recip ien t 
fa r m e r ?  In o rd e r  to answ er this im portant question  we shall m ake the 
s im plify ing suggestion  that all the land belonging to a peasant was planted 
in food  gra in s. This w ill then enable us to exam ine the im pact o f land 
re fo rm  in term s o f  the food  gra in  output it could p rov id e . In addition, we 
m ay bring consum ption  into the p ictu re  by  con siderin g  the c a lo r if ic  content 
o f the gra in  produ ction .
There rem ains one m a jo r  d ifficu lty : the ch o ice  o f  an average food
grain  y ie ld  fo r  south K iangsu at the tim e o f  land re fo rm . No such figure
appears to be available from  any sou rce  and it has th e re fo re  been n e ce s sa ry
to d erive  an estim ate fro m  a sm all num ber o f observation s  o f  total output
and sown area  o f gra in . Although there is no way o f checking its a ccu ra cy ,
it is  hoped that the figu re  o f  285 chin p er m ou resu lting fro m  these c a lcu -
(168)lations is  c lo s e  to the rea l one.
On the basis  o f  these assum ptions we can now d er iv e  the estim ates 
in Table II. 11 on the fo llow ing  page.
What em erges  fro m  this table is the im portan ce o f  rea lloca ted  land
in south K iangsu as a m eans o f  supplem enting the output w hich was a lready
being produ ced  by  the peasant. Even if  the m axim um  amount o f  land
w ere a llocated  to a p oor  o r  m iddle peasant, it could  not on its own provide
(170)su fficien t output to m eet his food  gra in  requ irem ents fo r  a yea r. v
-1 1 0 -
Ta
bl
e 
II.
 1
1;
 
Th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
of 
re
al
lo
ca
ti
on
 
up
on
 
po
or
 
an
d 
m
id
dl
e 
pe
as
an
ts
CO
o
U
do
43id
idMd
i-Hd
o
• H
u
CUDid
da
id
§
CO
id
da
p<oo
&
d
CUD
id
" " S o  “
:fl 8 §  .2
^  H orH
d  't3 <d
co
<
O y
a>
c u d
id+jd aj
d
• h  o  m  .H> pi o  p<'—' d CM Op, .—I
CO O  o
i  Sr-H
IB
U
o
> U
^  or-Hrt
u
4-> >NPl idd-M dPl piO do d
Pia)
£oo
Pi
id
d
Pi
d
d
doo
o
H
<d
PiW)
Pi •rH 
d  y
i-H m m CM NO in
r - CO 00 CO o
CM NO 00 r-H COin CM 00 CM 00
N O 00 NO O' H^ ot"- co CM vO co CM
• • • • • •
00 r-H o n -
CM oo CM n -
m CO oo o CO[N- o o CM nO. . • . • «r-H o O' oo mo o nO r-H H^ ooor-H in nOi-H O' m■ i
vO oo o 00 o CM• . • . • •O NO 00 mCM nO r-H o O mm r- CM o CO r-
a «. •t 9%m CM O' in CM 00NO 00 o co m t"-co i-H NO CO r-H m
o o o o o o00 o o NO
NO 00 00 m t"- M3CO^H NO CMCM CMr-H
m r-H
CM
o o o o o ONO oo o oo o CM. • • • • •
CO NO nO CO o COh- CO in in r-H COCM i-H drd
COcd
d
d
d
CM H^
o o o r-H o o oo o o dd m m m
CM r-H o •H co CM H^M< r- r- i-HCO r-H m CO i—H in
u
•rH
d
da)a
<
a)
dw
doa
Pi
da
43o
moo
CM
mhO
d
r-Hd
*£
d
CUD
idPi
d
S
§
MHO
CO
• H
CO
id43
0)
43+->
PiO
dd
rt
a•H-M
CO
w
in
43u
iddcr1d
d
CO
CuO
Pi
id
•|H
w
P3•rH
P3O•rl4->Oddo
Pi
d
id
Pi00
dooVH
VMO
d
Pid-Mod
Pi
co d, ■ *r1 
CO O^d d  
^  n4-» <->
d  CM
5 ^
s *
fe  CM
in
vO
C P
^  44r—I O
i  **  PQ
id
-M J\ 
Pi .d Ha 
CO
d d 
Pi * h
d  r
£ co Pi 4_»
O g
O' d 
CO PiOn
=- g. 
g *•H _j -M TJ
id O
K
CO r y  CO £
<  ^
idU
•|H
dd
S
d
CO
d
Pi•H
43
O
d
434->
43
dd
Pi
d
d•rH
CO
P3oo
CO
id
*
COd
•»H
PiO
r-H
idO
in
o
CM
dddco
Pi
d
CO
Pi
d
P3Oco
£
id
Q
J\
o
ddco
d
•|H
d
ddu
CO
CM
NO
nOO'
d  d 
Pl ti
4  3
doa
CM vO
o
o
CM
m
o
o
- 1 1 1 -
vi
i) 
B
ec
au
se
 
of 
re
ce
nt
 
su
gg
es
ti
on
s 
th
at
 
ca
lo
ri
fi
c 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 
ha
ve
 
be
en
 
ex
ag
ge
ra
te
d 
in 
th
e 
pa
st
, 
the
 
fig
ur
e 
of 
19
00
 
ca
lo
ri
es
 
ha
s 
be
en
 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
as 
an
ot
he
r 
cr
it
er
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
w
el
l-b
al
an
ce
d 
di
et
.
The rea l im portan ce  o f the rea lloca ted  land can be seen  m ore  c le a r ly  
i f  the potential food  grain  output o f a peasant's holding b e fo re  and after 
land re fo rm  is com p a red . This w ill indicate m o re  p r e c is e ly  the im pact 
o f land red istribu tion  upon rura l production  and consum ption  (see  Table
II. 12 on fo llow in g  page).
So fa r  we have assum ed that the average gra in  y ie ld  o f  285 chin
p er m ou m ay be applied equally  to all peasants in south K iangsu.
H ow ever, the evidence suggests that because o f d ifferen t re so u rce  and
sk ill patterns the produ ctiv ity  o f p o o r , m iddle and r ich  peasants was
quite d ifferen t. F o r  exam ple, L iao L u -yen , the M in ister  o f  A g ricu ltu re ,
m ade the point in 1958 that:
"P ro sp e ro u s  m iddle peasants have m ore  and better  land, 
adequate w ater su pplies , fe r t il iz e r s  and draft anim als 
and all the too ls  they need. They can get the agricu ltu ra l 
w ork  done on tim e and th eir  tech n ica l standard o f  cu lt i­
vation is re la tiv e ly  high. In these c ircu m sta n ces  th eir  
unit area  y ie lds are gen era lly  about 30% higher than those 
o f p oor  peasants. " (171)
Extrapolating fro m  this fo r  the single case  o f  K iangsu we can 
attempt to estim ate the d ifferen t y ie lds o f  p oor , m idd le and rich  
peasants in the p rov in ce . A ssum ing that the y ie lds o f  m idd le peasants
-1 1 2 -
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are rep resen ted  by  the p rov in cia l average (285 chin) and given  that 
p rosp erou s  m iddle peasant y ie ld s  are 30% above those o f p oor  peasants, 
the follow ing index can be constructed ;
Table II. 13; A verage grain  y ie lds fo r  d ifferen t 
ca teg or ies  o f peasants in  K iangsu .
Index o f y ie lds The absolute lev e l
(p oor  peasant o f  gra in  yields
y ie ld s  = 100) (ch in  p er  m ou)
P o o r  peasants 100 237 .50
M iddle peasants 120 285 .00
P rosp erou s
m iddle peasants 130 3 08 .75
R ich  peasants 140 332. 50
With this rev ised  in form ation  the ca lcu lations o f  Table II. 12 can 
now be re -w o rk e d  (see  Table II. 14 on the fo llow ing page).
A  m iddle peasan t's  holding b e fo re  land re fo rm  was a lm ost as large 
as that o f  a p oor  peasant after con fisca ted  land had been  rea lloca ted . 
Although land re fo rm  su cceed ed  in narrow ing the gap in farm  s ize  
betw een p oor  and m iddle peasants, in 1951-52 m idd le peasant farm s 
w ere  s till m o re  than 40% la rg e r  than those o f p oor  peasants.^   ^ ^
The e con om ic  im p lica tion s  o f this w ere v e ry  im portant. F o r  the extra
land w hich m iddle peasants re ce iv ed  through red istribu tion  enabled them
to m ove fro m  a situation in w hich th eir  land was in su ffic ien t to provide 
fo r  th eir  needs to one in w hich not on ly w ere they able to m eet their 
su bsisten ce  requ irem ents but they also p o sse sse d  a sm a ll cushion  against 
adventitious even ts. In p erson a l term s the benefits w hich the acqu isition  
o f extra  land co n fe rre d  are obvious enough. But m o re  s ign ifican t, in 
b roa d er  e con om ic  term s the extra  land provided  a surplus which fo r  the
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f ir s t  tim e enabled m idd le peasants to undertake net agricu ltu ra l in v e st­
m ent ( fo r  exam ple , land im provem ents or  the purchase o f  m o re  inputs). 
Although the Chinese could  have fo llow ed  a d istribu tion  p o licy  which 
further n arrow ed  the gap in farm  s ize  betw een p oor  and m iddle peasants, 
it seem s c le a r  that the p o licy  actually adopted was m o re  rational fro m  an 
econ om ic  point o f  v iew . It is  in this sense that our e a r lie r  rem ark  about 
the e con om ic  va lid ity  o f a n on -ega lita rian  p rogram m e o f land d istribution  
should be understood .
By con trast, the rea lloca tion  o f  land to p oor  peasants and agricu ltural 
la b ou rers  had m uch le s s  e con om ic  im p ortan ce . In p u re ly  person a l term s 
the fa ct that th eir  potential gra in  output was m o re  than doubled was not 
insign ifican t, but i f  th eir  orig in a l holdings w ere to ta lly  inadequate to 
support them  the data presented  above indicate that even after land d is t r i ­
bution th eir  position  rem ained in secu re . Even on the m ost op tim istic  
assum ptions they could  not be assu red  o f  that im portant surplus which 
would p rovide  the v eh ic le  fo r  fa rm  investm ent and agricu ltu ra l expansion.
If we assum e that the g ro ss  food  gra in  output o f  m iddle peasants (852. 15
(173)
chin) rep resen ts  the sm a llest amount com patib le  with net farm  investm ent, 
the p oor  peasants would have had to achieve an average y ie ld  o f  401 .96  
chin p er  m ou on th eir  final p er capita  holdings in o rd e r  to be in a position  
to expand o r  im p rove  th eir  farm  op eration s. The im p o ss ib ility  o f such a 
task is indicated  by  the fact that this was m ore  than 40% above the average 
south Kiangsu y ie ld  at this tim e.
To sum  up: the e ffects  o f the rea lloca tion  o f  land w ere  d ifferen t fo r  
p oor  and m iddle peasants. A rtic le  One o f the A grarian  R e form  Law had
-1 1 6 -
looked  to the establishm ent o f peasant ow nership  o f  land as the m eans o f 
M. . . setting fre e  the rura l productive fo r c e s ,  develop ing agricu ltural 
production  and so paving the way fo r  New China's in d u stria liza tion ". ^
In south K iangsu such hopes had a lim ited  ap p licab ility . B ecau se o f the 
gen era lly  high m an-land  ratio on ly sm all amounts o f land w ere available 
fo r  rea lloca tion  to peasants. As a resu lt the e co n o m ic  e ffe ct  o f  land 
re fo rm  depended to a la rge  extent on the s ize  o f  th eir  orig in a l hold ings. 
F or  this reason  on ly fo r  the m iddle peasants did land re fo rm  o ffe r  any 
p rosp ect o f agricu ltu ra l expansion and growth.
What was the e ffe c t  o f  land re fo rm  on c la sse s  other than the p oor  and 
m iddle p easan ts?  M ore  exactly , what was its im pact upon rich  peasants 
(fo r  the other rem aining c la s s , the lan d lord s, had ceased  to ex ist as a 
separate e con om ic  ca te g o ry  by  1952)?^ Since the publication  o f  the
A grarian  R e form  Law in June, 1950 em phasis had been  on the need to 
p re se rv e  the r ich  peasant econ om y. Such a p o licy  was founded on sound 
econ om ic  reasoning fo r  b y  virtue o f  their la rg e r  holdings and capital 
assets the r ich  peasants tended to be the m ost e ffic ien t and productive 
fa rm e rs . As such th eir  role in agricu ltural r e c o v e r y  and growth during 
this p eriod  was a v ita l one and it was o f the utm ost e co n o m ic  im portan ce 
that they should be perm itted  to continue unim peded in th eir  agricu ltural 
o p era tion s .
F rom  the January rep ort on land re fo rm  we know that follow ing land
distribution  the average per capita  holding o f  r ich  peasants was 200%
(176)
la rg e r  than the p er  cap ita  average in any p articu lar lo ca lity . In
other w ord s , with the p er capita  average fo r  all south K iangsu o f  2 .4 9 5
- 1 1 7 -
m ou as a b a se , the average holding o f a r ich  peasant a fter land had been 
rea lloca ted  was 4 .9 9  m ou. By extension  the average s ize  o f  a rich  
peasant fa rm  was 20. 56 m ou (4. 12 x  4. 99). This was m o re  than tw ice 
as la rge  as the average farm  s ize  o f a p oor  peasant and one and three 
quarters tim es that o f a m iddle peasant and in term s o f  food  grains could  
provide  the amounts o f  output and ca lo r ie s  shown in Table II. 15 on the 
follow ing page.
The fo r c e  o f  these figu res is c le a r . In term s o f  produ ction  potential 
the r ich  peasants w ere fa r  ahead o f  th eir  n earest r iv a ls , the m iddle 
peasants. Thanks to th eir  advantages in both land and capital th eir  g ro ss  
food  grain  output was 94. 7% h igher than that o f  the m idd le peasants.
L ooked  at in these term s the p o licy  o f  "p reserv a tion  o f  the r ich  peasant 
econ om y " would appear to have been not just a pragm atic  co n ce ss io n  to 
the ex igen cies  o f a tem p ora ry  situation but rather the sine qua non o f 
agricu ltu ra l expansion .
But what the figu res  do not show is the extent to w hich the rich  
peasan ts ' holdings w ere  im pinged upon during the land re fo rm  cam paigns. 
F rom  the e a r lie r  d iscu ss io n  o f the resp ective  p rov is ion s  relating to the 
treatm ent o f r ich  peasants in the cen tra l land re fo rm  regulations and 
those published by the regiona l authorities we should hard ly  be su rp rised  
i f  d isp o s se s s io n  o f  r ich  peasants had o c cu rre d . H ow ever, in form ation  on 
this sub ject is unfortunately ex trem ely  lim ited . At a gen era l le v e l one 
rep ort stated that " . . . in m ost parts o f  south K iangsu land rented out by 
r ich  peasants has not been requ isition ed . L ik ew ise , land cultivated by 
the r ich  peasants th em selves  o r  through the use o f  h ired  labou r, and other
-1 1 8 -
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p rop erty  belonging to them , have been s tr ic t ly  p ro te c te d "  (p a o -liu ).
This would seem  to indicate that som e rich  peasant land was taken fo r
purposes o f red istribu tion , although apparently s tr ic t ly  within the
p rov is ion s  o f the lo ca l land re fo rm  regulations. M ore revealing perhaps
is a single fragm ent o f  in form ation  from  a d ifferen t sou rce  to the e ffect
that in nine hsien  o f  Sung-chiang Specia l D istr ict  . . during land re fo rm
1 ,685 , 000 m ou o f  land belonging to landlords was con fisca ted , together
with public land o f variou s kinds and other land rented out by  rich  peasants
o f the se m i-la n d lo rd  type and landlords with industria l o r  co m m e rc ia l
(178)in terests  - m aking in all a total o f 2, 160, 000 m ou ". In other w ords
475 ,000  m ou, o r  21 .99%  o f all con fisca ted  land, cam e fro m  sou rces  other 
than the stra igh tforw ard  agricu ltural lan d lord s. B earing in m ind that the 
planners w ere p resu m ab ly  treating the land owned by landlords who w ere 
engaged in industry and trade with caution and that "p u b lic  land" was not 
e sp e c ia lly  im portant in south Kiangsu, it is  p o ss ib le  that there was a
(179)sign ificant con traction  in the s ize  o f r ich  peasants' la n d -h o ld in gs .
But it is  im portant h ere  to d istinguish  betw een ow nership  holdings and 
operational hold ings; A rtic le  Six o f the south K iangsu land re fo rm  
regulations s p e c if ic a lly  allow ed fo r  the requ isition  o f  land rented out by 
r ich  peas ants and as the f ir s t  quotation on this page in d ica tes , it
was probably  this land that was m ain ly  encroached  upon.
In the absence o f fu rth er in form ation  to the con tra ry  we are fo rce d  
to conclude that although substantial amounts o f land owned by rich  
peasants m ay have been  requ isitioned  and rea lloca ted  to p oor  and m iddle 
peasants, th eir  operationa l holdings w ere la rg e ly  unaffected .
(177)
-120 -
We pointed out at the beginning o f  the d iscu ss io n  that m ore  u p -to -  
date in form ation  on the con fisca tion  o f  land in south Kiangsu was published 
in S eptem ber, 1952. It seem s appropriate th e re fo re  to conclude this 
section  on land rea lloca tion  b y  b r ie f ly  exam ining these d a t a / 181^
A ccord in g  to this la ter  sou rce  10, 418, 260 m ou o f land (40. 57% o f 
the total arable area) was con fisca ted  o r  requ isitioned  in south K iangsu 
and 66 .67%  o f all agricu ltura l households benefitted  fro m  the subsequent 
rea lloca tion . Since the total num ber o f  agricu ltura l households was
r i g£\
2 ,4 9 5 ,5 4 4  and the average s ize  o f household was 4 .1 2  p e rson s ,
the num ber o f  agricu ltu ra l households to whom  land was red istributed
m ust have been 1, 663, 779 (6 , 854, 770 peasants).
On the assum ption  that all the con fisca ted  land was rea lloca ted , it 
is  now p o ss ib le  to show the average per household and p er  capita  amounts 
o f  land red istribu ted  in south Kiangsu:
Table II. 16: R ea lloca tion  o f  land in south Kiangsu 
(re v ise d  estim ate)______________________
T otal amount N um ber o f Amount o f land Amount o f land
o f  land c o n fis -  agricu ltu ra l rea lloca ted  p er rea lloca ted  per
c a te d /r e q u i-  households household capita
sition ed .  rece iv in g  land _________________ _________________
(m ou) (m ou) (m ou)
1 0 ,4 1 8 ,2 6 0  1 ,6 6 3 ,7 7 9  6 .2 6  1 .52
S ou rce ; SNJP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 , op. c i t . , p. 2.
These estim ates are con s id era b ly  h igher (by 40%) than those used 
throughout the previou s d iscu ss ion . In part the d iffe ren ce  re fle c ts  w ider 
and better  s ta tis tica l cov era g e ; the e a r lie r  figu res w ere on ly fo r  24 
hsien  while these co v e r  the whole o f  south K iangsu (27 h s ie n ). H ow ever,
-121 -
this cannot account fo r  the entire d ifferen ce  '  and it seem s lik e ly  
that the in cre a se  in con fisca ted  land was also the resu lt o f  the d is co v e ry  
o f h itherto untouched land w hich had been  con cea led  by  the lan d lord s.
To the extent that the figu res in II. 16 are c lo s e r  to the truth the e a r lie r  
ca lcu lations are o f  cou rse  un derestim ates.
But the d ifficu lty  in using the la ter  figu res lie s  in the assum ption 
that all con fisca ted  land was rea lloca ted . The whole o f  the fourth section  
o f the south K iangsu land re fo rm  regulations was con cern ed  with the 
treatm ent o f "sp e c ia l land p ro b le m s"  and set down the p rin cip le  that 
certa in  kinds o f  con fisca ted  land (such  as that used fo r  con stru ction  
p ro je c ts  o r  agricu ltu ra l experim ental w ork , o rch a rd s , fo r e s ts , e t c .)  
was not to be rea lloca ted  but should be retained and used under o ffic ia l 
su p erv ision . In other w ords the amount o f land rea lloca ted  was le ss  than 
the amount con fisca ted . It fo llow s that i f  the e a r lie r  estim ates are u n d er­
estim ates , the la ter  ones m ust be o v erestim a tes . F o r  such reasons and 
in view  o f the fact that the e a r lie r  rep ort p rov id es  in form ation  on the 
d istribu tion  o f  land by  c la s s e s , it has seem ed  best to r e ly  on the m ore  
p r e c is e  data given  in the January a rtic le  o f the 'South K iangsu D a ily '.
N everth e less , in o rd e r  to show that the argum ent presented  e a r lie r
in this section  is not underm ined by the la ter  data, le t us fo r  the m om ent
assum e that the amount o f  land rea lloca ted  (not con fisca ted ) in south
Kiangsu was the average o f  the January figu re  (plus our estim ate fo r  the
three hsien  not included) and the la ter  Septem ber fig u re . That is ;
10, 418, 260 + 8, 682, 220 = 19, 100, 480 m ou 
19, 100 ,480 t- 2 = 9, 550, 240 m ou
-122 -
On this basis the amounts of land redistributed per household and
p er capita  would be as fo llow s ;
Table II. 17; H ypothetical estim ate o f  rea lloca tion  
o f land in south K iangsu.______________
Total amount 
o f  land 
co n fisca te d / 
requ isitioned
N um ber o f 
ag ricu ltura l 
households 
rece iv in g  
land
Amount o f  land Amount o f  land
rea lloca ted  p er  rea lloca ted  per 
household  capita
(m ou) (m ou) (m ou)
9 ,5 5 0 ,2 4 0 1 ,6 6 3 ,7 7 9 5 .7 4 1 .39
This does not take into account the d iffe ren ce  in p er  capita 
a lloca tion  betw een p oor  and m iddle peasants. But in the e a r lie r  c a lc u ­
lations it was shown that the red istribu tion  o f 1 .10  m ou to a m iddle 
peasant would just prov id e  him  with a su fficien t surplus to undertake 
net investm ent. T h e re fo re , if  it is assum ed that m idd le peasants 
continued to r e ce iv e  on ly 1. 10 m o u , ^ ^  then given  the average r e a l lo ­
cation  figu re  o f  1. 39 m ou it is  con ce ivab le  that p oor  peasants re ce iv ed  
1 .68  m o u . ^ ^  With th eir  orig in a l plot o f  land this would have given 
them  a final (post la n d -re fo rm ) p er capita  holding of;
1 .68  + 0 . 9 2  = 2 .6 0  m ou.
A ssum ing that the average food  grain  yield  o f  p oor  peasants was 
237. 50 chin p er  m ou, it is once again p o ss ib le  to w ork  out the
produ ction  potential o f  th eir  land after rea lloca tion ;
- 1 2 3 -
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In other w ord s , even i f  the p oor  peasants re ce iv e d  the m axim um  
benefit fro m  the rea lloca tion  o f the in crea sed  amount o f con fisca ted  land 
th eir  final holdings w ere  still unable to provide them  with the a ll-im portan t 
surplus w hich m ight perm it net farm  investm ent to take p lace  and a g r i­
cu ltural grow th to get under way. Indeed, with average yields o f  237. 5 
chin p er m ou a p oor  peasant needed to own 3. 59 m ou o f  land b e fo re  he 
could  attain the sam e g ro ss  output as a m iddle peasant. Unless the 
potential e con om ic  benefits o f land re fo rm  w ere to be s a c r if ic e d  it seem s 
c le a r  that the high m an-land  ratio sim ply  p reclu ded  the granting o f p er  
capita  holdings o f  this m agnitude to p oor  peasants in south K iangsu.
A p r io r i  reasoning would suggest that p er capita  a llocation  o f c o n ­
fisca ted  and requ isitioned  land was h igher in the north o f  K iangsu than 
in the south. This is  borne out by  the sm all amount o f  sta tistica l 
in form ation  available fo r  the north o f the p rov in ce .
The V ice -C h a irm a n  o f the North Kiangsu Land R eform  C om m ittee 
stated in a rep ort m ade in D ecem b er , 1951 that about 40-60%  o f the 
total arable area  o f  the reg ion  had been con fisca ted  (req u isition ed ) to
m g7\
the benefit o f  60-70%  o f  the agricu ltural population. F ro m  this
in form ation  estim ates o f  the total amount o f  land con fisca ted  and the 
num ber o f  peasants to whom  it was rea lloca ted  can be m ade;
- 1 2 5 -
Table II. 19: C on fiscation  and rea llo ca tion  o f  land 
in north K iangsu._______________________
Total agricu ltu ra l population; 1 8 ,7 7 6 ,3 7 0 .
60% o f agricu ltu ra l population = 1 1 ,2 6 5 ,8 2 2
11 " = 1 3 ,1 4 3 ,4 5 970%
Total arable area;
40% o f arable area  
60% " " 11
S ou rces- a
50, 000, 000 m ou
= 20, 000, 000 m ou
= 30, 000, 000 m ou
SPJP, 3 0 /6 /5 1 , p. 4, "Land Relations 
in  North Kiangsu Now and in the P a st".
See Appendix B. Data in Chieh-fang 
ao (L ibera tion  D aily), h erea fter  
C F J P , 2 3 /7 /5 0  would suggest a north 
Kiangsu agricu ltura l population o f 18 
m illio n s . This lends support to the 
estim ate shown in the table.
If we furth er assum e an average household s ize  o f 4. 12 person s 
the range o f  p er  capita  and p er household a llocation  o f land can also 
be shown;
Table II. 20: R ea lloca tion  o f land p er household  and per
head o f  agricu ltural population in north Kiangsu.
Total amount 
o f  land 
rea lloca ted
(m ou)
2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
N um ber o f 
peas ants 
rece iv in g
(a) 11 ,2 6 5 ,8 2 2
(b) 1 3 ,143 ,4 59
(a) 11 ,2 6 5 ,8 2 2
(b) 1 3 ,143 ,4 59
Amount o f land Amount o f  land 
rea lloca ted  rea lloca ted
per household
(m ou)
7 .33  
6 .26
1 0 . 9 6  
9 .3 9
per capita 
(m ou)
1 .78
1. 52
2.66
2. 28
S ou rces ; S P J P , 3 0 /6 /5 1 , op. c i t . , p. 4.
C F J P , 2 3 /7 /5 0 , op. c i t . , Appendix B.
In all ca ses  the average amount o f  land rea lloca ted  to each peasant
(188)is h igher than in south Kiangsu. This fact em erg es  from  another
con tem p ora ry  rep ort that each peasant benefitting fro m  land re fo rm  in
-1 2 6 -
north Kiangsu on average rece iv ed  1 .0  - 2. 0 m ou. R egional variations 
w ere con sid erab le : in areas w here the agricu ltural population was sm all 
the figure was as high as 4. 0 - 6 .0  m ou while e lsew h ere  it was on ly 0 . 8 -
1 .00  m ou.
But i f  the peasants o f north Kiangsu appear to have benefitted  m ore  from
land re fo rm  than those in the south, a glance at the im p lica tion s in real
term s (in  term s o f the extra  output w hich the rea lloca ted  land could provide)
w ill show that the advantage was illu so ry . This is illu stra ted  in the table on
the fo llow ing page w hich attempts to estim ate the produ ction  potential o f
rea lloca ted  land in north Kiangsu on the basis  o f  an average grain  y ie ld  o f 
( 18 9 )150 chin p er m ou.
B ecau se o f m ore  favourab le natural conditions in the south the production  
cap acity  o f a given  area  o f land was h igher than in the north. Although the 
average amount o f land rea lloca ted  p er capita  was on ly  1 .15  m ou in south 
K iangsu, the corresp on d in g  figure fo r  the north would have needed to be 
1 .72  m ou in o rd e r  to produce the sam e amount o f food  gra in . The d ifficu lty  
is that no ov e ra ll p er  capita  figu re  is available fo r  north Kiangsu and so no 
com p a rison  can s tr ic t ly  be m ade. But the fact that three o f the four estim ates 
o f p er  capita  rea lloca ted  land in north Kiangsu shown in Table II. 20 are 
h igher than 1 .72  m ou perhaps indicates that the h igher fe r t ility  o f the south 
was o ffse t  by the la r g e r  amounts o f  land red istributed  in the north .
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What is  c le a r  is  that on ly  peasants who rece iv e d  w ell above the average 
amount o f rea lloca ted  land cou ld  hope to produ ce a surplus that was large  
enough to p erm it net agricu ltu ra l investm ent. The d ifferen tia l e ffects  on 
gra in  produ ction  o f rea llocatin g  the m inim um  and m axim um  amounts o f 
land are dem onstrated  in the table on the follow ing page.
The lack  o f quantitative data on con fisca tion  and rea llo ca tion  in north 
K iangsu is  p artly  com pen sated  fo r  by som e in terestin g  in form ation  on 
changes in the c la ss  com p osition  o f rural s o c ie ty  fo llow in g  land re fo rm .
The three exam ples w hich fo llow  are unlikely to be rep resen tative  but 
rather show the im pact o f  land re fo rm  in the m ost favourab le  light. They 
are s till in teresting  as an indication  o f the kind o f  s o c ia l changes that w ere 
taking p la ce .
The f ir s t  ca se  was that o f  a v illa ge  in N an-t'ung hsien . P r io r
to land re fo rm  it contained 16 households o f agricu ltu ra l la b ou rers  and 
46 o f  p oor  peasants. But after the rea lloca tion  o f  land had been  com pleted  
e v ery  one o f  these households was said to have r isen  to m idd le  peasant 
status. What is  m o re , the case  was c la im ed  to be rep resen tative  o f  the 
entire hsien .
- 1 2 9 -
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Another exam ple revea led  a s im ila r  pattern. In a v illa ge  o f  P in -h a i
hsien  ( Y e n -ch 1 eng S pecia l D istr ict) the c la ss  com p osition  o f the 158 resident
households b e fo re  land re fo rm  was as fo llow s:
Table 11.23: The c la ss  com p osition  o f a v illage  in
P in -h a i hsien  b e fo re  land re fo rm .
N um ber of 
households
P o o r  peasants 88
M iddle peasants 29
R ich  peasants 6
Landlords __ 5
Total 128
S ou rce ; S P J P , 3 0 /6 /5 2 , op. c it . , p. 2.
The d iscre p a n cy  o f 30 households is not explained: perhaps they 
rep resen ted  the agricu ltura l labou rers  in the v illa g e . In any ca se , after 
land re fo rm  the situation changed d ram atica lly , the num ber o f  p oor peasant 
households fa lling to 18 while that o f m iddle peasants rose  to 137. If the 
three households unaccounted fo r  w ere rich  peasants it is  in teresting that 
the num ber o f households in this ca tegory  had fa llen  by  half.
F in a lly  there was the case  o f an unnamed v illa ge  in  the "n ew ly- 
lib e ra te d "  reg ion  o f north K iangsu. Of the 80 p oor  peasant households that 
had ex isted  b e fo re  land re fo rm , 36 (45%) subsequently ro se  to the status
(191)o f "p rosp erou s  m idd le peasan ts".
On the ev idence o f  these three exam ples land re fo rm  was v e ry  s u c c e s s ­
ful in ra ising a la rge  num ber o f p oor peasants to the m iddle peasant c a te ­
gory . H ow ever, as was m entioned e a r lie r , there is reason  to be s ce p tica l 
o f  th eir  gen era l app licab ility  in Kiangsu and they are p robab ly  best regarded  
as an indication  o f the potential rather than the actual gains from  land re fo rm  -
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at lea st, if  the m ove fro m  p oor  to m iddle peasant status is  be liev ed  to have 
m o re  than sem antic o r  m ere  propaganda s ign ifica n ce .
(2) C on fiscation  and rea lloca tion  o f  other fa c to rs ;
Land re fo rm  was con cern ed  with m ore  than the red istribu tion  o f land
and A r t ic le  Two o f  the A grarian  R e form  Law stated that M. . . draft an im als,
farm  im plem ents and surplus gra in  o f  the lan d lord s, and their surplus
( 1 9 2 )houses in the countryside . . . "  w ere a lso to be con fisca ted  and
rea lloca ted  among p oor  peasants. Indeed, in p u rely  e con om ic  term s the 
rea llo ca tion  o f ploughs and oxen was a lm ost as im portant as that o f  land 
it s e lf  s in ce  the e ffic ien t operation  and future grow th o f the agricu ltural 
s e c to r  depended upon the availab ility  o f all th ree.
T here is scant in form ation  on the red istribu tion  o f surplus grain
belonging to the landlords in K iangsu but it is lik e ly  that this was one o f
(193)the e a r lie s t  acts in the land re fo rm  m ovem ent. The e con om ic  ra ison
d ’etre  was that the d istribu ted  gra in  should be used by  the peasants fo r  
produ ctive  p u rposes - that is ,  as seed . H ow ever, in view  o f the genera l
food  shortage o cca s io n e d  by recen t natural d isa sters  it is  m o re  lik e ly  that
, , . (194)the gra in  was used fo r  consum ption .
(195)Throughout south K iangsu o v e r  133 m illion  chin o f  surplus grain
w ere con fisca ted  and (presum ably ) red istribu ted  to the peasants.^   ^  ^ If
this had been  d istribu ted  among those peasants who subsequently re ce iv ed
land it is  c le a r  that the e ffe ct  would have been n eg lig ib le  s in ce  each peasant
would have re ce iv e d  a m ere  19. 5 chin. In fact a m o re  re s tr ic t iv e  p o licy
was adopted w hereby  each recip ien t was given a m axim um  o f 500 chin o f 
(197)grain . This m eant that the la rg e s t  p oss ib le  num ber o f  peasants who
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could  benefit was 266, 198^ o r  on ly 2. 59% o f south K iangsu ’ s a g r i­
cu ltural population. Even taking into account the fact that every  peasant 
would not have re ce iv ed  the m axim um  there can be little  doubt that the
n 99)
im pact o f  grain  d istribution  was on ly o f p eriph era l im p ortan ce .
Much m ore  seriou s  was the situation regarding the supply o f the two 
m ost im portant item s o f agricu ltural w orking cap ita l, draft anim als and 
to o ls . Throughout south K iangsu on ly  33 ,700  draft anim als w ere c o n fis ­
cated fro m  landlords during the land re fo rm  c a m p a i g n s y e  ^ these 
had to be d istributed  among 1 ,6 6 3 ,7 7 9  agricu ltural h ou seh o ld s . ^
This provided  each  household with a th eoretica l 0 .02  anim als and each 
p erson  with 0. 005! Stated m ore  m eaningfu lly, e v e ry  draft animal that 
was con fisca ted  had to serv e  49 .37  agricu ltural households o r  2 0 3 .4  
p easan ts.
Seen in this light it is obv iou sly  no co in cid en ce  that the developm ent
o f m utual-a id  team s was a lready under way b e fore  land re fo rm  had
( 202 )
p ro p e r ly  been com pleted . But even this provided  on ly  a partia l
solution  to the p rob lem  fo r  no m atter how effic ien t the system  o f sharing 
the anim als w as, on ly  an in crea se  in draft animal num bers could  u ltim ately  
rem ove the gap betw een anim al requirem ents and availab ility . This can 
be shown fa ir ly  sim ply : i f  the average per capita  amount o f  rea lloca ted  land 
in south K iangsu was 1 .1 5  m ou each  household would have rece iv e d  4. 738 
m ou. But we have just establish ed  that each con fisca ted  draft anim al had 
to serv e  49 .37  h ouseholds. T h e re fo re , the burden o f  (rea llo ca ted ) arable 
land p er head o f  (rea llo ca ted ) draft anim als w as;
49 .37  x  4 .7 3 8  = 233. 915 m ou 
-1 3 3 -
The full im p lica tion  o f this enorm ous burden can be seen  when it is
set against the w ork  cap acity  o f  draft anim als. It has been  estim ated  that
(204)the m axim um  burden o f agricu ltural w ork p er anim al is betw een 24 -
34 m ou during the spring season  and 12 - 17 m ou during the s u m m e r . ^ ^  
Even assum ing that all the existing anim als w ere strong and fit a sev e n ­
fold  in cre a se  in anim al num bers was requ ired  b e fo re  the gap betw een 
availab ility  and requ irem ents was elim inated. We m ay assum e that the 
exam ple o f the v illa ge  in  the T 'a i Hu region  w here the shortage o f  draft
anim als was o v e rco m e  by the sim ple  expedient o f organ izing  the peasants 
(206 )to pull the p loughs' was one that was repeated throughout Kiangsu.
Another fa c to r  which exacerbated  the shortage was the slaughter o f
draft anim als by lan d lord s. Although no p re c is e  data are available to show
the extent o f  these k illin gs , they w ere frequently m entioned as one o f  the
sabotage activ ities  p ra ctised  by landlords and the exp erien ce  o f  la ter
co lle c tiv iza tio n  cam paigns suggests that they could have reached  seriou s
p rop ortion s . Illegal sa les  o f  anim als and d isea se  caused  by inadequate
(207)ca re  further aggravated the situation.
Two final qu a lifications need to be m ade. F ir s t , on ly  rea lloca ted  land 
and draft anim als have been con sid ered . T h e re fo re , to the extent that the 
anim als also had to w ork  on the existing holdings o f peasants to whom c o n fi­
scated  land was red istribu ted  the situation m ay actually have been w orse  than 
that shown above. On the other hand, to the extent that the peasants a lready  
had som e draft anim als the situation m ay have been m o re  favou rab le . S ince 
sta tis tica l data on the total num ber o f  draft anim als in south Kiangsu are not 
available it is  im p oss ib le  to know the exact position . But given that China
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su ffered  fro m  an endem ic shortage o f  an im als ' there is little  danger
that the figu res  above g rea tly  exaggerate the se r iou sn ess  o f  the situation.
( 2 0 8 )
(209)
The secon d  point is  that no account has been  taken o f  p oss ib le  regional 
va ria tion s. U nfortunately on ly fragm en tary  in form ation  is available fo r  
individual areas within the p rov in ce  and this is rep rod u ced  below . The 
situation w hich it revea ls  is m uch in line with the gen era l p ictu re  we have 
suggested  above.
Table II. 24: The rea lloca tion  o f draft anim als
in south Kiangsu.
N um ber o f N um ber o f A v a ila ­ N um ber o f
draft peasants to b ility  o f households
anim als whom draft draft per draft
con fisca ted anim als w ere anim als animal
rea lloca ted per household
Nanking,
suburbs ' 347 65 ,172 0.0206  
(0. 005)
46
(188)
Nanking. _. 
suburbs ' 374 65 ,172 0.0247 
(0 .0 0 6 )
42
(174)
Nanking. . 
subu rbs ' ' 606 20 ,4 6 3 b 0 .0284  
(0 .0 0 7 )
34
(139)
Shanghai . 
suburbs ' 135 255, 041 0 .00206 
(0 . 0005)
459
(1889)
74 hsiang o f  , c , 
W usih hsien 109 4 9 ,3 1 5 b 0 .00206 
(0. 0005)
452
(1864)
N otes; F igu res  in brack ets  are fo r  peasants. The average s ize  
o f household  is assum ed to be 4. 12 p erso n s .
Peasants benefitting fro m  land red istribu tion  are assum ed 
also to have benefitted  from  the rea llo ca tion  o f  draft 
an im a ls .
This figu re  is fo r  households, not peasants.
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S ou rces:
(1) H HJP, 1 /1 0 /5 1 , p. 4, "R econ stru ction  W ork 
in the Suburbs During the L ast Two Y e a rs " .
(2) H H JP, 5 /1 0 /5 1 , p . 2, "C on solidate  the 
S u ccess  o f Land R eform  and P rom ote  the 
P a tr io tic  Spirit o f  the M a sse s " .
(3) H H JP, 1 2 /5 /5 2 , p. 3, "T h orou gh ly  E lim inate 
Feudal Landowner sh ip ".
(4) T K P , 1 9 /1 2 /5 1 , "T ota l V ic to ry  in Land R eform  
in the Suburbs o f Shanghai".
(5) SNJP, 2 /1 2 /5 0 , p . 2, "Land R eform  L a rg e ly  
C om pleted  in W usih and Wu H s ie n " .
The rea lloca tion  o f  farm  too ls  can be dealt with m o re  b r ie f ly . Through
out south K iangsu 1 ,7 6 8 ,3 6 8  farm  im plem ents w ere con fisca ted  and re d istr i
( 210 )buted to p oor  peasants. A ssum ing that the num ber o f  recip ien t h ou se ­
holds was again 1 ,6 6 3 ,7 7 9 , each household re ce iv ed  a th eoretica l average 
o f 1 .06  to o ls , and each  peasant 0 .2 6 . In other w ord s , there was one tool 
fo r  e v e ry  3. 88 p erso n s . It would be in teresting to know what kinds o f  tool 
w ere available and in what quantities. A  farm  im plem ent could m ean any­
thing from  the cru d est and sim p lest hoe o r  harrow  to a quite com plicated  
p iece  o f  equipm ent such as a w ater-w h eel and ob v iou sly  som e w ere m ore  
valuable and in g rea ter  dem and than o th ers. But even in the absence o f 
such in form ation  it is  c le a r  that the num ber o f im plem ents con fisca ted  
was inadequate fo r  red istribu tion  purposes and the consequent shortage 
m ust have p laced  one m o re  constrain t on agricu ltural p roduction  and 
grow th. This point is  underlined by the figu res below  showing the
rea lloca tion  o f too ls  in variou s parts o f south Kiangsu:
Table 11.25; The rea lloca tion  o f  fa rm  im plem ents 
in south Kiangsu.______________________
N um ber o f N um ber o f A va ilab ility  A vailab ility
fa rm  too ls  peasants to o f too ls  p er  o f too ls  per
con fisca ted  whom  tools  household  capita
w ere 
rea lloca ted
N anking 
suburbs 32,651 65, 172 2. 06 0. 50
N anking 
suburbs 41 ,432 2 0 ,4 6 3 a 2. 02 0 .49
72 hsiang of 
W usih hsien 12,144 4 9 ,3 1 5 a 0 .2 5 0 .06
Shanghai
suburbs 15, 100 255, 041 0.25 0.06
Note; a This figu re  is fo r  households.
( 212 )S o u rce s ; As Table 11.24, but excluding (3). '
IV Sum m ary and C onclusions
The ch ie f e co n o m ic  benefits o f  land re fo rm  in south Kiangsu could  be 
expected  to be an im provem ent in in cen tives , brought about by the granting 
o f "land to the t i l le r s " ,  and a m ore  e ffic ien t a llocation  o f  land and other 
fa c to r s . T h e o re tica lly , it was also p oss ib le  that land re fo rm  would have 
positive  econ om y o f s ca le  e ffe c ts ; in fact the e ffe ct  was negative since  
the rea lloca tion  o f  laud caused the average s ize  o f fa rm  to fa ll.
In term s o f incentives the red istribu tion  o f  laud and other landlord  
p rop erty  to p oor  peasants could  not fa il to have favourab le  resu lts . H ow ­
e v e r , an im provem en t in incentives was o f lim ited  value i f  the m eans to 
rea lize  the im p roved  incentives w ere lacking; while plots o f land w ere 
given to la rg e  num bers o f peasants, the per capita  amounts available fo r  
red istribu tion  w ere  frequently  too sm all to p erm it the fa rm e r  that surplus 
w hich was essen tia l i f  subsequent agricu ltural expansion  and grow th w ere
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to take p la ce . Even if  the acquisition  o f a tiny plot o f  land was o f great 
m om ent to a peasant who had p rev iou s ly  owned little  o r  none o f  his own, 
in b roa d er  econ om ic  term s the event was m uch le s s  s ign ificant. As we 
have seen , on ly  m iddle peasants who already p o ss e s se d  su ffic ien tly  la rge  
holdings o f th e ir  own w ere  in a p osition  to take advantage o f  the e con om ic  
potential o ffe re d  by  land red istribu tion  and undertake net investm ent.
In the regiona l context o f  East China this kind o f  p rob lem  was f o r e ­
seen  long b e fo re  land re fo rm  was com pleted . In a rep ort m ade at the 
secon d  p lenary  se ss io n  o f  the ECM A C om m ission  in July, 1950, Jao 
Shu-shih (C hairm an o f the ECM A) had pointed out that;
"T he fundam ental c o re  o f  agrarian  re fo rm  is the con fisca tion  o f 
the land o f  the landlord  c la ss  and its red istribu tion  to landless 
and land-hungry peasants. It fo llow s that the land and other m eans 
o f produ ction  con fisca ted  during agrarian  re fo rm  should be divided 
f ir s t  among p oor  peasants. H ow ever, becau se o f  the p o licy  o f 
p reserv in g  the r ich  peasant econ om y and showing con sid era tion  to 
those who rent out sm a ll p a rce ls  o f land, p oor  peasants w ill re ce iv e  
le s s  land and m eans of production  . . . P o o r  peasants should be 
educated so that after agrarian  re fo rm  they w ill s tr iv e  to ov e rco m e  
th eir  d ifficu lt ie s , p rom ote production  and im p rove  th eir  live lih ood  
by ca re fu lly  cultivating the land, applying g rea ter  amounts o f 
fe r t i l iz e r ,  im prov ing so il conditions and p ractis in g  mutual aid.
On the other hand, the variou s lo ca l p eop le 's  governm ents should 
also re le a se  loans and adopt other p oss ib le  and n e ce s sa ry  m ethods 
to help p oor  peasants o v e rco m e  their d ifficu lties  follow ing land 
d istribu tion . 11 (213)
In view  o f the fact that fo r  econ om ic  purposes there was in su fficien t 
land fo r  rea lloca tion  in K iangsu it would be tem pting to argue that one o f 
the m ost seriou s  fa ilings o f  the land re fo rm  m ovem ent was that by 
attempting to m ake an ega litarian  d istribution  o f  a s c a r c e  re so u rce  (land) 
it d issipated  the e con om ic  benefits o f the agrarian  p o licy . H ow ever, such 
an argum ent is  not supported by  the fa cts . It is true that land re fo rm  in 
K iangsu was ega litarian  to the extent that s im ila r  amounts o f land w ere
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allocated  to p oor  and m iddle peasants. But i f  these p easan ts1 orig in a l 
holdings are also taken into account the e ffect was not to bring about an 
ega litarian  pattern o f landholding at all. Rather the average m iddle 
peasant fa rm  was s till m ore  than 40% la rg e r  than that o f  a p oor  peasant.
It seem s reasonable to conclude that fo r  the sake o f  b roa d er  econ om ic  
in terests  the planners found it n e ce s sa ry  to s a c r if ic e  som e o f the so c ia l 
gains o f land re fo rm .
If there was a s ca rc ity  o f land fo r  red istribu tion  the shortage o f 
draft anim als and farm  im plem ents was even m o re  acute. Yet in the 
absence o f  m echanization  agricu ltural production  depended upon these 
fa c to rs  being available in the c o r r e c t  quantities. No m atter how effic ien t 
the m ethods o f  sharing existing supplies o f anim als and too ls  m ight be , 
th eir  shortage was bound to be a seriou s  constra in t on agricu ltural 
production  in K iangsu, at least in the short run.
That the C hinese w ere them selves aware o f the econ om ic  lim itations 
o f land re fo rm  has a lready been indicated by  the ex cerp t fro m  Jao Shu- 
sh ih 's  speech . We shall conclude this chapter by  exam ining v e ry  b r ie f ly  
som e  further reactions o f the Chinese planners to the econ om ic  c o n s e ­
quences o f  land re fo rm  in Kiangsu.
In F eb ru ary , 1951 a rep ort m ade by Kuan W en -w ei at a sp ecia l 
con feren ce  o f  hsien  lead ers  in south Kiangsu^ set out a num ber o f  
p rob lem s w hich w ere to continue to beset the agricu ltu ra l s e c to r  throughout 
1951 and into 1952. Two o f  these w ere s p e c if ica lly  related  to the im p le ­
m entation o f  land re fo rm ; the f ir s t  was the p ra ctice  w hich som e cadres 
had adopted o f  com pellin g  r ich  and m iddle peasants to m ake loans against
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their w i l l ; ^ ^ )  the second  was the v io la tion  o f  the p rin cip les  governing 
the hiring o f labou r. The fa ilu re  to ob serve  the p rov is ion  guaranteeing 
the freed om  to h ire  labour was causing a " . . . lack  o f  unity betw een 
labour and cap ita l",^  ^  Kuan stated, and together with the p ra ctice  o f 
en forced  loans was having adverse e ffects  upon the production  enthusiasm  
o f r ich  peasants.
The p rob lem s caused by  the shortages o f fa c to rs  o f production  other 
than land w ere  m entioned in the second  part o f Kuan W en -w ei's  speech . 
D espite the red istribu tion  o f  landlord p roperty , the lack  o f seed s , 
fe r t i l iz e r s ,  draft anim als, too ls  and rations fo r  the spring-p loughing 
p eriod  rem ained a seriou s  p rob lem  fo r  m any p oor  peasants. Other 
peasants such as the dependants o f "revo lu tion ary  m a r ty r s " , orphans 
and widows lacked  su fficien t labour to farm  th eir  land and unless they 
rece iv ed  help there was a danger that their fa rm s would becom e neglected  
and overgrow n  with w eeds. Kuan's p re scr ip tio n  fo r  all these ills  was the 
sam e: organ ization . M ass m ovem ents to c o lle c t  fe r t i l iz e r s  should be
launched; e fforts  should be m ade to rep a ir  and in cre a se  the num ber o f 
fa rm  to o ls ; above all, mutual aid would provide the m eans w hereby the 
fa cto r  shortages could be o v e rco m e .
C on cern  o v e r  s im ila r  p rob lem s was echoed in north Kiangsu. In
O ctober , 1951 an artic le  r e fe rre d  to the draft anim al and tool shortages
afflicting peasants after land re fo rm  and ca lled  fo r  the developm ent o f
new organ izational fo rm s to o v ercom e  the p rob lem s associa ted  with 
(21.8 )these s c a r c it ie s .
But the c le a re s t  evidence o f  the econ om ic  p rob lem s that land re fo rm
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had given r ise  to was contained in a rep ort published in a Shanghai 
new spaper in June, 1 9 5 1 .^ * ^  This was based  on an investigation  o f
agricu ltural produ ction  conditions conducted by the South Kiangsu Land
(220 )R eform  C om m ittee in 25 hsiang throughout south K iangsu. Its
fir s t  finding cen tered  around the p rob lem  o f com m unication  betw een the
lead ers  (e sp e c ia lly  lo ca l ca d re s ) and the peasant m a s s e s . C adres w ere
cr it ic iz e d  fo r  th eir  tendency to take things e a s ily  once land rea lloca tion
was com pleted . They fa iled  to explain the new produ ction  p o lic ie s  to
the peasants, s im p ly  believ in g  that "the p oor peasants are over joy ed  to
be a llocated  land. In o rd e r  to fill  their stom achs they w ill naturally 
(2 2 1 )w ork h a rd ". ' But this was c le a r ly  a m isca lcu la tion , fo r  the report 
continued;
"The peasants fo r  their part still show an attitude o f dependence 
on the governm ent, be liev in g  that the P e o p le ’ s G overnm ent w ill 
n ev er  let them  sta rve . They dem and loans o f  food stu ffs , seeds 
and fe r t i l iz e r .  The m iddle peas ants are afraid  o f  im prov ing their 
situation; the r ich  peasants dare not h ire help ; and the poor 
peasants hesitate to m ake plans fo r  fear o f  an in cre a se  in their 
burdens. " (222)
D espite the avowed p o licy  o f "p reserv in g  the r ich  peasant e con om y"
it is  c le a r  that the r ich  peasants them selves fe lt th em selves  to be in a
p a rticu la rly  vu lnerable position . In C h ’ ang-shu h s ien , fo r  exam ple, the
rea lloca tion  o f  land was said to have le ft them with a num ber o f  anxieties.
On an econ om ic  lev e l they w ere w orr ied  that th eir  freed om  to engage
h ired  labour would be v io la ted , that they would be com p elled  to m ake loans
(223)to m iddle peasants and that they would su ffer  a h eav ier  tax burden.
But in addition to this they also feared  that old "exp lo itative  accou n ts"
would be settled  and that a secon d  land re fo rm  would take p lace  in which
they would be d isp o sse sse d  and attacked.
- 1 4 1 -
It has a lready been shown that their e con om ic  w o rr ie s  at least
(224)w ere not without som e foundation and in the c ircu m stan ces  it is not
su rprisin g  that r ich  peasants ceased  to h ire labou r. One exam ple cited  
in the rep ort revea led  that o f  63 rich  peasants, 53 (86%) had engaged 
h ired  help b e fo re  land re fo rm  but that s ince the d isp o sse ss io n  o f the 
landlords not one continued to do so .
A m a jo r  finding o f  the investigation  was that production  d ifficu lties
continued to ex ist after the com pletion  o f  land re fo rm , in som e cases
exacerba ted  by  the p oor  r ice  harvest o f  the previous year (1950). In
one hsiang in L ieh -yang hsien , said to be represen tative  o f the h illy
reg ion  o f south K iangsu, 15 households (a ll o f them  p oor  peasant) out o f
a total o f  18 w ere experiencing  acute p rob lem s o f live lih ood  and on ly the
three m iddle peasant households m anaged to avoid such d ifficu ltie s . In
another v illage  o v e r  60% o f  all households w ere in need o f seed s . And
in L u -ch ao  hsiang (C hiang-yin  hsien) 18 households w ere without su fficient
r ice  seed s , nine w ere short o f farm  too ls  and 11 "la ck ed  even the b a s ic
(225)n e ce ss it ie s  o f l i f e " .
The rep ort adm itted that shortages o f draft anim als and farm  
im plem ents w ere com m on . In 16 v illa ges  investigated  in K ’un-shan
hsien  70% o f the agricu ltura l labou rer households w ere  found to be short
(226)o f draft anim als, ir r ig a tion  w heels and other too ls  such as ploughs
and h a rrow s. Som e 581 p oor  peasant fam ilies  lacked  a total o f  61 draft 
anim als, 46 boa ts , 57 irr ig a tion  w heels and 59 p loughs. In this kind o f 
situation it was em phasized  that urging the p oor  peasants to ov e rco m e  
th eir  d ifficu lties  by  econ om izin g  was not p o ss ib le . In the short run it was
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essen tia l to en force  a c o r r e c t  labour p o licy , to elim inate the fears  o f 
those peasants who w ere in a position  to make loans and to res to re  cred it 
channels based  on the p rin cip les  o f  fre e  negotiation  and mutual agreem ent.
But what about the long run? It was c le a r  that land re fo rm  did not 
on its own provide the m eans o f  rapid o r  sustained agricu ltural grow th. 
The s ca rc ity  o f essen tia l fa ctors  o f production  the sm a ll (and still fr a g ­
m ented) farm s and other p rob lem s arising out o f  the d ifferert econ om ic  
resp on se  o f each s o c ia l c la ss  to land re fo rm  - all threatened to underm ine 
e fforts  to bring about an expansion o f the agricu ltura l s e c to r . E ssen tia lly  
there w ere two ch o ices  b e fo re  the p lanners. E ither they could im plem ent 
further institutional changes in the hope that a d ifferen t organ ization  o f 
agricu ltural p roduction  would enable the outstanding prob lem s to be o v e r ­
com e ; o r  they could ca r r y  out an investm ent program m e based  on the 
in crea sed  supply o f inputs to the agricu ltural s e c to r  (including perhaps 
som e d egree  o f m echanization ). Even b e fore  land re fo rm  had ended it 
was c le a r  which alternative had been chosen . By the end o f  the land 
re fo rm  m ovem ent the establishm ent o f m utual-a id  team s was w ell under 
way in both north and south K iangsu.
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N otes to Chapter Two
In its orig in a l fo rm  the thesis was to have included an entire chapter 
on tenancy and related  fa ctors  in Kiangsu. F o r  reasons o f  length 
this has now been om itted and the b r ie f  su rvey  that fo llow s m e re ly  
su m m arizes  som e o f the findings that em erged  from  that resea rch .
C h ian g-su -sh en g nung-ts 'un t ia o -ch 'a , op. c it . , pp. 94-99 ; pp. 121-134; 
pp. 170-185 and pp. 207-220 . The four hsien  w ere P 'e i  (H sti-chou 
S pecia l D is tr ict); Y en -ch 'en g  (Y en -ch 'en g  S. D. ); C h 'i-tung (Nan- 
t'ung S. D. ); and C h 'ang-sh u  (Soochow  S. D. ).
Ib id . , pp. 207-220
A peasant "p led ged " ( t i -y a )his land to a m oney len d er in return fo r  
cred it  (usually  le s s  than w here a "m o rtg a g e " , tien -tang was 
arranged), retaining the right to farm  his land but with the added 
ob ligation  o f  paying a rental to the len der. The arrangem ent was 
e ffe c t iv e ly  a sim ple  loan with rent being paid instead o f in terest.
What is in teresting is the way in which the peasant becam e a de 
facto  tenant, the relationship  being tran sform ed  fro m  one betw een 
a c re d ito r  and debtor into that o f a landlord  and tenant.
F or  exam ple, in N an-t'ung, H ai-m en  and C h 'i-tu n g hsien  alm ost 
60% o f agricu ltural households w ere outright tenants (and there w ere 
others who both owned and rented land). See H B, op. c it . , pp. 31 -33 . 
An in teresting account o f the evolution o f  tenancy in som e o f the 
coasta l areas o f  north Kiangsu is given by C h 'en  H ung-chin in "The 
System  o f Land D iv ision  Am ong the S hareholders o f  the Com panies in 
the Kiangsu Salt and R eclam ation  R eg ions. "  See Q uarterly  Review  
o f the Sun Y at-sen  Institute fo r  Advanced Culture and E ducation , 
v o l. 4, no. 1, (1937).
In P 'e i ,  F en g -h sien , P 'e i-h s ie n  and T 'an g -sh a n  hsien  in the far 
north o f K iangsu, the p roportion  o f fa rm e rs  renting all their land 
ranged fro m  4% to 7% in the ea rly  1930's . H B, op. c i t . , pp. 31 -33 .
See, fo r  exam ple, Map V. 1 in D .H . P erk in s , op. c i t . , p. 88 which 
designates the entire area  o f  south Kiangsu as one in which tenant 
fa m ilies  represen ted  m ore  than 50% o f all farm  fa m ilie s .
P 'an  Kuang-tan and Ch'ttan W e i-t 'ie n , Su-nan t 'u -t i  k a i-k o fang-w en 
chi (Investigations into Land R eform  in South K iangsu), Peking,
1952; p . 2.
HB, op. c i t . , pp. 31 -33 .
The argument is as fo llow s : in gen era l, the rate o f p ro fit on 
renting out land (exp ressed  as a percentage o f  capital invested) was 
low  in China. A ccord in g  to a su rvey  o f m ore  than 100 farm s in 
Anhwei p rov in ce  (w here rural conditions w ere  probably  s im ila r  to 
those o f Kiangsu) m ade by Buck in 1923, the rate o f return was as 
low  as 2. 5% (J. L . Buck, E con om ic and S ocia l Survey o f 102 F arm s
N ear Wuhu, Anhwei, China, D ecem ber, 1923, cited  by  Chang 
C h ung-li, The Incom e o f the Chinese G entry , U niversity  o f  W ashing­
ton P re ss  (Seattle), 1962). In Kiangsu an investigation  m ade by 
Chang H sin -i in 1930 ("S om e M ateria ls on the Tenancy P rob lem  in 
China11 in T 'u n g -ch i ytieh -pao, v o l. 2, no. 6, June, 1930; pp. 31-32 ) 
indicated  that cash  rent as a p roportion  o f  land value in the provin ce 
ranged fro m  8 . 1 -  10. 4% fo r  d ry -crop  land and fro m  8.1  - 8. 7% fo r  
paddy land. When co s ts  o f rent co lle ctio n , p o ss ib le  spoilage , the 
e ffects  o f p oor  harvests and tax paym ents are taken into account, it 
is c le a r  that net p ro fit  m ust have been con s id era b ly  le s s .  By co n ­
tra st, investm ent in co m m e rc ia l and industria l en terp rises  o ffe red  
h igher returns as w ell as a degree o f s e cu rity  that did not attach to 
in com e fro m  land. Thus, it is  feasib le  that in  south Kiangsu the 
relative  attractions o f lan d lord ism  w ere le s s  than e lsew h ere .
One final p iece  o f evidence supports this analysis; in another 
study Buck stated that along the Shanghai-Nanking Railw ay land­
lord s  w ere giving up land in p re fe ren ce  to other investm ents, partly 
becau se o f  the d ifficu lty  o f co llectin g  rents w hich gave them  a decent 
return on their capital and partly  because o f  in creasin g  investm ent 
opportun ities in business and industry, (J .L .  Buck, F arm  O w ner­
ship and Tenancy in China, published by the C om m ittee on C h ris t ­
ianizing the E con om ic O rd er, Shanghai). What is p articu la rly  
in teresting is  that it was p r e c is e ly  those hsien  along the Shanghai - 
Nanking R ailw ay which had (accord in g  to other so u rce s ) low  rates 
o f tenancy. Thus, the hypothesis that there was som e relationship  
betw een the pattern o f  tenancy and the nature o f e con om ic  d ev e lop ­
m ent in south K iangsu is upheld by  e m p ir ica l ev iden ce.
P artia l evidence suggests that tenancy in Japan (in  term s o f  land 
cultivated by  tenants) in crea sed  from  34 .2%  in 1883 to 40% in 1892.
In 1903 the figure was 44. 5%, rising to 46 .2%  in 1917. Yet o v er  
the sam e p eriod  agricu ltura l production  ro se  by  w ell o v e r  50%.
See K. Ohkawa and H. R osovsk y , "The R ole o f  A gricu ltu re  in 
M odern Japanese E con om ic D evelopm ent" in E con om ic  D evelopm ent 
and Cultural Change, vo l. 9, Part 2, O ctob er , i960 ; pp. 43 -68 .
Landlords did som etim es provide seed s , fe r t i l iz e r  and other item s 
o f w orking capital, but this help was gen era lly  re fle cted  in a 
h igher rent.
A concom itant o f the growth o f absentee lan d lord ism  was the 
developm ent o f  institutions knows as "lan d lord  b u r s a r ie s "  (tsu -ch a n ), 
These organ izations fo r  the exploitation  and m anagem ent o f  land 
w ere operated  by agents w orking on behalf o f  lan d lord s. See the 
in teresting study by Yuji M uram atsu; "A  D ocum entary Study o f 
C hinese L and lord ism  in the Late C h ’ing and the E a rly  Republican 
Kiangnan" in the B ulletin  o f  the School o f O rienta l and A frican  
Studies, v o l. XX IX , Part 3, 1966; pp. 566-599.
That is , fixed  rents provided  the tenant with som e incentive to
in cre a se  his output s in ce  anything le ft o v e r  once the rent had been 
paid was retained by h im . On the other hand, it gave him  le ss  
se cu rity  than a sh a re -crop p in g  system  sin ce  in th eory  (and often 
in p ra ctice ) rent had to be paid in full no m atter how p oor the 
h arvest. F rom  the lan d lord 's  point o f view  fixed  rents perm itted  
in com e to be estim ated fa ir ly  accu rate ly  in advance as long as 
p r ice s  w ere  reasonably  stable.
(15) The co rre la tio n  betw een the p oor  natural conditions o f  P 'e i  hsien  
and the adoption o f  sh a re -crop p in g  is m ade exp lic it  in C h ian g-su - 
sh€rg nung-ts 'un  t ia o -c h 'a , op. c i t . , p. 56.
(16) The expected  d ire ct  relationship  betw een so il fe rt ility  (quality of 
land) and rent le v e l does not em erge  fro m  available data. Rather 
there was a tendency in Kiangsu fo r  an in v erse  relationsh ip  to exist: 
in other w ord s , the burden o f  rent was h eav iest fo r  those tenants 
least able to b ea r  it. F o r  s p e c if ic  evidence see  CKNY, v o l. 3, o p . 
c it. , p. 247; and Chen P o -ta , C hin-tai Chung-kuo t i-tsu  kai-k 'uang 
(Land Rent in M odern China), Second edition , Peking, 1962; p. 36.
The m ost com plete data on rent leve ls  in Kiangsu is  given in 
"The Kiangsu Rural E conom y and C urrent A gricu ltu ra l P ro b le m s "  
in T s ’un -ch ih  (Rural A dm in istra tion ), v o l. 2, n os . 11-12 , 5 /9 /3 2 ; 
p p .20 -40 .
(17) Wang T 'ie n -tzu , "T he Rural E conom y o f P e i-h s ia , W usih" in NHYK, 
v o l . 2, no. 11, N ovem ber, 1935; pp. 15-31 .
(18) This point is m ade in another analysis o f tenants* in com e and expen ­
diture in I-hsing hsien  (Sung-chiang S .D . ). When incom e from  all 
so u rces  is  com pared  with total expenditure, there is a total surplus 
o f  18 yiian. But if  su bsid ia ry  earnings are deducted from  total 
in com e, this surplus is tran sform ed  into a d e fic it  o f -2 .0  yilan.
See Ts ’u n -ch ih , v o l. 2, nos. 11-12 , 5 /9 /3 2 ,  pp. 4 1 -42 , "The Rural 
E con om y o f I-hsing  and the Com m unist D istu rb a n ces".
(19) A ltern ative ly  the total rent paid out by tenants m ay be taken as a 
p roxy  fo r  the surplus which could be tapped by  a governm ent fo r  
developm ent purposes (though not n e c e s s a r ily  agricu ltural d ev e lop ­
m ent).
(20) Liu H siu -ch 'in g , "The P rob lem  o f Tenancy in C h 'i-tung and the 
M ovem ent to C reate O w ner-C ultivators " in T i-ch en g  ytieh -k1 an 
( Land A dm in istration  M onthly), vo l. 5, nos. 2 and 3, M arch , 1937; 
p p .321-346 .
(21) E v ery  one o f  the ow n er-cu ltiva tor  households spent som ething on 
h ired  labou r, house rep a irs  and purchases o f  too ls  and fe r t i l iz e r s .  
The p rop ortion  carry in g  out expenditures on anim al husbandry was 
sligh tly  low er  at 66 .67% . Ibid.
(22) C on sideration  o f other fa ctors  such as the lack  o f secu rity  o f tenure
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in Kiangsu and la n d lord s ' use of exploitative d ev ices  other than 
rent (which we have been unable to con s id er  h ere  fo r  reasons of 
space) would serv e  only to re in force  this con clu sion .
B u ck 's  data fro m  his Land U tilization Survey showed that there was 
w ell under one draft animal unit per farm  in his Kiangsu sam ple.
See his S tatistical V olu m e, p. 131, Table 5. The supply situation 
o f fa rm  too ls  was equally seriou s ; m ost fa rm s probably  owned a 
traditional plough and one o r  two sim ple too ls  such as a hoe o r  
h arrow , but la rg e r  o r  m ore  sp ecia lized  equipm ent often  had to be 
shared.
Although the institution o f  tenancy enabled m any land less peasants 
to seek  a liv ing fro m  the land, the m ost frequent s ize  o f  operational 
holding rem ained v e ry  sm a ll. M ore o v e r , m ost farm s w ere also 
heav ily  fragm ented .
What is m o re , these r ich  peasants w ere often  the m ost e ffic ien t 
fa rm e rs  by virtue o f their p o sse ss io n  o f g rea te r  amounts o f fixed  
and w orking capital.
Ts 'un -ch ih , v o l. 2, n o s .11-12 , pp. 4 0 -46 , "T he Rural E conom y o f 
I-hsing and the C om m unist P arty M ovem ent. "
See Liu H siu -ch 'in g  in T i-ch en g  yiieh -k 1 an, v o l. 5, n os . 2 -3 , op. c it. , 
p p .321-346 .
See above, chapter 1.
A fter the outbreak o f  the S ino-Japanese W ar in 1937 the CC P 
m od ified  its agrarian  p o lic ie s  in the in terests  o f osten sib le  national 
unity against Japan. The com p rom ise  p o licy  w hich em erged  and 
was im plem ented  in the areas under C om m unist con tro l was the 
"D ouble R eduction"; the reduction  o f rents by  25% and o f  in terest 
paym ents on loans (to 1. 0% o r  1. 5% p er m onth).
S u -pei jih -p a o  (North Kiangsu D aily ), published in Y ang-chou  and 
h erea fte r  S P J P , 3 0 /6 /5 1 , p. 4, "Land Relations in North Kiangsu 
Now and in the P a st" .
Ibid.
This exam ple is  fro m  a fascinating study o f  land re fo rm  in north 
K iangsu b e fo re  1949: see  Lu Feng, Jen -m in  fan -sh en  chi ( The 
P eop le  Throw  O ff th eir  F eudal Yok e), Yangtze Publishing H ouse, 
1947; chapter 2.
B ecau se o f the d ifficu lties  o f unified organ ization  in w artim e 
conditions north Kiangsu was divided into two la rge  sub-un its, 
cen tra l and north K iangsu. The dividing line was the Hwai R iv er .
A good account o f  som e o f  the stratagem s reso rte d  to by landlords
is  given by  Lu Feng, op. c i t . But note that landlords w ere not 
u n iform ly  opposed  to the re fo rm s . In the Y en -ch 'en g  - Fou -n ing 
area  som e "en ligh tened" landlords w ere rep orted  to have shown 
th eir  sym pathy fo r  the anti-Japanese p o lic ie s  o f the C C P by 
participating in a "giving land as a g ift"  (h s i-t 'ie n )  m ovem ent and 
volu n tarily  giving a p iece  o f their land (from  10 to 100 m ou) to the
dependants o f  those fighting the Japanese without any dem and fo r
its future return . Mao is said to have heard o f  this in Yenan and 
ord e re d  that it be stopped on the grounds that such action con tra ­
vened the land and p roperty  rights o f the land lord  c la ss  which w ere 
at this tim e guaranteed by the Com m unist P arty !
(35) In C h inese, N ung-m in chiu-kuo hui (abbreviated  to N ung-chiu hui); 
and C h 'a -tsu  t'uan.
(36) Lu Feng, op. c i t .
(37) A fter  the end o f the S ino-Japanese W ar peasants began spontaneously
to m ove beyond rent reduction  to actual con fisca tion  o f lan d lord s ' 
land. In M ay, 1946, under the p ressu re  o f events, the C entral 
C om m ittee o f the C C P gave its form a l approval to these c o n fis ­
ca tory  actions against lan d lord s, though adding a qu a lification  that 
m odera tion  should be shown to landlords with industria l and c o m m e r ­
c ia l in terests  and to the r ich  peasant c la ss  as a w hole. But the last 
s ix  m onths o f 1946 and m uch o f  1947 was a p eriod  when m any 
peasants and cadres ign ored  the d irectiv es  issu ed  by the P arty and 
when, as Liu S h a o -ch 'i la ter  revealed  " . . . m ost o f  the deviations
in the im plem entation  o f agrarian  re fo rm  w ere  com m itted  . . . and 
the in terests  o f part o f the m iddle peasants w ere en croach ed  upon, 
industry  and co m m e rce  in the rural areas w ere  partly  im paired  
and in d iscrim in ate  beatings and k illings o c cu rre d  . . . "  (See Liu 
S h a o -ch 'i, "On the A grarian  R eform  L a w ", a rep ort m ade at the 
Second S ession  o f the National C om m ittee o f  the C hinese P e o p le 's  
P o lit ica l Consultative C on ference in Peking, 1 4 /6 /5 0  and tra n s ­
lated in full in The A grarian  R eform  Law o f the P e o p le 's  R epublic 
o f China and Other Relevant D ocu m en ts, F ore ig n  Languages P r e s s , 
Peking; D ecem b er , 1950.)
(38) K en g-ch e yu c h 'i - t 'i e n . The phrase was o r ig in a lly  Sun Y a t-sen 's
but was subsequently adopted by the C C P and in corp ora ted  into 
th eir  agrarian  p o lic ie s . To som e the adoption o f this slogan  in 
the late 1940's heralded  the event o f fu ll com m unism  - a b e lie f  
w hich, as Lu Feng points out, was tota lly  without foundation.
(39) This included the landlord  c la ss  except fo r  those who had in terests  
in industry and trade.
(40) Lu Feng, op. c i t .
(41) One such indication  is the strong language used  by Lu Feng in his
rep ort. See, fo r  exam ple, the opening paragraphs o f the f irs t  
chapter.
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SPJP , 3 0 /6 /5 1 , op. c i t . , p. 4. The C hinese phrase is ; i-sh o u  na 
ch 'ia n g .i-s h o u  na su a n -p 'a n .
Ib id . See also H sin-hua jih  pao (New China D a ily ), published in 
Nanking and h erea fter  HHJP, 2 7 /1 1 /5 0 , "M ethods o f Im plem enting 
Land R e fo rm ", which d e scr ib e s  these areas as w here " . . . land 
was d istributed  during the w ar o f  libera tion  but w here all the land 
d ivided am ongst the peasants has been snatched back  by landlords 
and rich  peasants. "
The b a s ic  re fe re n ce  to the num ber o f peasants involved  in land 
re fo rm  was given  by Kao Feng, V ice -C h a irm a n  o f the Land R eform  
C om m ittee o f  the P e o p le 's  A dm in istration  o f  N orth Kiangsu. See 
S P J P , 2 8 /1 2 /5 1 , p. 1, "R ep ort on Land R eform  W ork in North 
K iangsu during the Past Y ear. "
The A grarian  R eform  Law o f the P e o p le 's  R epublic o f China and 
Other Relevant D ocum ents, h erea fter  A R L , F ore ig n  Languages 
P r e s s , Peking, D ecem b er, 1950; pp. 1 -16 .
In p ra ctica l term s the d ifferen ce  betw een these two term s appears 
to have been n il. C on fiscation  applied to land belonging to landlords 
and requ isition  to r ich  peasants' land.
Ib id . , p. 4 
Ib id . , pp. 17-58 .
The ECM A was set up on 27th January, 1950 in Shanghai. It 
e x e rc is e d  ju r isd iction  over  the three p rov in ces  o f Shantung,
Chekiang and Fukien, the four adm inistrative d istr ic ts  o f north 
and south Anhwei, and north Kiangsu and south Kiangsu and two 
m u n icip a lities , Shanghai and Nanking.
The regulations w ere not published until the end o f  A p ril. The 
text can be found in Su-nan jih  pao (South K iangsu D aily) published 
in W usih and h erea fter  SNJP, 2 9 /4 /5 0 , p. 1.
See Chung-hua je n -m in  kung-ho-kuo k 'a i-k u o  wen hsien  (D ocum ents 
on the E stablishm ent o f the P e o p le 's  R epublic o f China), Hong Kong, 
New D e m o cra cy  Publishing H ouse, 1949; pp. 253-274 .
SN JP, 2 4 /9 /5 0 ,  op. cit. , p. 1.
A  speech  m ade on the sam e day that the East China Rent Regulations 
w ere  passed  (6 /2 /5 0 )  re in forced  this point by em phasizing that 
questions involving rent d ep osits , unpaid h ired  la b o u re rs , the 
m aintenance o f tenant secu rity  w ere to be d e lib era te ly  shelved until 
land re fo rm  was im plem ented . See Hsin S oo -ch ou  pao (New Soochow  
D aily), 2 8 /4 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "Explanation o f Rent R eduction  Regulations 
in the V illa ges  o f the N ew ly -L iberated  A reas o f East China".
The m oderate  tone o f  these docum ents was echoed  in a 
cen tra l d irectiv e  issu ed  on 18th F ebru ary , 1950 'On Land R eform  
and P u blic G rain A cqu isition  in the N ew ly -L ibera ted  A r e a s '.
"D ire ct iv e  by  the East China M ilitary  A dm in istrative  C om m ittee 
on P rep a ra tory  W ork fo r  Land R e fo rm " in Hua-tung ch'tt t s 'a i  
cheng ch in g -ch i fa -lin g  h u i-p ien  (E con om ic and F inancial Regulations 
fo r  the East China R eg ion ), 2 vo lu m es, E ast China P e o p le 's  
Publishing H ouse, Shanghai, 1951; vo l. 2, pp. 1972-1976.
SNJP, 8 /2 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "The Peasant M ovem ent in South Kiangsu 
Since L ib era tion ".
H sin S oo -ch ou  p a o , 2 3 /4 /5 0 , p. 4, "The Situation in N orth Kiangsu 
and R e lie f W ork ". A lso  S P J P , 2 9 /1 0 /5 0 , "R ep ort o f  G overnm ent 
W ork in N orth Kiangsu in the Past Y e a r "  states that the natural 
d isa sters  w hich had o ccu rre d  w ere the w orst in m any d ecad es.
Fam ine conditions w ere said to have lasted  m ore  than ten m onths, 
affecting 4, 000, 000 peasants.
At p rov in c ia l, sp ecia l d is tr ic t  and hsien  le v e ls .
"On A gricu ltu ra l P roduction  P o lic ie s  in the Land R eform  A reas 
This Autumn and W in ter", published on 18th Septem ber, 1950.
This was to be achieved in the areas w here land re fo rm  was to be 
im plem ented  through the follow ing p r in c ip les ;
(1) Cultivation o f autumn and w inter cro p s  should continue on the 
p rin cip le  o f  "he who reaps t i l ls " .
(2) The crop s  could be divided betw een the orig in a l cu ltivator and 
the new landow ner by  the agreem ent o f both parties accord in g 
to the norm s laid  down in rent reduction  regu lations.
(3) The new landow ner could  re im bu rse  the orig in a l cu ltivator fo r  
the total cost  o f  cultivation and fe r t i l iz e r  application ca rr ie d  
out b e fo re  the land was rea lloca ted .
Hua-tung ch'ti ts 'a i-ch e n g  ch in g -ch i fa -lin g  h u i-p ien , op. c it. , 
v o l. 2, p p .1972-1976.
F o r  exam ple, A rtic le  15 o f the East China Rent Reduction Regulations 
stated; "P ro te c t  industry and trade, including those industria l and 
co m m e rc ia l en terp rises  engaged in by  land lords and o ld -s ty le  
r ich  p easan ts".
The c la ss ifica tio n  of rural so c ie ty  at this tim e was the subject o f 
a long docum ent adopted by the G overnm ent A dm in istration  C ouncil 
o f the C entral P e o p le 's  G overnm ent in August, 1950 and entitled 
"D ecis ion s  C oncerning the D ifferentiation  o f  C lass Status in the 
C ou n trysid e" (see  A R L, op. c it . , pp. 17-58 ).
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B rie fly , the rura l population was divided into five c la sse s ; 
landlords w ere  those who owned land but did not w ork on it to any 
sign ificant extent, relying instead on "ex p lo ita tion " (ren ts , m on ey- 
lending, the h iring o f labour, e tc . ). R ich  peasants gen era lly  
owned and w orked their land, but som etim es also ca rr ie d  out 
"exp lo ita tion " through the hiring o f labour and renting out o f land. 
They w ere also ch a ra cter ized  by their ow nership  o f  " . . . better 
m eans o f p roduction  and som e floating ca p ita l" . (Ib id . , p. 20). 
M iddle p easan ts, although often owning som e land and w orking 
capital, w ere n everth eless  frequently  com p elled  to pay land rent 
and loan in terest. P o o r  peasants lacked both land and farm  
im plem ents and gen era lly  had to re ly  on rented land to m ake a 
liv in g . They w ere  also fo rce d  to h ire th em selves  out as labou rers  
fo r  short p er iod s . F inally , w ork ers w ere those who had neither 
land nor im plem ents and depended ". . . w holly  o r  m ain ly upon the 
sale o f th eir  labout pow er fo r  their liv in g " . ( Ib id . , p. 23).
H ence, the term  "r ich  peasants o f a sem i-la n d lo rd  typ e".
D oubtless they w ere  also aware that r ich  p easan ts ' land had s o m e ­
tim es been  con fisca ted  during agrarian  re fo rm s  ca rr ie d  out by  
the C C P b e fo re  the S ino-Japanese W ar.
F o r  an exposition  o f this p o licy  see Liu S h a o -c h 'i 's  report 
"On the A grarian  R eform  Law " in A R L , op . c i t . , pp. 71 -75 .
A R L , op. c i t . , p . 3.
I b id . , p. 3.
"R egulations on the M ethods o f Im plem enting Land R eform  in 
E ast China" in Hua-tung ch'tf ts 'a i-ch e n g  ch in g -ch i fa -lin g  hu i-p ien , 
op. c i t . , v o l. 2, pp. 1976-1986.
"D irectiv e  by  the East China B ranch o f the C entral C om m ittee o f 
the Chinese Com m unist P arty on Com pleting Land R eform  Ahead 
o f T im e " in ibid . , v o l. 2, pp. 1986-1998.
N orth Anhwei had been  p articu larly  hard hit by  flood s .
"Land R eform  in East China to be A c ce le ra te d "  in Shanghai N ew s, 
1 6 /1 2 /5 0 , translated  in Survey o f the China M ainland P r e s s , (Hong 
Kong), h erea fter  SCM P, no. 35, 2 1 /1 2 /5 0 ; pp. 7 -8 .
China entered  the K orean W ar in O ctober , 1950.
Hua-tung ch'tf ts 'a i-ch e n g  ch in g -ch i fa -lin g  hui-p ien , op. c i t . , 
v o l. 22, pp. 1986-1998.
(7 5) In o rd e r  to bring these "law less  la n d lord s" under con tro l, the
ECM A had, in O ctober , prom ulgated th eir  "P ro v is io n a l Regulations 
fo r  C ontrolling Law less Landlords in East China".
(76) M ing-ling  chu-i
(77) An in teresting phenom enon o f this p eriod  was the la rge  amount o f 
space  in new spapers and other m ateria ls  devoted to refuting the 
p rop os ition  that "there is  no feudalism  in Kiangnan" (Chiang-nan 
wu fe n g -ch ie n ). Specia l treatm ent o f the la rge  num ber o f  landlords 
with industria l and co m m e rc ia l in terests  in the area had given 
r ise  to the b e lie f  that rural conditions in Kiangnan w ere som ehow  
d ifferen t from  those e lsew h ere - that lan d lord ism  was in fact le ss  
feudal and m ore  p ro g re ss iv e . F rom  the C C P 's  point o f  v iew , the 
im plica tion s o f such a b e lie f  w ere dangerous; hence the cam paign 
to root it out.
(78) Som e indication  o f the e ffect upon land re fo rm  o f the 'new lin e ' can 
be seen  fro m  a rep ort which appeared in M arch , 1951. A ccord in g  
to th is, the orig in a l plan was that an area o f East China containing 
an agricu ltu ra l population o f 47, 000, 000 should com plete  land 
re fo rm  during the w inter and spring o f  1950-51. Yet by M arch , 
1951, land re fo rm  had been  fu lly  im plem ented  in an area containing 
66, 000, 000 peasants (40% m ore  than the orig in a l target). If the 
"o ld  libera ted  a re a s "  w ere included the figure ro se  to 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . 
See L iu  Jui-lung, "R ep ort on Land R eform  W ork in East China"
in HHJP, 2 1 /3 /5 1 .
(79) S P J P , 3 1 /5 /5 1 ,  p. 1, "Land R eform  Has B a s ica lly  Been Com pleted 
in North K iangsu".
(80) The Peasant A ssocia tion s  w ere the m ost im portant o f  the peasant 
organ izations and w ere resp on sib le  fo r  adm inistering land re fo rm  
under the guidance o f  the ca d res . In S P J P , 1 9 /1 0 /5 1 , p. 1, "T he 
N ew ly L iberated  A reas o f  North Kiangsu are V ig orou sly  Creating 
the Conditions fo r  Land R e fo rm " it was stated that by  the end o f 
August, 1950 512 hsiang (76% o f all the hsiang in the area)
had establish ed  Peasant O rganizations (nung- h u itsu - ch ih ).
(81) T 'a i-ch o u  S pecia l D istr ict  la ter becam e Y ang-chou  Specia l D istr ict .
(82) S P J P , 3 1 /5 /5 1 ,  op. c it. , p. 1.
(83) S P J P , 1 0 /1 2 /5 0 , p . 2, "Land R eform  W ork is  M ostly  C om pleted in 
the Old A re a s . In the New A reas the Land R eform  M ovem ent is 
M oving Ahead as a M atter o f U rgen cy".
(84) Ibid.
(85) A ccounts o f the sabotage activ ities o f  the "law less  la n d lord s" can 
be found in SPJP during ea rly  N ovem ber. See, fo r  exam ple, SPJP, 
1 /1 1 /5 0 , "L aw less  Landlords A re  Sabotaging Land R e fo rm ".
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( 86)
(87)
(88)
(89)
(90)
( 9 1 )
(92)
(93)
(94)
(95)
(96)
(97)
(98)
(99) 
( 100 ) 
( 101 )
( 102 )
K uan-m en c h u - i .
SP JP , 1 0 /1 2 /5 0 , op. c it. , p. 2.
SP JP , 1 8 /1 2 /5 0 , p . l ,  "S p ecific  M ethods fo r  Im plem enting Land 
R eform  in the North Kiangsu A dm in istrative R eg ion ".
See above, p. 66.
B y im p lica tion , it seem s certa in  that the sam e thing m ust have 
happened to r ich  peasants, although this is  not sp e c if ica lly  
m entioned.
F an -ts  'a i .
S P J P , 18/ 12/ 50, op. cit. , p . l ,  A rtic le  3 (i).
It is d ifficu lt to im agine a situation in w hich few er draft anim als 
would have been requ ired !
"T ra n s fe r  o r  d isp ersa l after the libera tion  o f  the lo ca lity  by  sa le , 
m ortgage , gift o r  any other m eans, o f any land which should be 
con fisca ted  o r  requ isitioned  accord in g  to this Law shall be d ecla red  
null and void . Such land should be included in the land to be 
red istribu ted . But i f  peasants who bought such land o r  took m o r t ­
gages on such land w ill thereby su ffer  any con sid erab le  lo s s ,  
m easu res  should be w orked out fo r  p rop er  com pen sation ". A R L , 
op. c i t . , pp. 3 -4 .
S P J P , 2 8 /1 2 /5 1 , p. 1, "R ep ort on Land R eform  W ork in North 
Kiangsu during the Past Y e a r"  by  Kao Feng.
S P J P , 3 1 /5 /5 1 , op. c i t . , p . l .
Ibid.
S P J P , 1 6 /8 /5 1 , p . l ,  "Counterattacks and R esu rgen ce  o f Law less 
Landlords " .
SPJP, 1 4 /5 /5 1 , p. 2, "Push Ahead with the W ork o f Regulating 
the Land".
SNJP, 8 /2 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "The Situation Regarding the South Kiangsu 
Peasant M ovem ent Since L ib era tion ".
But not without d ifficu lty ; SN JP, 8 /2 /5 0 ,  op. c it. , p. 2, reported  
that during the autumn lev y  landlords tra n s ferred  p rop erty  and 
wealth and con cea led  and divided their land in an e ffort to escape 
th eir  ob ligation s.
Ibid.
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(103) Ib id .
(104) See, fo r  exam ple, SNJP, 6 /2 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "R ep ort on the W ork 
Situation in the South Kiangsu A dm in istrative R eg ion ", which 
em phasized  the uniqueness o f the south K iangsu econom y.
(105) SN JP, 2 3 /3 /5 0 , p. 1, "D irective  on the P rep a ra tory  W ork fo r  
Land R e fo rm ".
(106) SN JP, 1 1 /4 /5 0 , p. 1, "The C urrent Situation and the Tasks o f 
P roduction  R e lie f in South K iangsu".
(107) Ib id .
(108) SN JP, 2 8 /7 /5 0 , p. 1, "A dm in istrative W ork in South Kiangsu in 
the F irs t  H alf o f 1950".
(109) M em bersh ip  o f  the Peasant A ssocia tion s  in July was put at
2 ,9 2 0 ,0 0 0 . Ibid.
(110) See, fo r  exam ple, SN JP, 2 1 /8 /5 0 , p. 1, "L a w less  Landlords B reak 
the Land R eform  L aw "; SN JP, 2 2 /9 /5 0 , p. 1, "L aw less  Landlords 
in Chinkiang S pecia l D istr ict  are U nderm ining P roduction  and 
Sabotaging Land R e fo rm ". The landlord  p rob lem  in south Kiangsu 
was m o re  in tractable than in the north becau se  o f  the la rge  num bers 
that w ere involved  in industria l and co m m e rc ia l e n te rp rises .
(111) SN JP, 7 /8 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "Im plem ent Land R eform  A fter the Autumn 
H a rvest" (dated 4 /9 /5 0 ) .
(112) SN JP, 7 /9 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "D e c is io n  to M ob ilize  A ll the Peasants o f 
South Kiangsu to C om plete Land R eform  This W inter and Next 
S prin g".
(113) C h 'en  P 'i -h s ie n  was the S ecreta ry  o f the P arty  C om m ittee o f the 
C C P (South Kiangsu B ranch ). Ou-yang H u i-lin  was a m em b er o f 
the ECM A Land R eform  C om m ittee. The text o f  O u-yang 's  rep ort 
on the "Situation R egarding the South K iangsu Peasant M ovem ent 
and Future T a sk s" can be found in SN JP, 3 /9 /5 0 ,  p . l .
(114) The supposed relationship  betw een tenancy and rural p overty  was 
not always understood  by the peasants. T here is evidence that
they w ere taken in by la n d lo rd s1 protestations that they (the peasants) 
ow ed th eir  v e ry  ex isten ce  to the la n d lord s ' g en eros ity  in renting 
out land.
(115) See e s p e c ia lly  SN JP, 5 /9 /5 0 , p . l ,  "R ep resen ta tives fro m  A ll 
A reas  A ccu se  the Landlord C lass o f  E xploitation  and Unmask the 
C rim inal A ctiv ities  o f Law less Landlords A gainst Land R e fo rm ".
(116) SN JP, 3 /9 /5 0 ,  op. c it . , p . l ,  "On M obilizing the Peasant M asses
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117
118
119
120 
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
to C om plete Land R eform  in South K iangsu This W inter and Next 
S prin g". The reso lu tion  was in m any ways s im p ly  an endorsem ent 
o f O u-yang H u i-lin 's  speech  in which he had ca lled  fo r  such an 
a cce le ra tion  o f land re fo rm  in south K iangsu.
SNJP, 7 /9 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "The Four D ecis ion s  Taken by  the South 
Kiangsu F irs t  Peasant R epresentative C o n fe re n ce " .
See also the Second R esolution  passed  at the con feren ce  "On the 
Future W ork o f the Peasant A ss o c ia tio n s" . Ib id .
SN JP, 7 /9 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "T horough ly  Inculcate the Spirit o f the South 
K iangsu C on feren ce o f  Peasant R epresentatives into the Peasant 
M asses ".
Su-nan k e -ch ie h  je n -m in  ta i-p ia o  h u i-i sh ou -ch 'u  e r h -tz 'u  ch 'tfan- 
hui.
See, fo r  exam ple, the b itter attack by Chang Ytin-hsi in SN JP, 
1 4 /9 /5 0 , p. 2, "Speeches by  V arious R epresentatives at the 
C on fe re n ce " . A lso  the speech  by Chiao K 'an g-sh en .
See above, note (77).
Even in S eptem ber, 1950 the question  o f  p rotecting trade and 
industry continued to con cern  som e o f the con feren ce  d elegates. 
P 'in g  h siao -ch u n g , a representative o f trade and industry, spoke 
o f the im portant in ter-re la tion sh ip  betw een agricu lture  and industry 
and trade . A g ricu ltu re , he said , p rovided  both the raw m ateria ls  
and m arket fo r  the industria l s e c to r , but on ly  through in d u stria li­
zation could the p rob lem  o f rural poverty  be so lved . The A grarian  
R e form  L aw 's  em phasis on the need to p rotect industry and trade 
re fle c te d  the im portan ce o f  this relationsh ip  and was quite c o r r e c t  
and in a ccorda n ce  with the ob jective  situation. SN JP, 1 4 /9 /5 0 , 
op. c i t . , p. 2.
Ibid.
SN JP, 1 5 /9 /5 0 , p. 6, "Speeches by  V ariou s R epresentatives at 
the C o n fe re n ce " .
SN JP, 1 4 /9 /5 0 , op. c i t . , p. 2.
SN JP, 1 5 /9 /5 0 , op. c i t . , p. 5. At this con feren ce  Ou-yang r e p r e ­
sented the south Kiangsu peasant a ssocia tion s .
SN JP, 1 5 /9 /5 0 , op. c i t . , p. 5.
SN JP, 4 /1 1 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "The Future Stages o f D evelopm ent of the
Land R eform  M ovem ent in South K iangsu".
SNJP, 2 8 /1 1 /5 0 , p. 1, "M ethods o f Im plem enting Land R eform
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(131)
(132)
(133)
(134)
(135)
(136)
(137)
in South K iangsu", prom ulgated by  the O ffice  o f  the P e o p le 's  
A dm in istration  o f South Kiangsu.
How fa r  ( if  at all) this apparent re v e rsa l o f  the d ecis ion s  o f  the 
W usih con feren ces  was a re fle ction  o f  a d iffe ren ce  o f opinion 
about how land re fo rm  should develop  it is  im p oss ib le  to say. 
Perhaps it was s im p ly  a re fle ction  o f the continuing d ilem m a o f 
how to m aintain the m inim um  econ om ic  d isruption  and yet achieve 
the m axim um  resu lt fro m  land re fo rm . F o r  som e con sideration  
o f the "L iu is t"  and "M a o ist"  approaches to land re fo rm  in China 
see  E llen  F . Ohja, "F luctuations in C hinese Com m unist A grarian  
P o licy , 1946 -50" in P apers on China, v o l.2 2 B , East A sian  
R esea rch  C enter, H arvard U niversity , D ecem b er , 1969; pp. 20-48 . 
A lso  E. V og e l, "Land R eform  in Kwangtung, 195 1 -53" in The 
China Q u a rterly , no. 38, A p ril-Ju n e , 1969; pp. 27 -62 .
SN JP, 2 8 /1 1 /5 0 , op. c i t . , p . l .
Ib id . , em phasis m y own.
S p ec ific  p rov is ion s  included the follow ing : all landlord  houses
in c ities  and v illa ges  used d ire ct ly  fo r  industria l and co m m e rc ia l 
a ctiv ities  (including those which had been rented out p r io r  to the 
publication  o f the AR L) w ere to be untouched. C on fiscation  o f 
surplus buildings belonging to landlords could  on ly  take p lace  after 
d iscu ss io n  at the ch 'd  leve l and after p e rm iss io n  had been given 
b y  the h sien  governm ent . . . e tc . See ib id . , A r t ic le s  3, 4 and 5.
Ibid.
A R L , Section  2, A rtic le  6: "Sm all portions o f  land rented out by
rich  peasants shall rem ain  untouched . . .  If the portions o f  land 
rented out by  r ich  peasants o f  a sem i-la n d lo rd  type exceed  in 
s ize  the land tilled  by  them selves and by  th eir  h ired  labou r, the 
land rented out should be requ is ition ed ". A R L , op. c i t . , p. 3.
The p ecu lia r  d ev ice  w hereby land was sy m b o lica lly  divided betw een 
the "su rfa ce  r igh t" (t 'ie n -m ie n  ch'tian) and the "bottom  righ t" 
(t 'ie n -t i  ch'ttan) was the or ig in  o f a p articu lar  fo rm  o f tenancy in 
south Kiangsu m istaken ly  ca lled  "perm anent ten an cy". The ow ner 
o f the bottom  right was the title h o ld er to the land and as such, 
it was his name that was reg is tered  with the governm ent and he 
who paid the land taxes . Although he was not allow ed to cultivate 
the land (that p r iv ilege  belonged to the ow ner o f the su rface  right 
alone) he was perm itted  to co lle c t  rent fro m  the cu ltivator o f the 
so il . In other w ord s , the h older o f the bottom  right was the land­
lo rd  and the h old er o f the su rface  right, the tenant. The landlord  
could  se ll  his bottom  right (his cla im  on rent) but this in no way 
a ffected  the right o f the tenant to continue cultivating the so il .
F o r  his part, the tenant could farm  the land h im se lf, em ploy  h ired  
labou r to do so o r  su b -lea se  the land to a third party and so s im u l­
taneously  be both landlord  and tenant.
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138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
The im portan ce o f this d ev ice  is ind icated  by  the fact that it 
existed  in an area of south Kiangsu containing ten m illion  peasants 
(about 40% o f the total agricu ltural population). H ow ever, d is t r i ­
bution was not gen era l and it was found in on ly  12 out o f  25 hsien .
It was m ost com m on  in the east, o c c u rr e d  to a m o re  lim ited  
extent in cen tra l south Kiangsu and was not found at all in the 
w est.
F o r  furth er con sideration  o f the d iv is ion  betw een su rface  and 
bottom  rights in south Kiangsu see P 'an  K uang-tan and Ch'tlan 
W e i-t 'ie n , op. c i t . , chapter 3. A lso  F e i H sia o -t 'u n g , Peas ant 
L ife  in China (A  F ie ld  Study o f Country L ife  in the Yangtze V a lley ), 
London, 1939; chapter XI, pp. 181-191 is  o f  sp ec ia l in terest.
A R L , op. c i t . , p. 5.
SNJP, 2 8 /1 1 /5 0 , op. c i t . , p . l .
SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 , pp. 2 -3 , "R ep ort on Land R eform  W ork in South 
K iangsu" m ade at the F irs t  Plenum  o f the Second S ession  o f the 
South Kiangsu C on ference o f P e o p le 's  R ep resen tatives.
H HJP, 2 1 /3 /5 1 , "Land R eform  B a s ica lly  C om pleted  in South 
K iangsu".
See SN JP, 1 2 /1 2 /5 0 , p . l ,  "The Land R eform  M ovem ent is 
Advancing on a B road  Front Throughout East China".
SNJP, 2 3 /1 2 /5 0 , p. 1, "Land R eform  in South Kiangsu is Advancing 
on a B road  F ron t".
This was the sh u o -li tou -ch eng; lite ra lly , "speak  out the truth 
stru g g le " .
SN JP, 1 8 /4 /5 1 , p. 2, "The Situation Regarding Land R eform  W ork 
in South K iangsu".
H H JP, 2 1 /3 /5 1 ,  op. cit.
S tatistics  showed that 520 landlord households had escaped  from  
v illa ges  in W usih hsien  and 391 in I-hsing h s ie n . See SN JP, 
1 8 /2 /5 1 , p. 1, "C r it ic is m  o f the W astage o f the Fruits o f Land 
R efo rm ".
G rain  was d istributed  to the p oor peasants fo r  production  
p u rp o se s .
SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , pp. 2 -3 .
SN JP, 1 3 /8 /5 1 , p. 1, "T h ree  Hundred and E ighty Three Hsiang 
Have C om pleted  the W ork o f  Issuing T itle D eeds. "
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(151)
(152)
(153)
(154)
(155)
(156)
(157)
(158)
(159)
(160) 
(161)
In the p reced in g  pages the land re fo rm  m ovem ent has been con sid ered  
in the gen era l contexts o f  north and south K iangsu. A  slight qu a li­
fica tion  to the accounts we have given is that land re fo rm  in the 
suburbs o f  the la rge  c ities  in south Kiangsu fo llow ed  a slightly  d ifferen t 
ch ron ology  fro m  that shown above.
SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , pp. 2 -3 . The three hsien  excluded w ere 
W u-hsien , K 'un -shan  and T an -t'u .
SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "The G reat A chievem ents o f Rural W ork in 
South K iangsu during the Past Three Y e a rs " .
This was the figu re  given in the Shanghai news on 2 6 /1 0 /5 2 . See 
S C M P , n o .206, (3 1 /1 0 /5 2 ) , p p .26 -28 , "A g ra ria n  R eform  Exhibition 
in Shanghai".
HB, op. c it . , pp. 2 0 -24 . Two sets o f figu res  are shown fo r  arable 
area in e v e ry  hsien  o f K iangsu. The relevant data fo r  the three hsien 
in question  are as fo llow s ;
W u-hsien
K 'un-shan
T a n -t 'u
Total
HB data
1 ,814 , 628 m ou 
1 ,0 6 9 ,6 7 5  
721 ,644
3 ,6 0 5 ,9 4 7
Statistica l 
M onthly data
1, 839, 000 m ou 
1 ,3 0 9 ,7 3 3  
753 ,734
3 ,9 0 2 ,4 6 7
The figu re  o f  3 ,7 5 4 ,2 0 7  m ou used in the text is  s im p ly  the average o f 
these two fig u re s .
(Note that T a n -t 'u  hsien  was Chinkiang hsien  b e fo re  1949.)
SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 , op. c i t . , pp. 2 -3 . Note also that P 1 an Kuang-tan and 
Ch'tian W e i-t 'ie n  op. c i t . , p. 1, cite m ateria l fro m  41 hsiang o f  23 
hsien  showing that landlords represen ted  about 2% o f the population 
but owned about 40% o f  all the land.
SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  op . c i t . , p. 2.
SC M P , no. 206, op. c i t . , pp. 26 -28 .
H H JP, 1 /1 2 /5 1 , "The Land R eform  M ovem ent in East ChinaD uring 
the L ast Y e a r" .
This is  som ething we should like to have e laborated . H ow ever, m ost 
o f the available in form ation  on tenancy relates to the 1930 's. A 
cru c ia l con sideration  is what happened to tenancy patterns betw een 
1937 (the outbreak o f the S ino- Japanese W ar) and 1949 and without 
knowing the nature o f  trends during these yea rs  it would be dangerous 
to in terpolate fro m  data in the e a r lie r  p eriod .
T 'ien -fu -n u n g .
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(162)
(163)
(164)
(165)
(166) 
(167)
(168)
(169)
(170)
SCM P, no. 206, op. c i t . , pp. 26 -28 .
HHJP, 2 1 /3 /5 1 ,  p. 2, "Land R eform  B a s ica lly  C om pleted  in 
South K iangsu".
SN JP, 2 /1 2 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "Land R eform  L a rg e ly  C om pleted  in Wusih 
and Wu h s ie n ".
H HJP, 1 2 /5 /5 2 , p . 3, "T horough ly  E lim inate Feudal Landowner sh ip ". 
On N anking's exp erien ce  see  also HHJP, 1 /1 0 /5 1 , "R econ stru ction  
W ork in the Suburbs in the Last Two Y e a rs" ; and H HJP, 5 /1 0 /5 1 , 
"C onsolidate  the S u ccess  o f Land R eform  and P rom ote  the P a tr io tic  
Spirit o f the P ea sa n ts".
Ta-kung pao (Im partia l D a ily ), h erea fter  T K P , 1 9 /1 2 /5 1 , "T ota l 
V ic to ry  in Land R eform  in the Suburbs o f Shanghai".
C h 'ang-ch iang jih -p a o  (Yangtze R iver D a ily ), 1 6 /1 2 /5 2 , p . 2, g ives 
the follow ing data on p er capita  land holdings o f p oor  peasants and 
agricu ltura l la b ou rers  rela tive  to the p er capita  average s ize  after 
land re fo rm ;
Honan 92 .8%
Hupeh 91.4%
Hunan 92 .6%
K iangsi 91. 5%
Kwangtung 99 .2%
Kwangsi 87 .6%
F o r  the derivation  o f  the average food  gra in  y ie ld  fo r  south Kiangsu 
see Appendix C.
The reason  fo r  this em phasis w ill em erge  m o re  c le a r ly  in the 
follow ing d iscu ss ion .
It m ust be adm itted that the assum ptions w hich underlie  the ca lc u ­
lations m ade in Table II. 11 are highly s im p lified . It is  true, fo r  
exam ple, that m em bers  o f a peasant fa m ily  who w ere  v e ry  old  o r  
v e r y  young would need a sm a lle r  ca lo r ie  intake than ab le -bod ied  
peasants betw een 16 and 60. To this extent the c a lo r if ic  r e q u ire ­
m ents m ay be con sid ered  too high. N or has any account been taken 
o f  the c a lo r if ic  content o f  food  other than gra in  such as m eat and 
v e g e ta b le s .
But against this m ust be set the c le a r ly  u n rea lis tic  assum ption 
that all land owned by a peasant was planted under food  gra in s. The 
con vers ion  ratio o f  80% m ay also be o v e r -o p t im is t ic  in view  o f the 
fact that after p ro ce ss in g , the output left in the hands o f the peasant 
had to m eet not on ly  his own consum ption but also seed  requirem ents 
fo r  future sowing and feed  fo r  d om estic  and draft anim als. F in ally , 
it is p o ss ib le  that the average y ie ld  o f  285 chin p er  m ou is also too 
high.
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(171)
(172)
(173)
(174)
(175)
(176)
(177)
(178)
(179)
(180)
(181)
(182)
(183)
Liao L u -yen , "On the B asis o f C o -op era tiv iza tion  Go A ll Out to 
F u lfil the D raft Plan fo r  China's A gricu ltu ra l D evelopm en t", 
in H sheh -hsi (Study), 1958, no. 2, pp. 2 -8 .
R em em ber that the figu res in Table II. 14 show the s ize  o f p er  capita  
h old ings, not fa rm s . The d ifferen ce  in farm  s ize  b e fo re  and after 
land re fo rm  (assum ing 4. 12 persons p er household) is as fo llow s :
B efore  land A fter land
re fo  rm  refo  rm
P o o r  peasants 3 .7 9  (100 .00 ) 8 .7 3  (100 .00 )
M iddle peasants 7 .79  (2 0 5 .54 ) 12.32 (1 4 1 .12 )
This w ill not seem  such an unlikely assum ption i f  we bear in m ind 
that the d ietary  standards shown in e a r lie r  tables in no way r e p r e ­
sent m axim a. In addition, agricu ltural taxes and the public levy  
o f gra in  also had to be m et out o f the sm all surplus above consum ption 
req u irem en ts .
A R L , op. c i t . , p . l .
A ctually  the landlords w ere perm itted  to own som e land. Thus 
A rt ic le  Ten o f  A R L (op. c i t . , p. 4): "L an dlords shall be given an 
equal share (o f land) so that they can m ake th eir  living by their own 
labou r and thus re fo rm  th em selves through la b o u r" . SN JP, 2 /1 2 /5 0 , 
p. 2, "Land R eform  L a rg e ly  C om pleted  in W usih and Wu H sien" 
states that o f  144, 384 m ou o f  land con fisca ted , 9, 326 m ou had been 
red istribu ted  to landlords ( i .e .  , 6 .46%  o f  the total con fisca ted  area ).
SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , pp. 2 -3 .
SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 ,  op. c it. , pp. 2 -3 .
HHJP, 2 1 /3 /5 1 ,  op. c it. , p. 2.
SN JP, 2 /1 2 /5 0 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2, also reports  that o f  144, 384 m ou o f 
land con fisca ted  in 74 hsiang o f Wusih h s ien , 113, 112 m ou had been 
owned by  lan d lord s. That is ,  21. 66% did not belong to lan d lord s.
This is  another p oss ib le  indication  o f encroachm ent upon rich  peasants ' 
land.
SN JP, 2 8 /1 1 / 50, op. c i t . , p . l .
SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
See above, p. 101.
The total arable area  o f K 'un-shan , T a n -t 'u  (Chinkiang) and Wu hsien  
was e a r lie r  estim ated  to be 3 ,7 5 4 ,2 0 7  m ou. If we assum e that 40% 
o f this land w ere  con fisca ted , then adding in the land con fisca ted  in 
the other 24 hsien , the total amount o f land available fo r  red istribu tion
-1 6 0 -
would be;
(184)
(185)
(186)
(187)
(188)
(189)
( 190)
(191)
( 192 )
(193)
(194)
(195)
( 1 9 6 )
7, 180, 537 + 1, 5 0 1 ,6 8 2 .8
= 8 ,6 8 2 ,2 2 0  m ou.
But there s till rem ains a d ifferen ce  o f  1 ,7 3 6 , 040 m ou betw een 
this figu re  (based on SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 )  and the la ter  estim ate shown in 
Table II. 16.
This is  not a re a lis t ic  assum ption. G iven that this amount only- 
p rovided  the m inim um  surplus (or  thereabouts), it is  lik e ly  that the 
m iddle peasants would also have gained from  the extra  land c o n fis ­
cated . H ow ever, the m ore  re str ic t iv e  assum ption w ill m ake the point 
we are trying to show all the m ore  c le a r ly .
That is ,  1 .10  + 1 .68  = 2 .7 8  2 .7 8  -r 2 = 1 .39
See above, Table II. 13.
S P J P , 2 8 /1 2 /5 1 , p. 1, "R ep ort on Land R eform  W ork in North 
Kiangsu During the Past Y e a r" .
The p rob lem  o f equating land con fisca tion  and land rea lloca tion  is 
a lso presen t in the data fo r  north Kiangsu. H ow ever, because o f  the 
m uch le s s  v a ried  pattern o f land use in the north we should expect 
that "sp e c ia l land" was m uch le ss  im portant. It is in terestin g , fo r  
exam ple , that the north Kiangsu land re fo rm  regulations contained no 
section  on the treatm ent o f sp ecia l land p ro b le m s .
This figu re  has been obtained by adjusting the average grain  yield  
o f north K iangsu d erived  from  con tem porary  sou rces  (139 .29  chin 
p er m ou) upwards by  7. 5%. F o r  the reasoning behind this see 
Appendix C.
SP JP , 3 0 /6 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "On the V ictor iou s  Foundation o f  Land R eform  
Lead the Peasants to Continue T heir A d van ce".
Fu-yti chung-nung. Ib id .
A R L , op. c i t . , p. 1.
See, fo r  exam ple, C .K . Yang, A Chinese V illa ge  in E a rly  C om m unist 
T ra n sition , M. I. T. P r e s s , 1959.
The shortage o f  gra in  in south Kiangsu is  ind icated  by the fact that the 
governm ent sent 9 3 .2  m illion  chin o f r ice  as r e lie f  to the area.
See SN JP, 1 1 /4 /5 0 , op. c i t . , p . l .
Data fo r  north Kiangsu are not available.
SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
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(197)
(198)
(199)
(20 0 ) 
(2 0 1 )
(202)
(203)
(204)
(205)
(206)
(207)
(208) 
(209)
SN JP, 1 /1 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , pp. 2 -3 . Seed requ irem ents w ere about 
365 chin p er capita  p er  year.
133 ,0 9 9 ,0 8 5  f  500.
If 365 chin w ere d istributed , the num ber o f  recip ien t peasants would 
have been 364 ,653 (3 .55% ).
SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  op . c it. , p. 2.
Ib id ; M. . . 66. 67% o f  all agricu ltural households (in south Kiangsu) 
with little  o r  no land o f their own had land rea lloca ted  to them  as w ell 
as other production  m a te r ia ls "  (em phasis m y own). H ow ever, 
although m ost o f the draft anim als w ill have belonged  to rich  peasants 
there m ust also have been a sm all num ber in the hands o f  m iddle 
(even p oor) peasants and to the extent that this was the case  the 
ca lcu lations below  exaggerate the true situation. N onetheless it is 
in con ce iva b le  that such considerations could  underm ine our genera l 
argum ent.
This is not to suggest that this was the only fa c to r  determ ining the 
crea tion  o f m utual-a id  team s. See chapter fou r.
That is ,  1 .15  x  4. 12 m ou.
Ploughing, harrow ing and irr iga tion .
K. R. W alker, "O rganization  o f A gricu ltu ra l P rod u ction " in E ckstein , 
G alenson and Liu (ed. ), E con om ic Trends in Com m unist China, 
C h icago, A ldine Publishing Com pany, 1968; p. 413.
H sin S oo -ch ou  pao (New Soochow  D a ily ), 2 4 /5 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "O rganizing 
M anpow er to Pull P lou gh s".
See SN JP, 1 3 /6 /5 1 , p. 2, "D raft Cattle Deaths and Anim al D isease  
R each Serious P ro p o r t io n s" . A lso  H H JP, 2 0 /3 /5 1 ,  "P reven t the 
Slaughter o f  D raft Cattle and Anim al D ise a s e "  stated that in the 
Nanking suburbs the slaughter o f cattle rose  m o re  than f iv e -fo ld  
betw een M arch  and S eptem ber, 1950. The sam e sou rce  cites  one 
v illa ge  in the suburbs in which only four draft anim als w ere ava il­
able fo r  61 households and an arable area o f 724 m ou.
This is  suggested  by the findings o f Buck. R em em ber too that the 
e ffects  o f the w ar years can on ly have been to furth er d ep ress  draft 
anim al num bers: H HJP, 2 7 /9 /5 2 , "G reat S u ccess  In China's 
A gricu ltu ra l P roduction  in the Past Three Y e a r s "  stated that in 
1949 anim al num bers in China (draft) had fa llen  b y  16% o v er  the 
p re -w a r  y e a rs .
K. R. W alker in "O rganization  o f A gricu ltu ra l P rod u ction ", op . c it. , 
p. 416, Table 5 (note e) c ites  a Chinese sou rce  to show that the arable
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area  p er head o f w orking draft anim als in K iangsu in 1957 was 67 m ou. 
This was said to be the highest burden in China. See also chapter 5 
below .
(2 11 )
( 212 )
(210)
(213)
SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2
But this shortage was presu m ably  not as seriou s  as that of draft 
anim als s ince  quite a la rge  num ber o f peasants w ill have owned at 
least a few  b a s ic  to o ls .
In o rd e r  to com plete  the p ictu re  on red istribu tion  o f landlord  p rop erty  
the figu res below  show data on the rea lloca tion  o f  buildings and fu rn i­
ture belonging to land lords;
(a) R ea lloca tion  o f buildings in south K iangsu;
No. o f  N o. o f N o. o f
buildings peasants buildings
c o n fis -  to whom p er
cated  allocated  household
South Kiangsu^ ^  
Nanking suburbs 
W usih hsien  
Shanghai suburbs
711 ,052 1 ,663 ,77 9
2 ,6 1 4  65,172
2 ,4 5 4  49 ,315
8,161  255,041
(a)
(a)
0. 43 
0. 17 
0. 05 
0. 13
No. o f 
households 
fo r  every  
building
2. 34
6. 05 
20 . 10
7. 59
(a) H ouseholds, not peasants. 
S ou rces; (1) SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 , op. c i t . , p. 2 
E lsew here as Table II. 25.
(b) R ea lloca tion  o f furniture in south Kiangsu;
No. o f 
p ieces  o f 
furniture 
con fis  - 
cated
No. o f 
households 
to which 
furniture 
allocated
P ie ce s  o f 
furniture 
p er  h o u se ­
hold
South Kiangsu 
Nanking suburbs 
Nanking suburbs 
W usih hsien  
Shanghai suburbs
1 ,920 ,07 1  1 ,663 ,77 9
4,377  
7 ,872  
7, 535 
55,540
65,172 
20,463 
49 ,315  
255, 041
(a)
(a)
1. 15 
0 .28  
0. 38 
0. 15 
0 . 90
(a) P easan ts, not h ou seh o ld s .
S ou rces ; As 11.25 and table (a) above.
"R ep ort by  Jao Shu-shih at the Second P len ary  S ession  o f the ECM A 
C o m m iss io n " , Shanghai, 14 July, 1950, translated  in C urrent B a ck ­
ground (Hong Kong, U .S . Consulate G en era l), no. 10, 2 8 /9 /5 0 .
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(214)
(215)
(216)
(217)
(218)
(219)
(220)
Although in form ation  on the con fisca tion  o f  draft anim ais and farm  
im plem ents is  only available fo r  south K iangsu, the va lid ity  o f  our 
argum ent would certa in ly  not be weakened i f  s ta tis tica l data fo r  the 
north cou ld  be found.
Kuan was D ire c to r  o f  the South Kiangsu P e o p le 's  A dm in istrative 
O ffice  until N ovem ber, 1952 and Chairm an o f this C on feren ce . His 
rep ort can be found in SNJP, 3 /3 /5 1 ,  p. 3, "D ire ct iv e  Sum m arizing 
A gricu ltu ra l P roduction  in 1950 and Relating to A gricu ltu ra l P roduction  
W ork in 1 9 5 1 ."
SC M P , no. 141, (2 4 /7 /5 1 ) ,  p . 25, noted s im ila r  tendencies in the 
context o f  East China: thus, r ich  peasants w ere  reported  to have 
com m ented (revea lin g ly ) that "the cad res arrange loans but do not 
arrange repaym ent".
SN JP, 3 /3 /5 1 ,  op . c it . , p .3 . The Chinese phrase is : la o -tzu  pu 
t 'u a n -c h ie .
It is  in teresting  that Jao Shu-shih in his July (1950) speech  was 
quite p roph etic  in his rem arks on the h iring o f  fa rm  labour and the 
d ifficu lties  that m ight a r ise  after land re fo rm . Thus;
"D isputes betw een em p loyers  and farm  la b ou rers  who continue 
such labou r should be solved  accord in g  to the m easu res  adopted 
in solv ing la b ou r-ca p ita l disputes in c it ie s  and on the p rin cip le  
o f benefitting both labour and capital and develop ing production .
We m ust constantly keep in m ind the in terests  o f the farm  
la b o u re rs , look  after th eir  live lih ood  and strive  constantly to 
ra ise  th eir  p o lit ica l con sciou sn ess  and th eir  cu ltural standard.
On the other hand, we m ust patiently educate the farm  labou rers  
to prevent 'le ft is t ' sentim ent and deviation . No dem and m ust 
go beyond the scop e  perm itted  by  the presen t econ om ic  situation.
If they exceed  the scop e  nobody w ill em p loy  farm  la b o u re rs .
This w ill resu lt in unem ploym ent fo r  fa rm  la b ou rers  and ruining 
agricu ltu re , to the disadvantage o f  both the farm  labou rers  and 
produ ction . "
(F ro m  C urrent B ackground, no. 10, op. c it . , pp. 6 -7 ).
S P J P , 1 0 /1 0 /5 1 , p. 3, "T he A chievem ents o f N orth Kiangsu in 
A g ricu ltu ra l P rod u ction  During the Past Two Y e a rs " . See also 
S P J P , 2 8 /1 2 /5 1 , p. 1, "R ep ort on Land R eform  W ork in North 
K iangsu During the Past Y e a r" .
C F J P , 1 /6 /5 1 ,  p. 7, "M any P rob lem s are s till A ris in g  in P rod u ction ".
The geograp h ica l scop e  o f the investigations was as fo llow s:
8 hsiang in the 3 hsien  o f C h iang-yin , W u-ch in  and L ieh -yang 
(C h 'an g -ch ou  S pecia l D istr ict)
11 hsiang in the 2 hsien  o f K 'un-shan  and C h 'ang-sh u  
(Soochow  S pecia l D istr ict)
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6 hsiang in the 3 hsien  o f Chti-jung, T a n -t 'u  and K ao-ch 'u n  
(Chinkiang S pecia l D istr ict).
( 2 2 2 )
(223)
(224)
(22 )
(226)
(221) C F J P , 1 /6 /5 1 ,  op. c i t . , p. 7. 
Ibid.
This fe a r  was not confined to r ich  peasants. P o o r  peasants too 
w ere w o rr ie d  by  the p rosp ect o f  h igher taxation.
In this context the rep ort noted that " . . .  fearing  that they would be 
com p elled  to give loans to their p o o re r  n eigh bou rs, som e rich  
peasants who had la rge  quantities o f foodstu ffs  on hand p re fe rre d  
to con vert them  into fe r t il iz e r s  as a sign o f in terest in production , 
thus avoiding the p o ss ib ility  o f being fo rce d  to m ake loans to p o o re r  
peasants. (F ro m  C F J P , 1 /6 /5 1 ,  op. c i t . , p. 7 . )
Ib id . The phrase is tu a n -ch 'u i. SC M P , no. 141 (2 4 /7 /5 1 )  translates 
this as "e leven  (fa m ilie s ) are on the verg e  of starvation  . . . "  But 
this would seem  e x ce s s iv e .
Shui - c h 1 e .
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CH A PTE R  THREE
The M utual-A id Team  M ovem ent and the E a rliest  Attem pts to 
Introduce A gricu ltu ra l C o-op era tiv iza tion .
Although the scop e  o f this chapter is b roa d er  than that o f  the last,
in its analysis o f the events which it d e scr ib e s  it is  le s s  detailed . It
exam ines the e a r lie s t  attempts by  the C C P in K iangsu to introduce s o c ia lis t
elem ents into the organ ization  o f that p ro v in ce 's  agricu lture  and it em braces
the M utual-A id Team  (M A T) M ovem ent and the e a r lie r  stages o f the
co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  cam paigns. The end-date chosen  fo r  the chapter is
31 July, 1955, the day on which Mao tse-tung m ade his ce lebra ted  speech
"On the Q uestion o f  A gricu ltu ra l C o -o p e ra t iv iz a tio n " .^ ^  A ll ch ron o log ica l
d iv is ion s are u ltim ately  a rb itrary , but it is at least arguable that this one
is con sisten t within the context o f agricu ltural developm ents in the 1950te.
Until July, 1955 the m ovem ent tow ards the soc ia liza tion  o f  agricu lture was
ch a ra cter ized  b y  a gradual and cautious approach: but fo llow ing M ao 's  speech
the ch a ra cter  o f  the m ovem ent changed d ram atica lly  as the "h ig h -t id e s"  o f
s e m i-s o c ia lis t  co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  and fu lly -s o c ia lis t  co lle c tiv iza tio n  fo llow ed
rap id ly  upon one another.
In form ation  fo r  the p eriod  up to m id -1955 is fragm en tary . In part this
(2 )
is  a re fle ction  o f the in com plete  holdings o f the so u rce  m ateria ls  used.
But it also d erives  fro m  the shortage o f  the kind o f  detailed  rep ort that 
y ie lded  such a c le a r  p ictu re  o f  land re fo rm  in K iangsu. The resu lt is that 
c lo s e  textual analysis has to be eschew ed in favour o f  a m o re  gen era l 
con sideration  o f  the issu es  under review .
I Introduction.
A gricu ltu ra l p o licy  follow ing land re fo rm  is  w ell sum m ed up in a phrase
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w hich constantly  appeared in new spaper reports in the e a r ly  1950 's;
(3)"get o rg a n ized ". This was in fact the title o f  a speech  m ade by  Mao
in N ovem ber, 1943 in support o f  the m ass production  m ovem ents then being
(4)organ ized  in the Shensi-K ansu-N inghsia  B ord er  R egion  o f  China. In it
the organ izational approach to p rob lem s o f agricu ltural produ ction  em erged
c le a r ly  and o f  p articu lar  in terest was M ao ’ s enunciation o f  certa in  p rin cip les
underlying institutional change in agricu lture which w ere to b ecom e exp lic it
in the p o lic ie s  adopted in the e a r ly  1950 's. F o r  exam ple, the m ove tow ards
a fu lly -s o c ia lis t  agricu lture was to take p lace gradually  and by stages, with
em phasis on the voluntary participation  o f peasants. In terest should not be
focu sed  e x c lu s iv e ly  on m ore  advanced fo rm s , such as co -o p e ra t iv e s  and
co lle c t iv e s , and Mao was at pains to point out the advantages o f  the s im p lest
kinds o f  c o -o p e ra t io n  involving little  m ore  than the exchange o f  labour at
(5)busy tim es o f  the agricu ltural yea r. It is true that the w a r -t im e  en v iron ­
m ent was v e r y  d ifferen t from  that o f the 1950’ s and s im ila r  p o lic ie s  m ay 
have been m otivated  by  d ifferen t con sid era tion s . N everth e less , in the light 
o f developm ents within agricu lture in the f ir s t  half o f  the 1950's the "get 
org a n ized " speech  is  c le a r ly  o f  sem inal in terest.
One o f  the e a r lie s t  d iscu ss ion s  o f  agricu ltural so c ia liza tio n  after 1949 
was contained in a reso lu tion  on mutual aid and co -o p e ra t io n  published in 
1 9 5 3 . ^ )  It throw s in teresting light on the con flicting  view s held by  sen ior  
Party  m em bers  and on the d ilem m a which faced  those form ulating agricu ltural 
p o licy  at this tim e. Som e em phasized  the fact that m any peasants, e sp e c ia lly  
the b e t te r -o ff ,  w ere in favour o f  the system  o f individual farm ing based on 
private ow nersh ip , w hich s till predom inated in China after land re fo rm .
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Others argued that there was a large  num ber o f  (p o o re r ) peasants who w ere 
encountering seriou s  production  d ifficu lties  that had th eir  or ig in  in this 
s e lf-sa m e  system . F o r  these the answer was not the perpetuation o f 
private , individual farm in g, but its abolition and rep lacem en t by som e fo rm  
o f agricu ltural c o -o p e ra t io n .
Kang Chao has d e scr ib e d  the 1953 R esolution  as a "re co n cilia tio n  of
(7)divergent view s within the P a rty ". Such a judgem ent is  too sanguine.
That it re fle cts  d ivergent view s is undeniable, but any attempt to re co n cile
them  seem s to have been  m in im al. The fact that it could  contem plate the
continued ex isten ce  o f  the private ow nership system  fo r  "quite a long tim e
to co m e "  while sim ultaneously  looking tow ards the establishm ent o f a
(8)co lle c t iv ize d  agricu lture  is an indication  o f  the essen tia l am biguity o f 
the docum ent.
That d ivergen t view s should have existed  is h ard ly  su rp ris in g . It was 
easy  enough to speak o f  showing the peasants the advantages o f mutual aid 
and co -o p e ra t io n  o v e r  individual farm in g, but such vague pronouncem ents 
le ft a lot o f im portant questions unansw ered. D ifferent re so u rce  endowment 
patterns m eant that the b e t te r -o f f  peasants would view  the p rivate , individual 
farm ing system  m ore  favourab ly  than their p o o re r  cou n terparts . M o reov er , 
to the extent that such c ru c ia l fa ctors  o f production  as draft anim als and 
ploughs w ere  concentrated  in the hands o f the b e t te r -o ff ,  from  a purely  
econ om ic  point o f  view  the benefits o f "p reserv in g  the r ich  peasant e con om y" 
w ere con s id era b le . H ow ever, other con sideration s m ade such a p o licy  
anathema and fo r  all the im m ediate doubts that ex isted  in the ea r ly  1950's 
the ultim ate su p rem acy  o f  a fu lly -s o c ia lis t  agricu lture  was not in question .
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The cru x  o f the p rob lem  was that if  co -o p e ra tiv e  farm ing was to be instituted 
both ends o f  the rura l c la ss  spectrum  had to be brought together; su ccess  
requ ired  the w orking capital o f the r ich  peasants as w ell as the labour o f 
the p oor . Mutual aid among the p oor elem ents alone could  not alleviate the 
shortages o f  draft anim als and too ls  which lay  at the root o f  their d ifficu ltie s . 
But given their p re fe re n ce  to continue w orking as private individuals, how 
could  the r ich  peasants be induced to jo in  the co -o p e ra t iv e  s e c to r ?
Looked at in this light it is d ifficu lt to see how the 1953 R esolution  
su cceed ed  in recon cilin g  d ivergent v iew s. It is m o re  re a lis tic  to see  the 
docum ent as an ad hoc respon se  to a s till-u n re so lv e d  situation - a resp on se , 
m o re o v e r , w hich o ffe red  no p ra ctica l p o licy  gu idelin es. A fter  all the s im u l­
taneous developm ent o f  spontaneous cap ita lism  within the r ich  peasant s e cto r  
and agricu ltural c o -o p e ra t io n  among the p o o re r  peasants hardly  o ffe red  a 
viable developm ental stra tegy  fo r  Chinese agricu ltu re .
The actual fo rm s  o f  agricu ltural co -o p e ra tio n  envisaged  by the R esolution  
can be b r ie f ly  sum m arized ; at the low est leve l was the tem p ora ry  M AT, a 
s m a ll-s c a le  unit in w hich peasants pooled  their r e so u rce s  fo r  a lim ited  
p eriod  in o rd e r  to achieve som e mutual advantage. F o r  exam ple, peasants 
with surplus labou r who lacked  draft anim als m ight exchange th eir  labour 
fo r  the animal pow er o f other peasants, so ensuring the su cce ss fu l com pletion  
o f  harvesting o r  transplanting. The form a l condition  fo r  the su cce ss  of 
these team s was that the accounting system , o r  m o re  gen era lly  the term s
(9)o f exchange, ' should sa tis fy  all m em b ers .
The s u c c e s s o r  to this b a s ic - le v e l  team  was the yea r-rou n d  (perm anent) 
M AT. This in corp ora ted  a num ber o f elem ents appropriate to a m ore
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advanced fo rm  o f c o -o p e ra t io n  such as som e p u b lic-ow n ersh ip  o f too ls  and 
draft anim als and a sm all accum ulation fund. In addition, planning was 
introduced; agricu ltu ra l operations w ere co -o rd in a ted  with su bsid ia ry  w ork 
(anim al husbandry, h an dicra fts , e t c .) ;  there was sp ecia liza tion  based  on 
the sk ills  o f the peasants; and techn ica l im provem ents w ere undertaken by 
the team . In sh ort, the establishm ent o f  perm anent M ATs was the tra n s ­
itional stage betw een co -o p e ra t io n  based  on traditional patterns o f mutual 
aid and the m o re  form a l organ ization  o f  c o -o p e r a t iv e s . It was anticipated 
that as the tem p ora ry  M ATs su cceed ed  in helping peasants o v ercom e  
produ ction  d ifficu lties  and as output and incom e in consequence ro se , the 
num ber o f  perm anent team s would rapidly  in cre a se .
The th ird stage was the form ation  o f s e m i-s o c ia lis t  A gricu ltu ra l 
P ro d u c e r s ' C o -o p e ra tiv e s  (A PC ) o r  "land c o -o p e r a t iv e s " .^  ^  Im portant 
features o f  the perm anent M ATs w ere retained but other new ones w ere 
in troduced , the m ost notable being the voluntary tra n s fe r  o f m e m b e rs ' land 
to the co -o p e ra t iv e  fo r  unified m anagem ent. H ow ever, the land rem ained 
under the ow nership  o f  the peasants who rece ived  a paym ent fo r  its use from  
the c o -o p .
It is  n oticeab le  that the 1953 R esolution  provided  no tim e-ta b le  fo r  the 
transition  fro m  one stage to the next beyond stating the need fo r  a gradual 
advance in a ccord a n ce  with the c ircu m stan ces  o f  each  lo ca lity . In the 
"n e w ly -lib e ra te d "  regions (which included m uch o f  K iangsu) em phasis was 
on the establishm ent o f  tem p ora ry  team s; only when these w ere su ffic ien tly  
stron g ly  based  could perm anent M ATs be set up. F u rth er, only those 
areas which had a lready  enjoyed con siderab le  exp erien ce  o f  mutual aid and
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w here lead ersh ip  was strong w ere perm itted  to develop  co -o p e ra t iv e s . 
Throughout all three stages ca re  m ust be taken to avoid " le ft is t "  and 
"r ig h tis t"  tendencies o f  e x ce ss iv e  haste o r  e x ce ss iv e  caution.
Such was the background to e a r ly  agricu ltural so c ia liza tion . In the 
long run the p osition  o f  the C C P was c le a r : agricu lture  would gradually
be co lle c tiv ize d  as the peasants cam e in crea s in g ly  to see  the dem onstrable 
su p erio r ity  o f  the team s and c o -o p s . But in the short run the situation was 
m ore  fluid and the P arty  rem ained divided o v er  p r e c is e ly  how and when this 
p ro ce s s  was to take p la ce . It was in this am bivalent context that the mutual 
aid m ovem ent got under way in K iangsu.
II The M utual-A id Team  M ovem ent
(1) Mutual aid in Kiangsu: a ch ron o log ica l account.
The case  fo r  c o -o p e ra t io n  among the peasants o f K iangsu em erged  
c le a r ly  fro m  the d iscu ss ion  in the previous chapter on the e con om ic  c o n s e ­
quences o f  land re fo rm  in the p rov in ce . Many o f the m ost b a s ic  p rob lem s 
in agricu lture  had not been  solved  by  land re fo rm . The rea lloca tion  o f  lan d ­
lo r d s ' land tended to d ep ress  the average s ize  o f  fa rm  and th e re fo re , to the 
extent that holdings w ere  a lready le s s  than optim al, m ilitated  against farm  
e ffic ie n cy . In addition, in e ffic ie n cy  caused by fragm entation  rem ained a 
seriou s  p rob lem . In the tr a d it io n a l^ ^  agricu lture a condition  o f  growth 
was that essen tia l fa ctors  o f production  should be available in the quantities 
determ ined  by  agron om ic and environm ental fa c to r s . Yet as was also 
shown, fo r  m any peasants there was a wide gap betw een what was available
and what was needed . Even labou r supplies cou ld  not always be assu red  and
( 12)in the cotton  areas o f K iangsu a 33% labour d e fic it  was rep orted .
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This situation had two con sequ en ces. F irs t  the shortage o f  draft 
anim als and too ls  im p osed  an upper lim it on the agricu ltural grow th that 
was p o ss ib le ; even i f  som e peasants em erged  fro m  land re fo rm  in a position  
not only to m aintain but to expand their production , others (and as it happened 
the m a jor ity ) w ere m o re  constra in ed  in the ch o ices  that lay  b e fo re  them .
In this sense the benefits o f land re fo rm  w ere lim ited . Second, given 
the lega l right to m ake loan s, buy and se ll land and em p loy  h ired  labou r, 
the unequal d istribu tion  o f  s ca rc e  re so u rce s  was bound to cause the gap 
betw een the b e t te r -o f f  and p o o re r  peasants to w iden. Indeed, in Kiangsu 
the fact that land rea lloca tion  had e ffe c tiv e ly  d iscr im in ated  against p oor  
peasants actually  encouraged  this trend.
In sum , fo r  pragm atic and id eo log ica l reasons the s o c io -e c o n o m ic  
situation in Kiangsu after land re fo rm  was fa r  fro m  sa tis fa ctory  and in the 
absence o f  state investm ent in agricu lture it was c le a r  that furth er institutional 
change would soon er  o r  la ter  have to take p la ce .
One o f  the fa ctors  w hich aided the planners in th eir  organ ization  o f the 
f ir s t  M ATs after 1949 w ere the traditional fo rm s  o f  c o -o p e ra t io n  which 
a lready ex isted . F ar fro m  instituting an en tire ly  new fo rm  o f agricu ltural 
co -o p e ra t io n , the im m ediate task o f  the C C P in the e a r ly  1950's was to 
institu tionalize a ro le  which the voluntary organ ization  o f  peasants on a 
sm all s ca le  had been fu lfilling  fo r  m any hundreds o f yea rs  throughout China.
(13]In East China traditional fo rm s o f mutual aid fe ll  into three ca te g o r ie s .
The f ir s t  con s isted  o f  help among peasants based  on human labou r, though 
it also included the exchange o f  labour fo r  the use o f  fa rm  to o ls . Fourteen
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(14)variation s o f  this kind o f  c o -o p e ra t io n  w ere said to ex ist in East China. ' 
Such organ izations w ere form ed  volu ntarily  by  peasants at peak p eriods 
(fo r  exam ple, sow ing, transplanting, harvesting) as a m eans o f  ensuring
the com pletion  o f  the w ork on tim e. In som e areas w here equipm ent such
(15)as w ater-w h eels  needed to be operated  by  m ore  than one o r  two person s 
the ow ners would seek  the help o f nearby  peasants to provide labour in 
exchange fo r  the use o f  the w heels th em selves.
Within this ca teg ory  w ere fo rm s  o f mutual aids p e cu lia r , though not 
unique, to K iangsu. In Sungchiang Specia l D is tr ict , fo r  exam ple, there 
was the p ra ctice  o f  "jo in ing in w ork with others on a la rg e  s c a le " .
The p rox im ity  o f  this area to the Yangtze m ade it su scep tib le  to flooding 
and it was in the in terests  o f the peasants to p rotect th em selves against such 
threats by  building w a te r -co n tro l w orks (thereby also u tilizing the irr ig a tion  
potential o f  the r iv e r ) . Such activ ities w ere beyond the cap acity  o f  individual 
households and the peasants could  on ly  undertake them  on a co -o p e ra t iv e  
b a s is . The m ost in teresting aspects o f this fo rm  o f  mutual aid w ere the 
purpose fo r  which it was ca rr ie d  out and its sca le  o f  operation . T raditional 
mutual aid has u sually  been  taken to m ean s m a ll-s c a le  operations designed 
to o v e rco m e  fa c to r  s ca rc it ie s  which hindered the com pletion  o f  the a g r i­
cu ltural c y c le .  Yet here  was not on ly an organ ization  on a m uch la rg e r
(17)sca le  but also one w hose aim  was investm ent in the agricu ltural s e c to r .
In the context o f the 1950's when one o f  the argum ents in favour o f 
co -o p e ra tiv iz a tio n  was its ability  to m ob ilize  peasants into s im ila r  
a ctiv ities , this was not without s ign ifican ce .
A nother fo rm  o f  c o -o p e ra t io n  ch a ra cte r is t ic  o f  certa in  areas in south
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Kiangsu b e fo re  1949 was known as "m ucking in to g e th e r" . This
seem s to have been  m ore  in line with what is n orm a lly  understood  by
traditional patterns o f  c o -o p e ra t io n . Land and too ls  rem ained the private
p rop erty  o f the peasants but agricu ltural w ork was planned and ca rr ie d  out
in con cert by  them . As a ru le, the w ork p er fo rm ed  by  each peasant was
not re co rd e d , but when the autumn harvest had been com pleted  accounts
w ere settled  and w ages paid. This p ra ctice  was found around T 'a i Hu
(in W u-ch iang, Soochow  and W usih h sien ) w here p easan ts ' holdings tended
to be a long way fro m  th eir  hom esteads, m aking individual m anagem ent
d ifficu lt. Perhaps its m ost in teresting aspect was that it involved  planning
and it was presu m ab ly  fo r  this reason  that it was r e fe r r e d  to as " co lle c t iv e
(19)
p rod u ction " ( c h i - t 'i  sh en g -ch 'an ).
The next gen era l ca teg ory  com p rised  mutual aid based  on the use o f
draft an im als. There w ere a num ber o f  variants o f  this fo rm . F o r
exam ple, w here two oxen w ere needed to pull a plough, two fam ilies  which
each owned one anim al m ight agree to com bine th eir  r e so u rce s  to plough
th eir land. M ore com m on  was the custom  o f "look in g after an ox as a 
(20)grou p "; in som e ca se s  this involved a num ber o f households joining
together to buy a draft anim al, each one subsequently feeding and caring
(21 )
fo r  it. In others one fam ily  would purchase the anim al and another
provide fodd er fo r  it. There w ere  instances too when a household with no 
ox o r  buffalo s im p ly  paid fo r  the use o f an oth er 's , although in this ca se  the 
peasant 'h ir in g ' the draft anim al b ore  no resp on s ib ility  fo r  its ca re .
The exchange o f  labou r fo r  the use o f  a draft anim al was com m on 
throughout E ast China. A peasant who had no anim al o f  his own would o ffe r
(18)
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his labou r in return fo r  the use o f one. A ltern ative ly , a peasant who did 
own a draft anim al m ight h im se lf do the ploughing fo r  a second  peasant, 
paym ent subsequently being m ade not only fo r  the use o f  the animal but 
also fo r  the labou r tim e o f  the ow ner.
A final ca teg ory  w hich was not s tr ic t ly  mutual aid involved  the
( 2 2 )organ ization  o f  peasants into the "co lle c t iv e  sale  o f  la b o u r" . ' This was 
a m eans w hereby  peasants with little  o r  no land organ ized  th em selves on 
a re la tive ly  la rge  sca le  and sold  th eir  labour pow er co lle c t iv e ly  during peak
p e r io d s . B y taking advantage o f the d ifferent agricu ltura l cy c le s  o f d ifferent
(23) , ,areas they w ere able to find w ork fo r  m uch o f  the y e a r . In parts o f
north K iangsu draft anim al pow er was also sold  on a co lle c t iv e  b a s is .
A ll these fo rm s  o f  co -o p e ra tio n  w ere quite com m on  in Kiangnan b e fore
(24)1949. E stim ates put the p roportion  o f agricu ltura l households p a r t i­
cipating in them  at 50-60%  in Soochow  and Sung-chiang S pecia l D istr icts  
and 70-80%  in Chinkiang and C h 'an g-ch ou . It is in teresting  that this high 
figure was la rg e ly  attributed by  Shih and his c o -e d ito r s  to the sp ecia l e con om ic  
ch a ra cter  o f  the region : they pointed out that becau se  o f its re la tive ly  
developed  state o f  trade and industria l developm ent a sign ificant withdrawal 
o f  labou r fro m  the countryside into the c ities  had taken p la ce . As a resu lt 
the labou r fo r c e  rem aining in the v illa ges  had to r e so r t  to mutual aid in 
o rd e r  to o v e rco m e  production  d ifficu ltie s . In addition, the dense w ater 
netw ork in Kiangnan m eant that certa in  essen tia l activ ities  such as w ater 
con tro l p ro je c ts  cou ld  only be ca rr ie d  out on the basis  o f  co -o p e ra tiv e  
e f fo r t s .
The ch a ra c te r is t ic s  o f these p r o to -c o -o p e r a t iv e  organ izations w ere
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th ree fo ld . F ir s t , m em bersh ip  was n a rrow ly  based , m ain ly  com pris in g
m iddle peasants (who p o sse sse d  som e w orking capital but could  not a fford
to h ire  the additional labou r they requ ired ) and p oor  peasants (who lacked
w orking capital but had surplus labou r). It was essen tia lly  a case  o f  "the
(26)p oor  helping the p o o r " ,  even i f  it was the m iddle peasants with their 
a cce ss  to too ls  and draft anim als who form ed  the c o re  o f  the groups. R ich  
peasants took part in co -o p e ra t iv e  activ ities on ly ra re ly  s ince  they not on ly 
p o sse sse d  su fficien t supplies o f  w orking capital but a lso the n e ce s sa ry  
financial cap ital to em ploy  h ired  labour.
Second, mutual aid was usually  p ractised  on a re la tiv e ly  sm all s ca le .
It gen era lly  involved  betw een two and five households and ca ses  in which 
m o re  than eight o r  nine jo in ed  together w ere not com m on . M o reov er , 
s ince the o b je c t  was to o v e rco m e  s p e c if ic  d ifficu lties  in production  mutual 
aid tended to be o f a tem p ora ry  nature, usually  lasting through a peak p eriod . 
Once the 'tea m s ' w ere disbanded there was no certa in ty  that they would be 
re -o rg a n ize d  in the follow ing yea r.
F in a lly , fo r  all th eir  aim  o f im proving farm  e ffic ie n cy  traditional
mutual aid p ra ctice s  w ere th em selves the sou rce  o f  e con om ic  irra tio n a lit ie s .
(27)The fa ilu re  to im plem ent a p o licy  o f  "exchange at equal v a lu e " ' was said 
to d iscr im in a te  against the p oor  peasants: fo r  exam ple , th eir  w ork was 
often  the last to be done - a delay  that was o f m o re  than academ ic con cern  
s ince  even a sm a ll amount o f  tim e lo s t  could reduce y ie lds by  10-20% .
There was also a tendency fo r  w ork by  draft anim als to be m ore  highly 
valued than human labou r w hich again e ffe c t iv e ly  d iscr im in ated  against the 
p o o re r  peasant.
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W aste a lso  o ccu rre d : sp ecia liza tion  accord in g  to peasant sk ills  was
(28)ign ored ; the re fu sa l to allow  w om en to w ork ' deprived  agricu lture  o f  
an im portant sou rce  o f labou r; and the need to prov id e  food  and drink fo r
(29)a peasant w ork er  could  lead to u n n ecessa ry  extravagance.
Traditional mutual aid has usually  been view ed in term s o f two o r
three households tem p o ra r ily  joining togeth er, on the basis  o f  frien dsh ip
as m uch as fo r  any p u rely  e con om ic  in terest, in o r d e r  to ov e rco m e  seasonal
fa c to r  s c a r c it ie s .  This is  usefu l as a f ir s t  approxim ation . H ow ever, even
the b r ie f  account just given has shown that som e co -o p e ra t iv e  p ra ctices
in K iangsu went con s id era b ly  beyond th is. The m ost in teresting exam ple
was the voluntary organ ization  o f  quite la rge  num ber o f  peasants into w a ter-
con tro l w ork . In addition, planning and unified m anagem ent w ere som etim es
introduced  into produ ction , suggesting a rather form a l e con om ic  a rran ge-
(30)
m ent. Even the "c o lle c t iv e  sale o f  la b ou r" is  an in teresting i f  anachron istic 
exam ple o f  la r g e -s c a le  m ob iliza tion  o f peasants into agricu ltural w ork .
It m ay be that fu rth er exam ination o f  the traditional pattern o f  co -o p e ra tio n  
b e fo re  1949 w ill revea l m any m ore  exceptions to what have hitherto been 
regarded  as essen tia lly  s m a ll-s c a le  ad hoc op era tion s . Such a d is co v e ry  
would add a new p ersp ectiv e  to the institutional re fo rm s  of the e a r ly  
1950 's . At any rate, it seem s safe to suppose that in south Kiangsu these 
traditional fo rm s  o f  co -o p e ra t io n  provided  the planners with a useful 
foundation on w hich to build when they cam e to im plem ent the M AT and 
C o -op era tiv iza tion  M ovem ents.
The f ir s t  M ATs to be set up by  the CC P in K iangsu w ere established
(31)in the north o f the p rov in ce  in 1943. ' They w ere  not a com plete  su cce ss
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and som e o f  them  gradually  disbanded. H ow ever, during the 'in terregn u m '
betw een the defeat o f  the Japanese and the establishm ent o f the P eo p le 's
R epublic o f China team s w ere again organ ized  throughout the area  north
o f the Yangtze w hich rem ained under C om m unist co n tro l. But p rob lem s
still a rose  and peasants continued to withdraw fro m  them . W riting in 
(32)1946 Hu Shu-tu re fe rre d  to the breakdow n in the previous year o f  team s
(33)in S su -sh u , attributing it p r im a rily  to the attitudes o f their le a d e rs .
T h eir "su b je c t iv is m "  and " fo r m a lis m ", said Hu, prevented them  from  
understanding the d ifficu lties  and contrad ictions that w ere  inherent in 
mutual aid based  on a backw ard and ind ividualistic agricu ltu re . Indeed 
such attitudes had serv ed  on ly to deepen these con trad ictions and had thereby 
contributed to the fa ilu res  o f  1945.
The con trad iction  from  which m any of the d ifficu lties  stem m ed was 
related  to the attempt to superim pose a form a l co -o p e ra t iv e  arrangem ent 
upon this in d iv idu a listic  agricu ltu re . Som e peasants w ere better w ork ers 
than others so that labour enthusiasm  varied  con sid era b ly . The fact that 
sk ill le v e ls  also d iffered  further com plica ted  the situation. The uneven 
d istribution  o f  land and labou r created  tensions among team  m em b ers : 
p oor  peasants with little  land but surplus labour dem anded an in crea se  in 
wage rates w hile b e t te r -o f f  peasants who had m ore  land (re la tive  to labour) 
wanted w ages low ered . M ore o v e r , p oor peasants who had p rev iou s ly  
com pensated  fo r  th eir  shortage o f land by w orking as tem p ora ry  labou rers  
could  no lon g er  do so under the new mutual aid arrangem ent.
The introduction  o f  an accounting system  gave r ise  to variou s p rob lem s. 
The sim ple  fact that m ost peasants w ere illitera te  m ade it easy  fo r  qu arre ls
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to break  out o v e r  the drawing up and settling o f  accounts. Odd jobs such 
as drying fe r t i l iz e r  o r  pulling up w eeds which m ight constitute half o f  all 
the w ork ca rr ie d  out by  the peasants, requ ired  com p lica ted  accounting 
p roced u res  and these in turn p roved  trou b lesom e to the peasants and on ly 
in crea sed  th eir  sense o f  d isillu sionm ent with the new institu tions.
In spite o f  such d ifficu lties  Hu was anxious to point out the achievem ents
o f the M ATs in Ssu-yang and Shu-yang during the p reced in g  yea r. The sown
(34)area  o f cotton  had been  extended by  30, 000 m ou and the im plem entation  
o f  certa in  s im ple  tech n ica l im provem ents (fo r  exam ple , m ore  hoeing and 
the in cre a se d  application  o f  fe r t i l iz e r )  had contributed  to the grow th o f food  
produ ction . The developm ent o f  su bsid ia ries  in the M ATs and th eir  ability 
to c a r r y  out land reclam ation  and other w ork beyond the capacity  o f a single 
household furth er dem onstrated  the advantages o f  agricu ltural co -o p e ra t io n .
That part o f  H u's a rtic le  which dealt with the establishm ent o f  new team s 
em phasized  the need fo r  flex ib ility  in a ccorda n ce  with lo c a l c ircu m sta n ces .
A peasant's  right to w ithdraw fro m  a M AT was to be guaranteed (an in te r ­
esting re fle c t io n  o f  e a r lie r  "com m a n d ist" attitudes among ca d re s ).
A ccounting p roced u res  w ere not to be arb itrarily  im p osed  i f  existing m ethods 
o f exchange w ere  w orking sa tis fa c to r ily  and in any ca se  the system  o f
accountancy was to be rationalized  in o rd e r  to iron  out any rem aining d e fi-  
(35)c ie n c ie s . S pecia l attention was to be given to foster in g  su bsid ia ries
(36)within the team s. Yet fo r  all such co n cess ion s  to peasant initiative
Hu did not fo rg e t to ca ll fo r  the tightest p oss ib le  con tro l o v e r  the new 
institutional units. C le a rly  he was seeking to ach ieve the benefits o f 
cen tra lized  con tro l without sa cr ific in g  those o f  independent d ecis ion -m a k in g .
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The Hu Shu-tu a rtic le  is in teresting fo r  its revelation  o f  the kind o f 
d ifficu lty  being encountered by  the planners in K iangsu in the 1940's and 
fo r  the p ersp ectiv e  which it g ives to the events o f  the yea rs  im m ediately  
after 1949. Just as the traditional fo rm s o f mutual aid provided  a foundation 
on which the C C P could build , so too the exp erien ce  o f  the 1940s should 
have provided  an insight into the p rob lem s o f  setting up M AT s. H ow ever, 
the exp erien ce  was obv iou sly  not w holly  absorbed  fo r  m any o f the prob lem s 
to em erge  in the 1950's b o re  a strik ing resem blan ce  to those we have just 
been  con sid erin g .
It w ill be usefu l to begin  our d iscu ss ion  o f post-1949  developm ents by
(37)con siderin g  the grow th of m utual-a id  team s o f  all kinds in K iangsu.
The relevant in form ation  fo r  the years 1951-55 is contained in Table HI. 1 
on the follow ing page.
Although traditional form s o f mutual aid w ere p ra ctised  in south
Kiangsu b e fo re  1949 the C C P lacked  exp erien ce  in setting up M ATs in
this reg ion . N everth e less , the establishm ent o f  team s got under way
alm ost im m edia te ly  after 'L ib era tion ' p r im a rily  in o rd e r  to ease a c r it ica l
(38)situation brought about by natural d isa ste rs . The d isa sters  had been
p a rticu la rly  seriou s  in Sung-chiang and C h 'an g-ch ou  and it was in these
(39)two S pecia l D istr icts  that labour M ATs w ere set up on the w idest sca le .
Since the crea tion  o f  the team s was a d irect  respon se  to the dam aged caused 
by  typhoons, floods and p ests , their activ ities cen tred  round the construction  
o f  w a te r -co n tro l p ro je c ts  and the developm ent o f  su b s id ia ries . The m ost 
c r it ic a l point seem s to have been  reached  in sprin g , 1950, but once this 
was passed  the im m ediate need fo r  m ore  M ATs becam e le s s  p ress in g  and
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som e o f  the existing ones w ere in fact disbanded. O th ers, h ow ever, u n d er­
went re -o rg a n iza tion  and continued to im plem ent mutual aid during the 
sum m er h arvest and sum m er sow ing. Throughout this p eriod  the d ev e lo p ­
m ent o f  M ATs was o f cou rse  constra ined  by  the fact that cad res  w ere 
a lready  fu lly  occu p ied  with im plem enting land re fo rm , a p o licy  which ca rr ie d  
h igher p r io r ity  than mutual aid. As a resu lt, m any o f  the team s found 
th em selves without adequate su p erv ision  and as was la ter  adm itted, 
there was a tendency fo r  them  to develop  "sp on tan eou sly ". N everth e less , 
all in all this f ir s t  stage o f  the M AT m ovem ent in south Kiangsu provided  
usefu l exp erien ce  o f  som e o f  the benefits and draw backs o f  institutional 
change to peasants and cad res  alike.
By the spring o f  1951 land re fo rm  in both north  and south Kiangsu was 
near com pletion  and as the new pattern o f re so u rce  ow nership  in the a g r i­
cu ltural s e c to r  began to em e rg e , so the case  fo r  the form ation  o f  m ore  
m utual-a id  team s becam e in crea s in g ly  apparent. As e a r ly  as F eb ru ary  3,
1951 a rep ort m ade by  Kuan W en-w ei at a sp e c ia lly  convened con feren ce  o f
(41)hsien  lea d ers  in south K iangsu 7 presented  the case  fo r  further institutional 
change in a gricu ltu re . Quite apart fro m  p rob lem s aris ing  fro m  the still 
un reso lved  m ilita ry  and p o lit ica l situations, Kuan pointed to the e con om ic  
d ifficu lties  w hich p oor  peasants in p articu lar had been  experien cin g  since 
the rea lloca tion  o f  land. He also em phasized  the im p ortan ce  o f  building and 
repairing irr ig a tio n  w ork s, co llectin g  fe r t il iz e r  and im prov ing  m ethods of 
cu ltivation . In o rd e r  to achieve all this and ensure agricu ltu ra l grow th he 
urged  that mutual aid be prom oted  on a wide s ca le  throughout south K iangsu. 
Though at the sam e tim e he was ca re fu l to re itera te  the need to uphold the
p rin cip les  o f  fre e  ch o ice , fa ir  exchange and d e m ocra tic  m anagem ent.
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R egional conditions requ ired  that em phasis should in itia lly  be on the
elevation  o f  traditional fo rm s o f w ork exchange into s m a ll-s c a le  seasonal
M A T s, organ ized  as the need a rose  and disbanded when it had p assed . The
tran sform ation  o f  these into la rg e r  and m ore  perm anent units should take
p lace  on ly  after con s id era b le  exp erien ce  had been gained and a strong
foundation been  la id . S im ultaneously, the team s w ere  to re ce iv e  top p r io r ity
in the d istribu tion  o f  state loans and p rov is ion  o f w orking cap ita l, such as
(42)seed s . So confident was Kuan o f  the benefits o f  the M ATs that he
argued that the organ ization  o f the labour fo r c e  into team s would not only 
bring about an in cre a se  in agricu ltural produ ction  but also im p rove  
e ffic ie n cy  to such an extent that a labour surplus d eveloped . This could 
then be used either to ra ise  produ ctiv ity  (y ields p er  unit area) o r  prom ote 
su b s id ia r ie s .
In the north o f  the p rov in ce , e sp e c ia lly  in the "o ld  lib e ra te d "  areas ,
a rapid expansion  o f mutual aid also took  p la ce . One sou rce  stated that
(43)in Hwaiyin S pecia l D is tr ic t  alone m ore  than 7, 000 " r e g u la r " ' and about
18, 000 tem p ora ry  team s w ere  organ ized  during the sp rin g -sow in g  p eriod  
(44)o f  1951. In the sam e p eriod  m ore  than 3, 000 team s w ere set up in
Y en -ch 'en g . And in the "new lib e ra te d "  areas too , M ATs began to be 
estab lish ed .
During the secon d  half o f 1951 renewed developm ent took p la ce . The
autumn h arvest and sowing p eriod  saw the re -o rg a n iza tio n  o f  labour M ATs
(45)and the establishm ent o f  new team s throughout south K iangsu. B y the
(46)end o f  the y ea r  there w ere 77 ,888  M ATs in Kiangnan. A  s im ila r
pattern was ob serva b le  in the north and at the end o f  D ecem b er , 1951 a
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rep ort published by  the P e o p le 's  A dm inistration  stated (on  the basis  o f
" in com plete  s ta t is t ic s " )  that there w ere 41 ,657  M ATs in the region  -
(47)2, 393 perm anent and 39 ,264  tem p ora ry . Thus, fo r  the whole o f  the
p rov in ce  the situation at the end o f  1951 was as fo llo w s :
41 ,657  + 77 ,888  = 119, 545 M A T s.
If it is assum ed that the average s ize  o f  team  was the sam e as that shown
in III. 1 fo r  m id -1 9 5 1 , the num ber o f agricu ltural households belonging to
the M ATs can e a s ily  be shown:
average s ize  o f  M AT at m id -y e a r , 1951;
590 ,736 + 82 ,284  = 7. 18 households
th ere fo re  the num ber o f  agricu ltural households in M ATs at 
y ea r  end w as;
119, 545 x 7. 18 = 858,333
If these ca lcu lations are approxim ately  c o r r e c t ,  they show that there
was a rapid expansion  in the num ber o f  M ATs in K iangsu in the second  half
o f  1951. The num ber o f  agricu ltural households belonging to the team s at
the end o f  the year was 45. 3% higher than it had been  at the end o f  June
so that p articip ation  had r isen  from  6. 96% to 10. 11% o f all households.
But to keep these developm ents in p e rsp e ctiv e , we should rem ind ou rse lves
that th eir  im pact upon agricu lture rem ained periph era l; on ly  a sm all
p roportion  o f  those p o o re r  peasants who th e o re tica lly  had m ost to gain from
join ing in mutual aid had in fact done so . M o re o v e r , em phasis was s till on
the form ation  o f  tem p ora ry  (seasonal) team s and these com p rised  the
(48)m a jo r ity  o f  all the M A T s.
Since the north  had been  con tro lled  by the C C P  fo r  lon g er  than Kiangnan 
and mutual aid organ izations set up m uch e a r lie r , it was to be expected  that
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new team s would be created  m ore  rapidly  here than in the south. In fact
on the ev idence o f the 1951 estim ate just derived  exa ctly  the opposite
was the ca se , the d istribu tion  o f  the 119, 545 team s being as fo llow s :
N orth K iangsu: 41 ,657  (34.85% )
South Kiangsu: 77 ,888  (65 .15% )
The d iffe ren ce  is even m ore  strik ing when the situation is view ed in
term s o f  the agricu ltura l population o f each region :
Table III. 2: P articipation  in M ATs in north and
south K iangsu, 1951.________________
North Kiangsu South Kiangsu
Total num ber o f  agricu ltural 
households 4 ,5 5 7 ,3 7 1 a 2 ,5 6 4 ,6 3 4
N um ber o f  agricu ltura l 
households in M ATs 2 9 9 ,0 9 7 ° 559,236
P rop ortion  o f total a g r i­
cu ltural households in M ATs 6. 56% 21. 81%
S ou rces ; a Appendix B shows north  Kiangsu a g r i­
cu ltural population (1951) to be 
1 8 ,7 7 6 ,3 7 0 . If average s ize  o f h o u se ­
hold is  4. 12 p erson s  then total num ber 
o f  agricu ltural households m ust be 
18 ,7 7 6 ,3 7 0  4- 4. 12.
b Ibid. j 10, 556, 293 4- 4. 12.
c S P J P , 2 8 /1 2 /5 1 , op . c i t . , p . l .
d SNJP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  op . c i t . , p. 2.
In other w ord s , organ ization  o f  the peasants into team s was m o re  than
(49)three tim es as advanced in south Kiangsu than in the north . ' It is
d ifficu lt to say with any certa in ty  why this d ifferen tia l should have arisen .
Perhaps the argum ent, cited  e a r lie r , relating to the p ecu lia r  e co lo g ica l
ch a ra c te r is t ic s  o f south K iangsu and the labou r shortage caused by the
d rift o f peasants into the c it ie s  is  not without som e s ign ifica n ce . It m ay
be too that the s ca rc ity  o f  other fa ctors  was m o re  seriou s  in the south
(50)fo llow ing land re fo rm  and that this m ade the need fo r  som e fo rm  o f
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agricu ltu ra l co -o p e ra t io n  m o re  p ress in g .
W hatever the uncertainties o f 1951, one fact that is not in doubt is
that 1952 m arked  the ' ’high - t id e " o f  the M AT M ovem ent in K iangsu. As
Table III. 1 show s, betw een m id-1951 and m id -1952  the p rop ortion  o f total
agricu ltural households belonging to team s ro se  fro m  le s s  than 7% to w ell
o v er  40%. Indeed the total num ber o f  team s in the p rov in ce  reached  its
highest le v e l in this y ea r , although the high point in term s o f  agricu ltural
(51)household m em bersh ip  was not reached  until two yea rs  la te r , in 1954.
The fo llow ing table g ives a m ore  detailed  p ictu re  o f  mutual aid 
developm ent in K iangsu during 1952;
Table II. 3: The M AT M ovem ent in  Kiangsu in 1952.
N. Kiangsu S. K iangsu A ll Kiangsu
Spring, 1952
Total no o f  M ATs 56,388 75 ,506  131,894
No o f  participating h. hs 387 ,949  499 ,850  887 ,799
As % total a g r ic . h .h s  7 .9 8  2 0 .0  12.07
M id-1952 (1st est. ):
Total no o f  M ATs 249 ,360  180,137 429 ,497
No o f  participating h.hs 1 ,7 1 5 ,1 3 7  1 ,1 9 1 ,8 7 2  2 ,9 0 7 ,0 0 9
As % total a g r ic . h .h s  35 .3  4 7 .7  3 9 .5
M id-1952 (2nd e s t .) :
Total no o f  M ATs 518, 526
No o f participating h .h s  3 ,6 9 3 ,9 8 5
As % total a g r ic . h .h s  43 .53
N otes ; (1) It has been  assum ed that the two m id -1952  e s t i ­
m ates re fe r  to approxim ately  the sam e point in 
tim e. The d ifferen ce  betw een them  is that the 
secon d  includes data fo r  those regions in N .K su . 
regained from  Anhwei and Shantung at the end o f 
the yea r.
(2) In o rd e r  to ca lcu late  the p rop ortion  o f h .h s  in 
M A T s, the follow ing estim ates o f  total a g r ic . 
h .h s  have been used: (a) fo r  sprin g , 1952 and 
m id -1952  (1st e s t . ) - N. K su. , 4, 858, 743 (S P J P , 
2 3 /8 /5 2 ,  op . c i t . , p. 1). S. K su. , 2 ,4 9 8 ,6 8 3  (SN JP, 
2 5 /7 /5 2 ,  op . c it. , p. 2). (b) fo r  m id -1952  (2nd e s t . )
8 ,4 8 6 ,0 6 7 , from  CK N YH TH YTSL, op . c i t . , v o l. 2,
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S ou rces; (1) Spring, 1952; SNJP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 , op . c it . , p. 2.
And S P J P , 1 9 /4 /5 2 , op . c i t . , p. 2.
(2) M id -1952 (1st e s t . ): S P J P , 2 3 /8 /5 2 ,  p . l .  
"M ake G eneral C hecks on the Mutual Aid 
and C o -o p e ra tiv e  M ovem ent". And SN JP, 
2 5 /7 /5 2 , p. 2, "Som e P rob lem s in the 
Mutual Aid and C o -o p e ra tiv e  M ovem ent 
that Must Be S o lved ".
(3) M id-1952 (2nd e s t . ) :  As Table III. 1.
As indicated  in the notes to Table III. 3, the d iffe re n ce  betw een the two 
m id -y e a r  estim ates is essen tia lly  one o f  geograp h ica l covera g e  and in rea l 
term s it is  the f ir s t  two sets o f data that m ost a ccu ra te ly  re fle c t  p ro g re ss  
in the M AT M ovem ent during 1952. M o re o v e r , i f  we take the en d -year 
estim ate as base rather than the m id -1951 figu re  we shall be able to p lace 
the events o f  1952 into p ro p e r  p ersp e ctiv e . Betw een the end o f  1951 and the 
spring o f  1952 a m od est in crea se  in the num ber o f  team s took p la ce , 
m em bersh ip  risin g  fro m  around 10% to 12% o f total agricu ltural households. 
The re a lly  dram atic  expansion o ccu rre d  in the fo llow ing  three m onths as 
m em bersh ip  in crea sed  th reefo ld  to em brace  40% o f the agricu ltural popu­
lation . This was a m ost sign ificant developm ent. No lon g er  could  it be 
said  that mutual aid had m e re ly  touched the p er ip h ery  o f  the agricu ltural 
s e c to r ; in the r ich  agricu ltura l reg ion  o f  south K iangsu in p a rticu la r , alm ost 
half o f  all peasants w ere now involved fo r  at least part o f  the year in som e 
kind o f fo rm a l co -o p e ra t iv e  farm ing arrangem ent.
H ow ever, the m ost rapid advance o c cu rre d  in the north o f  the p rov in ce .
Indeed in absolute term s the p osition  o f the two regions was reversed*, in
spring south K iangsu had the la r g e r  num ber o f team s (and m ore  peasants
in them ), but within the space o f  a few  m onths the north had overtaken  it.
N everth e less , although this had the e ffe ct  o f  n arrow in g the gap, Kiangnan
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rem ained  con s id era b ly  ahead o f  the north in term s o f  the p roportion  o f  
total households belonging to the team s.
It is  im portant to rem em b er that the agricu ltura l c o -o p e ra t io n  the 
peasants w ere participating in at this tim e was fa r  rem oved  from  a g r i­
cu ltural co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  (with all that this im p lied  fo r  ow nership  and 
unified m anagem ent o f p roduction ). Even if  they w ere  part o f the mutual 
aid s e c to r  the peasants w ere still w orking fo r  th eir  own private ends, not
those determ ined  by a co lle c t iv e  unit. They continued to m ake independent
(52)d ec is ion s  about what cro p s  to grow ' and retained con tro l o v e r  m uch o f
th eir  final output. It is true that the organ ization  o f  M ATs was an integral
part o f  the p r o ce s s  w hereby the individual sca ttered  farm  econ om y was to
(53)
be tran sform ed  into a co lle c t iv ize d  agricu ltu re . ' But this was a distant 
goal and fo r  the tim e being it was the s im p lest and m ost b a s ic  fo rm s o f 
co -o p e ra t io n  that w ere the focu s o f the p la n n ers ’ attention.
One o f  the m ost strik ing features o f Table III. 1 are the fluctuations 
in the developm ent o f M ATs in the f ir s t  half o f the 1950’ s . Of these the 
m ost n oticeab le  is  the retrea t o f 1953 which fo llow ed  the rapid expansion 
o f the previou s yea r .
Events in  the country as a whole provide som e clues as to why this
apparent v o lte -fa ce  should have o ccu rre d . By the spring o f  1953 the
M AT M ovem ent in China was encountering seriou s  d ifficu lties  arising out
o f the w idespread  v io la tion  o f  the supposedly key p rin cip les  o f  gradua lism ,
(54)volu ntarism  and mutual ben efit. Such v io la tion s w ere  causing rifts  to
develop  both within the rural s e c to r  betw een peasants and ca d re s , and
within the team s th em selves betw een the p oor and m iddle peasants. In
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these c ircu m sta n ces  a p o licy  o f retrenchm ent was ca lled  fo r  and the
(55)cam paign halted.
In K iangsu events fo llow ed  a s im ila r  pattern. Even in 1952, b e fore
the rapid expansion  o f M ATs had taken p la ce , there w ere re fe re n ce s  to
team s breaking up through d isreg a rd  o f the p rin cip les  o f fre e  ch o ice  and
mutual benefit and c r it ic is m s  w ere vo iced  against the fo rce d  organ ization
(56)o f  peasants in parts o f  south Kiangsu. But the p rov in cia l new spapers
fo r  la te -1952  and early -195 3  show that subsequent developm ents had led  
to a fu rth er d eteriora tion  in the situation and the em ergen ce  o f  a wide 
range o f p ro b le m s .
A ccountan cy was a fa m ilia r  area o f  d ifficu lty . T here w ere delays in
the settlem ent o f  accounts and som e team  lea d ers  w ere even reported  to
(57)have d e lib era te ly  withheld the paym ent o f  w ages to m e m b e rs . This
was con tra ry  to the sp ir it  o f fa ir  exchange and crea ted  disunity among 
team  m em b ers  and som etim es resu lted  in the breakdow n o f the M A T s.
/  C O N
A D ecem b er , 1952 artic le  showed how the purpose o f  accounting could 
be com p le te ly  m isu n derstood ; thus som e peasants w ere under the 
im p re ss io n  that " i f  the record in g  o f  w ork and draw ing up o f accounts are 
too thorough , unity w ill be a ffected "; and " i f  w e 'v e  got to be so thorough, 
how can we talk about 'mutual a id '? "  One team  lea d er  was even reported  
as saying " . . . soon er  o r  la ter  we shall have s o c ia lism  anyway so now that 
w e 're  ^getting o rga n ized ' , why bother about evaluation o f points and
(59)record in g  o f  w o r k ? "  Peasant s e lf- in te re s t  a lso  m anifested  itse lf .
F or  exam ple , those who had m ore  land than labou r tr ied  to d ep ress  wages 
w hile others who p o sse sse d  draft anim als and too ls  w ere fo r  raising the
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value o f  w ork  ca r r ie d  out with them . Inefficient team  m anagem ent led
to the deaths o f  m any draft oxen: at peak p eriods  peasants com peted  with
each other to use them , but none would take the resp on s ib ility  o f  feeding
(61)and caring fo r  them  - a p rob lem  which was to b e com e  c r it ic a l in 
la ter  c o -o p e ra t iv iz a t io n  cam paigns.
(60)
A good h arvest was no guarantee o f  furth er p ro g re ss  in a M AT. On
the con tra ry  it m ight lead  m em bers  to slacken  o ff in the b e lie f  that all th eir
(62)p rob lem s had been  so lved . When production  d ifficu lties  em erged  M ATs
w ere a lso ad verse ly  a ffected . In the w inter o f 1952, fo r  exam ple, ration 
shortages and a lack  o f capital fo r  su bsid ia ries  caused m any peasants to 
lo s e  faith in  mutual aid and team s w ere disbanded as the b e t te r -o f f  m em bers
IL 3 \
re sorted  to private , individual farm in g. Som e peasants fa iled  to u n d er­
stand that mutual aid could  be pursued in the o ff-p e a k  m onths and le ft 
th eir  v illa ges  in sea rch  o f  p a rt-t im e  w ork e lsew h ere , again contributing 
to the tem p ora ry  standstill o r  co lla p se  o f  the t e a m s .^ ^
In sh ort, starting tow ards the end o f  1952 there was c le a r  evidence o f
in creas in g  p rob lem s in the mutual aid s e cto r  o f K iangsu and by spring o f
the follow ing yea r these seem  to have reached  seriou s  p rop ortion s . The
(65)situation was w e ll-illu s tra te d  in an a rtic le  w ritten  in A p ril o f  that year
( 66 )w hich stron g ly  attacked the " fo r m a lis t ic "  tendencies o f the current 
M AT M ovem ent. It c ited  the case  o f a hsiang in W u-ch in  hsien  (south 
Kiangsu) w here investigations revea led  that o f  73 M ATs rep orted ly  set 
up, on ly  37 w ere re a lly  im plem enting mutual aid, 21 existed  in name only 
and the other 15 had broken  up com plete ly . S im ilar  situations could  be 
found in other parts o f  the p rov in ce .
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The speed o f  institutional change in 1952, o r  m o re  s p e c if ica lly  "the
e x ce ss iv e  haste shown by the leadersh ip  tow ards the mutual aid and
(67)co -o p e ra t iv e  m ovem en t", was blam ed fo r  this state o f  a ffa irs . C adres 
had ign ored  peasant opin ion  (and production  requ irem en ts) and fo r c ib ly  
im p osed  the new institutional fram ew ork  upon them . Instead o f  dem on ­
strating the su p erio r ity  o f  mutual aid through "patient education" and the
exam ple o f  "rep resen ta tive  m o d e ls "  they had heaped c r it ic is m  and sa rca sm
( 6 8 )on the peasants and "ca lle d  them  n a m es". The d ifficu lties  w ere c o m ­
pounded b y  the fact that once the team s w ere set up, the cad res either 
sat back  sa tisfied  with their organ izational su cce ss  and fa iled  to fo llow  up 
by helping peasants o v er  th eir  d ifficu lties  o r  b lin d ly  pushed on tow ards 
h ig h e r -le v e l organ izational fo rm s , " . . . m erging  sm all team s into la rge
ones and in ap p rop ria te ly  in creasin g  public p rop erty  and accum ulation 
(69)funds". In the p ro ce s s  the lo s se s  su ffered  by  the peasants had caused
th eir liv ing standards to d ec lin e , and as their enthusiasm  fo r  production  
waned so the M ATs had broken  up.
The " fo r m a lis t ic "  tendencies m entioned above also led  to the
circu la tion  o f  m isleadin g  rep orts  and fa lse  sets o f  s ta tis t ics . In T 'a i
h sien  cad res  in one hsiang reported  that there w ere  fou r perm anent and
15 tem p ora ry  M A T s; on ly  la te r , when an o ffic ia l check  was o rd ered ,
(70)was it found that in fact not a single team  existed  in the h sian g ! v
Another representative  case  was that o f  Ching-hu hsiang in L ien -sh u i 
hsien . During su m m er, 1952 cadres had used loans in o rd e r  to attract 
peasants into organ izing m ore  than 30 M A T s. Subsequently, the peasants 
d isco v e re d  that they had been  unwittingly absorbed  into h ig h e r -le v e l
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team s. No attempt was m ade to red ress  the situation, but la ter  as
prob lem s m ounted up which the cadres w ere unable to so lve  the peasants 
began to rev ert to w orking on their own. By A p ril, 1953 not a single o ffic ia l 
M AT rem ained .
To sum  up: there can be little  doubt that the sam e fa ctors  which halted
the M AT M ovem ent nationally in 1953 w ere also op erative  in K iangsu. The
vio la tion  o f  b a s ic  p r in c ip le s , tensions betw een cad res and peasants and
betw een p o o re r  and b e t te r -o f f  peasants, con flicts  o f co lle c t iv e  and s e lf- in te re s t ,
ca d r e s ' fa ilings - all contributed to peasant d issa tis fa ction  and created  strains
within the m ovem ent, leading to the co lla p se  o f a la rge  num ber o f team s.
(72)It is  in this context that the data shown in Table III. 1 should be v iew ed. '
The p ro g re ss  o f  the M AT M ovem ent in 1954 and 1955 can be b r ie fly
(73)
su m m arized . The 'G en era l Line fo r  the P eriod  o f T ran sition  to S o c ia lis m 1, 
published in the autumn o f 1953, m arked  the end o f retrenchm ent and the 
beginning o f  renew ed em phasis on agricu ltural co lle c tiv iza tio n . In a resolu tion
(71)
adopted by  the C entral C om m ittee o f  the CC P in D ecem b er  o f that yea r a
(75)
(74)cen tra l them e was the im portan ce o f  setting up A P C s and in line with
this change o f  d irection  the form ative  ro le  o f the M ATs was also s tre sse d .
The stage was set fo r  the further developm ent o f  M ATs and in 1954 a second  
upsurge took p lace  in the p rov in ce . The downward trend o f 1953 was rev e rse d  
and by the end o f  the year m ore  than half o f  all K iangsu peasants w ere m e m ­
b ers  o f team s. M o re o v e r , a lm ost half the team s w ere  o f  the perm anent
(76)type, com pared  with w ell under a third in 1952.
The d eclin e  in the num ber o f team s and participating households betw een 
m id -19 54  and m id -19 55  is on the face  o f it a little  su rp ris in g . H ow ever,
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the explanation is  sim ple ; by  m id -1955  the co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  m ovem ent 
was w ell under way and the M ATs w ere being su perseded  by the A P C s. 
Thus, the declin e  in 1955 shown in Table III. 1 is  no m o re  than a re fle ction  
o f this m ove tow ards a h igher lev e l o f agricu ltural co -o p e ra t io n .
So fa r  we have on ly  exam ined mutual aid developm ents in  Kiangsu in 
iso la tion  and without distinguishing betw een the form ation  o f  tem p ora ry  and 
perm anent team s. We shall th ere fo re  conclude this section  by  attempting 
to p lace  K iangsu 's exp erien ce  into a regional and national context and by 
b r ie f ly  con siderin g  the two kinds o f M AT separa te ly .
(We m ay also note that Kiangsu and Shanghai p resen t an interesting 
ca se -s tu d y  o f  d ifferen t resp on ses  to shifts in p o licy  during the M AT M ov e ­
m ent. In each  ob serva b le  case  Shanghai is a m o re  sen sitive  b a rom eter  
o f change, the m em bersh ip  o f team s in creasin g  in 1954 and declin ing in 
1953 and 1955, by  a grea ter  proportion  than in the rest  o f  the p rov in ce . )
Table III. 4 on the fo llow ing  page shows the developm ent o f  the M AT 
M ovem ent in China and the East China R egion , as w ell as in Kiangsu 
and Shanghai, betw een 1950 and 1955.
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The table requ ires  little  com m ent. The M AT M ovem ent in Kiangsu 
and East China (b) started  la ter  than in the "o ld  lib e ra te d "  regions o f  the 
north such as Shantung. In 1951 the proportion  o f  agricu ltural households 
belonging to team s in both these areas was le ss  than half that o f  China and 
con sid era b ly  le s s  than in East China including Shantung. H ow ever, despite 
(o r  becau se  of) this re la tiv e ly  slow  beginning, expansion  in 1952 was
p a rticu la rly  rapid and by the end o f that year the rate o f  participation  was
(771 (781h igher in E ast China (b ) ' ' than in the country as a w hole. ' Only
Shanghai continued to lag behind.
A com p a rison  o f  regional trends in 1953 is o f p articu lar  in terest. 
Although we have d e scr ib e d  this year as one o f retren chm ent, at a national 
le v e l M AT m em bersh ip  actually in creased  v e ry  s ligh tly  (though since  the 
total num ber o f  team s fe ll  by  7. 17%, it is  c le a r  that the r ise  in participation  
was due to the grow th o f perm anent team s). But m ost in terestin g , in East 
China (b) too , m em bersh ip  fe ll by  only 2%, com pared  with 15% in Kiangsu 
and Shanghai. Such a wide gap suggests that team  m em bersh ip  in crea sed  
in som e p rov in ces  o f  East China even though o v e ra ll participation  fe ll  
slightly . This is in fact borne out by  the follow ing data;
Table III. 5: The M AT M ovem ent in East China
(excluding Shantung): 1952-53
N um ber of a g r i-  N um ber o f a g r i­
cu ltural households cultural households
Kiangsu
Shanghai
Anhwei
Chekiang
Fukien
(Shantung)
in M A T s; 1952
3 ,6 9 3 ,9 8 5  
31 ,200  
3 ,3 4 3 ,1 4 6  
1 ,9 1 7 ,2 4 5  
1 ,3 0 0 ,8 0 5  
(5 ,6 0 9 ,2 1 8 )
in MATS: 1953
3 ,1 0 6 ,1 5 3  
24 ,384  
3, 179,981 
2 ,3 9 1 ,7 8 6  
1 ,4 2 1 ,4 7 3  
(5 ,1 0 1 ,8 4 3 )
P ercentage
change
-15 .91
-2 1 .8 5
- 4 .8 8  
+24 .75  
+ 9 .27
- 9 .0 5
S ource ; CKNYHTHYTSL, v o l. 2, op. c i t . , pp. 1002-1003 
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C le a rly  the reaction  to the rapid expansion o f  1952 va ried  con sid era b ly  
fro m  p rov in ce  to p ro v in ce . In Kiangsu 1953 saw a substantial cu t-back  in 
M A T s, a pattern that was fo llow ed  in Anhwei. But in Chekiang and Fukien 
events m oved  in the opposite  d irection  and p articipation  continued to r ise .
To investigate why these variations took p lace would take us beyond the 
scop e  o f  this chapter: they m ay re fle c t  the d ifferin g  su cce ss  in setting up 
team s in each p rov in ce  o r  perhaps they stem m ed fro m  the ascendancy o f 
d ifferen t p o lit ica l con v iction s . In any ca se , we m ust be care fu l in e x tra ­
polating fro m  the exp erien ce  o f  a single p rov in ce , no le s s  than from  that o f 
the w hole country.
The gap betw een Kiangsu and the rest o f East China narrow ed again in 
(79)1954, although the p rov in ce  actually fe ll furth er behind the country taken
as a w hole. This was the year in which M AT m em bersh ip  reached  its peak
in Kiangsu and this was also the case  in East China (including and excluding
Shantung) and China. But during 1955 num bers began to decline in all areas
as A PC s w ere set up on an in crea s in g ly  wide s ca le . What is  sign ificant
fro m  a com para tive  regiona l point o f  view  is that the p rop ortion  o f  agricu ltural
households belonging to team s was low er in K iangsu than in both China and
East China. This had an im portant consequ en ce , fo r  in e ffe ct  it le ft K iangsu
with a com parative  disadvantage as the co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  cam paign got
under way. A p r io r i  the sm a lle r  the num ber o f peasants that had participated
in mutual aid, the grea ter  the d ifficu lties  that cou ld  be expected  when the
„ ( 8 0 )co -o p e ra t iv e s  w ere form ed .
So fa r  no d istinction  has been drawn betw een the developm ent o f 
tem p ora ry  and perm anent M ATs and it seem s appropriate to conclude this
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section  by b r ie f ly  con siderin g  this aspect o f the m ovem ent. The relevant 
in form ation  fo r  K iangsu, East China and China is set out in Table III. 6 
on the fo llow ing page.
A fter  1952 there was a continual decline in the num ber o f tem p ora ry  
M ATs in K iangsu and East China (though cu riou sly , China showed a 16. 8% 
r ise  in 1954) and a corresp on d in g  in cre a se  in the im portan ce o f  perm anent 
team s. H ow ever, the pattern o f  developm ent in K iangsu o ffe rs  som e 
in teresting con trasts  with that o f other reg ion s . F o r  exam ple, in 1953 
K iangsu and Shanghai su ffered  d eclin es in the rate o f  participation  in 
perm anent as w ell as tem p ora ry  M A T s. E lsew here a s im ila r  fa ll in the 
m em bersh ip  o f season al team s took p lace but this was to a grea ter  o r  le s s e r  
d egree  o ffse t  by  a continuing r ise  in that o f perm anent on es . It is in teresting 
to specu late on the s ign ifican ce  o f  this con trast. Could it be that the d ifficu lties  
o f  im plem enting m utual aid in K iangsu w ere g rea ter  than e lse w h e re ?  That 
the v io la tion  o f  b a s ic  p r in cip les  o f gradualism  and volu n tarism  had been m ore  
s e r io u s , so creating  a m ore  c r it ic a l situation and n ecessitatin g  a sharper 
re tre a t?  W hatever the answ er, the phenom enon was on ly  tem p ora ry  and 
after 1953 perm anent M ATs assum ed m ore  im portan ce in Kiangsu than in 
the other areas shown.
Throughout the p eriod  the average s ize  o f  both kinds o f  M AT was on 
the in cre a s e . Team s in K iangsu (though not in Shanghai) w ere la rg e r  than 
in China and East China, excluding Shantung, but in the m o re  im m ediate 
regiona l context sm a lle r  than in Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien. This is 
not su rpris in g  fo r  the g rea ter  p ressu re  o f  agricu ltura l population on arable 
land in the south was bound to lead to a la rg e r  s ize  o f  unit. In purely
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Table III. 6 The development o f  tem porary  and permanent MATs; 1951-1955.
(a) Tem porary T ea m s ;
Total number 
of tem porary 
teams
Agricultural
household
m em bership
As percentage of 
all households
Average size  of 
team (h .h s /M A T )
1951 Kiangsu 63,042 445,622 5.25 7. 54
1952 Ki angsu 373,410 2, 571,408 30. 30 6. 89
Shanghai 4, 158 20, 652 24. 52 4. 97
Ksu + S'hai 377,568 2, 592,060 30. 20 6. 87
East China ( a) 1 ,796,249 10,857,875 32. 86 6. 04
East China (b) 1, 049,943 7 ,359 ,940 32.44 7. 01
China 6 ,270 ,282 33,915, 857 29. 80 5.41
1953 Kiangsu 296,316 2 ,136 ,045 25. 17 7.21
Shanghai 3, 050 16,474 19.80 5. 40
Ksu + S'hai 299,366 2 ,152 ,519 25. 12 7. 19
East China ( a) 1 ,529,355 10,183,225 30. 47 6. 66
East China (b) 954,229 7, 122, 547 31.11 7. 46
China 5 ,633 ,744 32,308, 398 27.77 5. 73
1954 Kiangsu 249,058 2, 035, 204 23.62 8. 17
Shanghai 3, 031 18,503 22. 55 6. 10
Ksu + S'hai 252,089 2, 053,707 23.62 8. 15
East China ( a) 1 ,411,841 9 ,927 ,514 29. 54 7. 03
East China (b) 883,983 6 ,839 ,358 29. 70 7. 74
China 6 ,130 ,179 37,764 ,576 32. 19 6. 16
1955 Kiangsu 196,127 1,767,419 20.33 9. 01
Shanghai 2,266 15, 157 17. 97 6.69
Ksu + S'hai 198,393 1,782,576 20. 30 8.99
East China (a) 962,606 7, 594,278 22. 19 7. 89
East China (b) 600, 535 5,255, 557 22. 55 8 .75
China 3 , 975, 058 27 ,545 ,955 23. 10 6. 93
(b) Permanent Teams
Total number Agri cultured As percentage of Average size  of
of permanent household all households team (h .h s /M A T )
teams m em bership
1951 Kiangsu 19,242 145, 114 1.71 7. 54
1952 Ki angsu 145, 116 1, 122,577 13.23 7. 74
Shanghai 1,786 10, 548 12. 53 5. 91
Ksu + S'hai 146,902 1 ,133,125 13. 20 7.71
East China (a) 752,658 5, 037,784 15.24 6 .69
East China (b) 363,638 2 ,926 , 501 12. 89 8. 05
China 1 ,755,755 11,448, 527 10. 05 6. 52
1953 Kiangsu 116,658 970,108 11. 43 8. 32
Shanghai 1,206 7 ,910 9. 51 6. 56
Ksu + S'hai 117,864 978,018 11.41 8. 30
East China (a) 662,250 5, 042,395 15. 08 7.61
East China (b) 339,464 3 ,001 ,230 13. 11 8. 84
China 1 ,816,468 13,328,465 11.45 7. 34
1954 Ki angsu 239,511 2 ,370 ,380 27. 52 9 .90
Shanghai 2 ,346 17,945 21,87 7. 65
Ksu + S'hai 241,857 2 ,388 ,325 27. 46 9. 87
East China (a) 1, 064,406 9, 555, 918 28. 44 8 .98
East China (b) 588,090 5 ,827,862 25. 31 9.91
China 3,801,301 30,713 ,423 26. 17 8. 08
1955 Ki angsu 227,862 2,552,211 29.35 11. 20
Shanghai 2, 064 16,224 19. 23 7. 86
Ksu + S'hai 229,926 2, 568,435 29. 26 11.17
East China (a) 906,764 9 ,268 ,977 27. 09 10. 22
East China (b) 556,005 6 ,276 ,138 26.92 11. 29
China 3, 171,965 32 ,842 ,835 27. 55 10.35
Notes and source ; As Table III. 4
e con om ic  term s it is d ifficu lt, how ever, to con cede  m o re  than m argina l 
s ign ifican ce  to the in cre a se  in s iz e . The sca le  o f  m utual aid operations 
in 1955 m ay have rep resen ted  a con sid erab le  advance o v e r  what had been  
p oss ib le  in the past but it was still a long way fro m  provid ing the conditions 
in which the benefits  o f  m ass m ob iliza tion  com bined  with cen tra lized  
m anagem ent could  be ach ieved. The inherent stru ctu re  o f  the team s its e lf  
p rov ided  a ca se  fo r  m oving to a h igher fo rm  o f agricu ltura l co -o p e ra t io n .
(2) Som e e con om ic  aspects o f  mutual aid in K iangsu .
The e con om ic  ra ison  d 'e tre  o f  mutual aid in K iangsu has a lready  been 
indicated : in a situation in w hich re so u rce s  w ere not on ly  lim ited  but also 
unequally d istribu ted , an institutional arrangem ent w hich gave m o re  peasants 
g rea ter  a cce ss  to the s ca rc e  fa ctors  was ob v iou sly  d e s ira b le . The su cce ss  
o f  such an institutional arrangem ent could be judged by  its dem onstrated  
ability to im p rov e  produ ction  e ffic ie n cy  and so in cre a se  agricu ltural output 
and ra ise  in co m e s .
In the yea rs  im m edia te ly  after 1949 it was the M A T s1 ability to in crea se
output that was m ost em phasized . Thus, in the w inter o f  1952;
"The purpose o f  organ ization  is  to d evelop  agricu lture  and ra ise  
unit area  y ie ld s . The aim  o f the w inter produ ction  w ork o f  the 
M ATs is  th ere fo re  p rin cip a lly  to lay  the foundation fo r  a bum per 
h arvest next yea r . The developm ent o f  su b s id ia ries  is m e re ly  
a m eans o f  serv in g  the needs o f  agricu ltural p roduction . " (81)
In a ssess in g  the im pact o f  M ATs upon produ ction  in K iangsu we m ust
be ca re fu l in our in terpretation  o f the available data. Quite apart fro m  the
lik elih ood  that published sta tistics  re fle c t  b e tte r -th a n -a v era g e  cond itions,
rep orts  w hich re fe r r e d  to the su cce ss  o f  team s in ra ising agricu ltural 
(82)output b y  10-20%  are m isleadin g  to the extent that they m ake no allow ance
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fo r  the in cre a se s  w hich m ight, and probably  would, 7 have taken p lace 
even in the absence o f mutual aid. A  m ore  accurate re fle c t io n  o f mutual 
aid su cce ss  would be gained from  a com pa rison  o f  le v e ls  o f  production  
inside and outside the M A T s. Fortunately , som e com para tive  in form ation  
o f  this kind is available and it is this that w ill fo rm  the bas is  o f  our 
quantitative assessm en t o f the Mutual Aid Team  M ovem ent in K iangsu.
C laim s that team s w ere achieving h igher y ields than individual peasant
households w ere  m ade in a num ber o f  reports appearing in D ecem b er,
(84)1952. L a ter the sam e month another report contained the follow ing
data on y ie lds o f  m a ize  w hich had been  attained in 1949 by a n e w ly -e sta b ­
lished  M AT in H sin -ch e  hsien  (north Kiangsu) and by peasants who w ere
(85)still w orking on their own:
Individual peasants 70 - 80 chin p er  m ou
Ma C heng-shou  M AT 120 11 11 11
In other w ord s , team  yields w ere betw een 50% and 70% h igher than those
o f peasants who rem ained outside the mutual aid fra m ew ork .
A  m ore  in teresting  exam ple, becau se  it is m ore  detailed  and cov e rs  a 
lon ger p er iod , is that o f  a M AT with 148 m ou set up by  13 households in
/ o n
N an-hui hsien  (near Shanghai) in A p ril, 1951. The fo llow ing  table
rep rod u ces  data which show the yields o f variou s cro p s  achieved by the team
b e fo re  and after its form ation , as w ell as those con cu rren tly  being attained
(87)by  Yeh Ch'tf an -sheng, a p rosp erou s  individual peasant who had been one 
o f those with the h ighest output b e fo re  1949:
(83)
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Table III. 7; Y ields o f p rin cipa l cro p s  inside and outside
A verage y ield A verage yield
o f Yeh Chtian - o f  Sung C hia-
sheng ch 'ia o  M AT
(ch in /m ou ) (ch in / m ou)
P r io r  to establishm ent o f  M AT;
1950 Cotton n. a. 40
Unhulled r ice n. a. 280
Wheat n. a. 100
A fter  establishm ent o f  M AT;
1951 Cotton 50 60
Unhulled r ice 350 320
Wheat 100 120
1952 Cotton 65 85
Unhulled r ice 400 450
Wheat 150 200
1953 Cotton 80 120
Unhulled r ice 380 440
Wheat 200 255
Av. Cotton 65 88
1951- Unhulled r ice 377 403
1953 Wheat 150 192
Source; F rom  S su -n ien -la i nung-ts 'un -chung ti ta
pien, op. c it. , p . 11.
F o r  purposes o f  analysis these figures can be e x p ressed  in the form  
o f an index;
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Table III. 8: Index o f  y ields o f p rin cipa l crop s  inside and
outside a M AT: N an-hui hsien , Sungchiang 
S. D.
Index o f  average Index o f  average P ercen tage r ise
y ield  o f  Yeh y ie ld  o f  Sung o r  fa ll in M AT
C h ia -ch ’iao 
M AT with p r e ­
vious year 
= 100
C h'ilan-sheng 
with previous 
y ea r  = 100
yield  o v e r  in d i­
vidual peasant 
yield
1950 n. a. n. a. n. a.
1951 Cotton - 150.00 -
Unhulled r ice - 114.29 -
Wheat - 120.00 -
1952 Cotton 130 .00 141.67 +30.77
Unhulled r ice 114.29 140.63 +12 .50
Wheat 150 .00 166.67 +33 .33
1953 Cotton 123.08 141.18 +50.00
Unhulled r ice 95. 00 97 .78 +15 .79
Wheat 133.33 127.50 +27.50
Av. Cotton +40.39
1952- Unhulled r ice +14 .15
1953 Wheat +30 .42
S ou rce ; Table III. 7.
The su p erio r ity  o f mutual aid o v er  individual farm in g would seem  to
em erge  c le a r ly  fro m  these data. The y ie ld  d ifferen tia ls  betw een the two
ca tegor ies  are v e r y  sign ificant fo r  all the crop s  (but e sp e c ia lly  cotton  and
wheat) and certa in ly  la rge  enough to convince peasants o f the advantages
o f join ing the team . In term s o f the average annual rates o f  grow th
( 88)achieved during 1951-53 the resu lts also favour the M AT.
A secon d  exam ple illu stra tes  the exp erien ce  o f  another peasant and 
M AT in a d ifferen t hsiang o f N an-hui h s i e n . Hstt C hia-ch 'ttan was in 
charge o f  a fa m ily  labou r fo r c e  o f  th ree , owned 17 m ou o f land and had 
both too ls  and draft anim als. A  on e -tim e  m em ber o f  Chu Chung-hsin 
M A T, he subsequently w ithdrew  fro m  it in the b e lie f  that his exp erien ce
- 2 0 2 -
and ow nership  o f  su fficien t supplies o f w orking capital would enable him
to do better  on his own. The y ields o f cotton and r ice  w hich he achieved
in 1953 and those o f  the M AT he had le ft are shown below ;
Table III. 9 Y ields o f cotton and r ice  achieved by  an 
individual m iddle peasant and a M AT in 
N an-hui hsien  in 1953.
Cotton (hsiao-hua) 
Cotton (ta -h u a ) 
Unhulled r ice
A verage y ie ld  
o f  Chu Chung- 
hsin M AT
(ch in /m ou )
100
130
440
A verage y ie ld  
o f Hstt C h ia- 
ch 'lian
(ch in / m ou)
70
100
390
P ercentage 
in cre a se  o f 
M AT over  
individual 
peas ant
42 .86
30. 00
12. 82
S ou rce ; F rom  S su -n ien -la i nung-ts 'un-chung ti 
ch ll-ta  p ien , op. c it. , p. 12.
B ecau se o f  his w ithdraw al from  Chu Chung-hsin M AT then, Hsli 
C h ia -ch 'lian  had lo s t  30 chin o f cotton and 50 chin o f  r ic e  (unhulled) on 
e v e ry  m ou planted under each  c ro p . Since his sow n area  com p rised  12 
m ou o f cotton  and 5 m ou o f r ice  he had fo rfe ited  a total o f  360 chin of 
cotton  and 250 chin o f r ice .
F rom  the d escr ip tion s  o f  th eir  re so u rce  endowm ents and the amounts
o f land they owned Yeh C h 'lian-sheng and Hstl C h ia-ch 'tlan  can c le a r ly  be
con sid ered  "p rosp erou s  m iddle peasan ts" o r , to use the la ter  c la ss
(90)term in o logy , "u p p er-m id d le  peasan ts". In the last chapter we cited
the M in ister o f  A g ricu ltu re , L iao L u -yen , to the e ffe c t  that the y ields o f
p rosp erou s  m iddle peasants w ere "gen era lly  about 30% higher than those
(91)
o f p oor  p ea sa n ts '"  ' and on the basis  o f this rem ark  we w ere able to 
con stru ct an index o f  unit area  yields by  c la sse s  o f  peasants. We can now 
use this sam e index to show the relationship  betw een the y ie lds o f the
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two MATs in Nan-hui hsien and those of individual peasants of different
c la s s e s . Thus;
Table III. 10: A com p a rison  o f  the average y ie lds o f 
2 M ATs in N an-hui hsien  and those o f
pooi: and m iddle peasants.
(A ll figu res in chin p er  m ou)
A verage A verage A verage A verage
y ield  o f y ie ld  o f y ie ld  o f y ie ld  o f
M AT u p p er- m iddle p oor
m iddle peas ant pe as ant
peasant
(a) The case  o f  Yeh Ch 'tlan-sheng and Sung C h ia -ch 'ia o  M AT
1951 Cotton 60 50 46. 15 38. 46
R ice  (unhulled) 320 3 50 323 .08 269 .23
Wheat 120 100 92. 30 76. 92
1952 Cotton 85 65 60 .0 0 50. 00
R ice  (unhulled) 450 400 369 .23 307 .69
Wheat 200 150 138.46 115.38
1953 Cotton 120 80 73. 85 61. 54
R ice  (unhulled) 440 380 350 .77 292.31
Wheat 255 200 184.62 153.85
Av. Cotton 88 65 60. 00 50. 00
1951 - R ice  (unhulled) 403 377 348 .00 290 .00
1953 Wheat 192 150 138.46 115.38
(b) The case  o f  Hsti C h ia-ch 'tlan  and Chu C hung-hsin  M AT
1953 Cotton (h s ia o -
hua) 100 70 64. 62 53 .85
(ta-hua) 130 100 92. 30 76. 92
R ice  (unhulled) 440 390 360 .00 300 .00
Note; The basis  fo r  these ca lcu lations is the index
shown in Table II. 13. If the y ie ld s  o f Yeh 
and Hstl are con s id ered  u p p er-m id d le  peasant 
y ie ld s , those o f  m iddle and p oor  can ea s ily  
be w orked out.
S ource : Tables II. 13, III. 7 and III. 9.
(T able  III. 10 needs a certa in  amount o f  qua lification : it is constructed  
on sim plify ing assum ptions and is best regarded  as a f ir s t  attempt at 
m easuring the relationsh ip  betw een leve ls  o f p rodu ction  o f M ATs and
peasants w orking on th eir  own. We should bew are o f drawing gen era l
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con clu sion s  too read ily  fro m  the data. )
On the ev idence o f  the table the case  fo r  join ing a M AT would appear 
to be irre fu ta b le . The average 1951-53 figu res  suggest that a p oor  peasant 
could in cre a se  his output by  at least half (and p robab ly  a good deal m o re ) - 
an in cre a se  which looks v e ry  sign ificant when view ed  against the c a lo r if ic  
d e fic ie n c ie s  o f produ ction  shown in the last chapter. M iddle peasants too 
(including the p rosp erou s  ones) stood to gain fro m  participating in mutual 
aid. In sh ort, from  the point o f view  o f both p erson a l w elfare  and a g r i­
cu ltural grow th the exp erien ce  o f  the two M ATs in N an-hui hsien  o ffe red  
firm  ju stifica tion  o f the mutual aid p o licy .
But these M ATs are on ly two out o f m any thousands in Kiangsu and 
we are bound to ask how representative  they can be con s id ered . In fact, 
there are a num ber o f reasons fo r  supposing that th e ir  exp erien ce  was not 
typ ica l. To begin  with a point m ade e a r lie r , it is  lik e ly  that individual 
ca ses  w ere  chosen  fo r  th eir  ability to show o ff mutual aid in the best 
p oss ib le  light and this presu m ab ly  applies equally  to the N an-hui exam ples. 
In the secon d  p la ce , i f  the exp erien ce  o f  Sung C h ia -ch 'ia o  and Chu Chung- 
hsin  re a lly  d e scr ib e d  what was happening throughout the p rov in ce , it would 
su re ly  have been  re fle cted  in a m ore  com preh en sive  developm ent o f M ATs 
than was actually  taking p la ce . Instead, as we shall see  below  (and as 
the ’ r e tre a t1 o f  1953 has a lready  suggested), the p rob lem s being encountered 
by the team s w ere great enough to dissuade m any peasants fro m  joining 
them  and indeed m any M ATs that had been set up w ere  co llap sin g . Such 
facts are not con sisten t with the view  that the two N an-hui exam ples 
are rep resen tative  on es.
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F in ally , although only p oor  and m iddle peasant y ie lds w ere shown
in Table III. 10, it is  p o ss ib le  to calcu late those o f r ich  peasants too .
What is in terestin g  about these is that they are a lso sign ifican tly  low er
(92)than the y ie lds o f  the two M A T s. But if this w ere  gen era lly  the case
the M AT M ovem ent would doubtless have em braced  m any o f the r ich  
peasants as w ell as th eir  p o o re r  counterparts . If this had o c cu rre d  its 
econ om ic  s ign ifican ce  would certa in ly  have guaranteed a wide coverage  
in the K iangsu p r e s s . Yet evidence o f such a trend is all but com p lete ly  
lack ing. Again, this would seem  to point to the u nrepresentative  nature o f 
the N an-hui data.
To sum  kp, w hile there is no reason  to doubt the a ccu ra cy  o f the 
data that we have presented  fo r  Nan-hui h s ien , there is  no reason  either 
to con s id e r  them  typ ica l o f  the relative p erform a n ce  o f M ATs and individual 
peasants in K iangsu in the e a r ly  1950 's. R ather, they should be c o n ­
s id ered  illu stra tive  o f  the optim al potential o f  m utual aid under the m ost 
favourab le  cond itions.
P roba b ly  m ore  rep resen tative , at least inasm uch as they have a w ider 
geograp h ica l b a se , are the follow ing sta tistics  c ircu la ted  at a con feren ce  
o f  the lead ers  o f  25 M ATs in C h 'ang-chou  S pecia l D is tr ic t  (south Kiangsu) 
in e a r ly  1952;
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Table III. 11; Changes in the r ice  output o f  25 M ATs 
in C h 'an g-ch ou  S .D . (south Kiangsu):
1951.______________________________________
P ercen tage  in cre a se  N um ber o f  M ATs As percentage
in r ice  output o f  M AT w hich achieved o f  all M ATs
o v e r  individual h ou se - this in crea se  
_________hold___________  ______
No change 1
1 0  9
10-20 5
20-30  2
30-40  2
50-60 2
Total 21
S ource ; SN JP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 , op. c it . , p. 2.
If it is  assum ed that the fou r M ATs not included in the table su ffered  
declin es  in output, the achievem ents o f the 25 team s can be sum m arized  
as fo llow s ; 80% in crea sed  output o v er  peasants who w ere  farm ing on 
th eir  own; 4% m aintained the sam e lev e l o f  output and 16% had a low er 
le v e l. In con trast to the N an-hui figu res which suggested  that in crea ses  
o f 50% o r  m o re  above individual household y ie lds w ere  com m on , the 
C h 'an g-ch ou  data indicate that such cases  w ere rather ra re . This gives 
further support to the argum ent that the M ATs in N an-hui w ere not a 
represen tative  sam ple .
We shall now use the C h 'an g-ch ou  data in an attempt to show the
relationsh ip  betw een the y ie lds o f M ATs and those o f  p o o r , m iddle and
rich  peasants. We shall fo llow  the gen era l p roced u re  adopted e a r lie r .
H ow ever, i f ,  as we b e lie v e , the C h 'an g-ch ou  M ATs are m ore  rep resen tative ,
these rev ised  estim ates w ill give a m ore  accurate im p re ss io n  o f  the lik e ly
e ffe ct  o f  the mutual aid m ovem ent on peasants and th ereby  on th eir  incentive
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4
36
20
8
8
8
84
to join the new teams.
In o rd e r  to do the ca lcu lations a num ber o f  s im ple  assum ptions have 
to be m ade:
(i) The in cre a se  in r ice  output achieved by  the M ATs w ill be taken 
as a p roxy  fo r  the in cre a se  in the output o f other c ro p s .
( ii)  The individual household with which the M ATs are com pared  
in III. 11 is  taken to be that o f a p oor  peasant.
(iii)  It is  assum ed that the m ost lik e ly  d ifferen tia l betw een M AT 
and individual peasant y ie lds is 15%. Table III. 11 shows the 
m ost frequent r ise  to have been 10% (o r  le s s ) ,  although quite 
a la rge  num ber o f  team s achieved in cre a se s  o f  10 - 20%.
By choosing a figure o f  15% we hope to avoid understating the
* (93)argum ent.
(iv ) The ca lcu lations w ill be m ade in term s o f  food  grains and the
average y ie ld , equivalent to that o f  a m idd le peasant, is taken
(94)to be 285 chin p er m ou.
On this bas is  Table III. 12 shows the relative leve ls  o f M AT yields and that
o f p o o r , m iddle and r ich  peasants;
Table III. 12; A verage food  grain  y ie lds o f  M ATs and 
individual peasants o f variou s c la s s e s .
P o o r  peasant 237. 50 chin p er m ou
M iddle peasant 285 .00
U pper-m idd le  peasant 308 .75
R ich  peasant 332 .50
M AT 273 .13
S ou rces ; Table III. 11. The re lative  leve ls  o f p oor ,
m iddle and rich  p easan ts ' y ie lds are based  
on the index shown in Table II. 13.
On this evidence the p oor  peasants w ere the one c la ss  which stood to
gain fro m  participation  in the M A T s. Given the low  le v e l o f  output at which
(95)
they w ere operating after land re fo rm , a potential r ise  o f  15% m ust
- 2 0 8 -
have been a v e ry  rea l incentive to jo in  a team .
By con trast, mutual aid had nothing to o ffe r  the p rosp erou s  peasants. 
W orking on th eir  own their average yields rem ained con sid era b ly  higher 
than those o f  the team s (13. 04% fo r  u p p er-m id d le  and 21. 74% fo r  rich  
peasants). Such gaps are an indication  o f the further p ro g re ss  n e ce s sa ry  be 
fo re  the b e t te r -o f f  peasants cou ld  be attracted into agricu ltu ra l co -o p e ra tio n
The m iddle peasants occu p ied  a rather am bivalent p osition . A ccord in g  
to the figu res  shown above they too did better by  continuing to w ork  on their 
own (individual y ie lds being 4 .35%  above those o f  the M A T s). H ow ever, 
becau se  o f  the s im ple  assum ptions which underlie them , the p o ss ib ility  o f  a 
sign ificant m arg in  o f e r r o r  m ust be allow ed fo r  in the ca lcu la tion s . While 
this should not a ffect our con clu sion s with resp ect to the other c la s se s  o f 
peasants, the 4 .35%  d ifferen tia l is  too sm all fo r  us to be at all certa in  in 
predicting the e ffe c t  o f  m utual aid upon the m iddle peasants. Perhaps the 
best way out is to distinguish  betw een the lo w e r-m id d le  and u p p er-m id d le  
ca te g o r ie s ; s in ce  the average y ie ld  o f  the fo rm e r  w ill have been le s s  than 
that o f  the m idd le peasants taken as a w hole, it m ay be assum ed that the 
benefits to them  o f join ing a M AT w ere p ositive . Such an in feren ce  is not 
o f cou rse  unexpected . It was after all the p oor and lo w e r-m id d le  peasants 
that w ere looked  to fo r  support o f  the p o licy  o f institutional change in a g r i­
cu lture , w hile the rich  and u p p er-m id d le  c la sse s  w ere  seen  as the m ost 
lik e ly  opponents o f it. But at least the calcu lations p rovide  som e con crete  
evidence to support the th es is .
Turning to the b ro a d e r  econ om ic  context Table III. 12 again underlines 
the d ilem m a that con fronted  the planners in Kiangsu; sim ple  form s o f
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co -o p e ra t io n  such as the M ATs w ere lik e ly  to appeal m o stly  to the p o o re r  
peasants. F o r  the sam e reason  th eir  econ om ic  usefu ln ess was lim ited , fo r  
the fa ctor  s ca rc it ie s  which w ere among the m ost p ress in g  p rob lem s with 
which they had to contend, could on ly  be o v e rco m e  i f  the p rosp erou s  peasants 
w ere brought into the team s. Thus, con siderab le  though a 15% r ise  in yields 
w as, the M ATs requ ired  a further in crea se  o f  20% i f  the r ich  peasants w ere 
to be vo lu n tarily  drawn into them . In any ca se , the 15% in crea se  was s ig n i­
ficant m ore  in p erson a l than in econ om ic  te rm s ; in the last chapter it was 
estim ated  that to produ ce a surplus a p oor peasant needed to attain a y ield  o f 
401 .96  chin per m ou on his p ost-lan d  re fo rm  h o l d i n g .  The data above
indicate that by joining a team  he could hope fo r  an average y ie ld  o f  about 
275 chin. This was s till m ore  than 30% below  the le v e l at w hich he would 
start to m ake a net contribution  to agricu ltural grow th. On these two grounds 
the in ab ility  o f the M ATs to provide su fficient incentive to the p rosp erou s 
peasants o r  to c a r r y  the p oor peasants o v er  the thresh old  at which they would 
cea se  m e r e ly  to be a drain  on the agricu ltural econ om y - it was inevitable 
that the M AT M ovem ent should be a transitional stage in K iangsu 's a g r i­
cu ltural developm ent.
So fa r  we have indicated  the capacity  o f M ATs to ra ise  the produ ctiv ity  
and output o f  d ifferen t groups o f  peasants in K iangsu. C on sideration  m ust 
now be given  to the sou rce s  o f  these in c re a s e s .
The ch ie f advantages o f organ izing agricu ltural operations on a mutual 
aid rather than an individual basis  w ere the ability to m ake techn ica l 
im provem ents and achieve grea ter  e ffic ie n cy  in the use o f  s ca rc e  fa ctors  o f  
p roduction . As e a r ly  as F ebru ary , 1950 an artic le  in a Shanghai new spaper
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re fe r re d  to the ability  o f  M ATs to " .  . . ov e rco m e  the w eaknesses o f  the sm all
peasant econ om y, so perm itting the rational u tilization  o f  labou r, draft
anim als and too ls  and the ra ising o f  labour e ffic ie n cy  . . . (and) . . .  to im p rove
(97)the tech n ica l standard o f  cu ltivation ". In view  o f the identification  in
m uch growth litera tu re  o f  tech n ica l p ro g re ss  with the adoption o f the latest 
and m ost soph isticated  (and thereby, often the m ost cap ita l-in ten sive ) 
techn iques, it is  as w ell to em phasize that the kinds o f  tech n o log ica l advance 
envisaged by the 1950 Shanghai a rtic le  w ere sim ple changes ca rr ie d  out 
within the fra m ew ork  o f  the traditional technology (fo r  exam ple, im provem ents 
in ploughing and w eeding o r  the g rea ter  application  o f  o rgan ic  fe r t i l iz e r s ) .
Not that such changes should be underestim ated becau se  o f their s im p lic ity ; 
on the con tra ry , they w ere capable o f contributing s ign ifican tly  to in crea sed  
agricu ltura l p rodu ctiv ity .
One o f the c le a re s t  expositions o f  the benefits o f mutual aid is  contained
within the a rtic le  fro m  which the C h 'an g-ch ou  S pecia l D is tr ic t  data w ere 
(98)taken. Thus, it was c la im ed  that by  in creasin g  the e ffic ie n cy  o f the
labou r fo r c e ,  M ATs saved on labou r pow er. E vidence fro m  all parts o f
south Kiangsu showing an average 30% rise  in labou r e ffic ie n cy  supported
this point. In Tan-yang hsien , fo r  exam ple, the establishm ent o f the C h 'en
H o -fa  M AT resu lted  in the num ber o f labour days (kung) spent in the fie lds
(99)
being reduced  fro m  1, 500 to 1, 050 (a saving o f 30%). The average
amount o f  land w eeded by each peasant p er day also ro se  from  0. 8 to 1 .2
m ou. P r e c is e ly  how these im provem ents w ere brought about is not re co rd e d ,
but p resu m ab ly  the in troduction  o f a d egree  o f planning, g rea ter  sp ecia liza tion
( 100)in the use o f  labou r and the fu ll-t im e  em ploym ent o f labour w hich had
p rev iou s ly  been partly  o r  w holly inutilized  w ere all con tribu tory  fa c to rs .
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C h'en  Y ung-k 'ang M AT in Sung-chiang hsien , is o f sp e c ia l in terest, fo r  it
cited  the m ob iliza tion  o f w om en in farm  operations as one o f the advantages
o f mutual a id .^ ^ ^  They w ere resp on sib le  fo r  feeding the pigs and they
also used th eir  labou r pow er to drive  the w ater-w heels and irr iga te  the fie ld s ,
so enabling draft anim als which had p rev iou sly  been  em ployed  in this w ork
( 1 0 2 )to be tra n s fe rre d  to ploughing. T h eir ch ild ren  w ere  le ft in the care
o f old  peasants who w ere unable to take part in the w ork  in the fie ld s .
In this connection a report on one of the "m o d e l "  teams of south Kiangsu,
An area  in w hich mutual aid could  contribute to h igher yields was in
the co lle c tio n  and application  o f  fe r t i l iz e r . C h em ica l fe r t il iz e r s  w ere s till
(103)little used  in K iangsu and the p rin cip le  sou rces  o f  plant nutrients
rem ained  organ ic fe r t il iz e r s  - anim al m anure, n igh tso il, o ilse e d  cak es, 
pond mud^ and green  m anure (e sp e c ia lly  fro m  legum inous plants).
Although the potential in cre a se  in output from  these so u rces  was sm all 
com pared  with the application  o f s im ila r  g ross  amounts o f ch em ica l f e r t i ­
l iz e r s ,  there was still con sid erab le  scop e  fo r  in creas in g  their u se . M ass 
fe r t i l iz e r  co lle c tio n  and application  cam paigns w ere  a notable feature o f 
agricu ltu ra l p o licy  in the 1950's and the new institutional structure provided  
a usefu l fra m ew ork  fo r  their im plem entation . Even the m odest organ izational 
advance afforded  by m utual aid (e sp e c ia lly  in its perm anent fo rm ) was 
su fficien t to bring about in cre a se s  in both the co lle c tio n  and application  o f
natural fe r t i l iz e r s .  The case  o f C h 'en  Yung-k 'ang M AT illu stra tes  the point;
(106)in 1952 this team  m ade plans to apply to each m ou o f  paddy f ie ld s ' ' an
average o f  1, 000 chin o f  green  m anure, 1, 500 chin o f  p igsty  m anure,
(107)80 chin o f  p re sse d  beancake and 10 chin o f ch em ica l fe r t i l iz e r .  In line
with this plan team  m em bers  applied 5 chin o f ch em ica l fe r t i l iz e r  to each
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of the 39 m ou o f  land sown under green  m anure c r o p s . The extra  output 
so achieved was able to supply the green  m anure requ irem ents o f s ix  out 
o f the ten m ou o f p o o r -q u a lity  paddy fie ld s . And by m ob iliz in g  w om en and 
ch ildren  into cutting m ore  than 20, 000 chin o f  g rass  the needs o f the rem aining 
four m ou w ere  also m et.
The single m ost im portant sou rce  o f  organ ic  fe r t i l iz e r  w ere p igs . This
fact was recogn ized  by  a team  in H uai-ning hsien  (north K iangsu) which
built pens to house the pigs and organ ized  a fo rm  o f com m unal ca re , so
obviating the w aste o f m anure that p rev iou s ly  resu lted  fro m  the anim als
being allow ed to roam  fr e e ly  round the v illa ge , eating up w hatever scrap s
(108)they could find.
F in a lly , there w ere  c la im s o f con siderab le  in cre a se s  in the application
o f fe r t i l iz e r s  by  team s; fo r  exam ple, Chin T an-ken  M AT (N an-hui hsien)
reported  a doubling o v e r  e a r lie r  years and cited  this as the reason  fo r  a
(109)bum per h arvest in 1951. In M ATs in P 'e i  and Sui hsien  leve ls  o f
application  w ere  said to be 30% higher than those o f  individual peasant
,  ( 110) fa r m e r s .
Mutual aid a lso  m ade it e a s ie r  to im plem ent changes in the m ethods
o f cu ltivation . Team s in the suburbs o f Nanking w ere said  to have in crea sed
unit area  y ields by  carry in g  out "ca re fu l and intensive cu ltiva tion ", ^  ^
constructing irr ig a tio n  w ork s, im proving techniques and using im proved  
( 112 )seed  stra in s. In Sung-chiang S pecia l D istr ict  one tea m 's  contribution
to the adoption o f  m o re  " s c ie n t if ic "  techniques was the abandonment o f the
n orm al m ethod o f  sowing cotton in favour o f the transplanting o f cotton
seed lin gs , ca re fu l attention being given to spacing them  betw een one
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and one and a half feet fro m  each other.  ^  ^ This was tr ied  experim ent ally-
on nine m ou o f  land and m et with con sid erab le  s u c c e s s . E lsew h ere  C h 'en  
Yung-k 'ang M AT started  the spring-p loughing 20 days e a r lie r  than usual in 
an attempt to p repare  the so il and im p rove  its fe rt ility , m em bers  o f the team  
ploughing th eir  land to a depth o f seven  inches (two m o re  than in the previous 
year).^  ^  It was anticipated that by t reins pi anting tim e the whole sown area 
o f paddy would have been  ploughed four tim es and harrow ed  eight.
Another area  o f  su cce ss  was in com batting natural d isa s te rs . In Shanghai 
h s ien , desp ite  the onset o f  typhoons in 1951 the m ob iliza tion  o f 65, 000 peasants 
into building irr ig a tion  w orks m ade it p oss ib le  to achieve a bum per h arvest. 
S im ila rly , in a v illa ge  o f N an-hui hsien  the con certed  action  o f M AT m em bers  
rescu ed  147. 5 m ou o f cotton: assum ing an average y ield  o f  10 chin p er  m ou
and a value o f 420 yflan p er  chin , this m eant a total saving o f  619, 500 yflan.
L a stly , m ention should be m ade o f the encouragem ent o f  su bsid ia ries  
in M A T s. To som e extent this d erived  from  a tea m 's  m ore  rational and 
e ffic ien t em ploym ent o f  labou r, s ince  the m ore  rap id ly  agricu ltural operations 
w ere com pleted  the grea ter  was the p oss ib ility  o f putting m em bers  to w ork 
in n on -a g ricu ltu ra l pu rsu its . At the sam e tim e the better  con tro l o v er  
re so u rce s  o f  a M AT could also give r ise  to "su rp lu s "  la b o u r^  * ^  which 
could be used in the su bsid ia ry  s e c to r . How valuable this could  be is  indicated 
by  the rep ort o f  the con feren ce  o f  25 M AT lead ers  fro m  C h 'an g-ch ou  that 
su bsid ia ry  in com e accounted fo r  about 25% o f total peasant in com e.
Seen in this light, the developm ent o f su bsid ia ries  was c le a r ly  an im portant 
m eans o f stim ulating the developm ent o f the whole v illa ge  econ om y and 
raising peasant in com es .
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A ll that has just been  said about the benefits o f m utual aid in Kiangsu 
should not m islea d  us into thinking that there w ere no associa ted  d ifficu lties  
and it w ill be usefu l to conclude this section  by con siderin g  som e o f the m ore  
im portant e con om ic  p rob lem s that em erged  from  the M AT M ovem ent in the 
p rov in ce .
Sim ple though the organ izational fram ew ork  o f a M AT w as, m em bersh ip  
o f  a team  n everth e less  introduced  a peasant to new con cepts  and a way o f 
w orking that was quite u n fam iliar to h im . It is  not su rp ris in g  th ere fore  that 
m any peasants who jo ined  a team  should fe e l uneasy about their econ om ic  
p ro sp e cts . This is  exem p lified  by  the case  o f  C h 'en  Yung-k 'ang w hose e a r ly  
exp erien ce  in setting up the M AT which b ore  his nam e seem s to have been 
fraught with m isg iv in g s ; fo r  exam ple, that a flood  o r  drought would cause 
r ice  output to fa ll; that co -o p e ra t io n  with other peasants (e sp e c ia lly  those 
" . . . p oor peasants who had on ly recen tly  thrown o ff the yoke. . . ") would 
prevent som e m em b ers  from  in creas in g  their y ie ld s ; even that in the event 
o f  a bum per h arvest the burden o f taxation would be so heavy as to o ffse t  the 
gain.  ^ ^  Such w o rr ie s  m ust have been com m on and the need to a llay them
was essen tia l to the future p ro g re ss  o f  the mutual aid m ovem ent. To what 
extent they w ere in fact allayed la rg e ly  depended on the su cce ss  o f  the team s 
in upholding the b a s ic  p rin cip les  o f fre e  ch o ice , mutual benefit, exchange at 
equal va lue, gradua lism  and d em ocra tic  d iscu ss ion  and m anagem ent that w ere 
supposed to underlie  the establishm ent o f every  M AT.
The use o f c o e r c io n  in setting up a M AT was a lm ost certa in  to be cou n ter ­
productive s in ce  it e ither resu lted  in the eventual breakdow n o f the team  o r  
in its assum ption o f a m e re ly  " fo r m a lis t ic "  status. D evelopm ents within a
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team  should take p lace  gradually; thus, the tran sform ation  to a perm anent
fo rm  could  not be a rb itra r ily  im posed  from  outside but n e c e s s a r ily  depended
on individual, lo c a l c ircu m sta n ce s . Yet as we have a lready  seen , v iola tions
o f these ru les w ere w idespread  in Kiangsu and contributed  to the co lla p se  o f
a la rge  num ber o f  M ATs in 1953. The situation was perhaps m ost c o n c ise ly
and revea lin g ly  sum m ed up in the statem ent that som e team s " .  . . have a
(118)front d oor  but no back  d o o r " .
"Exchange at equal v a lu e" and "mutual benefit"^ ^ w e r e  s im p ly  two
sides o f  the sam e coin . T ogeth er, they represen ted  the sine qua non o f a
tea m 's  s u c ce s s ; as one sou rce  put it "equal value and m utual benefit in the
exchange o f  human labou r, anim al pow er and agricu ltu ra l im plem ents are the
( 120)v e ry  e ssen ce  o f  a M A T ". H ow ever, these two p r in cip les  w ere the
sou rce  o f  som e o f the m ost in tractable p rob lem s a ssocia ted  with mutual aid. 
To take one exam ple, w ork done by  team  m em bers  was often  record ed  in a 
p u rely  m ech an istic  w ay without any due regard  fo r  its content. The d is in ­
centive e ffe ct  o f  such a tendency is  obv iou s, fo r  both w elfa re  optim ization  and 
econ om ic  e ffic ie n cy  requ ired  that a job be evaluated in term s o f its d ifficu lty  
and sk ill requ irem en ts, with peasants being paid fo r  the quality as w ell as 
the quantity o f th eir  w ork . A nother anachronism  was the fa ilu re  to pay m en 
and w om en the sam e rew ard fo r  the sam e w ork; w om en w ere com m on ly  
regarded  as s e m i-la b o u r  units and at best re ce iv ed  on ly  80% o f the wage 
paid to a m an.
In a team  w hich contained peasants fro m  d ifferen t backgrounds it was 
im portant to ensure that no c la ss  fe lt exploited  by another; in other w ord s , 
that paym ent fo r  the use o f the too ls  and draft anim als o f  the m iddle peasants
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and the wage paid fo r  the labour o f  the p oor  should sa tis fy  both groups.
Such a balance was not e a s ily  achieved becau se o f  the attempts o f each c la ss
to in cre a se  the p r ice  paid to its e lf  at the expense o f  that paid to the other.
One m ight have expected  the m a jo r ity  class, the p oor  peasants,^   ^  ^ to gain
the upper hand in such a struggle . But such a p r io r i  argum ents are too
s im p lis t ic , fo r  the m iddle peasan ts ' con tro l o v er  the re so u rce s  that w ere
m ost s ca rc e  could also give them  the dom inant position . In addition they often
( 122 )d erived  con sid era b le  pove r fro m  th eir  position  as team  le a d e rs . ' In 
short, while the c la ss  com p osition  o f the M ATs gave r ise  to antagonism  betw een 
the peasant m em bers  there was no way o f telling w hich c la ss  would em erge  on 
top.
E m p irica l evidence relating to this aspect o f the mutual aid m ovem ent is
scanty. In the Nanking suburbs ca ses  o f poor peasants and h ired  labou rers
rece iv in g  a wage that was too low  w ere said to be com m on  in team s which
(123)had a m iddle peasant le a d er . v But it was also adm itted that labour was
som etim es o v e r -v a lu e d , in e ffect d iscrim in atin g  against the m iddle peasants. 
Such was the case  in one M AT w here a m iddle peasant had to pay out m ore  
than 200, 000 yfian fo r  labour h ired  during the harvesting o f wheat.
E lsew here the p r ice  ratio betw een human labour and draft anim al pow er was 
said  to be 3:1 o r  even 4;1 and there w ere also instances o f  m iddle peasants 
not rece iv in g  adequate com pensation  fo r  tools  they had contributed to a team .
These w ere  som e o f the p rob lem s that arose  out o f  the establishm ent 
and operation  o f M ATs in Kiangsu. Som e o f them  w ere  inherent in the 
structure and c la ss  com p osition  o f  the team s and w ere  d ifficu lt to re so lv e . 
O thers w ere the product o f  exogenous fa c to rs , such as the way in which the
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institutional changes w ere im plem ented , and w ere th ere fo re  m ore  s u sce p ­
tib le  to a sa tis fa cto ry  solution . But all o f them  dem onstrated  the care  and 
patience that w ere  essen tia l to the su cce ss  o f the m utual aid p o lic ie s .
(3) Sum m ary
The M AT M ovem ent developed  rapidly in K iangsu. In 1951 the p rop ortion  
o f agricu ltura l households in team s was n eg lig ib le , yet on ly a year la ter  
w ell o v e r  40% w ere  in corp ora ted  into the mutual aid fra m ew ork . D espite 
a tem p ora ry  through sharp retreat in 1953, m em bersh ip  continued to in cre a se , 
perm anent team s in p articu lar  showing a steady advance. The o v era ll peak 
was reached  in 1954 although m em bersh ip  o f perm anent M ATs continued to 
r ise  in 1955. During the whole p eriod  the average s ize  o f  both kinds o f 
team  grew , re flectin g  the need fo r  grea ter  con tro l o v e r  agricu ltural re so u rce s  
and m o re  rationality  in their use. N everth e less , in com p a rison  with the 
la ter  c o -o p e ra t iv e s  and co lle c tiv e s  the unit rem ained  sm a ll.
The little  that has been  w ritten about the M AT M ovem ent be lies  the 
im portant ro le  it played in agricu ltural developm ent after 1949. Mutual 
aid was an essen tia l link betw een traditional fo rm s o f  agricu ltura l c o -o p e r ­
ation and the s o c ia lis t  organ ization  that was the ultim ate goal o f  the Chinese 
p lanners. The team s w ere  su ffic ien tly  sm all fo r  the peasants to be able to 
identify  them  with the traditional arrangem ents (on w hich they w ere often 
based ). But at the sam e tim e they serv ed  to in troduce the peasants to 
im portant new concepts such as planning, sp ecia liza tion  in the em ploym ent 
o f labou r, m ethods o f  accounting and so on.
In m o re  im m ediate term s the M ATs w ere looked  to as a m eans of 
ra ising agricu ltu ra l produ ctiv ity . In this context, h ow ever, it was perhaps
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th eir  lim itations that w ere  m ost in ev idence. The m ost lik e ly  b e n e fic ia r ies  
o f mutual aid w ere  the p oor  peasants who could hope to in cre a se  their output 
by 15% or  m o re . But these peasants w ere a lready operating at such a low  
le v e l o f  p rodu ctiv ity  that even an in cre a se  o f this m agnitude was unlikely  to 
provide them  with the w herew ithal to undertake net investm ent in agricu ltu re . 
The sam e was true though to a le s s e r  extent o f  the lo w e r-m id d le  peasants.
By con trast, the u p p er-m id d le  and rich  peasants w hose potential contribution  
to agricu lture  was grea test had little to gain from  p articipation  in a team .
Thus, the benefits  o f mutual aid accru ed  to peasants as individuals and did 
not im ply  corresp on d in g  e con om ic  gains in term s o f  grow th to the agricu ltural 
s e c to r  as a w hole. It is fo r  this reason  that we would regard  mutual aid as 
a lim ited  fo rm  o f co -o p e ra t io n  that could only rep resen t a transitioned stage 
in agricu ltu ra l developm ent. Looked at in this light the case  fo r  m ore  fa r -  
reaching institutional change m ust have seem ed  in cre a s in g ly  persu a sive  in 
the m id -1950's .
The rest  o f  this chapter is an account o f the establishm ent o f  the f ir s t
(125)co -o p e ra t iv e s  in Kiangsu. To a la rge  extent we shall fo llow  the approach
used in the p reced in g  section  in attempting to show p rov in cia l developm ents 
in the context o f  both China and the m ore  im m ediate E ast China region . 
H ow ever, detailed  con sideration  o f  the e con om ic  im pact and econ om ic  p rob lem s 
o f the co -o p e ra t iv e s  is  re serv ed  fo r  the next chapter and m any o f their 
econ om ic  aspects are here  e ither ign ored  o r  touched on on ly b r ie fly .
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II The M ove Tow ards A gricu ltu ra l P ro d u c e r s ' C o -o p e ra t iv e s .
It was envisaged  that c o -o p e ra t iv e s  would evolve  naturally  out o f  the 
M ATs either through the fusion  o f a num ber o f  team s o r  through the d ev e lo p ­
m ent o f  a single one, as it gradually  broadened the s cop e  o f its operations 
and attracted new m e m b e rs . Peasants would vo lu n tarily  p lace  th eir  land 
and other re so u rce s  under the m anagem ent o f the A P C , which would d e te r ­
m ine how they cou ld  be m ost e ffic ien tly  used. H ow ever, the land would 
rem ain  p riva te ly -ow n ed  by  the peasants and could be withdrawn by them  at 
any tim e. This private  ow nership  was sym bolized  by  a d istribu tion  system  
w hich not on ly rew arded  w ork done by  the peasants in the co -o p e ra tiv e  
s e c to r  but a lso  paid a dividend on the land w hich they had vested  in it, the 
exact amount depending on its quality as w ell as quantity. In m any ways the 
co -o p e ra t iv e  was part o f a continuum  o f institutional stru ctu res and rather 
than m arking a com plete  break  with the M A T s, it sought to em body m ore  
thorough ly m any o f  the concepts (e sp e c ia lly  planning and the cen tra lization  
o f agricu ltu ra l op eration s) w hich they had a lready in troduced .
The ch ie f th eore tica l advantages o f c o -o p s  w ere  related  to the con tro l
o f r e so u rce s  and sca le  o f operation  which they m ade p o ss ib le . T h eir grea ter
s ize  w ould, it was b e liev ed , lend it s e lf  to a m ore  rational u tilization  o f
r e s o u rc e s . The fragm entation  o f fa rm s in K iangsu had changed little  in
the im m ediate p o s t -1949 years so that farm  con so lid a tion  by  the c o -o p  could
m ake a s ign ificant contribution  to agricu ltural grow th b y  in creasin g  the
(126)arable area  and perm itting a m ore  e ffic ien t use o f w orking capital. 
S pecia lization  in the use o f  labou r was a d ev ice  fo r  ra ising produ ctiv ity  that 
had been  advocated in the M ATs but in the A PC s it cou ld  be further 
developed . The sam e applied to a c o -o p 's  ability to m o b ilize  peasants into
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la r g e -s c a le ,  labou r-in ten sive  p ro je c ts  such as building dam s o r  constructing 
h ills id e  t e r r a c e s . Another im portant aspect o f the new unit (and one which 
was an innovation) was the obligation  o f each m em b er household  to contribute 
to two cen tra lly -m an aged  funds: the f ir s t  a w elfa re  fund which would help 
peasants o v er  d ifficu lties  o cca sion ed  by illn ess  o r  old  age; the secon d , an 
accum ulation  fund to be used  fo r  financing agricu ltura l developm ent in the 
c o -o p .
Perhaps the m ost in teresting way o f linking the d iscu ss ion s  o f M ATs 
and A PC s w ill be to con s id e r  the exp erien ces  o f two team s (one in north, 
the other in south, K iangsu) w hich in 1951-52 su cce s s fu lly  tran sform ed  
th em selves into co -o p e r a t iv e s . Although not n e c e s s a r ily  representative  
they n everth eless  dem onstrate how further institutional change could 
d evelop  and illu stra te  som e o f  the issu es  at stake during this p r o c e s s .
(127)
F irs t , Chao F u -y a  M AT in Shu-yang hsien  (H w ai-y in  S pecia l D istr ict): 
set up in 1944, it was until 1950 a tem p ora ry  team , form ed  each sum m er in 
o rd e r  to com plete  the h arvest on tim e. But in 1950, in resp on se  to sev ere  
natural d isa sters  w hich o c cu rre d  in spring , eight households joined  in 
m utual aid e a r lie r  than usual in o rd e r  to get on with the spring ploughing 
and sowing and gradually  a perm anent team  d evelop ed , co -ord in a tin g  
agricu ltural and su bsid ia ry  a ctiv ities . D espite con s id era b le  s u cce s s , 
p rob lem s p ers is te d  and the team  lea d er  (Chao F u -y a ) began to con s id er  the 
advantages o f  form in g  a c o -o p e r a t iv e . A start in this d ire ct io n  was m ade 
after the 1951 su m m er h arvest when five households in the old  team  agreed 
to d e stro y  th eir  boundaries and p lace th eir  land and labour under a c o - o p e r ­
ative authority. During the autumn sowing the c o -o p  dem onstrated  g rea ter
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e ffic ie n cy  than the other households, both inside and outside M A T s, and it 
subsequently achieved a h igher output. In the fo llow ing  w inter a further 
three households joined  in and two m ore  M ATs brok e  down their land boun­
d aries  to fo rm  c o -o p s .
G rea ter e ffic ie n cy  in the use o f  labour and m ore  rational land utilization  
w ere the so u rce s  o f m any of the gains accruing to Chao F u -y a  and his 
co llea g u es . W ork cou ld  be com pleted  m ore  qu ick ly  and the standard o f 
cu ltivation , as revea led  by  the frequ en cy  o f w eeding and ploughing o r  
fe r t i l iz e r  application , was im p roved . With the d isappearance o f  boundaries 
betw een individual holdings land could also be used m ore  e ffe ctiv e ly . F or  
exam ple, crop s  could  be grow n accord in g  to topography - autumn crop s  
on the high ground, wheat on the low .
One of the m a jo r  resp ects  in w hich M ATs and A P C s d iffered  was in ­
com e d istribu tion . In the team s land was s till p r iva te ly  m anaged and a 
m e m b e r 's  in com e was th ere fo re  the output o f  his land le s s  taxes and any 
other paym ents due to other peasants fo r  the use o f  th eir  r e so u rce s . In 
a c o -o p  land was cen tra lly  m anaged and incom e was determ ined  by the total 
rece ip ts  in the hands o f  the co -o p e ra tiv e  authority. The o ffic ia l regulations 
governing the co -o p e ra t iv e s  published in N ovem ber, 1955 stipulated that 
a m e m b e r 's  in com e should be a function o f  both the w ork  he ca rr ie d  out fo r
the c o -o p  and the land and other w orking capital invested  by  him  in it, with
/  ^28)
em phasis on the fo rm e r : ' H ow ever, no such regulations yet existed  to
guide the n ew ly -estab lish ed  Chao F u -y a  APC and indeed the system  o f 
d istribution  in itia lly  envisaged seem s to have run con tra ry  to the sp ir it  o f 
the la ter  docum ent. Thus, the f ir s t  suggestion  was that 30% o f in com e
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should be d erived  from, the labour p erform ed  by peasants in the c o -o p , 
and the rest fro m  th eir  land (quality as w ell as quantity being taken into 
account). Chao F u -y a  even proposed  that in com e should be d erived  en tire ly  
from  land! A com p ro m ise  solution  was eventually reached  based  on the 
inputs o f  both fa c to rs ; paym ent fo r  land depended on its y ield  b e fo re  the
(129)application o f  any fe r t i l iz e r  and b e fore  any other w ork had been done on it, 
the paym ent to labou r was determ ined  by the w ork the peasants put into the 
land and the amount o f  fe r t i l iz e r  they contributed.
The south Kiangsu te a m -tu rn e d -co -o p e ra t iv e  was L i YU  M AT in the 
(130)suburbs o f  Nanking. It was form ed  on a tem p ora ry  basis  in M ay,
1951 but in the sum m er o f  that yea r advanced to the status o f  a perm anent 
team . Although the new fram ew ork  benefitted agricu ltu ra l and su bsid ia ry  
production  in a va rie ty  o f ways there w ere still ob sta c les  to the m ost 
e ffic ien t re so u rce  u tilization , ch ie f among these being the con trad iction  
betw een the co lle c tiv e  m ob iliza tion  o f  labour and the individual m anagem ent 
o f farm  w ork . An attempt to rem ove such ob sta cles  was m ade by the 
institution o f  a con tract system  stipulating a produ ction  and labour 'n o rm 1 
fo r  each m ou o f  land.  ^ H ow ever, the e ffe ct  o f this was cou n ter ­
productive as the output n orm  le ft  the peasants little  inducem ent to invest 
extra  e ffo rt  in th eir  land. In o rd e r  to reduce his expenditure on h ired  
labou r one m em b er o f the team  denied that there w ere  any w eeds in his 
paddy fie lds  o r  that they needed fe r t il iz e r . Such p rob lem s indicated the 
need to d istribute in com e on the basis  o f the land owned by each peasant 
and the w ork  put into it by h im . A ccord in g ly , in A p r il, 1952 after in v e s ­
tigations and d iscu ss ion s  had been held, the team  was disbanded and the
Li YU  APC fo rm a lly  established.
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The d iv is ion  betw een land and labour shares o f in com e was again the
m ost form id ab le  d ifficu lty . An in itial suggestion  was that y ie lds on each
m ou o f land should be determ ined  by its quality and the num ber o f peasants
requ ired  to s e rv ic e  it. This would serv e  as the b asis  fo r  calcu lating the
in com e due to c o -o p  m em b e rs . Its weakness was that it fa iled  to m eet the
p rob lem  caused by m em bers  undervaluing the amount o f  w ork requ ired  by
th eir land while over-va lu in g  its quality in the hope o f  getting a b igger
share o f  total revenue. As fo r  the share o f the two fa ctors  in in com e -
m ost argued that labour should be the m ore  im portant c r ite r io n  although it
was recogn ized  that undue em phasis in this d irection  could in ju re  the
(132)in terests  o f  those peasants who w ere short o f labou r. ' Eventually
it was agreed  that w hile labour should be given p r io r ity , peasants ' land
(133)should also be con verted  to sh ares. In addition, im portant too ls  w ere
to be purchased  fro m  m em bers  by the c o -o p  and paid fo r  in cash  and tools  
which w ere  not p u b lic ly -ow n ed  w ere n everth eless  to be used and rep a ired  
in com m on .
On the establishm ent o f the co -o p e ra tiv e  the totcil labour fo r c e  was 27. 
Within it d ifferen t groups w ere resp on sib le  fo r  d ifferen t areas o f  p roduction , 
each having its own lea d er  o r  d ep u ty -lea d er . M anagers and accountants 
w ere also appointed.^ Under the guiding p rin cip le  o f  f r e e -c h o ic e  it
was em phasized  that no one should be fo rce d  into o r  d e lib era te ly  excluded 
from  the c o -o p  except landlords and rich  peasants who w ere not allow ed to 
jo in . A ll m em b ers  w ere to be fu lly  com pensated  fo r  th eir  too ls  and other 
p rop erty  and i f  they la ter  w ithdrew , their land was to be returned to them  
in full (though in the event o f  it having been im p roved  by the c o -o p  they 
had to pay a cash  sum  in lieu  o f  these im p rovem en ts).
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The question  o f  accounting and the p rob lem s it gave r ise  to have 
a lready been  m entioned in the context o f  the M A T s. In the A PC s w here 
in com e was d istributed  from  a cen tra lly -a d m in istered  sou rce  and its ch ie f 
c r ite r io n  was the w ork  done by  the c o -o p  m e m b e rs , the evaluation and 
record in g  o f w ork  w ere even m ore  im portant and it was essen tia l to devise  
an accounting system  that sa tisfied  the s t ill-su sp ic io u s  and con servative  
peasants and could be understood  by  them . At f ir s t ,  w ork  in L i YU  APC 
was evaluated and re co rd e d  at m eetings held during the evening after it 
had been com pleted . H ow ever, becau se  they tended to drag on late these 
m eetings w ere  not a com plete  s u c ce s s . In any ca s e , som e o f  the m em bers  
w ere loth to p articip a te , taking the view  that w ork evaluation was the so le  
resp on sib ility  o f  the co -o p .^  A new "w o rk -co n tra c t  system  was
th ere fo re  in troduced  which had the e ffe ct  o f both in creas in g  involvem ent 
and saving tim e . Each job  was assigned a num ber o f  w ork -poin ts  which 
w ere guaranteed to the group o f  peasants chosen  to c a r r y  out the w ork; 
after it had been  com pleted  the w ork -poin ts  w ere d ivided among group 
m em bers  accord in g  to th eir  individual e ffo r ts . M oreover, this a llocation  
was m ade on the spot, in the fie ld s  rather than at m eetings held in the 
evening.
The m ethod o f  record in g  w ork was also new. "W ork  coupons
w ere issu ed  in two co lo u r s , yellow  and white, and w ork tables printed.
Each day the amount of w ork done by each m em ber o f  the c o -o p  was
re co rd e d  on the table and an appropriate coupon (that is , one w hose value
corresp on d ed  to his day 's  earn ings) given to h im . Printing the coupons in
two co lou rs  provided  a kind o f  secu rity  check  sin ce  each  yellow  coupon
issu ed  by the accountant to a peasant was com plem ented  by a white one o f
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the sam e denom ination which the accountant retained.
In a ccorda n ce  with the agreed p o licy  o f  a ccord in g  p r io r ity  to labour 
the d istribution  o f total output (a fter taxes) in L i Ytf APC was in itia lly  as 
fo llo w s :
45% o f agricu ltura l output to labour
40% M 11 11 11 dividends on land
15% M 11 11 11 a "com m on  re se rv e  fu n d "^ !^ ^
H ow ever, during sum m er harvesting and sowing in 1952 investm ent actually 
exceeded  15%. The resu lt was that living standards w ere  d ep ressed . It 
was th ere fo re  d ecided  that in future the residual investm ent fund be reduced 
to 5% and the shares o f  labour and land in total output w ere  a ccord in g ly  
adjusted;
53% o f agricu ltura l output to labour
42% » " "  » land.
(S u bsid iaries w ere also con tro lled  by  the c o -o p e r a t iv e . M ost o f this 
in com e (70%) was a llocated  to further expansion o f  su bsid ia ry  production  
and on ly 30% actually went as person a l in com e to the peasants. )
(139)The in itia l su cce ss  o f  the APC can be b r ie fly  su m m arized . F irs t ,
grea ter  rationalization  in the em ploym ent o f labou r, draft anim als and other 
fo rm s  o f  w orking capital led  to th eir  m ore  e ffe ctiv e  u tilization . In p a r t i­
cu lar, h igher leve ls  o f  fe r t i l iz e r  application w ere  cla im ed  to have produced  
average wheat y ie lds o f  239 chin p er m ou in 1952 (15% higher than the 1951
le v e l and89% above gen era l y ields in the v illa ge ). And o f  c o u rse , in crea ses
.  • , • ( 14° )in output w ere re fle cted  in h igher in com es.
Secondly , the in com e d istribution  system  adopted by L i Yti APC was 
said to have ra ised  labou r in cen tives . In gen era l, this was re fle cted  in
-2 26 -
im proved  w ork e ffic ie n cy  and in p a rticu lar , in a h igher rate o f  participation  
by  w om en. In the M AT the 11 w om en belonging to the c o -o p  had taken little 
o r  no part in fa rm  w ork . But in 1952 they had jo in ed  in the co -o p e ra tiv e  
activ ities  and accounted fo r  3 7 3 .4  out o f the 947. 55 labour days record ed  
during the sum m er h arvest and sum m er sowing (39 .41%  o f the total).
F in a lly , the introduction  o f  co lle c tiv e  m anagem ent fa cilita ted  the 
adoption o f s c ie n tific  agricu ltural techniques. R ice  seedlin gs w ere tra n s ­
planted fro m  seed -b ed s  instead o f being b ro a d ca st-so w n  and better  seed  
se le ct io n  and im p roved  m ethods o f  fe r t il iz e r  application  w ere in troduced.
Although in som e ways L i Yti and Chao F u -y a  A P C s w ere little  m ore  
than tigh tly -orga n ized  v ers ion s  o f  the M ATs they had rep laced , there w ere 
o f co u rse  other resp ects  in w hich they d iffered  com p lete ly  from  their 
p r e d e c e s s o r s . Two are p a rticu la rly  worth em phasizing h ere . F irs t , 
certa in  agricu ltu ra l r e so u rce s  w ere brought under co lle c t iv e  ow nership  
and, fo r  the f ir s t  tim e, it becam e p oss ib le  to m anage land as a single unit 
(even  though this p articu lar  fa c to r  rem ained p r iva te ly  ow ned). ^
This had im portant e con om ic  im p lica tion s , fo r  it m eant not on ly that the 
m ost rational cropping pattern cou ld  be p ra ctised  but also that new crop s  
and new cu ltivation  techniques could be tr ied  out m o re  read ily .
The other im portant innovation was related  to in com e d istribution .
Since agricu ltu ra l households no lon ger th em selves decided  how to d isp ose
o f th eir  output the arb iter  o f their incom e becam e the co -o p e ra t iv e  authority.
A fter  taxes had been  paid and variou s obligations to c o -o p e ra t iv e  funds m et
the residua l was the basis  on which incom e d istribu tion  was m ade and was
divided among m em bers  as dividends on their land and w ages fo r  their labour
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In sh ort, although the new institutional fra m ew ork  o f  the APCs 
retained m any features o f the M A T s, it also in troduced  im portant new on es . 
At one and the sam e tim e the co -o p e ra tiv e  was the natural s u c c e s s o r  to 
the team  and yet m arked  a com plete  break  with it.
Let us now m ove from  the m ic ro c o s m  o f L i Y U  and Chao F u -y a  A PCs 
to con s id er  developm ents within the p rov in ce  as a w hole. Table III. 13 
on the fo llow ing  page su m m arizes these developm ents in K iangsu, East 
China and China betw een 1950-55.
The gen era l pattern revea led  by  this table is in line with our e a r lie r  
analysis o f  trends in the M AT M ovem ent. Advance in 1952 was checked 
in the fo llow ing yea r. In 1954 rapid developm ent once m ore  got under way 
and this was in tensified  in 1955 as M ATs w ere in cre a s in g ly  tran sform ed  
into co -o p e r a t iv e s .
The m ost strik ing feature o f the data is o f  co u rse  the astonish ingly 
rapid rate o f  in cre a se  in A PC s that took p lace in K iangsu during these y e a rs . 
H ow ever, fo r  once it is  the absolute leve ls  that are im portant, fo r  as 
Table III. 13 show s, betw een 1952 and 1954 the p rop ortion  o f agricu ltural 
households and total arable area in the co -o p s  rem ained  v e ry  lo w .^ ^ "^
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It is  c le a r  that the f ir s t  breakthrough in the establishm ent o f
agricu ltural c o -o p e ra t iv e s  in Kiangsu o c cu rre d  in 1954-55, when the
p rop ortion  o f  agricu ltura l households participating in A P C s rose  fro m  a
m ere  1. 5% to o v e r  1 1 % .^ ^ ^  These developm ents re fle cted  what was
happening at the national le v e l, fo r  this was a yea r in w hich rapid p ro g re ss
was m ade throughout the country. This is  w ell illu stra ted  by  the reso lu tion
on the developm ent o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e s  adopted by the C entral C om m ittee o f
(146)the C C P and published in January, 1954; the target num ber o f APCs
m entioned in this docum ent was 35 ,800  and yet by M arch  o f the sam e year 
96, 000 w ere  a lready  in ex isten ce  in corporatin g  o v e r  two and a quarter 
m illion  households.
P ro g re s s  was in fact even m ore  spectacu lar than the table su ggests ,
fo r  the figu res  shown in III. 13 con cea l the rapid changes which som etim es
took p lace  within the space o f  on ly a few m onths. In China, fo r  exam ple,
. developm ents betw een M arch , 1954 and the m idd le o f  1955 w ere as fo llow s :
Table III. 14; The developm ent o f A PC s in China;
M arch , 1954 to the m iddle o f  1955.
(144) .
Total num ber N um ber o f  a g r i-  As percentage
o f A P C s cultural h ou se - o f total house -
____________________ holds in A P C s holds_______
M arch , 1954 96 ,000  1 ,7 7 7 ,0 0 0  1 .5
June, 1954 114 ,000 2 ,2 9 7 ,0 0 0  2 .0
S eptem ber, 1954 230 ,000  5 ,4 7 8 ,0 0 0  4 .7
D e cem b er , 1954 497 ,000  1 2 ,7 8 3 ,0 0 0  10.9
M arch , 1955 633 ,000  1 6 ,9 1 6 ,0 0 0  14 .2
June, 1955 634 ,000  1 6 ,9 2 1 ,0 0 0  14.2
S ou rce : S tatistical M ateria ls  on A gricu ltu ra l
C o - ope r ativi z at io n , op . c i t . , p . 11, 
Tables 5 and 6.
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Although such detailed  covera g e  from  a single sou rce  is not available
fo r  K iangsu the fo llow ing data suggest that a s im ila r  pattern was observab le
in the p rov in ce  during the sam e period ;
Table III. 15; The developm ent o f  A P C s in K iangsu 
(excluding Shanghai) fro m  m id -1954 
until m id -1955.
M id-1954
bO ctober , 1954
D ecem b er , 1954* 
dM id -1955
Total num ber 
o f  A PC s
4 ,8 3 5  
1 6 , 9 0 0  
25 ,000  
34,867
N um ber o f  a g r i-  As percentage
cultural h ou se - o f total h ou se -
holds in A P C s
126,657 
442 ,780  
655 ,000  
974 ,526
holds
1 .34  
5. 14 
7 .6 0  
11.207
N otes ; M em ber households obtained by m ultiplying
num ber o f A PC s by  average num ber o f 
households p er  APC in 1954 (d erived  from  
III. 13). See also III. 16 below .
P ercen tage  o f  all households in  A PC s based 
on a total household  figure o f  8 ,6 1 6 , 122. 44 
(derived  from  HI. 13).
S ou rces ; a Table III. 13.
b JM JP, 1 1 /1 1 /5 4 , p. 2, "O ver Tw elve 
Thousand A P C s N ew ly -E stab lish ed  in 
K iangsu".
c JM JP, 2 0 /1 1 /5 4 , p . l ,  "T w elve  T h ou s­
and APCs Set Up in Kiangsu During 
Autum n".
d Table III. 13.
As in China, the autumn o f 1954 and spring o f 1955 seem  to have
(148)
w itn essed  the m ost rapid advance. If the above figu res  are to be accepted  
participation  in c o -o p s  tr ip led  betw een the m iddle o f 1954 and O ctober o f 
that y ea r  and, fo llow ing  a sm a ll in cre a se  in the next two m onths, again 
ro se  substantia lly  in the f ir s t  half o f 1955. The speed  with which the 
changes took  p lace  is w ell indicated  by  the a rtic le  published by the
- 2 3 1 -
’ P e o p le 's  D a ily 1 in the secon d  week o f N ovem ber: 7 it reported  that as
o f the end o f  O ctober 12, 500 new A PC s had been set up and it fo re ca s t  the 
establishm ent o f  a furth er 8, 000 by  the end o f the m onth. L ittle m o re  than 
a w eek la ter  a secon d  rep ort con firm ed  that the 8, 000 new c o -o p s  w ere 
being set up and cla im ed  that this would bring the grand total to about 
2 5 ,GOO.*150)
We have said  nothing yet about the s ize  o f these e a r ly  co -o p e ra t iv e s  
as shown by  the num ber o f  agricu ltural households and the arable area  they 
contained. This in form ation  can be obtained fro m  Table III. 13 and it is set 
out below :
Table III. 16: The average s ize  o f  APCs.
A verage num ber A verage arable
o f agricu ltural area  p er  APC
households p er (m ou)
APC
(149)
1950 China 10.39 179.06
1951 China 9.71 146.36
1952 Kiangsu 33. 07 345 .78
E ast China (a) 18.09 228 .62
E ast China (b )* 20. 14 191.43
China 15.74 378 .14
1953 K iangsu 17.41 239 .06
Shanghai 12.67 81. 67
Ksu + S 'hai 17.36 237 .30
East China (a) 16. 50 2 1 9 . 6 6
E ast China (b) 16.82 192.98
China 18. 12 487 .42
1954 Kiangsu 26 .20 313 .30
Shanghai 21. 19 132. 17
Ksu + S 'hai 25 .82 299 .62
East China (a) 19.39 233.23
E ast China (b) 23. 72 255 .96
China 20. 02 395.41
1955 Kiangsu 2 7 .95 338 .99
Shanghai 23. 79 155.12
Ksu + S 'hai 27. 84 333.97
East China (a) 23 .86 277.73
East China (b) 24 .46 258 .66
China 26 .66 464 .68
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Source; Table III. 13.
The question  o f fa rm  s ize  and its relationship  with agricu ltu ra l p r o ­
ductivity  is a co n tro v e rs ia l one. P art o f  the argum ent revo lves  around 
p oss ib le  d iffe re n ce s  in econ om ic  e ffic ie n cy  betw een c la s se s  o f peasants; 
is p rodu ctiv ity  h igher on the sm a ll farm s o f p oor peasants than on the la rge  
fa rm s o f  r ich  p easan ts?  Or i f  one looks on r ich  peasants as "cap ita lists  '^ }  
is a fa m ily -b a se d  o r  cap ita list system  the m ore  e ffic ien t fo rm  o f a g ricu ltu re?  
H ow ever, in the p resen t context it is not this aspect w hich con cern s  us so 
m uch as the re lative  m erits  o f  sm a ll holdings farm ed  by  individual peasant 
households (including r ich  and p oor peasants) and the m uch g rea ter  o p e r ­
ational unit im p lic it  in  the A P C s.
Although d ifficu lt to form ulate  it seem s lik e ly  that fo r  any given  set o f 
conditions there ex ists  an optim um  s ize  o f  agricu ltu ra l op era tion s. M ore 
s p e c if ic a lly  it m ay be argued that the average fa rm  s ize  in Kiangsu in the 
e a r ly  1950s as w ell as b e fo re  1949^  ^  ^ was le ss  than the optim um  in the 
sense that it p rodu ced  u n der-em ploym en t, perhaps even unem ploym ent, o f 
labour and u n d er-u tiliza tion  o f other r e so u rce s . The d e c is io n  to im plem ent 
co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  was an im p lic it  recogn ition  o f th is , fo r  it was be lieved  
that the la r g e r  s ize  o f  unit com bined  with unified planning and m anagem ent 
was one o f  the ways in w hich the A PC s would o v e rco m e  such p rob lem s and 
im p rov e  e ffic ie n cy .
The m ost in terestin g  feature o f  Table III. 16 is  the v e ry  large  average 
s ize  o f  the co -o p e ra t iv e s  in K iangsu in the year in w hich they w ere  f ir s t  
set up (1952). C om pared  with China they contained m o re  than tw ice as 
m any households and a lm ost the sam e amount o f  arable land - desp ite  the
- 2 3 3 -
fa ct that the China figu re  included data fo r  the d r y -c r o p  areas o f the north
w here farm s w ere la rg e r  than in the r ice -g ro w in g , densely -popu la ted  
(153)south. Even m ore  rem arkable was the gap betw een Kiangsu and the
neighbouring p rov in ces  o f  Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien, the co -o p s  in
(1 54)Kiangsu com p ris in g  m ore  o f both arable land and peasants. 7 These 
contrasts are all the m o re  strik ing when the data fo r  the rem aining yea rs  
are exam ined, fo r  these revea l a m uch m ore  consisten t and pred ictab le  
regiona l pattern.
The e a r lie r  analysis o f  events in the M AT M ovem ent in K iangsu in 1952
p rovides a key to these apparently con flicting  tren d s. 1952 was a year in
w hich com m andist tendencies w ere w idespread  and la rge  num bers o f  peasants
w ere fo rce d  into team s against th eir  w ill. E lsew h ere , another w rite r  has
spoken o f the c r it ic is m  that was lev e lled  against ca d res  fo r  having " . . . b lind ly
(155)
run after h ig h -le v e l f o r m s " ' in this yea r. What the table above suggests 
is that such deviations w ere p a rticu la rly  evident in K iangsu and that cad res  
not on ly pushed peasants into M ATs but also attem pted to go beyond the 
mutual aid stage and set up agricu ltura l c o -o p e r a t iv e s . F u rther, just as 
the d eclin e  in  team  num bers in 1953 re fle cted  a tem p ora ry  retreat from  
these e x c e s s e s , so a s im ila r  reaction  can be seen  in the sharp fa ll in the 
average s ize  o f  c o -o p .
F o r  yea rs  other than 1952 the gen era l trend is  c le a r . Betw een 1953 
and 1955 A P C s in K iangsu gradually  becam e la rg e r  and the prov in ce  
exhibited the sam e tendencies that w ere apparent in China as a whole 
and in the East China reg ion .
To su m m arize  what has been  said so far: the annual rate o f growth o f
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A P C s in K iangsu (with o r  without Shanghai) was sp ecta cu la r ly  high betw een 
1952 and 1955. In absolute term s how ever, the num ber o f  agricu ltural 
households involved  rem ained sm all until 1955 when fo r  the f ir s t  tim e the 
co -o p s  began to assum e som ething m ore  than p erip h era l s ign ifica n ce . 
Although a s im ila r  pattern was observab le  in China and East China the rate 
o f participation  in K iangsu was low er; in this sense the p rov in ce  could be 
con sid ered  a la te -s ta r te r , even though in the single year o f 1952 events had 
actually outstripped  those at the regional and national le v e ls . In gen era l 
there was a tendency fo r  the s ize  o f  c o -o p  w hether m easu red  by m em ber 
households o r  arable area  to grow  throughout the p eriod .
But what o f the e con om ic  im pact o f these ea r ly  c o -o p e r a t iv e s ?  To 
begin  with, a num ber o f a rtic le s  m ade the point that land was being used 
m ore  fu lly  and e ffic ien tly  in the A P C s. In Ssu-yang hsien  (north Kiangsu) 
the evolution  o f  a c o -o p  from  a team  m ade it p o ss ib le  to d estroy  the boun­
d aries  betw een individual plots and to consolidate  150 tiny strips into 25
(156)large  units o f land. In addition, the arable area  was in crea sed  by
55 m ou, 10 m ou being saved by the establishm ent o f  a com m unal threshing
area in p lace  o f  the m any individual ones that had fo r m e r ly  ex isted  and 45
being obtained through the e lim iretion  o f dikes w hich w ere  no lon ger requ ired .
This extra  land was planted under food  gra in s. In Red Star C o -o p  in Sung-
chiang hsien  (south Kiangsu) con solidation  and other related  m easu res  a lso
had the e ffe ct  o f  im prov ing  labour e ffic ie n cy . ^  F in a lly , in Chang N ai-
hua APC (L ien -sh u i h s ie n ), land p rev iou s ly  used fo r  footpaths now had four
(158)o r  five rows o f  wheat grow ing on it.
Red Star C o -o p  provided  another illu stra tion  o f  the new institutional
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s tru ctu re 's  ability  to u tilize  re so u rce s  m ore  rationally . P r io r  to its
form ation  the fou r m iddle peasant m em bers  each had o v e r  20 m ou o f  land.
H ow ever, becau se  o f  th eir  lack  o f labour and fea r  o f  in crea s in g  their
expenses by  h iring other peasants they w ere unable to cultivate it all. By
con trast, the 15 p oor  peasant m em bers  (o r  in som e c a s e s , agricu ltural
la b o u re rs ) w ere  short o f  land but had surplus labou r and th eir  con cern  was
the shortage o f  em ploym ent ou tlets. Not until the APC was set up w ere land
(159)and labour used  in such a way as to rem ove this w aste o f  r e so u rce s .
S im ple kinds o f  tech n ica l p ro g re ss  w ere a lso ca rr ie d  out in these ea r ly
Kiangsu A P C s. In Red Star the area  irr iga ted  by  w ater-w h eels  rose  from
25 to 40 m ou (an in cre a se  o f 60%) and irr ig a tion  w orks w ere  constructed
( 160 )which benefitted  150 m ou. Unified m anagem ent ensured  that each m ou
o f land was ploughed three tim es and hoed and w atered  10 tim es . A pplications
o f fe r t i l iz e r  w ere  in crea sed  and m anure put on som e fie ld s  fo r  the f irs t
tim e in m o re  than 10 y e a rs . S im ilar achievem ents w ere  c la im ed  fo r
(161)Chang N ai-hua A PC .
These s u cce s se s  would seem  to add up to a strong ca se  in favour o f 
c o -o p s ,  fo r  the im provem ents w hich w ere c la im ed  on th eir  behalf p rom ised  
sign ificant in cre a se s  in y ields and total output. To what extent quantitative 
evidence bears  this out can be seen  i f  we now con s id er  the fragm entary  data 
relating to land produ ctiv ity  inside and outside the A P C s . As b e fo re  the 
lik e ly  n on -rep resen ta tive  nature o f  the figu res chosen  by the Chinese to 
illu stra te  the benefits o f  agricu ltural co -o p e ra tio n  needs to be borne in m ind.
The f ir s t  table shows average y ie lds o f paddy in fou r new c o -o p s  in 
K iangsu togeth er with the leve ls  o f  output achieved b y  peasants w orking
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outside the co -o p e ra t iv e  fra m ew ork , either in M ATs o r  on their own:
Table III. 17:
S ou rces
A verage y ie lds o f  paddy inside and 
outside four c o -o p e ra t iv e s  in Kiangsu.
A verage 
y ie ld  in 
APC
A verage 
y ie ld  b e ­
fo re  es ta b ­
lishm ent 
o f  APC
A verage 
y ie ld  o f 
M ATs in 
the sam e 
area as 
the APC
A verage 
y ie ld  o f  
"m o s t "  
peasants
A verage 
y ie ld  b e fo re  
L iberation
(1953) (1952) (1953) (1953) ( p r e - 1949)
A 620 .00 539.13 563 .64 - -
B 833 .00 650 .00 620 .00 - -
C 502.00 418 .33 - - -
D 550 .00 - 458 .13 423 .08 423 .08
N ote; The average y ield  o f 1'm ost p easan ts" m ight be
used  as a p roxy  fo r  the n orm al y ie ld .
A (R ed Star A P C , Sung-chiang h s ien ); JM JP, 
1 /3 /5 4 ,  op. cit.
B (APC in Shanghai suburbs); Ta-kung jih  pao, 
(Hong Kong), 1 5 /3 /5 4 , "Unit A re a  Y ields o f 
Paddy exceed  800 C hin".
C (T s 'ang-ytian A P C , C h 'in g -p 'u  hsien); C F J P , 
8 /3 /5 4 ,  op. c it.
D (Chin Tan-ken A P C , N an-hui h s ien ); S su -n ien  
la i nung-ts 'un -chung ti chtf-ta  p ien , op. c it. , p. 13
In o rd e r  to show the relationships betw een the variou s  y ie lds m ore  
c le a r ly , the data can be presented  in index fo rm  with the average yield  
in the A PC s (1953) as 100. Thus;
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Table III. 18: Index o f average y ie lds o f  paddy
inside and outside 4 co -o p e ra t iv e s  
in Kiangsu, with average paddy 
y ie ld  o f  APC = 100._________________
A verage 
y ie ld  in 
APC
A verage 
y ie ld  b e ­
fo re  estab 
lishm ent 
o f  APC
A verage 
y ie ld  of 
M ATs in 
the sam e 
area as 
the APC
A verage  
y ield  o f 
"m o s t "  
peas ants
A verage 
y ie ld  b e fo re  
L ibera tion
(1953) (!9 5 2 ) (1953) (1953) (p re -1 9 4 9 )
A 100 .00 86 .96 90. 81 - -
B 100.00 78 .03 74 .43 - -
C 100.00 83 .33 - - -
D 100.00 - 83 .33 76. 92 76. 92
N otes and s o u rce s ; As Table III. 17.
P red icta b ly , the data all revea l the c le a r  su p e rio r ity  o f  the A PC s as 
agricu ltu ra l units. A verage y ie lds w ere 10-25%  h igher than those o f 
neighbouring M ATs and in the one case  w here such com para tive  in form ation  
is  availab le , 25% above those o f  peasants s till w orking on their own.
H ow ever, fou r exam ples out o f 266 can h ard ly  be accepted  as rep resen tative , 
e s p e c ia lly  when details o f  th eir  p r e c is e  e con om ic  and so c ia l ch a ra cte r is t ics  
are not known. F o r  exam ple, w ere these four A P C s better  o r  w orse  o ff  
than m ost in term s o f the supplies o f w orking capital available to them ?
Did they contain m o re  m iddle peasants than u su a l?  What was the e con om ic  
status o f the M ATs and individual peasants with whom  they w ere com p a red ?  
C lea rly , the answ ers to these questions would a ffect ou r judgem ent o f  the 
c o -o p s ' p e r fo rm a n ce . In view  o f such con sideration s  and on the assum ption 
that the exam ples shown above w ere chosen  fo r  th eir  ability  to show the 
co -o p e ra t iv e s  in a favourab le light it seem s best to treat Table HI. 18 as 
an indication  o f  the potential rather than the actual benefits  o f  join ing an A P C .
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The e con om ic  im pact o f  the ea r ly  A PC s in K iangsu has been treated  
v e r y  b r ie f ly  in this chapter and no m ention at all has been  m ade o f the 
prob lem s that a rose  during the transition  fro m  team  to co -o p e ra t iv e . This 
is d e lib era te , fo r  in the next chapter we shall exam ine these issu es  in 
con s id erab le  deta il. A ll that has been attem pted here  is  to provide the 
n e c e s s a r y  background to that d iscu ss ion  by  giving a ch ron o log ica l account 
and analysis o f  APC developm ents up to m id -1955 and suggesting the kind 
o f  'dem on stration  e ffe c t ' they could have had fo r  peasants continuing to w ork 
outside the co -o p e ra t iv e  fram ew ork .
L ooked  at in this way the econ om ic  case  in favour o f the further 
expansion o f A P C s looked  quite strong . Q ualitative ev idence pointed to 
th eir  ability  to use re so u rce s  m ore  rationally  and e ffic ie n tly  and fragm en tary  
data on y ie lds showed that this could  lead to s ign ificant r ise s  in output 
(and presu m ab ly , peasant in com e too ). In short, there  w ere  both w elfare  
and eco n o m ic  ga ins. A gainst this background the co -o p e ra tiv iza tio n  
m ovem ent in  K iangsu could be expected  to p ro ce e d  sm ooth ly  and gradually  
in the com ing y e a rs . H ow ever, in the event p ro g re ss  was anything but 
sm ooth  o r  gradual and within little  m ore  than a year v irtu a lly  the whole of 
K iangsu 's agricu ltu ra l s e c to r  had been not m e re ly  co -op era tiv ized  but fu lly  
co lle c t iv iz e d . It is to the events o f  this ex traord in ary  p eriod  o f  the 
"high ti.de o f s o c ia lis m "  that we m ust now turn.
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Notes to Chapter Three
Mao T se-tung, "On the Question o f  A gricu ltura l C o -op era t iv iza t ion "  
in H sin-hua yfieh-pao (New China Monthly), vo l .  LXXUI, 1955, 
n o . 11, p p . 1 -8 .
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a single p rov in ce .  Following this the Su-nan jih  pao and Su-pei 
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H sin-hua jih pao (New China D a ily ) . This is the chief s ou rce  of 
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Mao T se-tung, "Get O rgan ized"  in Selected  W orks of Mao T se -tu n g , 
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the people jo in  vo luntarily  (com pulsion  m ust never  be used), all o f 
them are good, no m atter how they are named, no m atter whether 
they are each com posed  o f  a few , a few dozen  or  hundreds o f  people , 
o r  whether they are com posed  entirely  o r  partly  o f  people who can 
contribute fu ll -t im e  labour; no m atter whether the m em bers  render 
each other mutual aid in term s o f  m anpow er, animal pow er o r  
im plem en ts , o r  they live and eat together during the busy farm ing 
season ; and no m atter whether the organizations are tem p o ra ry  o r  
p e rm a n e n t ."  Ib id . ,  p. 156.
C C P Central C om m ittee , "R esolution  on M utual-Aid and C o -op era t ion  
in A gricu ltura l P rod u ct ion "  in Hstfeh-hsi (Study), 1953, no. 5, pp. 3 -6 .  
It was f ir s t  published in Kiangsu in HHJP, 2 7 /3 /5 3 ,  p. 1. The 
reso lution  was f irs t  issued  in D e cem b er ,  1951, when it was c ircu la ted  
internally  to all P arty  com m ittees .  H ow ever, it rem ained unpublished 
until M arch , 1953, when it appeared in a rev ised  fo rm .
Kang Chao, A gricu ltura l Production  in Com m unist China, 1949-1965, 
U niversity  o f  W isconsin  P r e s s ,  1970; p. 17.
HHJP, 2 7 /3 /5 3 ,  op. cit. , p . l .
The qualification  is n e c e s s a r y  because at this s im p lest  leve l o f  mutual 
aid peasants might w ell ignore  accounting p roced u res  as such.
See below .
T 'u - t i  h o - t s o - s h e .  In this chapter (and subsequent ones) we shall use 
the te rm  " c o -o p e r a t iv e "  to r e fe r  to the s e m i - s o c ia l i s t  lo w e r - le v e l  
agricultural p ro d u ce rs '  co -o p e ra t iv e  ( c h 'u -ch i  nung-yeh sheng-ch 'an  
h o - t s o - s h e ) ; and " c o l le c t iv e "  fo r  the fu l ly -s o c ia l is t  h ig h e r -le v e l  
agricultural p r o d u ce r s '  c o -o p e ra t iv e  (k a o -ch i  nung-yeh sheng-ch 'an  
h o - t s e - s h e ) .
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By "trad it iona l"  we m ean the absence o f  m o d e m  inputs such as 
ch em ica ls  and p o w e r -d r iv e n  m achinery .
S P J P , 8 /9 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "Hopes fo r  a Bum per H arvest in M ost o f the 
Cotton F ie lds  o f  North Kiangsu".
The account o f  mutual aid in Kiangsu be fo re  1949 is based  on "The 
V arious F o rm s  o f  Labour Mutual Aid Am ong Peasants in the V illages 
o f  the L iberated  A reas  o f  East China" in Shih Ching-t 'ang, Chang Lin, 
Chou C h 'in g-ho  and Hua Chung-chie (ed itors ) ,  Chung-kuo nung-yeh 
h o - tso -h u a  ytfn-tung shih-liao (Source M ateria ls  on the A gricu ltura l 
C o -op era t iv iza tion  M ovem ent in China), h erea fter  CKNYHTHYTSL, 
Peking, 1957; v o l . l ,  p p .48 -50 . The report is taken fro m  Hsin-hua 
ytieh-pao (New China Monthly), A p ril ,  1952, "The Situation Regarding 
Labour Mutual Aid in P rod u ct ion "  based on re se a rch  conducted by 
the A gricu ltura l M utual-Aid R esearch  Group o f  the Rural W ork 
Com m ittee o f  the East China Branch o f  the C C P  Central C om m ittee . 
F o r  details o f  the nom enclature o f  various kinds o f  mutual aid 
throughout south Kiangsu see  also SNJP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "On the 
Existing Base Broaden and D evelop  the Labour Mutual Aid and 
C o -o p e ra t iv e  M ovem ent in the Rural S ector  o f  South K iangsu".
CK N YHTHYTSL, vo l.  1, op. cit. , p. 48.
F o r  exam ple, w ater-w heels  pow ered  by the treadm ill  pr incip le .  
T a -p 'a n -k u n g .
That is ,  the w ater -con stru ct ion  p ro jec ts  can be looked  upon as a 
fo rm  o f  f ixed  capital.
This would seem  to be the nearest equivalent o f  the Chinese phrase 
ta -h u n -ts o .
CK N YHTHYTSL, vo l.  1, op. cit. , p. 48.
Huo - yang -n iu . In north Kiangsu (and north Anhwei) this was known 
as "helping the legs o f  an o x "  (pang n iu -t 'u i ).
The lo ca l  phrase which d e scr ib e d  this kind o f  co l le c t iv e  ownership of 
a draft animal in north Kiangsu was "one leg  o f  the ox fo r  each fa m ily "  
( i - c h ia  i - t ' i a o  n iu - t 'u i ) .
C h i-t ' i  m a i-k u n g .
Agricultural cy c le s  could d iffer  because  o f  variations in cropping 
patterns o r  d ifferen ces  in natural conditions which affected the tim e 
when crops  ripened.
Although in form ation  is lacking, it can be assum ed that the sam e, 
o r  s im ilar, p ractices  w ere  found in the north o f  the province  too.
This short d iscu ss ion  fo llow s the account o f  mutual aid in 
CKN YH TH YTSL, vo l.  1, op. c i t . , p. 50.
Ib id . , p. 50. The Chinese phrase is ch 'iu n g -p a n g - ch lu n g . It might 
be added that m em b ersh ip  also tended to be re str ic te d  to the young 
and able -bod ied ; and that kinship o r  friendship  was som etim es  an 
im portant basis  o f  mutual aid arrangem ents.
T e n g -ch ia  ch iao -huan . The im portance o f  this pr incip le  will em erge  
m o r e  c le a r ly  when we com e to d iscuss  the e co n o m ic  im plications of 
the M AT M ovem ent in Kiangsu in the 1950 's.
Apparently  on the grounds that such fem ale  participation  would 
"upset the winds and ra in".
In parts o f  south Kiangsu custom  required  that the peasant should be 
given "three teas, four m eals  and five s m o k e s "  ( sa n -ch 'a ,  s z u - fa n , 
w u -p ie n -y e n ) .
CKN YH TH YTSL, vo l.  1, op. c i t . , p. 49 points out that after land re fo rm  
the acquisition o f  land by  poor  peasants and agricultural labou rers  
caused this p ractice  to decline.
S P J P , 1 9 /4 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "M ore  than F ifty  Thousand M ATs Organized 
in North K iangsu".
H HJP, 1 8 /5 /4 6 ,  cited in CKN YHTHYTSL, op. cit. , p. 1073, "The 
M ajor ity  of the Labour F o r c e  O rganizes Mutual Aid in W ang-ch i 
Ch'tt, L ie n -sh u i" .
P resu m ably ,  Ssu-yang and Shu-yang hsien.
CKN YH TH YTSL, vo l.  1, op. cit. , p. 1076.
F o r  an account of the proposed  changes see  ibid. , pp. 1078-79-
The d ifferent attitudes towards subsid iaries  in the M ATs be fo re  and 
after 1949 is o f  som e interest. The point w ill  em erge  m o re  c le a r ly  
la ter  in the chapter, but fo r  the present we m ay  s im p ly  note that 
after 1949 the prob lem  was not to ensure the developm ent o f  subs id ­
ia r ies  in the team s, but rather how to prevent them fro m  taking up 
too m uch tim e at the expense o f  purely  agricultural work.
That is ,  te m p o ra ry  and permanent team s.
See above, chapter 3.
See SNJP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 ,  p . 2.
SN JP, 3 /3 /5 1 ,  p. 3. Kuan W en-w ei, D ire c to r  o f  the South Kiangsu 
P e o p le 's  Adm inistrative O ffice  and a m e m b e r  o f  the East China 
M ilitary  and Adm inistrative C om m ittee , was Chairman o f  the 
C o n fe re n ce .
In this context note that a paralle l and con tem porary  developm ent was 
to be the extension o f  Rural Supply and M arketing C o -op era t ives  
(nung-ts 'un  kung-hsiao h o - t s o -s h e )  which would be responsib le  fo r  
the supply o f  to o ls ,  seeds and other m ater ia ls  to the M ATs (and 
A P C s)  as w ell as fo r  the sale o f  agricultural and subsid iary  products . 
In this way the quantity o f  goods passing through private c o m m e r c ia l  
transactions would be dim inished and thereby  another fo rm  of 
exploitation o f  the peasants (by the m iddlem en) would eventually 
be elim inated.
C h ing-ch 'ang  h s in g . There is som e doubt o v e r  the meaning o f  this 
te rm . The m ost  obvious interpretation is that it re fe rs  to permanent 
team s although a la ter  sou rce  states that in the whole o f  north 
Kiangsu there w ere  only 2, 393 permanent M ATs in D e ce m b e r ,  1951 , 
(see  S P J P , 2 8 /1 2 /5 1 ,  p. 1, "R eport on Land R e form  W ork in North 
Kiangsu During the Past Y e a r " ,  op. c i t . ).
S P J P , 3 0 /6 /5 1 ,  p. 4, "Land Relations in North Kiangsu Now and in 
the P a st " ,  op. c i t . These 25, 000 teams would have represented  
30. 38% o f  all M ATs in Kiangsu in m i d - 1951 (see  Table III. 1).
It was at this t im e, fo r  exam ple, that m ost  o f  the 2, 700 team s in 
Wusih hsien  w ere  s e tu p .  See SNJP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
S P J P , 2 8 /1 2 /5 1 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .  Perm anent team s represented  5.74%  
o f  the total.
F o r  consideration  o f  tem p ora ry  and permanent M ATs as separate 
ca te g o r ie s ,  see  below .
It m ay  be that the relative proportion  o f  perm anent teams was 
h igher in north Kiangsu. This can be deduced fro m  the fact that in 
Kiangsu as a whole permanent M ATs represented  23.38%  o f  all 
M ATs (CKNYHTHYTSL, op. c i t . , vol. 2, p. 1002), whereas in south 
Kiangsu the figure was only 6. 28% (SNJP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2).
As we shall see in Chapter 5, the evidence does suggest that north 
Kiangsu was better  endowed with draft animals than the south.
On the other hand, the average s ize  o f  fa rm  was also la rg e r  in the 
no rth .
This apparent contradiction  is eas ily  explained. It s im ply  re flects  
the developm ent o f  larger, permanent M ATs in la ter  y e a rs .  Thus, 
although the total num ber o f  teams in 1954 was less  than in 1952,
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because  a la r g e r  proportion  of them w ere  perm anent team s the 
num ber o f  participating households in all team s was actually higher.
Iron ica lly ,  there m ay  have been less  planning in the new teams than 
there had been in traditional fo rm s  of mutual aid!
Thus, S P J P , 2 7 /2 /5 2 ,  p . 2, "Sum m ary Plans fo r  A gricu ltura l 
Production  in North Kiangsu in 1952" - " .  . . the developm ent of 
M ATs is a vital step in leading the peasants towards co llectiv iza t ion . "
F o r  a fu lle r  account o f  the events o f  this year  and the change in 
d irect ion  o f  the M AT M ovem ent in China see  K. R. W alker, 
"C o llec t iv iza tion  in R etrospect ;  The 'S oc ia list  High T id e 1 o f  Autumn 
1955 - Spring 1956", in The China Q uarterly , no. 26, A p ril-Ju n e ,
1966; esp. p p .9 -17 .
In 1953 " . . . the themes o f  p o licy  . . . towards agricultural o rg a n i­
zations w ere  the p rov is ion  o f  adequate financial incentives fo r  the 
private econ om y  and 'stable p r o g r e s s '  in institutional r e fo rm , with 
s tr ic t  observan ce  o f  the s ta ges " .  Ib id . , p. 15.
See SN JP, 1 9 /3 /  52, op. cit. , p. 2.
H HJP, 1 /1 1 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "A fter  the Com pletion  o f  the Autumn Harvest 
and Autumn Sowing, M ATs m ust Settle T heir  Accounts in Good T im e " .  
See also H HJP, 1 6 /1 1 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "Make All Round Checks on the 
Mutual Aid and C o -op era t ive  M ovem ent".
H HJP, 1 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "Explain the Way in which Rural D evelopm ent 
Should Take P la ce  and Thoroughly Im plem ent the P o l ic ie s  o f  Mutual 
Aid and C o -o p e ra t io n " .
Ibid.
H HJP, 9 /1 /5 3 ,  p . 2, "Only By O vercom in g  'S e lfish n ess ' Can the 
Team s C a rry  Out Mutual A id " .
HHJP, 3 0 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "L arg e  Num bers o f  Draft Oxen have Died 
in Many A r e a s " .
H H JP, 1 1 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "In O rder  to Consolidate and Im prove the 
M ATs We m ust O vercom e  Tendencies to sit Back and Take Things 
E a sy " .
H HJP, 3 /2 /5 3 ,  p. 2, "During Winter M ATs m ust Support and Im prove 
A gricu ltu ra l and Subsidiary P roduction " .
Ibid. It was em phasized  that mutual aid activities in the winter 
m onths, both in agriculture and su bs id ia ries ,  w ere  essentia l to 
in c re a se s  in output and in com e.
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(65) HHJP, 1 6 /4 /5 3 ,  p. 2, "In A ll Parts o f  the P ro v in ce  There A re  Many 
M ATs Which A re  Team s in Name Only".
(66) H sing-sh ih  c h u - i .
(67) H H JP, 1 6 /4 /5 3 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
(68) Ib id . The Chinese phrase is k 'o u -ta -m a o -t z u .  There w ere  also 
reports  o f  cadres  d iscrim inating against peasants: in Nan-hui hsien
p oor  peasants who had neither labour nor  working capital w ere  refused 
p e rm is s io n  to jo in  M A T s. See HHJP, 8 /4 /5 3 ,  p. 2, "In the Mutual 
Aid and C o -o p e ra t iv e  M ovem ent We Must Unite and Help Individual 
Peasant H ouseholds".
(69) HHJP, 1 6 /4 /5 3 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
(70) F o r  further evidence o f  "b u rea u cra t ism "  (kuan-liao  chu-i)  among 
cadres  see  HHJP, 2 4 /4 /5 3 ,  p. 1, "C on feren ces  of Ch'tf and Hsiang 
Cadres Called in All H sien ".
(71) P resu m ab ly ,  the tem p ora ry ,  seasonal fo rm  was b y -p a sse d .
(72) See also Table III. 6 below .
(73) JM JP, 1 /1 0 /5 3 .
(74) JM JP , 9 /1 /5 4 ,  p. 1, "R esolution  on the D evelopm ent o f  A gricu ltura l
P r o d u c e r s '  C o -o p e r a t iv e s " .  C om pare this with e a r l ie r  p ron ou n ce ­
ments encouraging the developm ent o f  the r ich  peasant econ om y and 
reiterating the im portance  o f  the individual peasant farm ing system .
(75) The reso lution  stated that;
"The developm ent o f  M ATs lays the foundation fo r  the d ev e lo p ­
ment o f  A P C s .  T h ere fore ,  while we m ust strngthen leadersh ip  
in developing A P C s ,  we m ust also s im ultaneously strengthen 
the leadersh ip  o f  all fo rm s  and leve ls  o f  M A T s. The Party  
C om m ittees  in all areas should study and make use of existing 
fo rm s  and custom s o f  mutual aid among the peasants and help 
them to get organ ized  on an even grea ter  sca le  in o rd e r  to solve  
their  production  d iff icu lt ies .  As the M AT M ovem ent goes f o r ­
ward the team s should gradually be tran s form ed  and im proved  
. . .  We m ust understand that the organ ization  o f  individual 
peasants into mutual aid activities and the w ork  o f  im proving the 
M ATs is a m eans o f  facilitating the developm ent o f  APCs and a 
preparation  fo r  the im plem entation o f  com plete  agricultural 
s o c ia l is t  transform ation . It would be a ser iou s  m istake i f  we 
fa iled  to see  that M ATs are a b a s ic  transitional fo rm  which leads 
the peasants towards so c ia l is t  transform ation , and in consequence 
ign ored  M AT w ork  . . . "
Ib id . , p . 1.
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See Table III. 6 .
The distinction between East China including, and excluding , 
Shantung helps to put the developm ents in the rest  o f  East China 
into p roper  p ersp ect ive .  H owever, in the rest  o f  this thesis , 
unless otherw ise  stated, East China will be taken to include Kiangsu, 
Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien but not Shantung.
Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien made slightly m o r e  rapid p ro g re ss  
than Kiangsu.
The percentage in crea se  in M ATs in 1954 o v e r  1953 was as fo llow s:
% r ise ;  1954 
o v e r  1953
Kiangsu 41 .83
Shanghai 49. 18
Anhwei 21. 64
Chekiang 12.00
Fukien 18. 04
(Shantung) (33 .60 )
The proportion  o f  agricultural households in M ATs in the provinces  
o f  East China during 1952-4 is as fo llow s:
1952 1953 1954
Kiangsu 43. 53 36 .60 51. 14
Shanghai 37. 05 29. 31 44 .42
Anhwei 51. 59 48. 24 58.49
Chekiang 39. 37 48 .42 54. 18
Fukien 47. 02 51. 00 60. 71
(Shantung) (54 .16 ) (4 8 .4 5 ) (64 .44 )
H HJP, 1 5 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "M A T M em bers  Must Understand the 
C o r r e c t  D irect ion  in which the Winter Production  M ovem ent Should 
P r o c e e d " .  C om pare the role  o f  subsid iaries  in this artic le  with 
that o f  Hu Shu-tu, cited e a r l ie r .
This was the c la im  m ade on behalf o f M ATs in north Kiangsu in 
S P J P , 1 9 /4 /5 2 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
Given the d e p re sse d  state o f  the agricultural econ om y  in 1949, the 
re -es tab lish m en t o f  a strong and purposeful governm ent was like ly  
to provide  the conditions in which agricultural r e c o v e r y  would take 
p lace , even with institutional ce ter is  paribus assum ptions. F o r  a 
m o re  detailed analysis o f  quantitative trends in Kiangsu agriculture 
after 1949, see be low , chapter 5.
See, fo r  exam ple , HHJP, 4 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "M A T  M em bers ! Be 
Patient and Show the Individual Peasants that A gricu ltura l P r o g re s s  
L ies  in the D irect ion  o f  C o llect iv iza t ion " .
HHJP, 2 9 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p . 2, "M a Cheng-shou M AT Has Gradually Been 
C onsolidated".
See Nan-hui H sien C C P Com m ittee , S su -n ie n -la i  nung-ts 'un-chung 
ti chii-ta  pien (Great Changes in the V illages  o f  Nanhui During the 
Past F our Y e a r s ) , East China P e o p le 's  Publishing Company; 
F ebru ary , 1954; 25 pp.
Yeh was d e scr ib e d  as an "ow n er-cu lt iva tor  m iddle  peasant" (tzu - 
keng chung-nung) who owned 23 m ou. He also p o ss e s se d  a "w in dm ill"  
(f e n g - c h 'e ) and various kinds o f  agricultural too ls .
The results  are as fo llow s ;
(If these leve ls  of growth appear e x c e s s iv e ly  high, they m ust be 
seen against the background o f  an agricultural econ om y rapidly 
re cover in g  fr o m  the d ep ressed  state to which it had fallen in the 
yea rs  o f  war be fo re  1949.)
S su -n ien -la i  nung-ts 'un-chung ti chif-ta p ien , op. c i t . , p. 12.
"U p p e r -m id d le "  and " lo w e r -m id d le "  peasants (shang-chung nung 
and hsia -chung nung) em erged  as separate ca tegor ies  in M ao 's  
co -o p e ra t iv iza t io n  speech  o f  July, 1955. Together with the poor  
peasants, the lo w e r -m id d le  peasants w ere  seen  to constitute the 
m ass  base  o f  support f o r  the p o lic ies  o f  institutional change in a g r i ­
culture. The up p er-m id d le  peasants, on the other hand, w ere 
c la ss i f ie d  with the r ich  peasants.
Actually , som e might argue that Yeh and Hsd are best seen as 
r ich  peasants. To the extent that this is the ca se ,  the d ifference  
in yields o f  the M ATs and individual peasants shown in Table HI. 10 
is understated.
See above, p . 112.
F r o m  Table II. 13 we find that i f  the y ie ld  o f  a p oor  peasant is taken 
as 100, that o f  a r ich  peasant is 140. Since p oor  peasants ' average 
y ield  has a lready been  calculated in III. 10, the production  leve l o f  
a r ich  peasant can eas ily  be included. F o r  purposes o f  com parison  
with Table III. 10, the results are shown below ;
Av. p. a. rate o f  growth, 1951-53
Yeh Ch 'uan-sheng Sung Chia-
chiao M AT
Cotton
Unhulled r ice  
Wheat
30.00%  
4 .29%  
50. 00%
50. 00% 
18.75% 
56.25%
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Av. yield  
o f  poor 
peas ant
Av. yield 
of rich 
pe as ant
Av. yield 
of MAT
(ch in /m ou ) (ch in /m ou) (ch in /m ou )
(a) Yeh Ch'tf an-sheng and Sung C h ia -ch 'iao  MAT
1951 Cotton 38 .46  53 .84  60
R ice  (unhulled) 269*23 376.92 320
Wheat 76 .92  107.69 120
Percentage 
in crease  o r  
d ecrea se  o f  
MAT o v e r  rich  
peasant yield
11.44 
15. 10 
11. 43
1952 Cotton 50. 00 70. 00 85 21.43
R ice  (unhulled) 307.69 430.77 450 4. 46
Wheat 115.38 161.53 200 23. 82
1953 Cotton 61. 54 86. 16 120 39* 28
R ice  (unhulled) 292.31 409.23 440 7. 52
Wheat 153.85 215.39 255 18. 39
Av. Cotton 50. 00 70. 00 88 25.71
1951 - R ice  (unhulled) 29 0. 0 0 406 .00 403 - 0 .74
1953 Wheat 115.38 161.53 192 18. 86
(b) Hsii Chia-ch 'fian and Chu Chung- hsin MAT
1953 Cotton
(hsiao-hua) 53. 85 75. 39 100 32. 64
(ta-hua) 76. 92 107.69 130 20. 72
R ice 300 .00 420 .00 440 4 .76
(93)
(94)
(95
(96
(97
(98
(99
(100
S ources ; As Table III. 10
It will also incidentally  com pensate in the event that the base for  
com p a rison  should be slightly higher than that o f  a p oor  peasant house 
hold.
As it happens, the choice  o f  this figu re is not cru c ia l  since it is in 
relative, not absolute, yields that we are interested . The figure o f  
285 ch in /m ou  is the one derived  in t ie  previous chapter.
See above, chapter 2.
See above, p . 116.
C F J P , 1 1 /2 /5 0 ,  "Mutual Aid Organ .zations A lread y  Total M ore  Than 
a M ill ion " .
SNJP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
Ibid .
Im proved specia lization  is im plied  in an article  in C F JP , 8 /3 /5 3 ,
"Get Production  Organized and Tear Down the H eavens” , which noted 
that during peak periods  the teams operated m o re  e ffic iently  than the
individual fa rm e r  who had sim ultaneously to c a r r y  out harvesting, 
ploughing, watering and fertiliz ing .
( 102 )
(103)
(104)
(105)
( 1 0 6 ) 
(107)
(108
(109
( 110
( m
(112
(113
(114
(115
(116
( 1 0 1 )
(117
JM JP, 2 6 /5 /5 2 ,  "A  V is it  to Ch 'en Yung-k'ang and His M A T ".
This kind o f  fa c to r  substitution is also r e fe r re d  to in C F JP , 3 1 /5 /5 2 .
Though in terestingly  enough, one o f  the two p re -1949  chem ical 
f e r t i l iz e r  plants in China was situated in Nanking. This was the Yung- 
li Plant.
This gen eric  te rm  re fe rs  to mud co llected  fro m  ponds, d itches, s tream s, 
r iv e r s ,  lakes, etc.
That is ,  l t f - fe i . These crope  w ere  ploughed into the soil  in o rd e r  to 
in crea se  its fert il ity .
The total sown area o f  paddy in the team was 56. 08 mou.
JM JP, 2 6 /5 /5 2 ,  "A  V is it  to the B u m per-H arvest  M odel Peasant Ch 'en 
Yung-k'ang and his M A T ",  reproduced in Chinese A cadem y o f Sciences  
R esearch  Institute, K uo-m in  ch ing-ch i hui-fu  sh ih -ch 'i  nung-yeh 
sh eng-ch 'an  h o -tso  tzu - l iao  hui pien (A Com pendium  o f  M aterials  on 
A gricu ltura l P roducers*  C o -op era t ives  During the R econstruction  
P er iod  o f  the National E con om y ), herea fter  KM CCH FSCNYCHH TTLH P, 
Peking, 1957, vo l.  2, pp. 829-834.
HHJP, 1 3 /4 /5 2 ,  p . 2, " T s 'u i  Yii-hsia MAT Draws Up Its Production  
Plans fo r  This Winter and Next Spring".
SNJP, 1 4 /1 0 /5 1 ,  "L abour M ATs in Sung-chiang Special D is tr ic t " ,  
cited in KMCCHFSCNYSCHTTLHP, op. cit. , pp. 823-828.
HHJP, 9 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p. 1, " P 'e i  and Sui Hsien Review  the MAT M ovem ent".
Ching-kung h s i - t s o .
HHJP, 1 9 /9 /5 2 ,  "The Situation Regarding the Mutual Aid and C o - o p e r ­
ative M ovem ent in the Suburbs o f  Nanking During the Past Six M onths" 
in KMCCHFSCN YSCH TTLH P, op. c i t . , vol.  2, pp. 830-846.
KMCCHFSCN YSCHTTLHP, op. c i t . , vol.  2, p. 827.
Ibid . , p. 830. Another innovation was the M A T 's use of a "n ew -sty le  
w alking-plough" (hsin -sh ih  p u - l i ) .
"Surplus" in the sense o f  being totally unem ployed o r  under-em ployed  
( i . e .  em ployed in the peak seasons only).
SN JP, 1 9 /3 /5 2 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
KMCCHFSCN YSCH TTLH P, op. c i t . , vo l.  2, pp. 829-834.
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(118) Ibid. , p. 844.
(119) T e n g -ch ia  ch iao-huan; and hu-li  ( som etim es  l ia n g - l i ) .
(120) KMCCHFSCNYSCHTTLHP, op. c i t . , vol.  2, p. 843.
(121) Our e a r l ie r  calculations (Table III. 12) suggested that the poor  peasants
had m ost  to gain fro m  the M ATs and a b r ie f  glance at the Kaingsu p ress
in 1952 and e a r ly  1953 con firm s  that these represented  the m a jor ity  
c la ss  in the team s. Thus;
M AT No. o f  poor  No. o f  m iddle Other Total
pe as ant 
households
peas ant 
households
(1)
(2 )
( 3 )
( 4 )
1
D escr ib ed  as " p o o r -m id d le "  peasant households. 
H ired labou rer .
S ources ; (1) HHJP, 2 1 /3 /5 2 ,  p . 2, "The Continuing 
P r o g re s s  o f  T 'ien  H sien -fu  M A T ".
(2) HHJP, 2 9 /1 2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "M a Cheng-shou MAT 
Gradually C onsolidated".
(3) HHJP, 2 3 /1 /5 3 ,  p . 2, "V isiting a 
B u m p er-H arvest  M A T ".
(4) HHJP, 3 /1 /5 3 ,  p . 2, "The Higher Our 
MAT P r o g r e s s e s ,  the M ore In destruc­
tible It B e c o m e s " .
(122) Statistics f r o m  11 ch 'it o f  Nanking suburbs revea led  that o v e r  half o f  
MAT leaders  w ere  m iddle peasants. See KM CCHFSCNYSCHTTLHP, 
op. c i t . , vo l .  2, p. 844.
(123) Ibid. , p. 844.
(124) Ibid. , p. 844.
(125) That is ,  " l o w e r - le v e l  agricultural p r o d u c e r s 1 c o -o p e r a t iv e s " .  See
above, note (10).
(126) A rab le  area  could be in creased  by  breaking down the boundaries 
between plots o f  land; and working capital used m o r e  e ffic ien tly  since 
draft animals and labour no longer  needed to waste tim e travelling 
fro m  one plot to another.
(127) The account that fo llow s is based on SPJP, 1 5 /2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "The
Advance Towards an APC by Chao F u -y a  M A T ".
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(128)
(129)
(130)
(131)
(132)
(133)
(134)
(135)
(136)
(137)
(138)
H sin-hua yifeh-pao, (New China Monthly), 1955, no. 12, "M odel 
Regulations fo r  A gricu ltura l P r o d u c e r s '  C o -o p e r a t iv e s " ,  which stated 
that " .  . . the incom e o f  an APC derives  fro m  the labour, not the land 
ow nership , o f  its m e m b e rs .  The dividend paid on land m ust there fore  
be low er  than the wage paid to agricultural labour, so that all m em bers  
o f  the co -o p e ra t iv e  can be encouraged to take an active part in the work 
o f  it " .
Land was c la ss i f ie d  into three categories  accord in g  to its productivity , 
as fo llow s ;
(1) unit area yields o f  120 chin per  m ou
(2) unit area  yields o f  100 chin per m ou
(3) unit area  yields o f  80 chin per  m ou
(S P JP , 1 5 /2 /5 2 ,  op. cit. , p. 2 . )
H HJP, 1 7 /8 /5 2 ,  "How the Li YU MAT B ecam e an A P C " .  This article  
can also be found in KM CCFHSCNYSCHTTLHP, op. cit. , vo l .  2, 
p p .847-854.
Pao-kung pao ch 'a n .
In this resp ect  Li Yti APC was m o re  in line with the later "m odel 
regu lations" than Chao F u -y a  APC had been.
Land was to be standardly exp ressed  in term s o f  "flat, d ry  land" 
(p 'ing -han  ti). The relationship between one share and land o f  d ifferent 
quality was as fo llow s ;
1 share was equivalent to;
- 2 .0  m ou o f  flat, dry  land
- 2 .5  m ou o f  irr igated  paddy land
- 3 .2  m ou o f  p o o re r  quality paddy land
5 .0  m ou o f  h illy  land o r  bam boo plantation
- 1 9 . 0  m ou o f  alluvial fie lds
- 27. 0 m ou o f  h illside with f irew ood .
Pao-kuan ytfan and chi-kung yd an.
KMCCHFSCN YSCH TTLH P, op. cit. , vol.  2, p. 851.
Pao-kung chih.
K ung-piao. They w ere  printed in the following denominations; 5 li;
1 fen; 2 fen; 4 fen; 5 fen; 8 fen; 10 fen; 50 fen; 100 fen; 200 fen; 
and 500 fen.
Kung - chi - ch in . This was to be used as fo llow s ; 70% fo r  expanding 
production  through purchases o f  agricultural t o o ls ,  f e r t i l iz e r s ,  seeds , 
etc . ; 2% fo r  bonuses to labour; 15% fo r  a w elfare  fund to m eet expen­
ditures in education and health; and 13% fo r  a labou r-insurance  fund.
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(139)
(140)
I
I
k
(141)
(142) 
1
(143)
(144)
(145)
(146)
(147)
(148)
"In itial"  because  at the tim e o f  writing the co -o p e ra t iv e  had only been 
set up fo r  about three months.
The following table shows the incom e o f  two m em b ers  o f  Li Yti APC 
in 1951 and 1952;
Net rece ipt  Net rece ip t  % rise  o ver
(1951) (1952) 1951
(a) Wang C h in -k 'e  900 chin 1 ,426 chin 58 .44
(b) Li Y ii
(wheat) 560 1, 078 92 .50
(broad  beans) 105 152 44 .76
Source : HHJP, 1 7 /8 /5 2 ,  op. c i t .
Ibid.
Actually , c o -o p  m em b ers  w ere  perm itted to retain sm all private plots 
which they could manage as they wished.
The exception  is Shanghai Municipality where the proportion  of a g r i ­
cultural households participating in APCs rose  fr o m  virtually  zero  to 
m o re  than 10% in one year. It would be interesting to investigate why 
Shanghai's behaviour d iffered  fro m  that o f  the rest  o f  the province 
but to do so would take us beyond the scope o f  the present chapter.
" F i r s t " ,  because  after m i d - 1955 there was an even m ore  rapid 
expansion.
By this tim e m o re  than a quarter of Shanghai's agricultural households 
had joined c o -o p s .
JM JP, 9 /1 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
A M arch  figure o f  2, 297, 000 m em b er  households is given in State 
Statistical Bureau, Nung-yeh h o -tso -h u a  ho 1955-nien nung-yeh sheng- 
ch 'an h o - t s o -s h e  shou -i  fe n -p 'e i  ti t 'ung-ch i t z u - l ia o . (Statistical
M aterials  on A gricu ltura l C o -operativ iza tion  and the Distribution of 
the Product in C o -op era t ives  During 1955), h erea fter  Statistical 
M ateria ls  on A gricu ltura l C o -op era t iv iza t ion , Peking, 1957; p. 11, 
Table 5.
JM JP, 1 3 /8 /5 4 ,  p. 2, "Take F lood  P recaution  M easures  and P ro tect  
the Seedlings and Then Get On With Consolidation and Im provem ent 
W ork "  states that the total num ber of AP C s (August, 1954) was 4 ,400  - 
i . e .  435 le ss  than the m id -y e a r  figure shown. The d ifference  can 
probably  be eas ily  accounted for :  it m ost  l ik e ly  re flected  incom plete
statistics  available to the 'P e o p le 's  D aily ' com pared  with the later  
sou rce .  Certainly , there is no evidence to indicate a decline in APCs 
between m i d - 1954 and the sum m er of that year.
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149) JM JP, 1 1 /1 1 /5 4 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
150) JM JP, 2 0 /1 1 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
151) They could be thought of as capitalists since their  farm ing operations 
are based  on the h ire  o f  labour.
152) P a radox ica lly ,  as we have seen, land re fo rm  serv ed  only to exacerbate  
this prob lem .
153) Because  o f  the higher density o f  population in the south it was to be 
expected  that APCs in Kiangsu would contain m o r e  m em bers  than in 
the country taken as a whole. But as the data fo r  the other years 
ind icates , this would not explain a gap o f  100%.
154) This can be deduced by com paring Kiangsu and East China (b) in 
Table III. 16.
155) K. R. W alker in The China Q u arterly , op. cit. , p. 11.
156) Ta-kung pao (Hong Kong), 2 5 /1 2 /5 3 ,  "Through the Use o f  C o llect iv ized  
Labour and R esou rces  C o -op era t ive  Production  is  Increasing E v e r y ­
w h ere " .
157) JM JP, 1 /3 /5 4 ,  "The F irs t  Year o f  Red Star A P C " .
158) C F J P , 1 4 /4 /5 4 ,  "Why is Production  So High in This C o - o p ? "
159) JMJP, 1 /3 /5 4 ,  op. cit. A  s im ila r  balance was achieved in the use of
draft animals and som e large tools  ( e .g .  w ater-w h ee ls )  which w ere 
m ost ly  owned by  m iddle peasants and which had f o r m e r ly  either not 
been available o r  only available at inappropriate tim es to the poor 
peas ants.
(160) Ibid .
(161) CF  J P , 1 4 /4 /5 4 ,  op. cit.
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CH APTE R FOUR
The Two "High T id es " ;  S em i-S oc ia lis t  
Agricu ltura l C o-operativ iza tion  and 
Fully  S ocia lis t  Agricu ltural 
C oil e ctivi z ation.
( 1 )I. The C hronology o f  the Two "H ig h -T id e s " v
B efore  the second  half o f 1955 a lack of unanimity among governm ent 
leaders  over  the speed and even d irect ion  of institutional change in agriculture 
held back the co -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent in China. Not until M ao 's  in te r ­
vention o f  31 July, 1955 w ere these d ifferences  reso lved  and the ground 
c leared  fo r  the rapid changes o f  1955 and 1956. Until this date o f f ic ia l  p o l icy
towards the form ation  of c o -o p s  rem ained genera lly  con servative , em pha-
(2 )sizing consolidation  rather than expansion.
There w ere  o f  cou rse  deviations fr o m  the o f f ic ia l  p o licy  and although
d iscu ss ion  o f  these would take us beyond the scope o f  this chapter, one in
particu lar should be noted because of its orig in  in Kiangsu. In May, 1955
(3)a joint con feren ce  o f  Party  S ecreta ries  was held in the prov ince . M ost
of the proposa ls  put b e fo re  it w ere  unexceptionable and m e r e ly  upheld the
guidelines of recent C C P d irect iv es .  H owever, one was m o re  unusual for
on the basis  o f  the su cce ss  o f  existing co -o p e ra t iv e s  in the province it ca lled
( 4 )fo r  a doubling in their  num bers in less  than a year.
With hindsight and viewed against M ao 's  speech  o f  only two months
later  this d ec is ion  looks v e ry  rem arkable indeed. Not only did it d irect ly
contradict the prevailing p o l icy  of caution, but also in its demand fo r  a
(5)doubling o f  co -o p e ra t iv e s  it anticipated Mao alm ost exactly . It would be
tempting to conclude that the con ference  resolution was in fact prom pted by 
som e knowledge o f  the July speech . But unfortunately the evidence to support
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such an argument is lacking and it seem s best to conclude that the s im i ­
larit ies  w ere  la rg e ly  coincidental. N evertheless  it rem ains the case that 
in proposing such an expansion the Kiangsu delegates w ere  e ffect ive ly  
pursuing an independent line which was c lo s e r  to the sp ir it  of M ao 's  speech  
than that of recent national d irect iv es .
M ao 's  intervention broke  once and fo r  all the im passe  created  by  the
opposing views and determ ined the future cou rse  o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion  in
China. His ca ll  fo r  a doubling of APCs in China by autumn, 1956 was based
on a ". . . new upsurge in the soc ia lis t  m ass  m ovem ent . . . throughout the 
(6 )countrys ide".  He attacked conservative  elem ents fo r  holding back
peasants ' demands fo r  further socia lization  in agriculture  and s tressed  the 
im portance o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion  as a means of both controlling  the expanding 
r ich  peasant econ om y and maintaining unity between w ork ers  and peasants. 
H owever, qualitative aspects w ere  not ignored and the traditional princip les  
of gradualism  and voluntarism  w ere  upheld. F or  all its departure from  
previous p o licy  and notwithstanding the extraord inary  events which fo llow ed, 
the p o licy  set out by Mao was w ell considered  and even cautious.
The response  to the speech  was overw helm ing. In the second half o f
1955 there was a dram atic  in crease  in the num ber of agricultural households
taking part in co -o p e ra t io n  above the MAT leve l in China. In D ecem ber ,
1955 59.3%  o f  all households belonged to lo w e r - le v e l  AP C s com pared  with
( 7 )
only 14. 17% in June. In 1956 the transform ation  to h ig h e r -le v e l  APCs
got under way: between D ecem ber ,  1955 and January, 1956 m em bersh ip  of
these co lle c t iv es  rose  fro m  4. 0% to 30. 7%, and by M arch  the figure was 
(8)54. 9%. By the end of the year 87. 8% o f  households w ere  in co llec t ives
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and 8. 5% in co -o p e r a t iv e s .  Not only agricultural co -o p e ra t iv iza t io n  but
indeed agricultural co llectiv iza tion  had been b a s ica l ly  com pleted  in China -
(9)an achievement far  beyond that envisaged by Mao.
In Kiangsu lo w e r - le v e l  co -op era t iv iza t ion  was achieved in two stages.
The f irs t  was in Septem ber and O ctober , 1955 when the proportion  of
agricultural households in APCs rose  from  less  than 18% to about 5 0 % . ^ ^
During the next two months there was a lull and at the end o f  the year
m em bersh ip  was about the sam e as it had been in O ctober . H owever, at
the beginning o f  1956 there was renewed rapid p r o g r e ss  and by the end o f
January 84% of agricultural households in the prov in ces  w ere  working within
( i l )the fram ew ork  o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e s .
The d ec is ion  to wind up s e m i-s o c ia l is t  co -op era t iv iza t ion  in Kiangsu
during 1956 appears to have been taken at a con feren ce  held in N ovem ber,
( 12)1955. M ore  sp e c i f ica l ly ,  a report  in D ecem b er  anticipated that bas ic
(13)
com pletion  would be achieved by autumn, 1956. But even these p ro g n o s ­
tications w ere  overtaken by  the speed o f  events and by  F eb ru ary  o f  the new 
year co -op era t iv iza t ion  had already been essentia lly  c a r r ie d  out.
A theme o f  e a r l ie r  chapters has been that because  o f  d ifferent re so u rce
endowments the p o o r e r  peasants w ere  likely  to be the ch ie f  ben e fic iar ies  of
agricultural co -o p e ra t io n  in Kiangsu. Indeed our calculations o f  the likely
gains fro m  various fo rm s  of c o -o p e ra t io n  indicate that w e l l -o f f  and certa in ly
r ich  peasants might actually lose  out by participating in co -o p e ra t iv e  activities.
The point was exp lic it ly  made in a Shanghai new spaper which stated that
w e l l - t o -d o  peasants hesitated to jo in  in co -op era t ion  because  1!. . . in the
initial period  after a c o -o p  has been set up, its output and incom e in creases
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te m p ora r ily  cannot com pare  with their own and so they are unable to see
( i 4)the advantage o f  being a m em b er  of an A P C ".
That the greatest support f o r  co -o p e ra t iv e  developm ents in the "high-
t id e"  cam e fro m  the p o o r e r  peasants is c o rrob ora ted  by  various so u rce s .
In ear ly  O ctober , 1955 it was reported  that the m a jo r ity  of peasants joining
(15)the new APCs w ere  fro m  the poor  and low er -m id d le  ca te g o r ie s .  In the
Shanghai suburbs 70% o f  poor  and 85-90% o f lo w e r -m id d le  peasants w ere
demanding to set up new, o r  jo in  old, co -o p e ra t iv e s .^  ^  57% o f households
belonging to c o -o p s  in one ch'tf o f  S u -ch 'ien  hsien w ere  p oor  peasants and
(17)the other 43% m iddle peasants.
A s im ila r  p icture em erges  fro m  a m o re  detailed c lass  breakdown o f the
m em bersh ip  o f  675 new APCs in two hsien in H sti-chou Special D istrict :
Table IV. 1; The c lass  com pos it ion  o f  675 lo w e r - le v e l
APCs in Hstt-chou Specia l D istr ict  in 1955.
Num ber of p arti-  As percentage of
cipating house- total participating
holds  households
P o o r  peasants 10,256 53.49
L o w e r -m id d le  peasants 5,388 28 .10
U pper-m idd le  peasants 3 ,279 17.10
Petty rentiers o f  land* 134 0 .70
Total 19,057 99 .39
* Hsiao t 'u -t i  ch 'u -tsu  c h e .
Source : HHJP, 2 8 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "In A ll Areas
C o-operativ iza tion  Plans A re  Gradually 
Going Ahead".
All the data on co -o p e ra t iv e  m em bersh ip  presented  above would suggest
a v e r y  s im ple  d ichotom y between poor  and b e t te r -o f f  peasants. H owever,
despite its obvious appeal, any analysis which took such a d iv is ion  as a bas ic
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p rem ise  would be m isleading. Evidence points to the fact that upper-m idd le
peasants too w ere  anxious to jo in  in co -op era t ive  farm ing activities. In
six APCs planned to be set up in Ssu-yang hsien in spring, 1956 upper-m idd le
peasants w ere expected  to c o m p r ise  m o re  than 35% o f  all m e m b e rs ;  in
another four c o -o p s  planned fo r  autumn and spring (1955-56) the c o r r e s -
( 18)ponding figure was 30%.
The c lass  com posit ion  o f  rural soc ie ty  was a p r im e determinant o f  the
su ccess  o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion .  W here there was increas in g  polarization
between p oor  and b e t te r -o f f  peasants the d ifferent e con om ic  interests  and
soc ia l  outlook o f  each group w ere  likely  to give r ise  to con flict .  By contrast,
where the overw helm ing m a jor ity  remained p oor  peasants institutional change
(19)might take p lace m o r e  sm oothly.
In Kiangsu such con flicts  w ere  the source  o f  m any o f  the m ost  intractable
prob lem s in the new ly-estab lished  A P C s . The m ost  ser iou s  manifestation
was the tendency to partiality  towards a particu lar group o f  peasants. A
report made in Septem ber, 1955 stated that throughout Kiangsu poor  peasants
( 20 )w ere being excluded fro m  c o -o p s .  In Chie-nan hsiang, H wai-yin  hsien
26 out o f  48 p oor  peasant households which had asked to jo in  APCs w ere 
refused adm ission . In Chii-jung h s ien , out o f 45 households in one village 
five lacked the n e c e s s a r y  experience  to fo rm  a co -o p e r a t iv e ,  but the rem ain ­
ing 40 (30 m iddle and ten poor)  w ere elig ib le . H ow ever, when the 30 m iddle 
peasants subsequently set up an APC not one of the ten poor  peasants was 
admitted to it. This was c le a r ly  a case  o f  deliberate  exclusion  by  the m iddle 
peasants fo r  fear  that the p oor  peasants' lack o f  r e so u rce s  would hold back 
r ises  in productiv ity  and im provem ents in living standards. The only
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co n ce ss io n  made by the head o f  the new unit was that the p oor  peasants
( 2 1 )would be allowed to jo in  after two yea rs .  S im ilar  reports  w ere  fo r th ­
com ing fro m  Y en -ch 'en g  where p oor  peasants spoke resentfu lly  about cadres
(22 )
"suspecting the poor  and loving the r ich "  and threatened to organize 
their  own c o -o p e r a t iv e s .
Although there w ere  also cases  o f  prosperous  peasants being fo rce d
into co -o p e ra t iv e s  there can be little doubt that the o s tr a c is m  of p oor  peasants
(23)was the m ost  serious  aspect of "com m a n d ism " during the " f ir s t  h igh -t ide" .
The situation was aggravated by  the activities o f  subvers ive  elem ents. Thus,
in its O ctober  d irect ive  the P rov in c ia l  Party Com m ittee unam bigiously stated
that landlords, r ich  peasants and cou n ter -revo lu tion ary  infiltration of c o -o p s
(24)had o c c u rr e d  in e v e ry  area o f  Kiangsu.
If the d ifferent e con om ic  status of the various c la s se s  o f  peasants posed
the m ost  serious  d ifficu lty  during co -op era t iv iza t ion  it was not the only
difficulty. C r it ic ism  o f cadres  fo r  their " r ig h t is t -co n s e rv a t iv e "  attitudes
towards soc ia liza t ion  or  their "blind satisfact ion”  with what had so far  been
(25)achieved re -a p p ea red  as a com m on  theme. P o lit ica l  p ressu res  to set
up m o re  APCs becam e in creas in g ly  important while ob ject ive  econ om ic  
factors  w ere  ignored . Production  p r io r it ie s  in m any o f  the new c o -o p s  w ere  
not drawn up and in m any areas autumn sowing was delayed. In som e cases  
agricultural plans did not exist at all; in others m em b ers  w ere  only c o n ­
cerned  to harvest their  own crops  and neglected  the autumn ploughing and
(26)sowing w ork o f  the APC.
In sum, the speed with which the lo w e r - le v e l  AP C s w ere  set up in 
Kiangsu caused m any adm inistrative prob lem s. At the sam e time o v e r -
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p re -occu p a t ion  with the co -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent was accom panied  by-
neg lect  o f  fa rm  operations. This threatened to create  a v ic ious  c ir c le :
the m o re  AP C s that w ere  set up, the m o re  agricultural w ork would be
neglected ; the m o re  such work was neglected , the low er  would output and
incom e be - and so ultim ately  the greater  the disenchantment with the new
structure. It was in these c ircum stances  that the Kiangsu Party  Com m ittee
in O ctober , 1955 ca lled  a halt to further co -o p e ra t iv e  expansion and instituted
(27)a period  o f  retrenchm ent and consolidation . It is in this context that
(28)the lull during N ovem ber and D ecem b er  should be understood.
The essentia l d ifference  between lo w e r - le v e l  and h ig h e r - le v e l  APCs 
( co -o p e ra t iv e s  and c o l le c t iv e s )  was that in the latter dividends on land and 
working capital w ere  abolished and m e m b e r s '  in com e was derived  entirely  
f rom  the w ork they did in the co llect ive  s e cto r .  On the basis  o f  its im portance 
and difficu lty  o f  execution each job was assigned a n orm , exp ressed  in term s 
o f  a num ber o f  w ork -p o in ts .  Ten w ork -points  constituted a labour day and 
a peasant 's  final in com e (in the co llect ive  se cto r )  cons isted  o f  the number 
of labour days he had w orked m ultiplied by  the value o f  the labour day.
(29)All land, except fo r  sm all private p lots, graves  and building sites
(30)was taken under co l le c t iv e  ow nership without com pensation . Draft
animals and large  farm  tools  w ere  also co l le c t iv ized  at agreed p r ices  as 
w ere  other fo rm s  o f  fixed capital, such as irr iga t ion  w orks and fishponds. 
P igs ,  poultry, sm all  d om est ic  utensils and som e trees  w ere  how ever 
retained under private ownership. If they so wished m em b ers  w ere  to be 
allowed to leave the co lle c t iv e  and in these c ircu m stan ces  they could w ith­
draw their land (o r  the equivalent thereof) together with any m oney they
(31)
had invested in the APC.
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The only tim etable proposed  by Mao in his July, 1955 speech  was that
co -op era t iv iza t ion  should be com pleted  by  i960 and that thereafter  ” . . . the
s e m i-s o c ia l i s t  co -o p e ra t iv e s  w ill be gradually developing into fu l ly -so c ia l is t
(32)ones, group by  group and stage by stage". But so rapidly did lo w e r - le v e l
A P C s expand during the second  half o f  1955 that at the end of D ecem ber  Mao
was able to state that . . by  1959 o r  I960 we can com plete  the transform ation
(33)fro m  s e m i- s o c ia l i s t  to fu l ly -so c ia l is t  A P C s " .  v B a re ly  a month later the
Draft Twelve Year Plan was published in which the com pletion  of c o l l e c -
(34)tivization was ca lled  fo r  by  1958.
In Kiangsu plans fo r  the transition to a c o l le c t iv ize d  agriculture w ere
outlined as e a r ly  as N ovem ber, 1955 in a d ec is ion  o f  the P rov in c ia l  Party
Com m ittee that h ig h e r - le v e l  APCs should be set up on an experim ental basis
in spring, 1956. A ccord in g ly ,  at the end o f  D ecem b er  and into January the
firs t  plans fo r  the establishm ent o f  co llectives  began to appear in different
(35)areas of the p rov in ce . A lm ost  sim ultaneously fu l ly -so c ia l is t  APCs
began to be set up on an in creas in g ly  wide sca le  throughout the prov ince .
These developm ents presaged  a new "h igh -t id e"  in Kiangsu agriculture.
As had happened during the " f ir s t  h igh -t ide"  plans w ere  continually rev ised
upwards but still fa iled  to keep up with actual events. Despite hints o f
(36)opposition the m ost  com m on  theme was that the enthusiasm of the great 
m a jor ity  o f  peasants justified  the m ove towards full co llectiv ization .
Emphasis was still  p laced  on the old virtues of mutual benefit, gradualism  
and voluntarism  though in view  o f  the speed with which the agricultural 
s e c to r  was being tran s form ed  it is c lea r  that they w ere  often ignored.
Although data are not readily  available there can be no doubt that
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during the f ir s t  months o f  1956 co llectiv iza tion  took p lace  v e r y  rapidly
throughout Kiangsu. A  report published towards the end o f  January
suggested that 665 co l le c t iv es  had been or  w ere  about to be set up in the
(37)province  but that by  M arch  this figure would have r isen  to over  5, 000
(381containing m o re  than a m ill ion  agricultural households (15% of the total).
A news broad cast  o f  3 F ebru ary  revealed  that the second  stage of the APC
M ovem ent had already been com pleted  in Hsti-chou Specia l D istr ict  and that
(39)
in som e areas o v e r  90% o f  agricultural households belonged to c o l le c t iv e s .
In any case  by  the m iddle o f  1956 Kiangsu was w ell on the way to having 
a fu l ly -c o l le c t iv iz e d  agriculture . The following table su m m arizes  the 
situation in Kiangsu, the other provinces  o f  East China and China as a whole. 
F o r  purposes o f  com p a rison  data fo r  m i d - 1955 are also included.
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Table IV. 2 ;
Mid - 1955 :
M id - 1956;
The p ro ce s s  o f  s e m i - s o c ia l i s t  and 
fu lly - so c ia lis t  co  -operativ ization  
in Kiangsu and other areas o f  China: 
1955-56.
PERCEN TAGE OF A L L  AGRICU LTU RAL HOUSEHOLDS
IN:
C o -op s C o l l e c ­
tives
C o -op s  and 
co l le c t iv e s
F orm s other 
than APCs
China 14. 16 0. 03 14. 19 85. 81
Anhwei 13. 60 0. 05 13. 65 86. 35
Chekiang 16. 90 0. 15 17. 05 82 .95
Fukien 15. 14 0 .05 15. 19 84. 81
Kiangsu 11. 21 - 11.21 88. 79
Shanghai 27. 59 0. 68 28. 27 71. 73
China 2 9 . 1 0 62 .60 91. 70 8. 30
Anhwei 15.20 80. 70 95. 90 4. 10
Chekiang 36. 00 60. 00 96. 00 4. 00
Fukien 26. 70 62 .20 88. 90 11. 10
Kiangsu 17. 50 78. 90 96. 40 3. 60
Shanghai 3. 60 90. 90 94. 50 5. 50
Source; CKNYHTHYTSL, op. cit. , p p . 1011-12
The extraord inary  magnitude of the events which o c c u rre d  within the
short space o f  a single year em erge  c le a r ly  fro m  this table. As of m id -
1955 a m e re  11.21%  o f Kiangsu's agricultural households w ere  m em bers  of
lo w e r - le v e l  agricultural co -o p e ra t iv e s  and not one co l le c t iv e  existed . Yet
a year  la ter  96 .4%  o f peasant households w ere participating in som e fo rm
of co -o p e ra t iv e  farm ing - the vast m a jor ity  o f  them in fu l ly -so c ia l is t
c o l le c t iv e s .  The p er fo rm an ce  is even m o re  im p re s s iv e  when set against
that o f  other regions; in m i d - 1955 Kiangsu was lagging behind both China
as a whole and all the other provinces  o f  the East China region. In m i d - 1956
(40)it was m o r e  highly co -o p e ra t iv iz e d  than any of these re g io n s ' and only
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Anhwei had a higher proportion of its households in higher-level APC s.
It seem s c le a r  that co llectiv iza tion  was im plem ented in Kiangsu even 
m o re  rapidly than co -op era t iv iza t ion  had been. In January, 1956 84% o f  
agricultural households w ere  still in the lo w e r - le v e l  units and only 665 
c o lle c t iv es  had been (o r  w ere being) set up. At this tim e it was anticipated 
that 15% o f  them would be in corpora ted  into co l le c t iv e s  by  M arch . Even 
allowing fo r  the probability  that this was an u n d er-est im ate ,  the fact that 
by  the end o f  June eight out o f  ten peasant fam ilies  belonged to h ig h er -lev e l  
AP C s is evidence o f  an astonishing rate o f  p r o g r e s s .  C o llectiv ization  had 
b a s ica l ly  been com pleted  in about five months.
During the second  half o f  the year m ost  o f  the remaining peasants 
w ere  absorbed  into the co l le c t iv e s .  By the end of D e ce m b e r  the situation 
was as fo llow s:
Table IV. 3: C ollectiv ization  in Kiangsu and China
at the end o f  1956.
Total number 
o f  co l le c t iv es
China 540,000
Kiangsu^ 29,539
(exc l .  Shanghai)
Sources ; c
Total num ber 
of m em b er  
ag ri cultural 
households
107 ,422 ,000
8 ,1 6 3 ,6 5 0
As percentage 
of total a g r i ­
cultural h ou se - 
 holds_______
87. 8
90. 3
Statistical M ateria ls  on A gricu ltura l 
C o -op erativ iza tion , op. c i t . , p. 13.
HHJP, 1 /1 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "F u lly -S oc ia l is t  
C o -op erat iv iza tion  Im plem ented” .
In Kiangsu m em bersh ip  in creased  by a further 14. 65% during the
(41)second  half of 1956. In the s ix  Special D istr icts  o f  Hstl-chou, Hwai-yin ,
Y en -ch 'en g , Nan-t 'ung, Chinkiang and Sung-chiang and in som e cities
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participation was around 95%. y Indeed in Sung-chiang 98. 5% o f  agri-
(43)cultural households w ere reported  to belong to c o l le c t iv e s .
The abandonment o f  gradualism  which was an inevitable consequence of 
(44)the "secon d  h ig h -t id e " '  meant not only that the consolidation  o f  lo w e r -
leve l AP C s ceased  to be a condition o f  the establishm ent o f  co l le c t iv es  but
that in m any cases  the co -o p e ra t iv e  stage was b y -p a s se d  altogether.
Peasants whose exper ience  of co -o p e ra t io n  extended no further than mutual
aid m oved  d ire c t ly  into the fu l ly -so c ia l is t  units. Of the 1 .4  m illion  peasant
households that jo ined APCs between the end of January and end o f  June,
(45)1956 m ost  m ust have been im m ediate ly  in corpora ted  into co l le c t iv e s .
In any ca se ,  f o r  those who did belong to c o -o p s  but who had only joined since 
m i d - 1955 m em bersh ip  can have had little m o re  than sym bo lic  significance 
given the speed o f  the co llec t iv e  transform ation .
One o f  the m o st  striking d ifferences  between lo w e r - le v e l  and h igher- 
leve l A PC s was in their  s ize  (defined here  in term s  o f  the number of 
households p er  unit) and we conclude this in troductory  account of the "secon d  
h ig h -t id e "  in Kiangsu by presenting som e data relating to this aspect o f  the 
institutional changes. F o r  com parative  purposes f igures  fo r  China and 
East China are again included;
(42)
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Table IV. 4; The average s ize  o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e s
and co llec t iv es  in Kiangsu and other 
a re a s ; 1955-56.
Mid - 1955: 
CHINA
EAST CHINA
Anhwei
Chekiang
Fukien
Kiangsu
Shanghai
Mid - 1956; 
CHINA
EAST CHINA
Anhwei
Chekiang
Fukien
Kiangsu
Shanghai
A verage  number 
o f  households 
per  co -o p e ra t iv e
26 .66
22. 89 
23. 53 
2 3 .09
27. 95 
23. 79
51 .24
59. 11 
42. 88 
34. 62
69. 36
55. 40
S ource ; Table IV. 2
A verage  number 
o f  households 
per co l le c t iv e
75. 77
251.77 
113. 17 
116 .64
35. 81 
245. 34
429 .44  
181.69 
243 .74
299 .64
225 .44
Data presented  in the last chapter show that between 1953 and 1955 
the average s ize  o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e  in Kiangsu and Shanghai in creased . It 
is c le a r  fro m  Table IV. 4 that this trend continued during the period  of 
the two "h ig h -t id e s M. Indeed the average s ize  o f  co -o p e ra t iv e  in the 
province  was grea ter  than in any other East China prov ince  (and than China 
as a whole) while that o f  fu l ly -so c ia l is t  c o l le c t iv es  was exceeded  only by 
the astonishingly high figure in Anhwei. Bearing in mind that co l le c t iv es  
in Kiangsu w ere  m o re  than four tim es as large as co -o p e ra t iv e s  it is not 
difficult to im agine the adm inistrative d ifficu lties  o f  running the new units 
for  inexperienced  ca d res .  F or  the peasants too the d is location  o f  m oving
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(47)300 m ust have been con siderab le .
from a unit of perhaps six households to one containing more than
An analysis o f  the reasons underlying the d ec is ion  to im plem ent full 
co l lect iv iza t ion  in Kiangsu is given in Appendix D. We th ere fore  conclude 
this introduction by  b r ie f ly  sum m ariz ing the argument that appears there.
The rapid co llect iv iza t ion  o f  agriculture during the f ir s t  half o f  1956 
was less  an optim istic  response  to the potential e co n o m ic  gains o f  the new 
institutional structure than a re flect ion  o f  the fa ilure  o f  the lo w e r - le v e l  
APCs to achieve the lo o k e d - fo r  breakthrough in agricu lture . The c lass  
antagonism and in e ff ic ien cy  in re so u rce  use which stem m ed fro m  the part-  
wage, part dividend system  o f  incom e distribution in the co -o p s  w ere  
particu lar ly  se r io u s .  As a result the cadres turned in creas in g ly  towards 
the co l le c t iv es  with their  wholly w age-based  system  o f  fa c tor  payment as 
a way out o f  these d iff icu lt ies .
This is not to deny that other m o re  purely  e co n o m ic  considerations
also played a part in the d ec is ion  to c o l le c t iv ize .  The consolidation  of
fragm ented farm s p rom ised  to im prove  the utilization o f  land and working
(48)
capital and to save on labour tim e. There is evidence too that
co llec t iv iza t ion  was seen, rightly o r  wrongly, as a m eans towards the
(49)achievem ent o f  a m o r e  m echanized  agriculture. F inally , there is no
doubt that the publication of the Twelve Year A gricu ltu ra l Plan and Chou
(50)E n -la i 's  ca ll  f o r  a "great  leap "  in agricultural p roduction ' also influenced 
the timing o f  co llect iv iza t ion .  H owever, we would argue that such factors  
w ere  not the p r im a ry  agents o f  the events o f  1956; rather they served  to 
r e - in fo r c e  a trend whose true origins lay e lsew h ere .
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(1) The lo w e r - le v e l  c o -o p e r a t iv e s ;
The th eoretica l advantages o f  lo w e r - le v e l  APCs can be b r ie f ly
sum m arized . Unified planning and management o f  fa rm  operations would
benefit production  in a variety  o f  ways. F o r  exam ple, im proved  land
(51)utilization would perm it the m ost  rational cropping pattern to be adopted. 
The agricultural labour fo r c e  could also be m o r e  e f fe c t ive ly  m obilized ; 
specia lization  o f  labour p rom ised  greater  e f f ic ie n cy  and the ability to d irect  
the c o -o p  m em b ers  into the m ost  urgent tasks would help ensure the c o m ­
pletion o f  agricultural operations on tim e. Control o v e r  the entire labour 
f o r c e  enabled the planning authorities to undertake la r g e - s c a le  p ro je c ts ,  
such as land rec lam ation  o r  w ate r -co n tro l ,  which w ere  otherw ise  beyond 
the capacity  o f  individual peasant fam ilie s .  M o re o v e r  s ince  the co -o p e ra t iv e  
management was concern ed  to m axim ize  the use o f  the labour f o r c e  rather
than the unit value o f  a w ork point, labour could still  be em ployed up to the
(52)point at which its m arginal product reached zero .  Again, within the
la rg e r  organizational fram ew ork  o f  a co -o p e ra t iv e  technica l change,
innovation and experim entation could take place m o r e  eas ily  than where the
(53)risks o f  such activities w ere borne by  a single peasant household.
Finally, with its unified control o ver  financial re so u rce s  a co -o p e ra t iv e  
was better  able to accumulate capital and c a r r y  out net investment.
Yield data presented  in the last chapter suggested that the e a r ly  c o -o p s
in Kiangsu w ere  su cce ss fu l  in raising agricultural productiv ity  above the
leve ls  attained by M ATs and m ost  individual peasants - although in the
absence o f  m o r e  com prehensive  statistics  it was em phasized  that such a
conclusion  m ust be con s idered  tentative. We shall now con s id er  how far
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(54)this conclusion is upheld by data published after m id -1955 .
The assertion  in Septem ber, 1955 that between 80% and 90% o f  all
(55)c o -o p s  in Kiangsu had in creased  production is not an adequate m easure  
o f  their  s u c c e s s .  It is like ly  after all that even in the absence o f  c o - o p e r a ­
tivization output would have risen . N everthe less , it is worth record ing  
the range o f  in c re a se s  achieved in 187 APCs o f  C h ’ ang-shu hsien;
Table IV. 5; Increases  in output o f  187 APCs in 
C h 'ang-shu hsien; Soochow S .D .
Level o f  in cre a se d  output Number o f  AP C s As percentage
of total APCs
less  than 10% 8 4 .28
m o re  than 10% 22 11.76
m o re  than 20% 64 34.22
m o re  than 50% 92 49 .20
fall in output 1 0. 53
Total 187 99.99
Source ; HHJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
That all but one o f  the co -o p e ra t iv e s  in crea sed  production  and that 
a lm ost half did so by  m o re  than 50% would seem  to be a strong case  in 
favour o f  the new institutional fram ew ork  o f  agricu lture . But the data 
cannot be taken at face  value. No in form ation  is given o f  the in crea ses  
attained by M ATs and peasants still working on their own although these 
would provide a m o r e  valid basis  fo r  assess ing  the p er form an ce  of the 
A P C s . Further, the large  in crea se  record ed  in m any of the c o -o p s  must 
be seen against the background not only o f  c o -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent 
but also o f  the unusually favourable natural conditions o f  1955. In any case  
it is d ifficu lt to be lieve  that in crea ses  in output o f  50% and m o re  w ere
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com m on . If they had been the fact would su re ly  have rece ived  full publicity 
in the lo ca l  new spapers . In short, the C h 'ang-shu  data m ust be regarded 
as illustrating a spec ia l ca se .
M ore  representative , because  o f  better  geograph ica l and statistical
cov e ra g e ,  are the following data;
Table IV. 6: D irect ion  o f  changes in output in 2, 590
APCs in Ssu-yang, Ch 'i-tung and Clien­
ts e hsien (H w ai-y in , Nan-t'ung and 
Soochow Special D is tr ic ts ) ._______________
Number o f  APCs As percentage of 
_______________________  total APCs
C o -o p s  with in cre a se d  output 2 ,253  87 .0
C o -o p s  maintaining existing 
leve l  o f output 238 9 .2
C o -o p s  with declining output 155 6 .0
Total 2 ,646  102.2 (s ic )
S ource ; HHJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
F o r  the reasons already given these figures are o f  lim ited  value. 
However, they have been included here  fo r  their interesting d is c lo su re  that 
15% o f  APCs in what was presum ably  a care fu lly  se lected  sam ple actually 
failed to ra ise  production.
M ore  detailed in form ation  is available fo r  Ssu-yang hsien fro m  an 
investigation o f  the sum m er harvest in its 1,448 c o -o p s ;
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Table IV. 7: D irection  o f  changes in output in 1,448
APCs in Ssu-yang hsien  (H w ai-yin  S. D. )
1955._______________________________________
Change in output o ver  1953 Number of AP C s As percentage of 
_______________________________  ___________________  total APCs
30% r ise  in output 295 20.37
10% r ise  in output 950 65.61
Same leve l  o f  output 120 8. 29
D ecline in output 83 5.73
Source : HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 5 ,  "The Situation Regarding
the Current C o-op era t iv iza tion  M ovement 
in S su -yang".
Although the usual caveats apply, the experience  o f  Ssu-yang is of 
cons iderab le  in terest. A ll 1 ,448 APCs in the hsien  had been set up b e fore  
M ao 's  s p e e ch (^ ^  But despite this f irm  foundation (and the v e r y  favourable 
natural conditions o f  1955) 14% still failed to in cre a se  production. M o r e ­
over ,  of those that did achieve higher levels  o f  output m o r e  than three 
quarters w ere  h igher by  only about 10% - a contrast to the C h 'ang-shu  data 
in Table IV. 5. It is hazardous to genera lize  fro m  a single hsien 's  e x p e r i ­
ence. But i f  there is an in ference to be drawn f ro m  IV. 7 it is su re ly  that 
among the co -o p e ra t iv e s  created  m o re  in response  to M ao 's  speech  than
to ob ject ive  e co n o m ic  conditions, cases  where output either failed to r ise
(57)o r  did so only m arg ina lly  w ill have been m o re  com m on  than in Ssu-yang.
A slightly  d ifferent exam ple will conclude these in troductory  rem arks .
In Shanghai, w here a high proportion  of c o -o p s  had reported ly  succeeded
/ C Q \
in raising output, the following average yields w ere  c la im ed fo r  the 
AP C s in one o f  the m unicipal 'd is tr ic ts '  ( ch'ti):
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Table IV. 8; Average yields o f  r ice  and cotton in 
the co -o p e ra t iv e s  o f  H sin-ching ch 'tf, 
Shanghai.________________________________
Late paddy Cotton
A verage  y ield  
Index
1954;
630 ch in /m ou
100.00
120 ch in /m ou  
100.00
1955;
A verage  yield 
Index
670 ch in /m ou  
106.35
170 ch iq / m ou 
141.67
S ource ; CF J P , 2 5 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. cit.
The in terest  o f  these figures is that they give som e idea of the im pact 
o f  co -o p e ra t iv e  farm ing upon different cro p s .  They suggest that the 
benefits o f  belonging to a c o -o p e ra t iv e  w ere m uch grea ter  fo r  cotton 
fa rm e rs  than fo r  r ice  p ro d u ce rs .  That co -op era t iv iza t ion  should have had 
such a favourable e ffect  upon cotton production is not in itse lf  surpris ing; 
the ch a ra c te r is t ic s  o f cotton cultivation w ere such that substantial in creases  
in productiv ity  could be gained from  the in creased  labour inputs which, by 
virtue o f  its contro l over  the labour fo r c e ,  a c o -o p  could provide . But the 
sam e argument applied to r ic e - fa rm in g ;  m o re  weeding, greater  ca re  in 
transplanting, b ig ger  fe r t i l iz e r  applications would su re ly  yield  a higher 
output o f  paddy. Why then should cotton yields have r isen  by  o ver  40% 
com pared  with only 6. 35% fo r  r i c e ?  Although no definite answer can be 
given the agricultural h is tory  o f  Kiangsu m ay provide  an explanation. F o r  
m any centuries this province  (at least, Kiangnan) was one o f  the r ichest  
r ice -p ro d u c in g  regions o f  China. As a result o f  the accumulated m arginal 
im provem ents  in cultivation methods the technical standard o f  r ice  cu lt i ­
vation had reached a high leve l .  By contrast, cotton had been le ss  important
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at least until com pa ra tive ly  recent t im es . It fo llow ed  that the scope  for  
im proving cotton production was greater  than fo r  r ic e .  Hence the d ifferentia l 
shown in the table.
If c o r r e c t ,  this explanation had important im plications fo r  c o -o p e r a t iv ­
ization  in m any other regions o f  Kiangsu where r ice  was the ch ief c rop , 
e sp e c ia l ly  the r ich  areas south o f  the Yangtze. There too the opportunities
which the organizational fram ew ork  o f  the APCs o f fe re d  fo r  raising yields
(59)by  im provem ents  in the tra d it ion a l  ' technology w ere  l ik e ly  to be lim ited. 
This would in turn affect peasants ' enthusiasm fo r  c o -o p e r a t iv e  farm ing.
The pattern shown in Table IV. 8 is borne out by in form ation  fro m  other 
areas. F o r  exam ple, o f  50 lo w e r - le v e l  APCs in Chuan-ch 'iao  ch'tf the eleven 
growing d ry  crop s  in crea sed  production by 25-50% w hereas the corresponding  
figure fo r  the 39 'paddy c o - o p s '  was 1 0 - 2 0 % .^ ^  At the prov incia l leve l it 
was reported  that co -o p e ra t iv e s  w ere  increasing  the output of paddy and 
wheat by between 10% and 20% com pared  with about 30% fo r  cotton and 
m isce llan eou s  grains.
What w ere  the sou rces  o f  the in crea ses  in production  (however large o r  
sm all)  achieved by the c o -o p e r a t iv e s ?  A glance at the Kiangsu newspapers 
during the autumn o f  1955 reveals  that the two m ost  im portant w ere  better 
use o f  land and labour and the im plem entation o f  techn ica l r e fo rm s .  In Chuan- 
ch 'iao  ch'ti h igher output was attributed to three fa c tors :  the unified m anage­
ment o f  land and labour; better  cultivation techniques; and the ability o f  the
(62)co -o p e ra t iv e  organ ization  to com bat natural d isa s te rs .  Soil im provem ent,
deeper  ploughing and sowing, and greater  application o f  f e r t i l iz e r  w ere  the
three technical m easu res  said to have contributed m ost  significantly  to
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increased output in 722 co-ops in the suburbs of Shanghai.
G reater  application o f  organ ic  fe r t i l ize rs  was o f  particu lar  im portance
as a sou rce  o f  h igher productiv ity  (yields per unit area) in the c o -o p e ra t iv e s .
In P ao-y in g  and Ssu-yang hsien its contribution to in cre a se d  output was 
(64)em phasized  and in Fou-ning the co llection  and application o f  m o re  fe r t i l iz e r
was said to have been the single m ost  important fa c tor  responsib le  fo r  the
(65)bum per wheat harvest. The su cce ss  of the APCs in m obiliz ing  the peasants
is re flected  in the c la im  made in e a r ly  1956 that there was sufficient base
fe r t i l iz e r  fo r  90% o f  K iangsu's s in g le -crop p in g  land and "top d re ss in g "  for
, r (66)60% o f  the wheat a creage .
The advantage of the la r g e r  sca le  o f  farm ing perm itted  by  the c o -o p s  was 
m ost  c le a r ly  dem onstrated  in their  utilization o f  b a s ic  r e s o u rc e s .  F o r  the 
f irs t  time land could be used according to its e co lo g ica l  conditions (the nature 
and fert il ity  o f  the so i l ,  availability o f  water, etc . ). In T ’ ai hsien a c o - o p e r a ­
tive conducted fie ld  studies which enabled it to divide the r ice  land into four
(671ca tegor ies  correspond ing  to its different growing ch a ra c te r is t ic s ,  thereby
m oving c lo s e r  to output m axim ization . E lsew here it was c la im ed  that unified
land utilization m ade it poss ib le  to introduce the m ost  rational cropping
pattern and fully exploit the potential fo r  raising land productiv ity . Instead
of " .  . . always planting whatever we eat"  peasants w ere  now " . . . planting
(681w hichever c rop s  are m ost  suitable for  each particu lar  p iece  o f  land". 
Centralized  contro l o v e r  land also facilitated irr iga t ion  construction  and a 
num ber o f  art ic les  reported  the su ccess  o f  c o -o p s  in repairing or  building
v <69) such w o rk s .
There w ere  o f  co u rse  para lle l  benefits fro m  the unified con tro l o f  labour.
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This em erged  m ost  c le a r ly  fro m  a report on co -o p e ra t iv iza t io n  in Wusih
(70)hsien. B e fore  co -op era t iv iza t ion  men had w orked fo r  130-150 days a
year; now the num ber of labour days had risen  to 180-200 (a 35% in crea se ) .
An investigation o f  575 APCs in the hsien also indicated much greater  fem ale
(71)participation in agricultural work. This was not m e r e ly  a quantitative
im provem ent fo r ,  whereas women had fo r m e r ly  done jobs  o f  secon dary  im p o r ­
tance, they w ere  now engaged in co llecting  fe r t i l iz e r ,  transplanting r ice  
seedlings and harvesting the wheat. Indeed in 86% o f  the co -o p s  the em ergen ce  
o f  labour surpluses com bined with the lack of long -run  planning was creating 
d iff icu lt ies .  In som e cases  peasants w ere  "b lind ly”  drifting away in search
o f  work; in others fem ale  participation was being lim ited  in o r d e r  to cut back
(72)the labour f o r c e .  '
But how far  did the benefits o f im proved  r e so u rce  utilization and unified
contro l give the APCs a lead over  the M ATs and individual peasants?  In
other w ord s , what w ere  the levels  o f  output and incom e inside and outside
the c o -o p e r a t iv e s ?  To answer this question d ire ct ly  would require a great
deal m o r e  statistical in form ation  than is available. H ow ever, notwithstanding
the d ifficu lties  caused by  lack  o f  data and the qualifications noted e a r l ie r ,  the
issue  is o f  such c ru c ia l  im portance  that som e attempt m ust be made to a ssess
co -op era t iv iza t ion  in these com parative  te rm s . This attempt is the subject
(73)o f  the following pages.
The data which m ust serve  as the basis  fo r  our calculations are eas ily
sum m arized . Output o f  e a r ly  and m id-autumn crop s  in 2 ,827  APCs o f  Yen-
ch 'eng Special D istr ict  was between 10% and 30% higher than that of peasants
(74)operating outside the new institutional fram ew ork . The same differential
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was noted fo r  wheat in Wisih hsien. In one co -o p e r a t iv e  in P ao-shan
hsien (Sung-chiang Special D istr ict )  the average yield  o f  upland non-glutinous 
r ice  was 15% above n o n -c o -o p  y ie lds . Finally, in the sum m er o f  1955 
average wheat yields in the APCs o f  Soochow Special D is tr ic t  w ere  reported  
to be 20% higher than the average fo r  the region  as a whole.
M eagre though they are let us assume on the basis  o f  these figures that 
output in APCs was on average between 15% and 20% higher than that o f  
peasants outside the co -o p e ra t iv e  s e cto r .  In o r d e r  to com pare  the p e r fo r ­
m ance o f  the two s e cto rs  som e assumptions m ust be m ade about the in creased  
production o f  c o -o p s  between 1954 and 1955. Two hypotheses are proposed :
Case (a); Out o f  100 APCs 85 achieve an average in crease  in
production  o f  20% o ver  1954; 10 maintain existing leve ls ;
and 5 su ffer  an average decline o f  5%.
Case (b): As (a) except that the average in cre a se  in output is 15%.
That 15% o f c o -o p e ra t iv e s  should fail to in crea se  their  output is in line 
with the findings o f  Tables IV. 5, IV. 6 and IV. 7. The assumption o f  an 
average in cre a se  o f  15-20% also approximates to the situation in the 1,448 
APCs in Ssu-yang (Table IV. 7). If there is any bias in the assumptions it 
is that they are too generous to the c o -o p s .
We begin  our calculations by  deriving two indices  o f  average output in 
the 100 hypothetical AP C s in 1955;
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Table IV. 9: Index o f  output in 100 hypothetical APCs
in 1955 (with 1954 output = 100)__________
CASE (a) CASE (b)
(1) (2) (3) = 
(1)*(2)
( i ) (2) (3) = 
(1)*(2)
Index o f
output
(1955)
Num ber of 
A P C s  
having this 
index
'G ros s ' 
index o f  
output 
(1955)
Index o f
output
(1955)
Num ber o f  
APCs 
having this 
index
'G r o s s ' 
index o f  
output 
(1955)
120 85 10,200 115 85 9 ,775
100 10 1,000 100 10 1, 000
95 5 475 95 5 47 5
11,675 11,250
Source ; See assumptions above.
T h ere fore ,  the average 'g r o s s '  index o f  output in 1955 is ;
C a s e (a ) ;  116.75
Case (b); 112. 50
In other w ord s ,  depending on what assumptions are m ade, the average
in crease  in output between 1954 and 1955 achieved by  the APCs (taken as a
whole) was 12. 5% o r  16.75%.
But by  our initial assumptions output in the co -o p e ra t iv e  s e cto r  was
15-20% higher than in the n o n -co -o p e ra t iv e  s e c to r .  Thus;
Table IV. 10; An index o f  output inside and outside APCs 
in 1955 (with 1954 output = 100).____________
C o -o p e ra t iv e  s e cto r
N o n -co -o p e ra t iv e  
s e c to r
Source ;
CASE (a)
116.75
101.52 
97.29
As Table IV. 9.
CASE (b)
112.50
97 .83  (15% differentia l)
9 3 .75  (20% differential)
In interpreting these results two factors  m ust be kept in mind. F irs t ,
1955 was a year o f  exceptionally  favourable natural conditions; second, we
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know that on average food  grain  output in Kiangsu in 1955 in creased  by 11.91% 
above 1954.
Against this background the findings o f  Table IV. 10 begin to look  suspect. 
In three out of four  cases  output outside the co -o p e ra t iv e s  is shown to have 
declined in 1955 and in the remaining case  the in cre a se  is v e r y  m arginal 
(1. 52%). Yet given the b u m p er-h arvest  conditions of 1955 it is inconceivable  
that production  should have fallen. On the contrary , even without the benefits 
o f  c o -op era t iv iza t ion  (but thereby also without its attendant p rob lem s) it is 
like ly  that individual peasants would have raised  their  output by a m ore  
substantial m arg in  than 1. 5%. In short, we would argue that the data fo r  
the n o n -co -o p e ra t iv e  se c to r  presented in IV. 10 are incom patible  with what 
is known about agricultural per form ance  and conditions in 1955.
One way of reso lv ing  this prob lem  would be to assum e a higher in crease
(77)in production  in the AP C s between 1954 and 1955. H ow ever, there is
no f irm  e m p ir ica l  evidence nor any a p r io r i  reason  that would justify  this. 
Indeed the investigation o f  1 ,448 APCs in Ssu-yang would suggest that the 
m ost  com m on rate o f  in crease  was 10% and the average no m ore  than 15%. 
T h ere fore ,  any change in the assumptions should be in a downward d irect ion . 
By a p r o ce s s  o f  e lim ination we are left with a final possib ility : that the 
differential between output inside and outside the c o -o p e ra t iv e s  was a good 
deal le ss  than the 15-20% so far  assumed.
Let us assum e that the results given under case  (b) give a better
indication o f  like ly  trends in the APCs between 1954 and 1955. Then the
index o f  co -o p e ra t iv e  output fo r  1955 (with 1955 as 100) is 112. 50. But the
index o f  food  grain  production fo r  all Kiangsu in this year is about 112. It
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fo llow s that the index fo r  the n o n -co -o p e ra t iv e  s e c to r  m ust be 111. 50.
There is but a one p er  cent d ifference  between leve ls  o f  output in the two 
s e c to r s !  It is true o f  cou rse  that the Kiangsu index is f o r  food  grains only 
and we have already suggested that the APCs m ay  have been  m o re  su ccess fu l  
in raising yields o f  non -food  crops  such as cotton. But although allowing 
fo r  this would widen the differeitial to som e extent, it would not significantly 
alter our general conclusion .
To sum up: while there is no reason  to doubt the a ccu ra cy  o f  data 
relating to individual areas of Kiangsu, their representativeness  is m o re  
questionable. C la im s that levels  o f  production in AP C s w ere 15% o r  20% 
above those o f  peasants outside the new fra m ew ork  are not supported fo r  the 
p rovince  as a whole and the calculations presented in the preceding pages 
would suggest that the gap was less  than 5%. In view  o f  all the prob lem s 
associated  with the organ ization  and running o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e s  and the evidence 
o f  rapidly declining enthusiasm fo r  c o -o p e ra t iv e  farm ing by certa in  groups 
o f  peasants, such a conc lusion  is not surpris ing . F r o m  the point o f  view of 
cadres  and planners the situation can hardly have been  one that insp ired  
future confidence and it is  sm all wonder that the final months o f  1955 saw a 
tem p ora ry  halt ca lled  to further co -o p e ra t iv e  expansion.
(79)Changes in output w ere  accom panied  by changes in in com e and we
conclude this sect ion  by  considering  the im pact o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion  upon
peasant in com e. At a general leve l  90% o f the m e m b e rs  o f  the old c o -o p s
(80)in Kiangsu w ere  reported  to have in creased  their  net in com es : In the
Shanghai suburbs the value o f  a labour day had r isen  by  16. 67% fro m  1. 8
(81)yfian (1954) to 2 . 1 yttan (1955) and big r ises  in in com e w ere  reported .
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A case study of one APC in Wu hsien (Soochow) revealed that since co -o p era ­
tivization in creased  production  com bined with falling costs  had exerted  a
(82)continuous upward p re ssu re  on in com es . The achievem ents o f  this
particu lar  c o -o p  are sum m arized  in the following table:
Table IV. 11; Increases  in in com e in an APC in Wu-sung 
hsiang, W u-hsien; Soochow  S. D.____________
Average  household in com e 
be fore  co -op era t iv iza t ion
Average  household incom e 
after co -op era t iv iza t ion
Highest leve l  o f  household incom e 
after co -o p e ra t iv iza t io n
L ev e l  o f  
incom e 
in 1955
750 ytian 
1, 050
Lowest leve l  o f  household incom e 
after co -o p e ra t iv iza t io n
Source:
1,250 
791
JM JP, 1 0 /1 1 /5 5 ,  op. c i t .
Index with 
average in ­
com e  be fore  
c o -o p e r a t iv i -  
zation as 100
1 0 0 . 0 0
140.00
166.67
105.73
These f igures  illustrate the potential rather than the actual im pact o f
the A P C s upon in com e . Not only was Soochow one o f  the r ichest  regions o f
Kiangsu and l ik e ly  to benefit f r o m  co -op era t iv iza t ion  m o r e  than m ost  areas
but also the particu lar  APC in question was not a typ ical exam ple. Thus,
average household incom e in Soochow was second  only  to that o f  Sung-chiang
Special D istr ict ;  and within Soochow itse lf  the average leve l  o f  incom e
after co -o p e ra t iv iza t io n  shown above (1, 050 ytian) was m o re  than twice the
(84)average fo r  the whole Special D istr ict .
(83)
Data showing the extent to which peasant in com es  in the APCs w ere
rising o r  falling are alm ost totally  lacking and the findings with regard  to
the two hsien  fo r  which som e in form ation  is available can be b r ie f ly
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D istr ict )  between 85. 5% and 93 .75%  o f  the m em bers  o f  one APC rece ived
(85)in crea ses  in in com e during the f irs t  three years  o f  its existence .
Second, in the 187 c o -o p s  o f  Ch 'ang-shu  hsien 93 .41%  o f  m e m b e r  households
/QO
enjoyed h igher in co m e s ,  though the rest  suffered  d ec lin es .  '
summarized. F irst, in H sin-hai-lien Municipality (Hsti-chou Special
Throughout this d iscu ss ion  our ch ie f  con cern  has been the im pact o f  
the co -o p e ra t iv e s  on output and incom e. But in addition to raising average 
leve ls  o f  production  and incom e the co -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent was expected 
to reduce differentiation  between c la sse s  by  achieving a m o r e  equitable 
distribution. This is an aspect o f  institutional change to which we shall return 
when we examine the e ffect  o f  the co lle c t iv es  upon the agricultural se c to r .  
M eanwhile, the following figures o f fe r  a preview  to that d iscu ss ion  by showing 
how lo w e r - le v e l  AP C s could reduce incom e differentia ls  between peasants.
Table IV. 12; P o o r  and m iddle peasant incom e b e fore  and 
after co -op era t iv iza t ion  in M in-chu  A P C ,
W ang-tzu hsiang, L iu -h o  hsien ( Yang-chou S. D. ) .
1953 (be fore  c o - o p e r a ­
tivization)
1954 ( f ir s t  year  of
co -op era t iv iza t ion )
1955
Source-
A verage 
incom e of 
poor  
peas ant 
household
32 ytlan
136
214
A verage  Index o f
in com e of poor  peasant
m iddle 
pe as ant 
household
in com e, if  
m iddle peasant 
incom e = 100
252 ytian 12.70
309
343
44. 01 
62 .39
HHJP, 2 4 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t .
The usual qualifications about representativeness  apply here (an average
household incom e o f  32 ytian was low even fo r  the p o o re st  regions of north
(87)Kiangsu, let alone Yang-chou). But such p rob lem s  apart, the case  o f
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M in-chu  APC illustrates  how the new system  o f fa c to r  payments in the c o -o p s  
could bring about a fa ir e r  d istribution o f  in com e. It also serv es  to rem ind 
us that the co -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent had other aims than s im ply  raising 
productiv ity  in the agricultural s e c to r .
(2) The h ig h e r - le v e l  c o l le c t iv e s ;
Mo J ih -ta 's  analysis o f the APC M ovement in China leaves us in no
doubt o f  the benefits con fe rre d  by  co llect iv iza t ion  on the agricultural se c to r .
The rate o f  land utilization had been in creased , m ost  obv iously  through the
consolidation  o f  fragm ented holdings, but also by  land rec lam ation  and by
(89)raising the m ultiple cropping index (MCI). B a s ic  construction  p ro jects
had been c a rr ie d  out and irr igation  and drainage fa c i l it ie s  im proved . There
had also been im provem ents  in the rate of labour utilization and labour 
(90)e f f ic ien cy .  New and better  techniques had been introduced. The rural
econ om y had b e co m e  m o re  d ivers if ied ,  esp ec ia l ly  through the developm ent
(91)
(88)
o f  su bs id ia ries ,  
output had r isen
And o f  c o u rse ,  as the following table dem onstrates ,
Table IV. 13; Food grain output in lo w e r - le v e l  and h ig h er - 
leve l APCs in China; 1955.
A verage  output 
per  m ou (of 
arable area)
Average output 
per  agricultural 
household
C o -op era t ive
C o llect ive
209 .0  3 ,727
288 .7  4,361
N ote; All units are in shih chin
Source ; Mo Jih-ta, op. c i t . , p. 122
A verage output 
per head of 
agricultural 
population
808
966
Average  yields o f  grain  in the co llec t iv es  w ere  38. 13% higher than those
o f  the lo w e r - le v e l  c o -o p s  while output p er  capita and per  household was
-2 8 2 -
19. 55% and 17.01% higher resp ect ive ly .  In addition, the r ises  in production
(92)w ere  accom panied  by a reduction in costs .
Investment rates and incom e levels  had also r isen  in the co l le c t iv e s .  
Agricu ltura l investm ent represented  28. 5% o f  total agricultural incom e
(40 .4%  in the case  of subs id ia ries )  com pared  with 21 .9%  and 30 .3%  in
(93) (94)c o -o p s .  W elfare  and accumulation funds w ere  h igher too . As fo r
incom e M o 's  data suggested a 50% differential between the higher and lo w e r -
leve l  units:
Table IV. 14: Incom e per household in lo w e r - le v e l  and 
h ig h e r -le v e l  APCs in China.______________
Income p er  Index
household ______
C o-op era t ive  274 .3  ytian 100.00
C ollect ive  412 .50 150.38
Source ; Mo Jih-ta, op. c i t . , p. 124.
In short, Mo J ih -ta 's  findings indicated that the co l le c t iv e s  had m et 
with unqualified su cce ss  in China. The question m ust now be asked; to what 
extent was this p er fo rm an ce  emulated by  Kiangsu?
Our approach to this question will be as fo llow s : first, we shall examine 
two exam ples o f  the planned changes in rural production  in 1956 and 1957. 
This w ill give som e idea  o f  the anticipated im pact o f  co l lec t iv iza t ion  and it 
w ill u sefu lly  serv e  as a kind o f  backcloth  (though not n e c e s s a r i ly  a r e p r e ­
sentative one) fo r  the d iscu ss ion  o f  the actual changes that fo l low s . In o rd e r  
to s im plify  the analysis o f  the econ om ic  effects  o f  the co lle c t iv es  we shall 
con s ider  separate ly  the relationship between the h ig h e r - le v e l  APCs and 
labour productiv ity ; technical change; agricultural production (total output
o r  yields p er  unit area); and in com e. Finally, we shall try  to say something
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about changes in the c lass  com posit ion  o f  rural so c ie ty  resulting fro m  the 
events o f  1956.
That substantial gains w ere  expected to flow fro m  co llectiv iza tion  is
c le a r  fro m  the following data showing the planned yields o f  food  grains fo r
one o f  the p oorest  regions o f  Kiangsu in 1956 and 1957:
Table IV. 15: Planned yields o f  food  grains in Hstf-chou 
Special D istr ict : 1956 and 1957.__________
Average yield  Index with
of food  grains 1955 yield
=  100 .0
1955 (actual) 210 ch in /m ou  100.00
1956 344 163.81
1957 471 224.29
Source ; B roadcast  report, 3 /1 /5 6
(Hsii-chou News).
The figures require  little com m ent and we need only em phasize the
v e r y  ambitious nature o f  the plans; within two years  average grain  yields
w ere to be m o re  than doubled, the sim ple average rate o f  growth im plied
(95)
by the 1957 target being 62. 15% p. a.
M ore interesting still,  because of their greater  detail w ere the plans 
fo r  a single co l le c t iv e  in Chiang-ning hsien in Table IV. 16 overlea f;
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The sim ple  average rate o f  growth im plied  by  these figures ranged
fro m  49. 11% per year  fo r  food grains to 71. 5% fo r  o il  crops  - the kinds of
in crea se  that w ere  m o re  in keeping with the atm osphere o f  the later  "great
leap fo rw a rd "  than o f  the F irs t  Plan. The planned grain  yield  fo r  1956 not
only represented  a 67 .7%  in crease  o ver  the previous year  but i f  attained,
p rom ised  to give Tung-shan APC higher yields than those o f  the T 'a i-h u  
(96)region. M ost striking o f  all w ere  the plans fo r  subsid iaries  which fore
(97)saw an e leven -fo ld  in crease  within two yea rs .  ' If these targets w ere 
attained subsid iary  incom e would represent 2 0 . 2 9% o f  g ro ss  agricultural 
and subsid iary  incom e in 1956 and 23.63%  in 1957.
As the following table shows, these plans had v e r y  profound w elfare
im plications fo r  the m em b ers  o f  Tung-shan APC:
Table IV. 17: Incom e effects  o f  planned agricultural 
and subsid iary  expansion in Tung-shan 
C ollect ive : 1956-57.
G ross  agricultural and 
subsid iary  incom e
C osts ,  adm inistrative 
expenses , taxes , c o n ­
tributions to w elfare  
and accum ulation funds
Income available fo r  
distribution
A verage  incom e p er  head
Total grain  output
Deductions fo r  taxes, 
seeds and CPCS
Grain available fo r  
d istribution
A verage  grain  per  head 
Note:
1956 
271 ,126 ytian
67,110
204,016
300 ytian
2 ,4 9 9 ,2 0 4  chin
532,954
1 ,966 ,25 0
1,250 chin
1957 
333 ,266 ytian
82,656
250,610
450 ytian
2, 954 ,037 chin
531,617
2 ,4 2 2 ,4 2 0
1, 540 chin
Total m em bersh ip  o f  Tung-shan C ollect ive ; 
1, 573
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Source: Table V . 24.
It is im p oss ib le  to say how representative these targets w ere  although 
in the light o f  Chou ’ s call fo r  a "great leap "  in agricu ltural production^*^ 
and the op tim ism  engendered by  co llectiv ization  it m ay  be that such large 
planned in crea ses  in output and incom e w ere not uncom m on.
Let us now turn to the actual p er form an ce  o f  the co l le c t iv e s .  The
argument that the fu l ly -so c ia l is t  units would im prove  labour e ff ic ie n cy  is
supported by  a num ber o f  reports  f r o m  various parts of Kiangsu. F o r
exam ple, an investigation o f  a co l lec t iv e  in Chiang-ning hsien revealed  that
the num ber o f  labour days worked per  unit of labour was 173 in 1955 (after
the h ig h e r -le v e l  APC had been set up) com pared  with 75 in 1953, when no 
(99)
APC existed . O ver the sam e period  wages had also r isen  fro m  1 yttan
p er  labour day to 1.73 yttan. Adm ittedly, this co l le c t iv e  was one of the few
to have been established b e fore  the "h igh -t id e"  but reports  fro m  the "high-
t id e"  period  i t se l f  m ade s im ila r  c la im s .  In L i -m in  C o llec t ive ,  Sung-chiang
hsien  the rate o f  w ork attendance had r isen  fro m  20-30%  to 80% during the
winter o f  1 9 5 6 .^ ^  In Sui-ning hsien  (Hstt-chou Specia l D istr ict )  the
establishm ent o f  a m od e l co l lec t iv e  had pushed up the rate o f  attendance to
84% (an in crea se  o f  45%).^  ^ And statistics  fro m  the northern and eastern
suburbs o f  Shanghai showed that p easants ’ rate o f  w ork  attendance in 1956
( 1 0 2 )was between 20% and 40% higher than the 1955 leve l .
Such im provem ents  in w ork  participation  com bined with greater
contro l o ver  fa c tors  o f  production perm itted la r g e - s c a le  construction
p ro je c ts  to be undertaken by  the co l le c t iv e s .  In the f ir s t  five months of
1956 the amount o f  ir r iga t ion  w ork com pleted  under the auspices o f  the
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h ig h e r - le v e l  APCs was 1.7 tim es that o f  the previous three y e a r s . '
Some 409 m ill ion  cubic m etres  of earth w ere m oved . The irr igated  area 
was expanded by 8, 860, 000 m ou and the drained area  by  15, 890, 000 m ou. 
Conditions fo r  agricultural production w ere thereby considerab ly  im proved .
The new institutional fram ew ork  also enabled s ignificant technical
im rpovem ents  to be m ade. The rationalization o f  cropping patterns was a
case  in point. In 1956 6, 520, 000 m ou o f  land sown under glutinous r ice  was
converted  to non-glutinous va rie t ies ;  a further 1 ,270 , 000 m ou was changed
fro m  d r y -  to w e t-c ro p p e d  r ice ;  and 630, 000 m ou o f  d ou b le -crop p ed  r ice  was
extended. The con vers ion  o f  50, 000 m ou o f  low -output, m ed iu m -
( 106)maturing paddy to higher-output varieties  in the Shanghai suburbs ' was
likew ise  attributed to the im proved  organizational structure o f  the co l le c t iv e s .
The extension o f  the sown area had a spec ia l s ign ificance  in Kiangsu.
In m any parts o f  the p rov in ce ,  e sp e c ia l ly  the r ich  areas south o f  the Yangtze, 
the high density o f  agricultural population and intensive cultivation p ractised  
fo r  m any centuries  had left little scope  fo r  further extending the arable 
a r e a J ^ ^  It fo llow ed  that r ises  in yields w ere  bound to be the principal 
s ou rce  o f  future agricultural growth. Hence the im portance  of extending
x ( 108)the sown area (that is ,  raising the multiple cropping index). The
following two exam ples suggest the ability of the co l le c t iv e s  to contribute 
towards this end;
(103)
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Table IV. 18: Expansion o f  multiple cropping in two 
hsien  in Kiangsu: 1955-57_____________
K ' UN - SHAN SS U - YANG
MCI Index MCI Index
1955 (be fore  
c o -o p e r a t iv ­
ization) 175 100.00 150 100.00
1957 192 109.71 200 133.33
S ources ; K 'un-shan - HHJP, 5 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "A P C s A re
Superior  to the Small Peasant 
E con om y ".
Ssu-yang - HHJP, 1 0 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "A  R ise  of 
70% in Food  Grain Production  
During the Two Years o f  
C o -op era t iv iza t ion " .
The data do not separate the e ffects  of co -op era t iv iza t ion  and 
co llect iv iza t ion  but in view  o f  the speed with which the co llec t iv es  superseded  
the c o -o p s  it seem s reasonable to assume that they m ain ly  re f le c t  the im pact 
o f  the h ig h e r - le v e l  units. M o re o v e r ,  it was in 1956, after the "secon d  high- 
t id e"  had a lready begun, that the greatest e ffort  was m ade to extend double 
cropping.
In K 'un-shan  and Ssu-yang there had been a significant r ise  in the 
m u ltip le -crop p in g  index since  1 9 5 5 .^ ^ ^  In both cases  it is reasonable to 
suppose that the sou rce  o f  the im provem ent was pr inc ipa lly  the benefits 
stem m ing fro m  the co llec t iv e  organization - unified managem ent o f  the land, 
the ability to plant the m ost  rational cropping pattern and the capacity  to 
m ob il ize  the labour fo r c e  fully and effic iently  (so  ensuring that the m ost  
urgent jobs w ere  done f irs t  and on tim e).
The in cre a se  in output resulting fr o m  a higher MCI could be substantial.
F o r  exam ple, one sou rce  suggested that by  changing f r o m  s in g le -crop p in g  to
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doub le -cropp ing  o f  r ice  in Kiangsu average unit area  y ie lds could be ra ised  
by  m o re  than 68%. if  this leve l  o f  in crease  had applied to the two hsien
the result would have been to in crease  total output in K 'un-shan  by 6. 8% and in 
Ssu-yang by 22 .44%  Even allowing fo r  a cons iderab ly  sm a lle r  r ise  in y ie lds , 
it is c le a r  that the effect  on total output was still l ik e ly  to be significant.
B e fore  examining the d irect  evidence relating to output in the co llec t iv es  
it w ill be usefu l to say a little about conditions fo r  agricultural production in
1956. In contrast to the exceptionally  favourable natural conditions of 1955, 
1956 was a year  o f  seriou s  d isasters  (certa in ly  the m ost  serious  s ince  1949 
and perhaps the wo rst in a hundred yea rs ) .  F ro m  M ay to July, heavy rain 
affected the wheat c rop  as w ell as ear ly  and m edium -m aturing  varieties  o f 
r ic e ;  throughout August and Septem ber, high winds, typhoons and violent 
s torm s exacerbated  the situation, causing damage to cotton, late r ice  and 
other food  c r o p s .  In all, 40 m illion  m ou (42. 5% of K iangsu's total arable 
area) w ere  f looded  during 1956.^  ^ In such c ircu m stan ces  it was unlikely
that agricultural production  would be in creased  and any assessm en t o f  the 
p er form an ce  o f  the co lle c t iv es  should c le a r ly  take this into account.
Sung-chiang and Soochow Special D istricts  contained the r ichest  a g r icu l­
tural land in Kiangsu and despite the adverse conditions, grain output here 
actually in crea sed  by 7 .7%  between 1955 and 1 9 5 6 .^  ^  Part o f  the reason  
was undoubtedly that the natural d isasters  had a l e s s e r  im pact here  than in 
other parts o f  the p rov in ce .  N everthe less , w riters  w ere  not slow to attribute 
the s u cce ss  p r im a r i ly  to the institutional changes that had o c c u rr e d .  In 
Sung-chiang it was c la im ed  that co l lectiv iza tion  had enabled the g ross  value 
output o f  agriculture and subsid iaries  to be maintained at the 1955 leve l and
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grain  output to be in creased  by  alm ost 200 m illion  chin. Emphasis was
particu larly  p laced  on the c o l le c t iv e s '  proven ability to in crea se  yields o f  
whe at:
Table IV. 19: A verage wheat y ields in 
Sung-chiang S .D ._______
Average  yields
L o w e r - le v e l  A P C s ; 1956 201 chin per m ou
H ig h er - lev e l  A P C s ; 1956 185
Individual peasants; 1956 100. 50
Sung-chiang S. D.; 1955 179*98
S ource; HHJP, 1 8 /1 2 /5 6 ,  op. c i t . , p . l ,  citing figures
f ir s t  published in JM JP, 1 5 /9 /5 6 ,  "Enthusi­
astic Demands to Join H ig h e r -L e v e l  A P C s " .
Thus, in 1956 average yields of wheat in the co l le c t iv e s  o f  Sung-chiang 
w ere 8. 65% higher than in c o -o p e ra t iv e s  and alm ost tw ice  as high as those 
achieved by  the few peasants who continued to farm  on their  own. The v e ry  
wide gap between the yields o f  individual and 'c o -o p e r a t iv e '  peasants is o f 
p articu lar in terest  and would seem  to be a vindication of the organizational 
strength o f  the co l le c t iv es  (and c o -o p s )  in unfavourable cond it ions . In 1955 
the ability o f  the c o -o p s  to ra ise  output above the leve l  attained by  peasants 
in M ATs o r  still working as a fam ily  unit was not noticeab ly  great. But 1955 
was a year  o f  exceptionally  good natural conditions. In 1956, when conditions 
w ere exceptionally  bad, it m ay  be that the su p erior ity  of la r g e -s c a le  a g r i ­
cultural co -o p e ra t io n  was m o re  eas ily  dem onstrated. That is ,  the adverse 
e ffects  o f  flooding could only be combatted and o v e r c o m e  through the c o n ­
certed  efforts  o f  a large  num ber o f  people; this the co lle c t iv es  w ere ideally  
suited to prov ide , while the individual peasant was he lp less  against the 
d isa s te rs .  In this way the co lle c t iv e  could achieve h igher wheat yields in
-291 -
( 113)
It is true that just as e a r l ie r  examples w ere con s idered  unrepresentative , 
so too the data cited above m ay not be typical. But even i f  this w ere allowed 
fo r ,  we would argue that for  the reasons just given the yields o f  individual 
peasants would still ,  in the poor  conditions of 1956, be s ignificantly  low er  than 
those o f  the c o -o p s  and co l le c t iv e s .
In Chinkiang Special D istr ict  too , in creases  in the y ie ld  o f  ear ly  and 
m edium  paddy was put down to co llectiv ization ;
Table IV. 20; Average  yields o f  e a r ly  and m edium  
paddy in Chinkiang S. D.______________
1956 even though those of the individual peasants fell dramatically by 44. 16%.
Although there is no reason  to doubt the c la im  that the 400 chin yield 
o f  1956 was m ade p oss ib le  by  irr iga tion  construction  and repair  w ork ca rr ied  
out by  the co l le c t iv e ,  the true quantitative im pact o f  co l lect iv iza t ion  is not 
brought out by  these f igu res .  The absence o f  a figure fo r  1955 would suggest 
that y ie lds fe ll  betw een that year  and 1956; and although we would not argue 
that yields in 1954 (a lso  omitted) w ere also higher than in 1956, the d ifference  
between these two years  m ay not have been v e r y  significant. In short, the 
su cce ss  o f  co l lec t iv iza t ion  in Chinkiang was probably  le s s  than is suggested 
by  the data in IV. 20.
1950
1953
1956
Average  yields
250. 00 chin per  m ou
344.83
400 .00
Source ; HHJP, 1 6 /9 /5 6 ,  p . 2, "B um per H arvests o f
E a rly  and Medium Paddy in Chinkiang 
Special D is tr ic t " .
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Data fo r  other parts o f Kiangsu are unfortunately v e r y  lim ited . Despite 
c la im s that con vers ion  o f  land fro m  dry to wet crops  had led to spectacu lar
in crea ses  in grain  production  in H sii-chou and H wai-yin , there appears to be
no quantitative in form ation  at all on yields o r  total output in these Special 
D istr icts  during 1 9 5 6 .^ ^ ^  Since this was traditionally  the region  m ost  
susceptib le  to d isa sters  and with the m ost  unstable output it is m o re  likely  
that there was a substantial decline in production in 1956; indeed the lack  o f  
data m ay be an indication o f  this. E lsew here , in form ation  is v e r y  f r a g ­
m entary  and adds little to our knowledge o f  the effects  o f  co l lec t iv es  upon 
output. Take fo r  exam ple the following estim ates o f  y ields in a co l lec t iv e  
in Yang-chou Special D istr ict :
Table IV. 21: A verage yields and total output in
Ta-wang C ollect ive ,  Y ang-chou  S. D.
A verage  yields Total output 
1954 224 chin per  m ou 410, 000 chin
1956 303 710 ,000
Source : HHJP, 2 1 /1 /5 7 ,  p . 2.
As in an e a r l ie r  exam ple the om iss io n  of a figure fo r  1955 seem s to
indicate a fall in output between that year  and 1956. Even so the com pa rison
between 1954 and 1956 is o f  cons iderab le  interest. F o r  1954 was also a year
o f  natural d isa s te rs ,  but on a le ss  serious  sca le  than in 1956. The fact that
yields in the latter year  w ere  still 35 .27%  higher than in 1954 could there fore
be an indication o f  the s u cce ss  o f  the co llect ives  in overcom in g  the adverse
conditions. N otice too that total output rose  by 73. 17%, showing that as a
so u rce  o f  growth yie ld  in crea ses  w ere m argina lly  le s s  important than the
extension o f  the arable a r e a . ^ ^ ^  H ow ever, in the absence o f  data fo r  1955
it is im p oss ib le  to say how far  this was the result o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion  o r
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co llect iv iza t ion .
Interesting as this example is in its own right, u ltim ately  we are bound 
to question its representativen ess . In the case  o f  Ta-w ang C ollect ive ,  the 
fact that the f igures  w ere  cited in o r d e r  to rebut those who w ere  questioning 
the e co n o m ic  validity o f  the co l le c t iv es  following the decline in production 
which had o c c u r r e d  in som e o f  them, makes them m o r e  suspect than usual.
It would be wrong th ere fore  to draw any general in feren ces  fro m  the data 
shown above.^ ^
W e  m ay  conclude this survey  o f  output trends in the co l le c t iv es  by  c o n ­
s idering the case  o f  Shanghai. H ere m o re  than anywhere e lse  the d ec is ion  
to c o l le c t iv ize  is vindicated by the quantitative in form ation  that is available 
fo r  1956. In the suburbs of the M unicipality 1956 agricultural and subsid iary  
g ross  value output was 11.3%  higher than in the previous  b u m p er-h arvest  
y e a r J ^ ^  Total output o f  vegetables (outstandingly im portant in the suburbs) 
rose  by  23 .9% ; y ie lds  o f  food  grains by  4 .4%  to 712 chin p er  m o u / ^ ^  and 
pig num bers w ere  up by  20%. C ollect iv ization  and the d issem ination  o f
the Twelve Y ear  Plan w ere  held out as the reasons fo r  this s u c ce s s .
How should we sum m arize  the im pact o f  co l le c t iv iza t ion  upon agricultural
productiv ity  and output in Kiangsu? The lack o f  data fo r  1956 re flects  the
disappointment o v e r  the p er form an ce  o f  agriculture in that year: it was
after all openly admitted that the 1956 grain  targets had not been fulfilled.^
By extension the likelihood o f  attaining the kind o f  targets that w ere  cited
at the beginning o f  this d i s c u s s io n ^ ^ ^  was even m o re  rem ote . But because
o f the sever ity  o f  the adverse  conditions in 1956 such fa ilure  should not be
equated with the fa ilure  o f  co llectiv iza tion . On the con trary , we would argue
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that it was p r e c is e ly  the existence o f  these conditions that to som e extent 
vindicated the new institutional structure. F o r  it was their  centra lized  
m anagement and unified control o ver  reso u rce s  which enabled them to c a r r y  
out la r g e -s c a le  ir r iga tion  and drainage p ro jects  and thereby  protect  a g r i ­
culture fro m  the w orst  e ffects  o f  the floods and other ca lam it ies .  Such under­
takings w ere  beyond the capacity  o f  individual peasants who w ere  in consequence 
exposed to the full f o r c e  o f  the d isa sters .  There is som e evidence too that 
the co lle c t iv es  s u cce ss fu l ly  im plem ented technical r e fo rm s  and im proved  
e f f ic ien cy  in the use o f  r e s o u rc e s ,  so benefitting agricultural production.
The overa ll  result was that in 1956, fo r  the f ir s t  tim e since  M ao 's  speech 
"On C o -op era t iv iza t ion " ,  the superior ity  o f  agricultural co -o p e ra t io n  over  
individual peasant farm ing was c le a r ly  dem onstrated .
Yet paradox ica lly ,  this strong showing o f  the h ig h e r - le v e l  APCs did not 
lead to grea ter  confidence in them. Instead o f  recogn iz ing  the su cce ss  o f  the 
co lle c t iv es  in combatting the natural d isasters  the peasants m e r e ly  noted the 
production d ec lin es ; and it was these that they equated with co lle c t iv e  p e r ­
fo rm a n ce .  The result was not renewed optim ism  but growing d isillusionm ent. 
Thus, the iron y  was that the events of 1956 which might have provided a f irm  
foundation fo r  the new institutional structure served  m ainly to undermine it
and in 1957 the agricultural s e c to r  in Kiangsu was faced  with a serious
• • (122) c r i s i s .
No quantitative indicators  o f  the im pact o f  co l lec t iv iza t ion  on incom es
in the agricultural s e c to r  have yet been given. In L ia n g -l i  C ollect ive  an
investigation o f  20 households showed that incom e was at least 50% and at
(123)best 280% higher than it had been in the original s e m i - s o c ia l i s t  c o -o p .
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But this r e fe r r e d  to the p er iod  b e fo re  the "secon d  h ig h -t id e "  and was designed 
m o re  to show the potential o f  co l le c t iv es  than the rea lity  o f  1956. M ore u s e ­
ful are the few reports  published la ter  in 1956 and 1957. F o r  exam ple, in 
Sung-chiang Specia l D istr ic t  90% o f  APC m em bers  had in creased  their incom es 
s ince  1955 - a significant f igure , since it showed that one o f  the c r i te r ia  fo r  
the establishm ent o f  co l lec t iv es  had been m et. In L i -m in  C ollect ive  (also in 
Sung-chiang) 88% o f  m em b ers  w ere  said to have rece ived  higher incom es.^
But Sung-chiang was situated in the r ichest  reg ion  o f  the province  and 
its p er form an ce  was unlikely to be a good guide to that o f  other areas. It is 
interesting th ere fore  that another report, while c la im ing r ises  in incom e fo r  
80-90% of co l le c t iv e  m em b ers  in the "good "  areas o f  the p rov in ce , cited a 
figure o f  70-80%  fo r  the "n o rm a l"  areas J  In view  o f  the natural d isasters
o f  1956, it seem s reasonable to suppose that in other unmentioned areas 
where conditions w ere  w orse  than "n o rm a l"  a m uch sm a lle r  proportion  o f  
peasants enjoyed h igher in com es . F o r  Kiangsu as a whole it is there fore  
unlikely that the 90% incom e cr ite r io n  was m et in 1956.
Am ong peasants living in urban areas the sm all amount o f  available data
point towards considerab le  im provem ents in living standards, as m easured
by in com es . In the suburbs o f  Soochow 1956 was said to have brought a
higher leve l  o f  in com e to 33, 801 agricultural households o r  90. 3% o f all the
. (126)households in APCs (that is ,  co l le c t iv es ) .  A verage  per  capita incom e
in 1956 was o v e r  90 ytian, an in crease  o f  20% o v e r  1955. In the Shanghai 
suburbs the p er form an ce  was less  good, only 70% o f  peasants in co lle c t iv es  
having ra ised  their  in com e between 1955 and 1956 .^^*^  N everthe less , 
taking a lo n g e r -ru n  view , the changes which had taken p lace  since 'L iberation '
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remained quite im pressive:
Table IV. 22: Changes in peasant in com e in the suburbs 
o f  Shanghai since 'L ib e ra t io n 1 (1949)._____
A verage per A verage  per
capita annual household
incom e  annual incom e
B efore  'L ibera t ion ' 49 ytian 203 ytian
After  co l lect iv iza t ion  
(that is ,  1956) 99 437
Source ; C F JP , 3 0 /8 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
In other w ord s ,  average per capita incom e had r isen  by 102. 04% (a
1 128)sim ple average o f  14. 58% p. a. ) ' and per household incom e by 115.27%
(16.47%  p. a . ) .
Peasant incom e co m p rised  not only receipts  f r o m  agriculture but also
those fro m  subsid ia ry  production. It was to be expected  that by carry ing
out agricultural operations m o re  effic iently  the co l le c t iv e s  would also give
a boost to subsid iaries .^  If this w ere  the ca se ,  declining agricultural
incom e resulting fro m  the adverse conditions o f  1956 might be partia lly
offset  by a r ise  in subsid iary  in com e. Unfortunately, evidence on this is
lacking fo r  1956 though it is o f  som e interest that the big in crease  in p ig -
rearing during the f irs t  half o f  that year  was said to have been one o f  the
(130)m a jo r  factors  contributing to r ises  in rural in com e.
But changes in the absolute leve l o f  incom e is not the only c r ite r ion  fo r
judging the s u cce ss  o f  the c o l le c t iv e s .  Changes in incom e distribution also
need to be cons idered  and o f  spec ia l interest is an account o f  the experience
o f  one APC in Ssu-yang h s ien , which illustrates this aspect o f  co llectiv ization .
The incom e rece ived  by  d ifferent c la sse s  of peasants in this area p r io r  to
co -op era t iv iza t ion  is shown in the following table;
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Table IV. 23; Incom e levels  o f  poor  and m iddle peasants 
be fo re  they w ere  in corp ora ted  into T s 'a n g -  
chi A P C , Ssu-yang hsien.___________________
A verage  in com e (1953)
P o o r  peasants 18 .94  ytlan
L o w e r -m id d le  peasants 2 7 .35
U pper-m idd le  peasants 41 .00
A verage  32 .00
Source ; HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
This pattern represented  a v e r y  inequitable distribution o f  in com e. The 
u p p er-m idd le  peasants re ce ived  alm ost 30% m o re  than the overa ll  average 
incom e while the lo w e r -m id d le  and p oor  peasants w ere  both beneath that 
f igure (the latter by  m o re  than 40%). The d ifferentia l between poor  and 
u p p er-m idd le  peasants was 116.5%. H ow ever, as a result o f  co llectiv ization , 
by  1957 (the 1956 figure is not available), the average incom e o f  all m em bers  
had reached 70 yiian - m o re  than twice the fo rm e r  average and 70% above 
the up p er-m id d le  peasant leve l.  M o re o v e r ,  it is c le a r  that it was the less  
w e l l -o f f  peasants who had gained m ost ,  fo r  it was c la im ed  that 95 .79%  of
the or ig ina l p oor  peasants had by  1957 achieved the incom e leve l  o f  m iddle
was n
(132)
peasants. On a m o r e  general ba s is ,  such a c la im  made for
increas in g  num bers o f  co l le c t iv e  m em bers  in late 1957.
The exp er ien ce  o f  this APC would appear to be a strong argument for
co llect iv iza t ion  in Kiangsu. O verall,  incom es  had r isen  considerab ly  and
although the greatest benefits had doubtless accrued  to the p o o re r  peasants,
the u p p er-m idd le  m em b ers  had in creased  the absolute leve l  o f  their  earnings
(133)even i f  they had failed to maintain their fo rm e r  relative position. The
usual caveats about representativeness  obv iously  apply to this single case .
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H ow ever, even i f  it is a better-than  average exam ple, a p r io r i  reasoning 
would suggest that the general trend which it dem onstrates  had a w ider
applicability. The wholly w age-based  distribution system  of the fully - 
s o c ia l is t  co l le c t iv e s  was bound to im prove  the in com es  o f  p oor  peasants at 
the expense o f  those o f  the b e t te r -o f f .
A d ifferent avenue o f  approach to the question o f  the im pact o f  c o l l e c ­
tivization upon living standards is to examine the changing d istribution o f  
food grains among peasants.^ The predictable  shortage o f  in form ation
m akes it im p oss ib le  to do this on even a hsien -w ide  (let alone a provincia l)  
b a s is ,  but the following data derived  fro m  an investigation o f  a single 
co l le c t iv e  in Fou-ning hsien are suggestive o f  the trends that w ere  under way;
Table IV. 24; A verage annual grain  rations among 369
households b e fore  and after co -operativ ization  
and co llectiv ization : H sin -ch iao  APC, 
Fou-ning hsien.___________________________________
P r e - c o - o p e r a -  
tivization 1953
386. 0 ytian
P o s t -co l le c t iv iza t io n  
_______ 1956____________
P o o r  peasants 
L ow er -m id d le  peasants 
U pper-m iddle  peasants 
Rich peasants 
Landlords
417. 5
411 .0  ytian 
428. 5
433. 5 432. 5
417. 0 413. 0
415. 0 410. 0
Average 413. 8 419. 0
Source : F ro m  data given in HHJP, 1 8 /9 /5 7 ,  p. 2,
"Thoroughly  Understand the Question o f  
Levels  o f  Grain Rations Among P easan ts" .
These figures w ill  be m o re  eas ily  understood i f  they are converted  to
index form ;
Table IV. 25; The same data presented  as three 
index s e r ie s .
P o o r  peasants 
L ow er -m id d le  peasants 
U pper-m idd le  peasants 
Rich peasants 
Landlo rds
A verage
Source;
1953
Index with 
average 
(1953) as 
100
93. 28 
100.89 
104.76 
100.77 
1 0 0 . 2 9  
1 0 0 . 0 0  
Table IV. 24.
1956
Index with 
average 
(1956) as 
100
98. 09 
102.27 
103.22 
98. 57
97 .85
1 0 0 . 0 0
Change in 
grain 
rations 
o ver  1953
+ 6 .48%
+ 2 .63%
- 0 .23%
-  0 . 9 6 %
-  1 . 2 0 %
+ 1.26%
The table bears  out what was said e a r l ie r  about changes in incom e 
leve ls  and distribution. Between 1953 and 1956 it was the poor and lo w e r -  
m iddle peasants who apparently gained m ost  fr o m  the institutional changes 
( a p r i o r i , e s p e c ia l ly  fro m  the co l le c t iv e s ) .  Indeed w hereas these two 
ca tegor ies  re ce ived  higher grain rations in 1956, land lords , upper-m idd le  
and rich  peasants actually su ffered  a decline . The m o r e  equitable d is t r i ­
bution in 1956 is shown by  the narrowing o f  the gap between the highest and 
low est grain  rations fro m  4 7 .5  chin (1953) to 2 2 .5  (1956); a fall o f  52. 63%. 
N otice how ever that in 1956 it was still the up p er-m id d le  peasants who w ere 
best o ff,  fo llow ed  c lo s e ly  by  their lo w er-m id d le  counterparts . Ration leve ls  
o f  the other groups w ere  v e r y  s im ila r .  It would be o f  great interest to know 
how far this pattern was repeated e lsew here  in the p rov in ce ,  but until m o re  
data b e co m e  available we present these figures as further support f o r  our 
contention that co llect iv iza t ion  did effect  a m o re  equitable distribution of 
incom e within the rural so c ie ty  o f  Kiangsu.
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This d iscu ss ion  leads us f inally  to con s ider  the extent to which the
institutional changes had altered the c lass  structure in the countryside of
Kiangsu. In contrast to the s tr ic t  checks on landlord  and rich  peasant
participation during s e m i -s o c ia l i s t  co -op era t iv iza t ion  both groups seem  to
have been in corp ora ted  into the em ergent co llec t iv e  agriculture on an
in creas in g ly  wide sca le .  In the Shanghai suburbs it was c la im ed  that
co llec t iv iza t ion  was gradually  eliminating exploitation by  the r ich  peasants
and thereby  rem oving the b a r r ie r s  to their entry into the new agricultural
(135)
fram ew ork . In the w estern  suburbs 43% o f all landlords had been allowed
to jo in  the co l le c t iv es  and throughout the entire suburban area m o re  than 
85% o f r ich  peasants had b ecom e  m e m b e rs .
The search  fo r  a m o re  equitable distribution o f  rewards had obvious 
im plications fo r  the c lass  com posit ion  of rural s o c ie ty .  There w ere  reports  
o f  in creas in g  num bers of peasants having achieved the living standards o f  
m iddle peasants. An artic le  published late in 1957 review ed the p ro g re ss  
o f  the co -op era t iv iza t ion  campaigns and stated that im provem ents  in a g r i ­
cultural and subsid iary  production and incom e had reduced the number of
peasants living in straitened c ircum stances  and brought about an in crea se  in
(137)those attaining m iddle peasant status. At the sam e tim e, landlords and
(138)rich  peasants had to support them selves  through their  own labour. '
In this way the two ends o f  the c lass  spectrum  w ere  brought c lo s e r  together. 
M ost interesting o f  all w ere  representative investigations o f  conditions in 
the four Special D istr icts  o f  Sung-chiang, Chinkiang, Y en -ch 'en g  and Hsti- 
chou which revea led  a rem arkable  transform ation  within rural soc ie ty  since 
the tim e o f  land re form ;
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Table IV. 26; The c lass  structure o f  rural soc ie ty  in
Sung-chiang, Chinkiang, Y en -ch 'en g  and 
H sti-chou Special D istr icts  at the tim e of 
land re fo rm  and after co llectiv iza t ion .
P o o r  peasants
Middle peasants 
(L o w e r-m id d le )  
(U pper-m idd le  )
Total 
( 'Others ')
LAND REFORM
As percentage of 
all peasants
63. 50
30. 35
Source :
93. 85 
( 6 . 15)
HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
PO ST-
COLLECTIVIZATION
As percentage o f  
all peasants_________
25.01
69 .98  
(40 .58 )
(29 .40 )
94 .99  
( 5 .01 )
The positions o f  p oor  and m iddle peasants had been  com plete ly  rev e rse d ,  
although taking both groups together their  relative im portance  had in creased  
at the expense o f  a slight fall in the numbers o f  the "o th e r "  ca tegory  
(presum ably  including the r ich  peasants and landlords). The fo rm e r  poor  
peasant so c ie ty  was c le a r ly  being changed into a m iddle peasant one. F o r  
once the wide coverage  o f  the investigations and the fact that they included 
p oor  as w ell as r ich  areas give the figures wide cred ib ility .  In any case , 
their findings are con firm ed  by other data fro m  15 A P C s in five h s ien :
Table IV. 27: Changes in the c lass  com pos it ion  o f  rural 
socie ty : the findings o f  representative  
investigations o f  15 A P C s in five hsien  o f  
Kiangsu.______________________________________
P o o r  peasants 
Middle peasants 
Total 
( 'O th e rs ')
LAND REFORM
As percentage o f  
all peasants
60.0
33. 0 
93. 0
7 .0
PO ST- 
C O LLECTIVIZATION  
As percentage o f  
all peasants
27. 0 
69. 5 
96. 5 
3. 5
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The percentage changes fo r  poor  and m iddle peasants are very-
s im ila r  to those shown in Table IV. 26. The m ost  interesting d ifference  is 
that the hsien findings show that the p oor  and m iddle peasants, taken together, 
had b ecom e  even m o re  important; this presum ably  re flected  a m o re  rapid 
d eterioration  in the relative position  o f  the rich  peasants and any landlord 
e le m e n ts .
These changes in the c lass  com posit ion  o f  rural so c ie ty  in Kiangsu w ere  
d irect ly  attributed to the establishment o f  APCs o f  both kinds, but esp ec ia l ly
to the fu l ly -s o c ia l is t  c o l le c t iv e s .  As long as private ow nership  o f  the means
of production rem ained, it was argued, polarization  was bound to o c cu r .  
C o llect ive  ow nership rem oved  this obstacle  and by  providing a m o re  just 
distribution o f  agricultural and subsid iary  production laid the foundation fo r  
a m o re  integrated soc ie ty .  In view  o f the evidence o f  o v era ll  upward class  
m ob ility  o f  peasants it is not surpris ing that c la im s w ere  made fo r  o v e r ­
whelming m a jor ity  support f o r  the new institutional fram ew ork . Not only
p oor  and lo w e r -m id d le ,  but also m ost  o f  the u p p er-m id d le  peasants w ere
(139)said to have given their  support to the new structure. v Only a sm all
num ber o f  up p er-m id d le  peasants continued to d isp lay  capitalist tendencies.
As fo r  the r ich  peasants and landlord e lem ents, they w ere  c le a r ly  no longer  
regarded  as a ser iou s  p rob lem .
On balance then the co lle c t iv es  had seem in gly  been a su cce ss  in Kiangsu.
In e con om ic  te r m s ,  it is true, their  im pact could be said to have been
negatively  benefic ia l;  that is ,  their  m a jo r  contribution in 1956 had been to
lim it  the e ffects  o f  the natural d isa ste rs .  But if  only because  o f  the sever ity
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Source; HHJP, 3 0 /9 /  57, op. cit.
of those d isa sters  such a judgement would be less  than fa ir .  In any ca se ,  
there is evidence of m o re  positive achievements; som e technical advances 
had been m ade; subsid iaries  had been encouraged; f o r  m any peasants there 
had been r ises  in in com e. In soc ia l  term s the s u cce ss  o f  the h ig h e r -le v e l  
APCs was m o re  obvious; they had brought about a m o r e  equitable d is t r i ­
bution system  and reduced class  stratification.
When looked at in this way the per form ance  o f  the co lle c t iv es  in 1956
might - notwithstanding the decline in output and fa ilure  to m eet planned
targets - have given grounds for  an optim istic  assessm en t  of agricultural
developm ent in the prov ince . The newspapers o f  that yea r  certa in ly  give
(140)little indication o f  anything but good having com e out of the c o l le c t iv e s .  v 
H owever, such sanguine expectations w ere not borne out by  subsequent 
events; the sh ort-ru n  achievements w ere not a good guide to the lon g er-ru n  
p rosp ec ts .  F o r  as 1957 p ro g re ss e d  it becam e in creas in g ly  apparent that 
conditions in the agricultural s e c to r  w ere far  fro m  sa t is fa ctory  and that 
co llectiv iza tion  had left m any prob lem s unsolved and even introduced new 
ones. It is to this c r i t ica l  situation that we turn in the final section  o f  this 
chapter.
Ill Conclusion: The E m erging C r is is  in Kiangsu A gricu ltu re .
Up to this point we have tended to em phasize the positive  features o f  
co l lect iv iza t ion  in Kiangsu. This is partly because  prov inc ia l newspaper 
reports  written during the f irs t  year  o f  co llectiv iza tion  give little indication 
o f  any d ifficu lties  having arisen  within the new fra m ew ork  and partly because 
we have w ished to underline the point that the c o l le c t iv e s '  ability to m in im ize  
the effects  o f  the 1956 d isasters  did represent a cons iderab le  achievem ent.
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But this is not to deny that there was a less  happy side to the institutional 
changes. The speed o f  those changes and the profound transform ation  o f  
e con om ic  and so c ia l  relationships which they im plied  could not fail to create  
p rob lem s o f  som e kind.
Evidence o f  d ifficu lties  in the agricultural s e c to r  o f  Kiangsu appeared
ear ly  in 1957. A speech  by Ytt K 'e  contained an adm iss ion  that many
m istakes had been m ade in 1956; plans had been too ambitious; technical
demands too high; there had been im patience and a lack  o f  resolution  among
cad res ;  and insufficient attention had been given to c lim atic  fa ctors  and
loca l e con om ic  conditions in carry ing  out agricultural p o licy .  These
failures had caused u n n ecessa ry  lo s se s  in production. A report fr o m  a
con feren ce  o f  ch'ti Party  se cre ta r ie s  further stated that the undem ocratic
attitudes, com m andism  and co e r c io n  which had accom panied  co l le c t iv i -
( i 42)zation had caused d isillusionm ent among som e peasants. Even if
som e o f  the p rob lem s w ere  the lega cy  o f  the individual peasant econom y,
others w ere  the d ire ct  consequence o f  the establishm ent o f  the co l le c t iv e s .
Such exam ples w ere  the contradictions between w ork team s and brigades^
(144)and between se l f - in te r e s t  and co lle c t iv e  in terest and the em phasis on
quantity at the expense o f  quality which arose  fro m  the w ork -po int  system . 
The con flict  between agricultural and subsid iary  production  was the source  
o f  m o r e  d iff icu lt ies .  In one co lle c t iv e  in Chiang-tu hsien the high p ro f ita ­
b ility  o f  turnip cultivation (on their  private p lo t s ? )  led peasants to c o n ce n ­
trate their  e fforts  in this area at the expense o f  the e co n o m ica l ly  m ore
(145)im portant w ork  o f  co llecting  fe r t i l iz e r .  The question o f  fe r t i l iz e rs
cam e up in other contexts; in Yang-chou peasants w ere  reluctant to c o l le c t
(1.46 )and apply fe r t i l iz e rs  because  o f  the low wage paid fo r  this work;
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elsew here  peasants refused to se ll  d om estic  f e r t i l iz e r  to the co llec t ives  
because  o f  the low p r ice  they received .^
Some o f  the c r i t ic is m s  vo iced  by  Y U  K 'e  w ere taken up in other
art ic le s .  A letter  fro m  a peasant published in the 'New China D aily ' spoke
of the fa ilure  o f  cadres  to organ ize  the peasants into anti-drought m easures
in 1956. Instead, they had fo rce d  through technical changes which w ere
often inappropriate and not understood  by the peasants. The result
was that ploughing was done badly and wheat was left  in the fields to b e co m e
m ildew y because  so m uch time was taken up in im plem enting the technical
r e fo r m s .  S im ilar  com plaints of ex ce ss iv e  demands that took no account of
(149)lo ca l  conditions w ere  made e lsew here . These m istakes w ere  all
sym ptom atic  o f  the fact that in 1956 ". . . agricultural p rob lem s w ere  created
by attempts to bring about too much, not too little , change in traditional
(150)farm ing m eth od s" .  The e x ce ss iv e  demands o f  1956 w ere re flected  in
a m o r e  cautious attitude in 1957. Emphasis was p laced  on the need to make
technical changes that w ere  in accordance  with a particu lar  area 's  r esou rce
( 151)endowment pattern.
G reater  caution was also apparent in som e o f  the plans drawn up fo r  
1957. In Chti-jung hsien  (Chinkiang) 1957 targets w ere  set at the sam e leve l 
as in 1 9 5 6 .^ ^ ^  The argument was that in view of the p oor  growing c o n ­
ditions, the lack  o f  f e r t i l iz e r  and the susceptib ility  o f  the region  to natural
(153)d isa s te rs ,  plans could only be fulfilled  i f  output norm s w ere  low ered .
While this downward adjustment o f  plans m ay be interpreted  as a pragm atic
reaction  to the fa ilures o f  1956 it seem s c le a r  that it was also a sign of the
(154)loss  o f  confidence in the new institutional fram ew ork .
-306 -
An ed itoria l o f  9 F eb ru ary  was la rge ly  devoted to p rob lem s o f  planning.
It stated that only 20% o f  planned irr igation  and construction  work had been
com pleted  because  o f  d ifficu lties  that had arisen  in the co llec t iv es  - and
this in spite o f  the fact that irr iga tion  was one o f  the m ost  important ways
of raising agricultural productiv ity  in Kiangsu. It was c r it ica l  of those
areas which had failed to draw up any plans and urged that each ch'tt
do so in o rd e r  that ir r iga tion  w ork could go ahead. But d e fic ienc ies
p ers is ted  and towards the end o f  M arch  another ed itoria l p laced renewed
(156)em phasis on the need fo r  p rop er  planning, p articu lar ly  deprecating
recent tendencies to set targets too high o r  too l o w ^ ^ ^  and cr it ic iz in g  
certa in  elem ents who had ignored  state plans and set up quasi-independent 
management system s.
P a radox ica lly ,  such planning problem s w ere  not only confined to those 
areas which had fa iled  to m eet the 1956 targets . In one co lle c t iv e  o f  Sung- 
chiang hsien cadres  w ere  taking the view that the in cre a se s  in output and 
incom e o f  1956 had exhausted the potential o f  the co lle c t iv es .^  M ore
genera lly , throughout Sung-chiang and Soochow Special D istr icts  a com m on
(159)view  was that "production  has reached its peak".
A m anifestation o f  the lack  o f  confidence in co l le c t iv e s  was a tendency
to re ly  in creas in g ly  on state aid. Some believed  that all the agricultural
( 160 )p rob lem s should be solved  through state loans. But existing econ om ic
p r io r it ie s  ruled this out and the peasants w ere instead urged to show s e l f -  
re lian ce . Production  d ifficu lties  and shortages of working capital could all 
be o v e rco m e  through co l le c t iv e  e ffort . Even an ed itoria l which admitted 
that shortages o f  food  gra ins, fuel and fodder w ere  daily  becom ing m ore
(155)
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seriou s  and that future prosp ects  w ere not good, argued that re l ie f
n , (161) m easures  by  the state w ere unnecessary .
M ore genera lly ,  declining peasant m ora le  was re flected  in a growing 
c a re le ss n e s s  and neg lect  o f  agricultural work. Throughout 1957 agricultural 
operations w ere  behind schedule. As ear ly  as F eb ru ary  there was con cern  
at the s low ness of spring ploughing in som e areas . The poor  p rospects
fo r  the sum m er c rop  em erged  c le a r ly  from  a report  that in I-cheng, L iu -h o , 
Chiang-tu, T 'a i -h s in g  and Wusih hsien wheat sprouts w ere  rotting at the 
root and dying.  ^ The fa ilure  rate fo r  wheat was at least 10% and
com m on ly  30%; fo r  green  fe r t i l iz e rs  it was even higher. This serious 
situation was attributed to ca re le ss  autumn-sowing in 1956 and the poor  
standard o f  w inter w ork exacerbated  in som e instances by  inadequate 
drainage. Slow p ro g re ss  was also reported  from  Y en -ch 'en g  Special
- • (164)D istr ict .
The busy agricultural months of F ebru ary  and M arch  w ere  followed
by a hiatus during which the neglect o f  fa rm  operations ceased  to be a m a jo r
preoccupation . H ow ever, in June there was further evidence that such
neg lect  was continuing. Inadequate precautions had been  taken against the
p oss ib il ity  o f  natural d isa ste rs ,  the peasants believing that nothing on the
sca le  of 1956 could be repeated so quickly.^ There w ere  complaints
(166)that r ice  was being transplanted too s low ly ' and warnings lest  the
(167)peasants beca m e  slack  after the sum m er harvest. Another hiatus
follow ed until the e a r ly  autumn when m ore  reports  indicated that the same 
prob lem s w ere  still holding up agricultural w o r k J ^ ^
One o f  the c le a re s t  exp ression s  of the wide range of p rob lem s caused
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by  the recent institutional changes em erged  fro m  an artic le  setting out 
the "con tra d ic t ion s"  which stem m ed from  co llectiv ization .^  The m ost
serious  of these w ere those that existed between the co lle c t iv e  and its 
m em bers  and between the m em bers  th em se lves . The f o r m e r  could arise  
in the p r o ce s s  o f  distribution if  the peasants suspected  that the co llective  
unit was benefitting m o re  than they w ere .  F o r  this reason  the princip le  o f  
"retaining little and distributing m u c h " ^ ^ ^  was advocated. M ore 
sp e c if ica lly ,  60-70%  o f  total co l le c t iv e  incom e was to be distributed to 
m em b ers  and e v e ry  e ffort  m ade to guarantee in com e r ises  fo r  90% o f  them 
in o r d e r  to allay their  susp ic ions .
Contradictions between a co llec t iv e  and its m e m b e rs  w ere also the 
product o f  n o n -e co n o m ic  fa c to rs ,  such as the distribution  o f  pow er among 
the various organizational leve ls  within it. The May artic le  s tressed  the 
need to balance the interests  o f  the co llective  and the production  team .
This was c le a r ly  a re fe ren ce  to the bu reau cratism  and ov er -cen tra l iza t ion  
which had e a r l ie r  infected the APCs and created  tension between cadres 
and peasants.^  ^  ^ That such difficu lties p ers is ted  is evident fro m  a ccu ­
sations against cadres  fo r  being " o n e -s id e d "  and refusing to follow  the
;gr 
(173)
(172)m ass  line o r  learn  fro m  the old peasants. The situation was aggravated
by the old p rob lem  o f  unclear and undem ocratic  accounting m ethods.
As fo r  contradictions between co llective  m e m b e r s ,  although the 
abolition o f  dividends to land and other working capital had rem oved  the 
m ost  seriou s  sou rce  o f  c lass  antagonism in the agricultural s e c to r ,  the 
c lass  issue  was still not com plete ly  laid to rest . Payment was still made 
fo r  those item s ( fo r  exam ple , draft animals, to o ls ,  t r e e s ,  f ish -ponds)
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contributed by the peasants to the co lle c t iv es  and just as the determ ination 
o f  dividend leve ls  had caused fr ic t ion  between different c la s s e s ,  so the sam e 
thing tended to happen in the case  o f  these lu m p-sum  payments.
To som e extent all these c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ^ w e r e  lega c ies  o f  old 
attitudes and habits. H owever, it is c le a r  that the pecu liar  nature o f  the 
co llect ive  system  itse l f  with its d ivisions o f  resp on s ib ility  and authority and 
its d ichotom y between private and co llect ive  s e cto rs  was an even m ore  
im portant sou rce  o f  the d ifficu lties  exp ressed  by  them.
Perhaps the single m ost  serious  consequence o f  co l lect iv iza t ion  in
Kiangsu was its e ffect  on the draft animal population.^ During 1956 any
suggestion o f  a 'draft animal p r o b le m 1 was totally lacking but in 1957 it
b ecam e in crea s in g ly  apparent that there had been a ser iou s  decline in their
num bers . The f irs t  hint o f  d ifficu lties  cam e in a report  which spoke o f  their
neg lect  in Sung-chiang Special D istrict.^  a  few days later it was revealed
that spring production  w ork in H wai-yin  was being delayed by the shortage of
draft anim als. Serious lo s s e s  had o c cu rre d  principa lly  as a result o f  the poor
care  they rece ived  under co lle c t iv e  ownership (though shortage o f  fodder  was
(177)another contr ibutory  fa ctor ) .  They w ere i l l - fe d ,  i l l -h ou sed  - given cold
water to drink and m ade to s leep  on wet ground - and overw orked .
The situation seem s to have reached its m ost  c r i t i c a l  point in M arch
during the cru c ia l  spring production  period . A report f r o m  Hsti-chou re fe rre d
(178)to the "unusually h igh" rates of s ickness and death among animals.
Poor care  and lack  o f  feed  w ere  again cited as the m ain causal fa c to rs .
Calls went out to im p rove  co llec t iv e  treatment, set up s tr ic t  responsib ility
(179)system s and stop deaths fr o m  co ld . An ed itoria l spoke o f  the need to
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re ly  on lo ca l  products and initiative to o v e rco m e  fodder  s ca rc ity .  ^ I n
H w ai-yin  even m o re  desperate  m easures  w ere advocated; the work burden
o f  the existing stock  o f  animals should be in creased  and where this failed
(181)to m eet requirem ents m an -p ow er  should be substituted fo r  o x -p o w e r .
In an e ffort  to stimulate the exchange o f  animals and alleviate shortages
where they w ere  m ost  cr it ica l  250 draft animal m arkets  w ere  set up under
state guidance in 26 hsien  in the province  and trading o f f ic ia ls  w ere sent to
Anhwei to purchase an anticipated 5, 000 draft oxen in the f irs t  six months of
(182)the year.
The m ost  care fu l analysis o f  the situation in Kiangsu was contained in a
(1 83)d irect ive  issued  at the end o f  M arch . It made the point that cultivation
im provem ents , agricultural re -organ izat ion  and the extension o f  double
cropping w ere  all d ifficult where draft animals w ere in short supply. Even
in norm al c ircu m stan ces  Kiangsu did not have large  num bers o f  animals;
but in 1956 the total num ber o f  working animals had been about 1, 500, 000,
with an average burden o f  about 60 m ou of arable land p er  head. Even if
this showed a considerab le  im provem ent o ver  the situation im m ediate ly
following land re fo r m  the figure was still indicative o f  an endem ic shortage
of  v e r y  seriou s  proportiona . Given a m axim um  burden p er  animal o f  24-
(184)34 m ou in spring and only 12-17 m ou in sum m er, Kiangsu needed to
double her  supply o f  draft animals in o rd e r  fo r  agriculture to p e r fo rm  
effic iently . Yet s ince  1956 the situation had actually further deteriorated . 
Cold weather during the winter and spring (1956-57 ), m is-m an agem en t in the 
co lle c t iv es  and a shortage o f  feed  had led to a high death rate. Incom plete 
statistics  put the num ber o f  deaths at 60,000^  ^  ^ and as o f  spring, 1957
weak and thin beasts represented  som e 40% o f  the total population. Even
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m o r e  serious  was the failure to conceive  among m any animals. ( 186)
A fter  M arch  em phasis was increas in g ly  placed  on the im plem entation
of appropriate m easu res  to o v e rco m e  the d iff icu lt ies .  To a large extent
these took the fo rm  o f  exhortations to provide adequate food and sleep  and
cut down d isease  and ra ise  the birth rate, although there w ere som e interesting
con cess ion s  to n o n -co l le c t iv e  form s  o f  animal ca re .  F o r  exam ple, a proposal
was made to delegate old peasants and children to look  after the animals and
pay them a fixed  incom e; it was even suggested that draft cattle should be
returned to the care  o f  individual peasants instead o f  being kept in co llect ive
pens. ' It was admitted that co l lect ive  care  had not w orked and that
private managem ent by  individual peasants was better  suited to the d ev e lo p -
(188)ment o f  strong and healthy animals. Those co l le c t iv e s  which had already
reverted  to decentra lized  system  had already succeeded  in arresting the 
w eakness, s ickness  and high death rates.
The evidence that has been presented suggests that the co llectiv iza tion  
o f  draft animals in 1956 was one o f  the m ost  signal fa ilures  o f  agricultural 
p o l icy  in Kiangsu. Their  transference  fro m  individual to co l le c t iv e  ow n e r ­
ship was not accom panied  by  the establishment o f  any c le a r  system  o f 
responsib ility  to ensure that they w ere  p rop er ly  looked  after. Instead, 
peasants sought only  to m axim ise  their use by increas in g  their w ork loads .
It is true o f  co u rse  that the decline in animal numbers was aggravated by  
the harsh  conditions o f  1956. But equally there can be no doubt that the
(189)c r is is  was precip itated  by  co llectiv ization .
During the second  half o f  1957 it seem s l ik e ly  that there was som e
im provem ent in the draft animal situation in Kiangsu. H ow ever, no sooner
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had this p rob lem  ceased  to p reoccu p y  the planners than another c r is i s  began 
to em erge  in the agricultural s e c to r .  This was the c r is i s  o v e r  state grain 
acqu is it ions .
As e a r ly  as M arch grain  acquisitions w ere causing d iff icu lt ies .  1,500
m ill ion  chin o f  food  grains purchased by the state in the prov ince  w ere  said
to have a high w ater content and contain many im purities  and there w ere  fears
( 190 )that future stocks would be s im ila r ly  affected. There was con cern  too
that the opening o f  f re e  m arkets would disrupt state purchases  o f  important 
agricultural and subsid iary  products.^  ^  ^ But there was no sign o f  anything 
m o re  than lo ca l  d ifficu lties  until the sum m er when, in the face  o f  e a r l ie r  
c la im s to the con trary , it becam e c lea r  that CPCS targets w ere not being
n  9 2 )
fu lfilled . The b a s ic  p rob lem  o f  grain  production  not keeping up with
consum ption was exacerbated  by  the attitudes o f  cadres  and peasants; in 
surplus areas they w ere  calling fo r  greater  distribution  and higher consumption; 
in de fic it  areas the demand was for  greater  amounts o f  state supplies. The 
overa ll  result was that in m any areas state purchase quotas w ere not being 
m et. These had already been reduced from  2, 100 m ill ion  to 1, 670 m illion  
chin (a fa ll  o f  o v e r  20%) in o r d e r  to com pensate fo r  the e ffects  o f the 1956 
natural d isa sters  but there could be no further reduction.
The ser iou sn ess  o f  the situation was evidenced by a report that as of the
end o f  June le ss  than 10% o f  planned grain acquisitions had been handed
(193)o v e r .  There was renewed c r i t i c is m  o f  peasants ' extravagance and the
c a d r e s '  preoccupation  with peasant w elfare  at the expense o f  state needs -
this only a short tim e after they had been attacked fo r  being too c o e r c iv e !
The refusal by  v il lages  to re lease  their  grain and their  ins istence  that state
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purchases be low ered  and sales in creased  w ere m e r e ly  heightening the 
b a s ic  contradiction  between production and consum ption. In future peasants 
should eat less  grain  and give p r io r ity  to the state, not the co lle c t iv e ,  in 
the d istribution o f  the harvest.
Such appeals seem  to have had little e ffect  and on ly  a few days later
there w ere  ominous reports  o f the em ergence  o f  b lack  m arkets  in grain and
(194)an in crease  in speculative activ it ies . The distribution  o f  too much grain
to co lle c t iv e  m em b ers  and their  consequent ability to accumulate large  amounts
w ere  b lam ed fo r  these phenomena. Pred ictab ly , the w orst  offenders w ere
( I 95)
said to be rich  peasants and other "ev il  e lem en ts" .
Notwithstanding a c la im  that Hsti-chou Special D istr ic t  had fulfilled
(196)60% o f  its planned state purchase quota, m o re  genera l statistics  showed
(197)that throughout the province  as a whole the figure was only 25%. In
the f irs t  half o f  August state purchase work p roceed ed  even m o re  slowly .
The amount o f  grain  entering the granaries  each day was about ten m illion  
chin le s s  than during the second half o f July. In all the granaries
contained 220 m ill ion  chin of food grains o r  25% less  than the planned target. 
M o re o v e r ,  although the output o f  sum m er crops  had in creased  in m ost  areas 
o f  Kiangsu, 14. 4% le ss  grain  had been acquired than in the sam e period  of 
the previous year. Within the province  p ro g re ss  was also v e r y  uneven;
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Table IV. 28; State grain acquisitions; the situation as of 
5th August, 1957._______________________________
Percentage  o f  state purchase 
 quota fulfilled____________
Soochow S. D. 115.0
Nan-t'ung S .D . 108 .0
Sung-chiang S. D. 9 3 .0
Y en -ch 'en g  S. D. 53 .0
H w ai-y in  S .D .  44 .6
Source ; H HJP, 1 4 /8 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
Final data on state acquisitions o f  grain are unfortunately unavailable,
but in view  o f the continuing speculative activities and the apparent lack  o f
(199)response  by  peasants to the kind o f  patriotic  appeals just mentioned ' it 
is l ik e ly  that purchase quotas f o r  sum m er, 1957 w ere  not m et.
Let us now turn to examine the reaction  o f  the co l le c t iv e  m em b ers  to
the various p rob lem s that had em erged  in 1957. In a sense the grain
acquisition  cr is is  was itse l f  a part o f  that reaction , fo r  c le a r ly  it was a
sym ptom  o f  the peasants ' declining confidence in the ability o f  the co lle c t iv es
to protect  their  in terests .  But it was only one ex p re ss io n  (albeit a powerful
one) o f  a m uch w ider sense o f  d isillusionm ent that was apparent throughout
1957. Even in January Liu Shun-yiian, D epu ty -S ecretary  o f  the Kiangsu
Party  Com m ittee, admitted that peasants w ere  losing confidence in the h igh er -  
(200 )leve l  A P C s .  Even i f  c lass  analyses could be cited to show that the p oor
and m iddle peasants (except a few upper-m idd le  ones) w ere  still ov e rw h e lm ­
ingly in favour o f  c o l le c t iv ize d  agriculture and that even m ost  rich  peasants 
and landlord elem ents w ere  w e ll -d isp o se d  towards it, there w ere  also
( 2 01 )indications o f  a m o re  scep tica l attitude by  quite a la rge  num ber o f  peasants.
Indeed in som e cases  peasants w ere  actually calling fo r  a retreat - either
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because  they had su ffered  declines in output and incom e o r  because  they
(202 )felt that co l le c t iv e  farm ing entailed too great a lo ss  o f  freed om .
To what extent peasants actually withdrew fro m  the co llec t iv es  in
Kiangsu it is v e r y  difficult to say, though the ser iou sn ess  o f  the c r ise s
confronting agriculture during 1957 might suggest that such cases  w ere not
uncom m on. At any rate the evidence that there w ere withdrawals is c le a r
enough: In Tan-yang h s ien , fo r  exam ple, it was reported  in May that
(203)peasants w ere  pulling out of som e o f  the co l le c t iv e s .  In the w orst
instance m o re  than 20 had withdrawn in a single day. T heir  reasons w ere  
threefold : co l le c t iv e  accounting was not ca rr ied  out openly and d e m o cr a t i ­
ca lly ; cadres  w ere behaving in their  own private interests  and bringing 
p ressu re  to bear  on the peasants; and co llect ive  managem ent (e sp ec ia lly  of 
tools  and draft animals) was inadequate. An even m o r e  dram atic  case  was 
that o f  an APC in T 'a i  hsien where 204 households withdrew their  support, 
leaving only nine p oor  peasant fam ilies  to pursue co lle c t iv e  production.
Another sign o f  w idespread  discontent was the "blind flow "  o f  peasants
(205)out of the v illages  and into the c it ies  which was reported  during May.
It was revea led  that the rura l-urban  m igration  was leading to illega l trading
in food coupons in the c ities  o f  Nanking, Soochow, Yang-chou and H sii-chou
(and doubtless Shanghai as w ell).  Even the cadres  w ere  joining in the 
(206 )i l lega l activ it ies .
(207)Despite the launching o f  a "re c t i f ica t io n "  cam paign the erroneous
tendencies w ere  evident w ell into the second half o f  the year . As had 
happened at s im ila r  junctures in e a r l ie r  institutional re fo rm s  the d e te r io ­
rating situation was heightened by the growing v o c i fe ro u sn e ss  o f  subversive
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as saying that " . . .  the Com m unist Party has su ffered  a change of heart. At
the tim e o f  L iberation  they gave out re l ie f  r ice ;  but now they won't even let
(208)you eat what you grow  y o u rs e lv e s " .  Others spread s im ila r  libels  to
the effect  that ". . . th ere 's  no advantage in agricultural co l lect iv iza t ion  . . .
the peasants ' l ives  are v e r y  hard . . . the CPCS system  is  in a m ess  . . .
b a s ic - le v e l  cadre unity has been disrupted . . . the C C P  d oesn 't  ca re  about 
(209)the peasants".
One o f  the m ost  interesting aspects o f  the anti-rightist cam paign in
(2 1 0 )Kiangsu centred  around the anthropologist, F e i H siao -t 'u n g . This
eminent s ch o la r  had made a return vis it  to the  v illage  in south Kiangsu where 
he had c a rr ie d  out extensive field  investigations into so c ia l  and econ om ic  
conditions in the 1930's .  His aim was to make an assessm en t  of the im pact 
of the new governm ent upon the lives  o f  the peasants. But his findings w ere 
le ss  than com plim entary . Peasants ' incom es  in 1956, he said, w ere only 
5% higher than they had been in 1936. G ross  in com e fro m  raising s ilkw orm  
cocoon s  (a m a jo r  subsid iary  and an important sou rce  o f  incom e in the area) 
was actually 40% less  than in the 1930's .  His genera l conclusion  was that 
" .  . . the m a jor ity  o f  peasants fee l that life  isn 't  as good as it was be fore  
L ibera tion ".  ^  Such findings could hardly pass unchallenged and not 
su rpr is in g ly  F e i cam e under v e ry  strong attack, his detractors  insisting 
that he had gone to K 'a i-hs ien -kun g  with p recon ce iv ed  ideas and that he had 
d e liberate ly  fa ls if ied  data and ignored  many significant developm ents that 
had o c c u rr e d  since  1949.
Gradually such rightist c r i t i c is m  was s ilenced  and the " re ct i f ica t io n "
elements. In K'un-shan hsien old landlords and rich peasants were quoted
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cam paign had its d e s ired  e ffect . H ow ever, at the end o f  1957 there was 
little to give co m fo r t  to the planners in Kiangsu. The high hopes o f  
co l lect iv iza t ion  had obv iously  not been  fulfilled . Not only  had econ om ic  
growth fa iled  to m ater ia lize  but the agricultural s e c to r  was beset by as 
m any prob lem s as e ver .  Indeed the final year o f  the F irs t  Five Y ear Plan 
was ch a ra c ter ized  by  a growing sense o f  c r is is  in agricu lture .
But if co l le c t iv iza t ion  had fa iled , what other so u rce  o f  agricultural growth 
was availab le?  L a r g e -s c a le  state investment in the rural s e c to r  was ruled 
out because  o f  existing and still sa crosan ct  e co n o m ic  p r io r it ie s .  It fo llow ed  
that further re -o rg an iza t ion  within the fram ew ork  o f  the traditional tech n o­
logy  was the only alternative. In the last months o f  1957 the new p o licy
began to em e rg e .  A significant event was the publication in O ctober  o f
( 2 1 2 )the rev ised  Tw elve Year Plan fo r  A gricu lture . F o r  alm ost im m ediate ly
the targets set down in this plan w ere  adopted as sh ort-ru n  ob ject ives  and 
the stage was set f o r  the "great leap fo rw a rd "  o f  1958.
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Notes to Chapter Four
Em phasis in this chapter is on the purely  e co n o m ic  im pact of 
co -op era t iv iza t ion  and co llectiv iza tion  in Kiangsu. A ccord in g ly  only 
a b r ie f  ch ronology  o f  the m ovem ents is given here  as an introduction 
to the m ain d iscu ss ion . Events in the prov ince  during 1955 and 1956 
gen era lly  fo llow ed  the pattern observab le  in China as a whole and since 
this has a lready been analyzed in som e detail e lsew here  it seem s 
u n n ecessa ry  to burden the text with what would essentia lly  be a 
repetition o f  such analyses. H owever, in o r d e r  that this thesis should 
present as com plete  a picture as p oss ib le  a detailed account of d ev e lo p ­
ments in Kiangsu during the period  o f  the two "h ig h -t id e s "  and a 
d iscu ss ion  o f  som e o f  the p rob lem s associated  with the rapid changes 
are included in a separate appendix. See Appendix D.
Although there w ere  som e spectacu lar percentage in crea ses  in m e m ­
bersh ip  o f  AP C s in China between m id-1953  and m id -1955 , in 
absolute term s the num ber o f  agricultural households belonging to 
c o -o p s  rem ained v e r y  sm all.
HHJP, 4 /6 /5 3 ,  p. 1, "D evelop  M ATs and APCs on a Large S c a le . "
Ibid . The su cce ss  of APCs in Kiangsu was c la im ed  to be shown in a 
representative  study o f  o v e r  2, 000 APCs in Soochow, Chinkiang, 
Yang-chou and Y e n -ch ’ eng Special D is tr ic ts ,  90% o f  which had 
achieved a higher output than M ATs and individual peasants. In o rd e r  
to m eet the demand fo r  67, 591 APCs in Kiangsu by  spring-ploughing 
1956, la rge  num bers o f  cadres  w ere  to be tra n s fe rre d  to the c o - o p e r a ­
t ives . In addition, 136, 000 "backbone cad res"  w ere  to be trained 
be fore  the autumn harvest (1955) in preparation  fo r  the expansion.
". . . P roba b ly  the existing figure of 650, 000 (A P C s)  ought to be 
roughly doubled, that is ,  in creased  to something like 1, 300, 000 . . . "
Mao in H sin-hua ydeh-pao, 1955, n o . 11, op. c i t .
Ibid .
Statistical M aterials  on Agricu ltura l C o -o p e ra t iv iza t io n , op. c i t . ,
p p .7 -9 .
Ib id . , p . 13.
The following table shows the speed with which co -op era t iv iza t ion  
and co llect iv iza t ion  w ere  achieved in China:
1955
1956
( 10 )
( U )
( 12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
The establishment of s e m i - s o c ia l i s t  c o -o p s  
and fu l ly -so c ia l is t  co l le c t iv es  in China: 
m id -1955  - end-1956._________________________
PERCEN TAGE OF A L L  AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS
IN:
C o-op s C o l le c ­
tives
C o -op s  & 
co lle c t iv es
F orm s other 
than APCs
June 14. 17 0. 03 14.2 85 .8
D ecem b er 59.3 4. 0 63 .3 36 .7
January 49. 6 30 .7 80. 3 19. 7
M arch 34. 0 54. 9 88. 9 11. 1
May 29. 3 61 .9 91 .2 8. 8
July 29. 0 6 3 .4 92. 4 7 .6
Septem ber 21. 8 72.7 94. 5 5. 5
D ecem b er 8. 5 87. 8 96. 3 3 .7
Source : Statistical M aterials on Agricu ltura l
Co - operativization , op. c i t . , pp . 7 -9 , 
p .11 and p . 13.
See Appendix D, Table D. 1. A lso  HHJP, 2 9 /5 /5 5 ,  p. 1, " im prove  
Hsiang Planning Work fo r  the Agricu ltura l C o-op era t iv iza tion  M o v e ­
ment and W elcom e a New H igh-T ide in the Socia lis t  Mass M ovem ent"; 
and TK P (T ientsin), 1 0 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "The Peasants A re  Demanding to Set 
Up C o -o p s :  The C o -op erativ iza tion  M ovem ent is Entering a High-
T id e" .
C h ,ang-chou kung-jen  pao (C h 'ang-chou  W orkers* D a ily ) , 2 /2 /5 6 ,  
"Kiangsu Has B a s ica l ly  Com pleted A gricu ltura l C o -op era t iv iza tion " .
HHJP, 2 6 /1 1 /5 5 ,  "C on ference  o f  Kiangsu C C P  Com m ittee D ecides 
that S em i-S o c ia l is t  A gricu ltura l C o -op erat iv iza tion  will be B a s ica lly  
C arr ied  Out Next Y e a r "  .
C hiang-su  nung-m in pao (Kiangsu Peasants* D a ily ) , 2 7 /1 2 /5 5 ,  
"F u lly -S o c ia l is t  C o llectiv ization  Will Be Com pleted  in Kiangsu in 
1958". The artic le  defined "b a s ic  com plet ion "  as meaning that 85% 
o f  agricultural households would belong to c o -o p e r a t iv e s .
CF JP , 1 7 /1 2 /5 5 ,  "A gricu ltura l C o-op era t iv iza tion  is the Only Way 
in Which to P r o ce e d  fo r  the Benefit of the Peasant M a s se s " .
Ch 'ang-ch iang j ih -p a o ,  1 1 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. cit.
H sin -w en  jih -p ao  (Daily  N ew s), herea fter  H W JP, 3 0 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "Peasants 
in the Shanghai Suburbs V ig orou sly  Demand to Set Up and Join 
C o -o p e ra t iv e s  " .
-3 2 0 -
HHJP, 1 6 /9 /5 5 ,  p . l ,  "The Newly-Established. C o -op era t ives  in 
S u -ch 'ie n  Hsien are Enthusiastically Going Ahead with Autumn Ploughing 
and Sowing".
HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 5 ,  "An Investigation o f  the Situation Regarding the L a rg e -  
Scale Developm ent o f  C o -o p s  in Ssu-yang H sien".
This was one o f  the points to em erge  fro m  an im portant artic le  written 
by T 'ao  Chu: "The L a rg e -S ca le  Developm ent o f  A gricu ltura l
C o-op era t iv iza tion  in New A reas  and the P ro b le m  of Guaranteeing 
Q uality" in Hstteh-hsi (Study), 1955, no. 12; pp. 5 -9 . Although 
written s p e c i f ica l ly  about Kwangtung m any o f  the points brought out by 
T 'ao  Chu w ere  d ire ct ly  relevant to the situation in Kiangsu.
HHJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  p . l ,  "Make Good Preparations  fo r  C o -op erativ iza tion  
in Hsiang and W elcom e a New H igh-T ide in the C o -op erat iv iza tion  
Mass M ovem ent".
Ibid.
Ib id . F o r  other accounts see HHJP, 1 4 /1 0 /5 5  and CF J P , 2 4 /1 1 /5 5 ,
"I finally  Joined an A P C " .
The " f ir s t  h ig h -t id e"  re fe rs  to the m ove into lo w e r - le v e l  c o -o p e r a t iv e s .
HHJP, 2 6 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "D irect ive  o f  the Kiangsu C C P  Concerning the 
Consolidation  o f  the New C o -o p s ,  the Im provem ent o f  the Old Ones and 
the W ork o f  Com pleting Autumn-Sowing on T im e " .  The mention of 
r ich  peasants is o f  particu lar interest; during the second  half o f  1955 
the few  re fe re n ce s  to their activities would suggest that their role  in 
this phase o f  the co -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent was m inim al. O ffic ia l 
p o l icy  was that fo r  the tim e being they should be excluded fro m  the 
c o -o p e r a t iv e s .  But they obv iously  cannot have rem ained indifferent 
to the institutional changes taking place and it m ay  be assum ed that 
on balance they w ere hostile  to the m oves  towards greater  socia lization  
in the agricultural s e c to r .  How this hostility  m anifested  itse l f  it is 
m o re  d ifficult to say but there w ere certa in ly  cases  when it went 
beyond m e r e  voca l  opposition. In one hs iang , fo r  exam ple, there is a 
r e fe ren ce  to three r ich  peasants having ingratiated them selves  with 
other peasants in o rd e r  to set up a lo w e r - le v e l  organization. See 
H HJP, 1 4 /1 0 /5 5 ,  p. 3, "Thoroughly  C a rry  Out the L a rg e -S ca le  
Developm ent o f  A gricu ltura l C o -op era t iv iza tion " .
F o r  a sp e c i f ic  instance o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e  activities being disrupted 
by  subvers ive  elem ents (in this case  "bad elem ents fro m  outside")  see 
HHJP, 1 5 /9 /5 5 ,  "W e 've  D ecided to Set Up a C o -o p " .
See, fo r  exam ple , HHJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .  A lso  HHJP, 1 8 /9 /5 5 ,  
"In Fou-ning Hsien H o-p 'in g  APC O rganizes a F e r t i l iz e r -C o l le c t io n  
M ovem ent fo r  the Autumn Ploughing".
HHJP, 2 6 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
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The O ctober  d irect ive  issued  by the Kiangsu branch of the CCP 
re flected  the seriou s  situation which had developed  in the agricultural 
s e c to r .  Thus "the m ost  press ing  task at present in Kiangsu is to use 
all our r e s o u rce s  to consolidate the new c o -o p s  and im prove  the old 
ones . . . Party  Com m ittees at all leve ls  should turn their attention 
away fro m  the developm ent of new co -o p e ra t iv e s  to the consolidation  
and adjustment o f  existing o n e s " .  (HHJP, 2 6 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l . )
It was s ignificant that this document em phasized  the central ro le  o f 
agricu ltural production  in consolidating the new institutional structure; 
" .  . . a good autumn harvest is a means o f  consolidating the bum per 
harvest  achieved e a r l ie r  this year. Even m o r e  a good autumn sowing 
is a means of laying the foundation o f  a bum per harvest next sum m er. 
This not only provides  the key to the fulfilm ent o f  next y e a r 's  state 
plans; it is  also the f irs t  link in a chain which w ill determ ine whether 
o r  not the new co -o p e ra t iv e s  can in crease  production  and raise  
m e m b e rs  ' in c o m e s . "  (Ib id . )
See above, p . 256.
Each m e m b e r  o f  the co llec t iv e  was perm itted  to retain fo r  his own 
use re n t - fr e e  a portion  o f  land not exceeding 5% o f  the average per  
capita arable area  in the co l le c t iv e .  Despite their  sm all s ize  these 
plots w ere  a m ost  im portant sou rce  of peasant in com e. See K. R. 
W alker, Planning in Chinese A gricu lture ; Socia lization  and the 
Private  S ector ,  1956-1962, London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. , 1965; 
p a s s im .
The absence o f  com pensation  was justified  on the grounds that the 
ow ners would get their  full rew ard through sharing in the benefits o f 
co ll  e ctivi z ation.
F o r  the com plete  regulations governing the co l le c t iv e s  see Hsin-hua 
pan-yUeh k 'an (New China S em i-m on th ly ) , 1956, no. 88. An English- 
language translation  is also available; see M odel Regulations fo r  
Advanced A gricu ltura l P r o d u c e r s '  C o -o p e r a t iv e s , F ore ign  Languages 
P r e s s ,  Peking, 1956.
H sin-hua ytieh-pao, 1955, n o . 11, op. c i t .
G eneral O ffice  o f  the C C P Central Com m ittee , Chung-kuo nung-ts 'un 
ti she-hui ch u -i  k a o -c h 'a o  ( The Socia list  H igh -T ide  in China's 
V il la ges ),  h erea fter  CKNTTSHCIKC, 3 vo lu m es , Peking, 1956; see  
v o l . l ,  P r e fa c e ,  p. 2.
JM JP , 2 6 /1 /5 6 ,  "Draft Outline o f  the Plan fo r  the D evelopm ent o f  
Chinese A gricu ltu re , 1956-1967". This fo resa w  the establishment 
o f  h ig h e r - le v e l  APCs in areas where conditions w ere  favourable, 
in 1957; and throughout the whole country during the next year. Even 
this was superseded  by  the rev ised  edition o f  the Plan (promulgated 
on 25 O ctober , 1957 and published in H sin-hua pan-vfieh k 'a n , 1957, 
no. 22) which ca lled  fo r  a fu l ly -so c ia l is t  c o l le c t iv e  agriculture by  the 
end o f  1957. But as we shall see , by  autumn, 1957 events had o v e r ­
taken both plans.
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For more detailed consideration of these plans see Appendix D.
See HHJP, 2 2 /1 /5 6 ,  "Q uick ly Stand at the Front o f  the Mass M o v e ­
m ent"  which v o ice d  c r i t ic is m  against those who w ere  refusing to 
participate in the new co llec t iv es  and instead advocated a m ore  
gradual transition.
TK P (Hong Kong), 2 2 /1 /5 6 ,  "This Spring Should See the Number o f  
H ig h e r -L e v e l  APCs in Kiangsu R ise to O ver F ive Thousand".
Ibid.
B roadcast  report, 3 /2 /5 6  (Nanking News).
"C o -o p e ra t iv iz e d "  is taken to em brace  both lo w e r -  and h ig h e r -le v e l  
A P C s .
The la rg e r  percentage in crease  in China as a whole s im ply  re flected  
the country 's  low er  proportion  o f  households in co lle c t iv es  at m id -y e a r .
HHJP, 1 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
HHJP, 1 0 /1 1 /5 6 ,  p. 1, "Sung-chiang Special D is tr ic t  Has Implemented 
H igher-Stage C o llect iv iza tion " .
See also HHJP, 9 /2 /5 7 ,  "Make P ro p e r  Preparations in O rder  to 
Deal with Any P rob lem s That Should A r ise  A fter  C ollectiv ization  Has 
Been C a rr ied  Out in the Mountainous and F o re s t  A r e a s "  which c o n ­
f irm s  that o ver  90% o f  agricultural households in Chinkiang w ere  in 
h ig h e r - le v e l  A P C s . And C F J P , 1 3 /1 2 /5 6 ,  "Conditions Favour 
C ollect ive  M anagem ent" which reported  a 92% m em bersh ip  in the 
Shanghai suburbs.
The "secon d  h igh 't ide"  re fe rs  to the p ro ce s s  o f  fu l ly -so c ia l is t  
c o 11 e c ti vi z ation.
That is ,  the d ifference  between the 84% o f households in c o -o p s  at 
the end o f  January, 1956 (see  above) and the 96 .4%  in co -o p s  and 
co lle c t iv es  at the end o f  June (see Table IV. 3).
That is ,  if  their  experience  extended no further than M A T s.
H ow ever, there is an interesting postscr ip t .  Table IV. 3 reveals 
that by  the end o f  1956 the average s ize  o f  co l le c t iv e  in Kiangsu had 
fallen to just o v e r  276 households. M o re o v e r ,  by autumn, 1957 there 
had been a further decline to about 240 households. (HHJP, 2 8 /1 0 /5 7 ,  
"In Kiangsu About Half the APCs Have Been B a s ica l ly  C onsolidated" 
gives a figure o f  3 5, 564 co lle c t iv es  in the p rov in ce .  On the assumption 
that they contained about 95% o f  all agricultural households, total 
m em bersh ip  would have been around 8. 6 m ill ion  households and the 
average s ize  o f  A P C , 241 .82  h ou seh old s .)
In other w ord s ,  in term s o f  s ize  m i d - 1956 seem s to have 
represented  a kind o f  peak, not subsequently re-atta ined. Data fo r  
the rest  o f  East China are not readily  available, but if  the example 
o f  China (where an even grea ter  decline o c c u r r e d  between the m iddle 
and end o f  1956) is anything to go by, it is l ik e ly  that the Kiangsu 
pattern was repeated.
A considerab le  amount o f  tim e was p rev iou s ly  wasted by fa rm ers  
travelling  fro m  one plot to another.
See, fo r  exam ple , C F J P , 1 4 /1 /5 6 ,  "O ver  F ifty P e r  Cent of 
A gricu ltura l Households are A lready  Demanding to Set Up C o l le c t iv e s " ;  
C F J P , 1 8 /1 /5 6 ,  "The Peasants in the Shanghai Suburbs F ly  Towards 
S o c ia l is m " ;  and C F J P , 1 5 /3 /5 6 ,  "Without T ra c to rs  How Can H igher- 
L ev e l  A P C s Be Set U p ? M A lso  Appendix D.
See H sin-hua pan-ytteh k 'a n , 1956, no. 5; pp. 1 -10.
"R ationa l"  in term s  o f  lo ca l  natural conditions and the requirem ents 
o f  the state plan.
A ccord in g  to the norm al p ro fit -m a x im iza t ion  hypothesis labour should 
be used up to the point where its m arginal product equals the unit 
value o f  w ork  points. In departing fro m  this rule the co -o p e ra t iv e  
could behave in the sam e way as an individual peasant household.
See also Chao Kang, op. cit. , p. 47.
But it has been pointed out that p easants ’ inborn  " r is k  av ers ion "  
acts as a deterrent against haphazard technica l innovation which is 
lacking in a c o -o p e ra t iv e .  Ibid. , p. 50.
A note on the quality of these data is in o rd e r  h ere .  F irs t ,  s ta t is ­
t ica l in form ation  fo r  the " f ir s t  h igh -t id e"  p er iod  is neither as p lenti­
ful nor  as com prehen sive  as we should have w ished. Second, it is 
not always p oss ib le  to know whether the A P C s fo r  which data are 
available w ere  actually set up during this p er iod .  If not, they m ay  
not have encountered (at least to the sam e extent) the problem s 
associated  with the rapid p r o ce s s  o f  co -o p e ra t iv iza t io n  and so m ay  
not be representative  o f  general conditions in la te -1955 . There is a 
further d ifficu lty  which is that even in those c o -o p s  that w ere  the 
product o f  the "h igh -t id e "  crops  harvested  m ay  have been sown and 
ripened b e fo re  their  establishment. All these considerations are 
qualifications to the following d iscu ss ion .
H HJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  op. cit. , p . l .
HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 5 ,  op. cit.
Why 1953 and not 1954 was chosen  as a bas is  f o r  com p a rison  in 
Ssu-yang is not explained. In Chinese e co n o m ic  statistics  the choice  
o f  a b a s e -y e a r  is often dictated by  the d e s ire  to show econ om ic
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p er fo rm an ce  in as favourable a light as p o ss ib le .  H ow ever, 1954 
m ay  have been considered  unrepresentative because  o f  the incidence 
o f  natural d isa sters .
CF J P , 2 5 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "C o -o p s  in the Shanghai Suburbs Have G enerally  
Increased  P rod u ct ion "  revealed  that o f  722 AP C s in 85 hsiang 93♦ 63% 
had in crea sed  their  output and less  than 1% had su ffered  declines .
The m ost  com m on  range o f  in crease  was 10-15%, although another 
sou rce  (Lao-tung pao / “Labour D aily7 , 2 5 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "Ninety P e r  Cent 
of the C o -op era t ives  Have Achieved a Bum per H arvest This Y ear")  
stated that 13 o f  the 722 co -o p e ra t iv e s  had in creased  production by  
between 50% and 200%!
To the extent that the co -o p e ra t iv e s  introduced m odern  inputs (pow er-  
driven  m ach inery , e lectr if ica t ion , chem ica l f e r t i l i z e r s , in sec t ic id es ,  
etc. ), this argument would o f  cou rse  have less  fo r c e .
HHJP, 1 3 /9 /5 5 ,  "E v e ry  One o f  the Fifty C o -op era t ives  in Chuan- 
ch 'iao  Ch'ii Has Increased  P roduction " .
HHJP, 1 4 /9 /5 5 ,  "A lm ost  Twenty Thousand New C o -op era t ives  Have 
A lread y  Been Set Up in Kiangsu".
HHJP, 1 3 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t .
CF J P , 2 5 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. cit.
H HJP, 1 5 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . ; and HHJP, 1 6 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t .
HHJP, 1 8 /9 /5 5 ,  "In Fou-ning hsien, H o-p 'in g  APC Organizes a 
F e r t i l iz e r  C ollect ion  M ovem ent for  the Autumn Ploughing” . Other 
technical re fo rm s  m entioned in this artic le  w ere  seed  se lection , 
pest con tro l and close -p lanting .
C h 'ang-chou  kung-jen  p a o , 2 /2 /5 6 ,  op. c i t . "T op  d re ss in g "  is 
c h u i - fe i .
H HJP, 1 3 /9 /5 5 ,  "Implementing D ifferent M easures  fo r  Raising 
P roduction  A ccord in g  to the Different Growing Conditions fo r  Paddy".
HHJP, 2 4 /9 /5 5 ,  "Unified Cultivation is the P r inc ipa l Reason fo r  Our 
Increased  Output".
See fo r  exam ple HHJP, 2 3 /9 /5 5 ,  "Talking about the Changes Since 
We Joined the C o -o p " .  A lso  HHJP, 2 8 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "M easu res  for  
Increasing Production  and Production  Management in C h 'ien -ch in  A P C , 
C h 'ao-yang H sien".
HHJP, 8 /1 /5 6 ,  "On the Basis o f  Increases  in Production  Strength 
Make Plans fo r  P roduction " .
Ibid. The fem ale  work fo r c e  was reported  to have in creased  from
10,805 to 16 ,695 ; and the average number o f  labour days per  capita 
p er  year  f r o m  40 to 60.
Ibid.
In view  o f  the d ifficu lties  m entioned it needs hardly  to be added that 
m any of the calculations that fo llow  (and the conclusions based on 
them) can only be cons idered  approximate and tentative.
HHJP, 1 8 /9 /5 5 ,  "In Y e n -c h ’eng and Nan-t'ung Special D istr icts  O ver 
Th irty Thousand M ATs are Demanding to Set Up C o -o p e ra t iv e s " .
HHJP, 1 8 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t .
See below , chapter f ive .
This would yield  a higher APC output index fo r  1955 and so also raise  
that o f  the n o n -co -o p e ra t iv e  sector .
That is ,  1 1 2 .5 +  111 .5  = 224. 224 -r 2 = 112. F o r  the sake o f
convenience this assum es a 50-50 d istribution o f  peasants between 
the co -o p e ra t iv e  and n o n -co -o p e ra t iv e  se c to rs  which is approxim ately  
the situation in autumn 1955.
The relationship is not an exactly  proportional one. B e fore  c o - o p e r a ­
tive in com e was distributed deductions w ere  m ade fo r  taxes and 
contributions to w elfare  and accumulation funds. In any ca se ,  we 
have so far  been concerned  with agricultural output only, whereas 
peasants ' in com e com p r ised  the receipts  fr o m  subsidiaries  as well 
as agricu lture .
HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 5 ,  "The Implementation of O vera ll Planning is the Key 
to the Healthy Developm ent of the Present C o-op era t iv iza tion  
M ovem ent".
C F J P , 2 2 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "A  H igh-T ide o f  C o -op era t iv iza tion  Has A rr ived  
in H sin -ch ing Ch'ti".
JM JP, 1 0 /1 1 /5 5 ,  "A  P o o r  C o -op era t ive  T ran sform ed  Into a Rich 
One".
H HJP, 1 6 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "We Must Set Up M ore  and Better  C o -o p e r a t iv e s "  
cited the high rate of land utilization, shortage o f  working capital at 
peak p e r iod s ,  heavy fragm entation and the com plicated  dike system  as 
factors  favouring the adoption o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e s  in Soochow. See 
also Appendix D.
Hwang Niu-chung, W o-kuo kuo-m in  shou-ju  ti c h i - le i  ho h s ia o - fe i  
(National Incom e Accum ulation  and Consumption in China) , Pek ing , 
1957, provides  the following incom e sta tistics ;
A verage  per  capita 
peasant in com e (1955)
Sung-chiang S .D . 110-120 ytian
Soochow S .D . 100-110
Chinkiang S. D. 90-100
North o f  Yangtze 30-80
On the assumption of an average s ize  of household o f  4 .4  persons 
(see Appendix B), the average household in com e o f  peasants would be 
about 462 ytian (4 .4  x 105 ytian). This is 44% o f  the average p ost -  
co -op era t iv iza t ion  incom e shown in Table IV. 11.
HHJP, 2 8 /1 0 /5 5 ,  “ M easures fo r  Increasing Production  and Production  
Management in C h 'ien -ch in  C o -op erat ive  in C h 'ao-yang H siang". The 
com plete  set o f  data are as fo llow s:
Changes in incom e in an APC in H s in -h a i- l ien -sh ih
PERCENTAGE OF C O -O P  MEMBERS 
WITH
Increase in 
incom e
Same incom e Fall in 
incom e
1 93. 75 6 .2 5 0
2 85. 50 8. 40 6. 10
3 90. 60 4. 10 5 .30
These figures m ust be set against the rapidly  expanding size  
o f  the APC (16 m em b ers  in the f irs t  year; 131 in the second; 
and 578 in the third).
H HJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p. 1.
F o r  som e consideration  o f  levels  o f incom e in d ifferent parts o f 
Kiangsu see  below , chapter f ive.
Mo Jih-ta, W o-kuo nung-yeh h o -tso -h u a  ti fa -ch a n  (The D evelopm ent 
o f  C o-op era t iv iza tion  in China), Statistical Publishing House,
Peking; June, 1957.
Ibid. , p. 138. The consolidation  of peasants ' fragm ented  holdings 
in crea sed  land utilization by  breaking down the boundaries between 
the tiny p lo ts .
Mo cited data issued  by the State Statistical Bureau to show that the 
rate o f  labour utilization and work attendance in co llec t iv es  w ere
34. 7% higher than in c o -o p e r a t iv e s .  He c la im ed  that there had also 
been a significant in crease  in work participation  by  women. Ib id . ,
p . 121.
The developm ent o f  subsidiaries  is indicated by  the following figures ;
(92)
(93)
(94)
(95)
(96)
(97)
(98)
(99) 
( 1 0 0 )
Subsidiary in com e A verage  subsid iary
as percentage o f  in com e per  h ou se -
agricultural plus hold
subsid iary  incom e ______________________
C ollect ive  11.2  87 ytian
C o -op era t ive  7 .7  32
Ibid. , p. 123. But see  also Fei H s ia o -t 'u n g !s con trov ers ia l  report 
o f 1957 on subsid iary  developm ents in K 'a i-h s ien -ku n g  (south Kiangsu) 
in HHJP, 5 /9 /5 7 ,  "The True Nature of F e i  Hsiao t 'ung 's  Rural 
Studies"; and HHJP, 6 /9 /5 7 ,  p. 3, "What was F i H s iao -t 'u n g 's  Rural 
Study A ll A b o u t? "
Mo Jih-ta , op. c i t . , p. 123. B ecause o f  the la r g e r  s ize  and better 
contro l o v e r  r e so u rce s  o f  the co lle c t iv es  m anagem ent expenses 
declined  fro m  0 .8%  o f  g ross  expenditure ( lo w e r - le v e l  A P C ) to 0 .6%  
(h ig h e r - le v e l  A P C ).
Ib id . , p . 123.
Ib id . , p. 123. Thus:
W elfare  fund as Accum ulation  fund
percentage o f  as percentage o f
annual incom e annual incom e
C ollect ive  1 .6  8 .7
C o -op era t ive  1 .4  5 .2
Actually , the fact that such a high rate o f  growth was looked fo r  in 
one o f  the p oorest  regions o f  Kiangsu is o f cons iderab le  interest, 
fo r  it suggests that it m ay  have been here  - not in the rich  areas 
o f  T 'a i  Hu south o f  the Yangtze - that the m ost  significant advances 
w ere  being planned. But such questions are m o r e  p ro p e r ly  the 
subject o f  the next chapter.
In 1957, average food  grain  yields in T 'a i -h u  w ere ;
Soochow S .D . 600 .19  chin p er  m ou
Sung-chiang S. D. 592 .00  "  "  "
In Tung-shan C o lle c t ive ,  emphasis in the developm ent o f  subsid iaries  
was p laced  on aquatic products , d om est ic  poultry, horticu lture , 
vegetable cultivation, the rearing o f  s i lk w orm s , etc.
Chou E n -la i  in H sin-hua pan-ytieh k 'a n , 1956, no. 5, op. c i t . , pp. 1-10
H HJP, 2 6 /1 /5 6 ,  "A fter  Reward A ccord in g  to L a bou r" .
HHJP, 1 4 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "W inter Production  W ork Is Bubbling O ver in 
L i -m in  C o lle c t iv e " .
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( 102)
(103)
(104)
(105)
( 106)
(107)
(108) 
(109)
(101)
( 110)
( 111)
( 112 )
(113)
(114)
(115)
(116)
H HJP, 2 8 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "C o -o p e ra t iv e  Reorganization  in H sfi-chou 
Special D istr ic t  Pushes Up Production" .
H sin -w en  j ih -p a o , (Shanghai), 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  "The C o -op era t ives  in the 
Suburbs Show T heir  Strong Poin ts" .
HHJP, 1 /1 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
Ibid.
HHJP, 2 2 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "The Situation Regarding Governm ent W ork in 
Kiangsu During the Past H a lf-Y ear ,  and Future T a sk s" .  The total 
area o f  r ice  affected by  these changes was 8 ,4 2 0 ,0 0 0  m ou o r  about 
23% o f  the r ice  sown area. See also chapter f ive .
H sin -w en  j ih -p a o , 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
Note that in Table IV. 16 the in crease  in total grain output between 
1956 and 1957 is exactly  the same as that fo r  grain  y ields; in other 
w ord s ,  arable area expansion was to play no part in the planned 
in c r e a s e s .
The sown area is the arable area m ultiplied by  the MCI: in other 
w ord s , it is grea ter  than the arable area by  the amount o f  land on 
which m o re  than one crop  is grown. C eteris  paribus the growing o f  
a second  crop  will ra ise  yields per unit o f arable area.
Ssu-yang was situated in the poorest  part o f  Kiangsu. As a result 
the scope  fo r  im proving techniques and raising yields m ay well have 
been grea ter  than in an area such as K 'un-shan , where agriculture 
was re la tive ly  advanced. The greater  in crea se  in S su -yang 's  MCI 
m ay  s im ply  be a re flect ion  o f  these d iffering e con om ic  conditions.
CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 126.
HHJP, 2 2 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
HHJP, 1 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
H HJP, 1 8 /1 2 /5 6 ,  p. 1, "Sung-chiang Special D istr ict  Increases  Food 
Grain Production  by  Two Hundred M illion  Chin".
The c la im s on behalf o f  Hsti-Hwai w ere  m ade in HHJP, 1 5 /2 /5 7 ,
"The Evaluation o f  the Bum per Harvest in A gricu lture  Throughout 
the P rov in ce  Winds Up".
That is ,  73. 17% less  35. 27% is  37 .90%  This f igure can be taken as 
the in crea se  in total output resulting fr o m  the extension o f  the arable 
area.
P r e c is e ly  the sam e point can be made about data fo r  a co l le c t iv e  in 
Y en -ch 'en g  hsien cited in HHJP, 1 5 /2 /5 7 ,  "Stand Upright and Set 
Up the C o lle c t ives  W ell" .  The big r ises  in yields shown w ere
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( 117)
( 118)
( H 9)
( 1 2 0 )
( 121)
( 1 2 2 )
( 1 2 3 )
( 1 2 4 )
(125) 
(1.26)
(3.27)
(1.28)
(3.29)
( 1 3 0 )
( 131) 
(3.32)
(133)
p r im a r i ly  designed to counter the w orr ies  which som e peasants felt 
about declining production  in other A P C s .
CF J P , 3 0 /8 /5 7 ,  "The C o llect ives  in the Suburbs Should Be C o m ­
pletely  C onsolidated” .
Ib id . But slightly  d ifferent figures fo r  vegetable output and grain 
yields are given in H sin -w en  j ih -p a o , 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
Ib id . P igs  w ere  the ch ie f  sou rce  o f  m eat fo r  the urban inhabitants.
HHJP, 2 2 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
See above, pp. 284 -5 .
On the c r is i s  see  the conclusion  to this chapter.
H HJP, 2 6 /1 /5 6 ,  op. c i t .
H HJP, 1 1 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , "In A ccord an ce  with L oca l  Conditions L i -  
m in C ollect ive  Raises  its Production  T a rg e ts " .
H HJP, 1 /1 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
S u-chou  pao (Soochow D aily ), 2 5 /1 /5 7 ,  "F ood  Grain In creases ; 
S ubsidiaries  Develop; Incom e R is e s " .
H sin -w en  jih  p ao , 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
Actually , such a s im ple  average has little m eaning because  o f  
fluctuations and high differentia l growth rates between the ear ly  
post-1949  years  and those of the m id -1 9 5 0 's .
F o r  an extrem e exam ple see  the planned su bs id ia ry  expansion for
Tung-shan C o llect ive  given e a r l ie r  (Table IV. 16, p. 285).
H HJP, 3 /8 /5 7 ,  p. 3, "The Increase  in P ig -R e a r in g  Has Led to an
In crease  in the Amount o f  P ork  on the M arket" .
H HJP, 3 0 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
See fo r  exam ple JM JP, 2 5 /1 1 /5 7 ,  "P rod u ct ion  Levels  in the C o l l e c ­
tives Can C erta in ly  Surpass Those o f  W e l l - 0^ "^0 Middle P easan ts" .  
And C F J P , 2 6 /1 1 /5 7 ,  "Surpass the Production  L evels  o f  W e l l - t o -d o  
Middle P easan ts" .
F o r  a detailed examination of the effect  o f  the c o -o p s  and co llec t iv es  
on in com es  of u pper-m idd le  peasants see  the ca s e -s tu d y  o f  ten such 
peasants in H ung-hs ing-erh  C ollect ive  (K 'un-shan  hsien) in HHJP, 
5 /1 2 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "S oc ia l ism  and the U pper-M iddle  P easan ts" .  The 
following data taken fro m  that artic le  show c le a r ly  that despite the
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institutional changes taking place u p p er-m idd le  peasant incom es 
could still r ise :
Leve ls  o f  incom e o f  10 up p er-m id d le  peasants 
in H ung-hsing-erh  APC (K ’un-shan hsien) 
during 1953-56.___________________________________
P r e - c o - o p e r a -
tivization L o w e r - le v e l  APC H igher-
1953 1954 1955 1956
1 755 1367 1135 1428
2 729 901 905 1146
3 1275 1798 1661 2881
4 695 762 616 986
5 1031 1291 1314 1140
6 781 834 628 854
7 635 720 630 934
8 1361 1547 1115 1524
9 911 866 948 1302
10 2173 1946 1588 2132
All figures in ytian
(134) Actually , this is also a rather devious approach, since availability 
o f  grain  fo r  distribution is also a m easure  o f  the su cce ss  o f  the 
CPCS system . N everthe less , as long as we bear  in mind that the 
relationship is not un i-causa l the e x e r c is e  rem ains a valid one.
(135) H sin -w en  jih p ao , 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
(136) Ib id .
(137) H HJP, 3 0 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
(138) Ibid .
(139) Ib id . An investigation o f  o ver  34 ,000 peasants in 95 co llec t ives  
showed that 70% o f  m em b ers  supported the A P C s unreserved ly ;
24% upheld the general system  but re se rv e d  judgement on a few 
s p e c i f ic  points; and 6% w ere  threatening o r  demanding to withdraw 
fro m  the co l le c t iv e s .  -
(140) F o r  hints o f  em erging  p rob lem s see HHJP, 3 1 /1 0 /5 6 ,  "The Late 
Paddy Regions Should Guarantee that Autumn Harvesting and Sowing 
Do Not Fall Behind T im e " ,  which suggested that in one co llect ive
in Hsing-hua hsien (Y ang-chou  S. D. ) there was insufficient labour to 
com plete  agricultural operations on tim e. And HHJP, 1 /1 1 /5 6 ,
"We Must Consolidate C ollect ive  and Individual Interests Within the 
C o l le c t iv e "  pointed to d ifficu lties arising out of the conflicting 
demands o f  w ork in the private and co l le c t iv e  s e c to rs .
(141) HHJP, 9 /1 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "Strive fo r  A ll-rou n d  Increases  in Production  
in the Second Year o f  C o llect iv iza tion " .
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(142)
(143)
(144)
(145)
(146
(147
(148
(149
(150
(151
HHJP, 1 3 /1 /5 7 ,  "C le a r ly  R ecognize  the Main Current and the L e s s e r  
C u rrent" .
C o llect ives  w ere  sub-div ided into brigades com pris in g  30-40 h o u s e ­
holds; and production  team s which w ere  the b a s ic  work units.
Such a contradiction  could ar ise  because the retention o f  sm all,  
p r ivate ly -ow ned  plots meant that there was still som e w ork which 
rem ained com plete ly  under a peasant’ s own contro l and where the 
incom e he rece ived  was d irect ly  related to the w ork  p er fo rm ed  - 
and could be seen to be so.
HHJP, 1 1 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Ensure That There is No Falling Behind in 
the W ork o f  Im proving Subsid iaries , Building Up R iver  D ikes, 
Collecting and Applying F e r t i l iz e r " .  Interestingly enough the report 
on governm ent w ork in the second half o f  1956 (HHJP, 2 2 /1 /5 7 ,  o p . 
c it . , p. 2) m ade exactly  the opposite point when it warned against 
concentrating too heavily  on agriculture at the expense o f  subs id ia ries .  
Perhaps the two reports  are best seen as a re flect ion  o f  how fin e ly -  
balanced the conflicting interests  within a co l le c t iv e  w ere .  This point 
em erges  c le a r ly  in an artic le  about Chiang-ning h s ie n , reporting 
d ifficu lties  caused by d ifferences  in rewards m ade by production teams 
which had ra ised  output and those which had su ffered  d ec lin es . See 
HHJP, 3 0 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Give Attention to Solving the Outstanding 
P rob lem s  in the C o l le c t iv e s " .
HHJP, 2 6 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Han-chiang Hsien Has A chieved  T op -D ress in g  
on E v ery  Mou of W heat".
Ibid. The ch ie f  s ou rce  o f  organ ic  fe r t i l iz e rs  was pig manure and pigs 
rem ained under private ownership after co llect iv iza t ion .
H HJP, 5 /1 /5 7 .
H HJP, 2 5 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "How to Strengthen Techn ica l Guidance in 
A gricu ltura l P rod u ct ion " .  And HHJP, 1 7 /2 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "Strive for  
Even G reater  V ic to r ie s  in Extending D ouble-C ropping  o f  Paddy".
K. R. W alker in "Organization o f  A gricu ltura l P rod u ct ion " ,  op. cit. , 
p . 418.
See fo r  exam ple the interesting analysis in HHJP, 1 7 /2 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , 
p. 2 which warned against extending the planting o f  two crops  o f  paddy 
r ice  o v e r  too wide an area. The experience  o f  Sung-chiang and T 'a i  
hsien  had shown that the dou b le -crop p ed  area o f  r ice  should genera lly  
be only 10-15% of the arable area of paddy because  o f  the demands on 
labour. Thus, in paddy areas one unit o f  labour could se rv ice  only 
one m ou - even less  where subsid iaries  w ere  particu lar ly  im portant. 
See also be low , chapter f ive.
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(152) In som e cases  they w ere  set even low er.  H HJP, 4 /2 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Chti- 
jung Hsien Sets This Y ear 's  A gricu ltura l P roduction  P la n s" .  See 
also H HJP, 1 4 /2 /5 7 ,  "L i -sh u  APC Has F ixed  Its Plans fo r  Increased  
P rod u ction " .
(153) An exam ple o f  e x ce ss iv e  1956 demands was that paddy yields had been 
set at 30% above 1955 le v e ls ,  even though 1955 had been a b u m p er-  
harvest  year .
(154) Thus, a counter-argum ent pointed out that the high targets of 1956
w ere  a re flec t ion  o f  peasants ' enthusiasm and urged  that 1957 targets
w ere  not set too low .
(155) H HJP, 9 /2 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Construct and Repair  Irrigation  F acilit ies  in 
the F ields With A ll Effort: Ensure Quality and Speed Up the W ork ".
(156) HHJP, 2 3 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Thoroughly  Investigate the P rep ara tory  W ork 
fo r  Spring P loughing".
(157) Significantly, it was the tendency to set plans too high that rece ived  
grea ter  attention.
(158) H HJP, 8 /2 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "H sin-hua C ollect ive  has Knocked the Attitude
that 'P roduction  Has Reached its Peak ' on the H ead".
(159) H HJP, 2 4 /2 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "The Great Spring Production  M ovement 
U nfolds". The Chinese phrase is sheng-ch 'an  tap-ting.
(160) H HJP, 1 1 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "R e ly  on C ollective  M em bers  to O vercom e  the 
D ifficu lties  A ssoc ia ted  with P rep ara tory  Ploughing and Other W ork ".
(161) HHJP, 1 3 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Show S e lf -R e lian ce  in Production  and O v e r ­
com e the P o o r  Spring H arvest P r o s p e c t s " .  It was also argued that 
state loans obstructed  incom e r ises  fo r  c o l le c t iv e  m em bers  whereas 
se l f -h e lp  was a spur to in cre a se s  in both output and incom e (see  
HHJP, 1 5 /3 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "In Chiang - yin H sien the M asses  Develop the 
'T hree  S e l f - s u f f i c i e n c ie s '" ) .
(162) HHJP, 2 1 /2 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Swiftly O rganize an A ll -o u t  Spring Production  
M ovem ent".
(163) HHJP, 2 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "An Urgent Notice fro m  the Kiangsu A g r ic u l ­
tural Department on Taking Urgent M easures  to Guarantee the Full 
Growth o f  the Sum m er C ro p " .
(164) H HJP, 3 /3 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "Slow P r o g re s s  in the Spring Production  M o v e ­
ment in Y en -ch 'en g  Special D is tr ic t " .
(165) HHJP, 2 2 /6 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Take P recautionary  M easures  Against 
P o s s ib le  Natural D isasters  and Strive to Guarantee the Autumn 
H arvest" .
(166) H HJP, 2 6 /6 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "The T im e fo r  Transplanting W ill Soon Have 
Ended".
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167) HHJP, 2 9 /6 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "Hstl-chou Special D istr ic t  Takes M easures to 
Guarantee a Bum per Autumn H arvest” .
168) See fo r  exam ple HHJP, 1 3 /9 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "The A gricu ltura l D epartm ent 
Demands that Management be Strengthened in the Cotton F ie ld s ” .
A lso  H HJP, 1 6 /1 0 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "Y ang-chou  Specia l D istr ic t  Launches a 
M ovem ent to Prevent Drought and Get On with Sowing".
169) H HJP, 7 /5 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "On Contradictions Within the C o llect ives  and 
the D e m ocra t ic  Running o f  the C o l le c t iv e s " .
170) S hao-k 'ou  tuo-fen . Ib id .
171) See H HJP, 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "The Irrigation  Department o f  Kiangsu 
A ssum es the Tasks fo r  Raising Production  and Practis ing  E con om y ".  
And HHJP, 2 6 /1 /5 7 ,  "In a Rational Manner Delegate P ow er  Down to 
the Production  T e a m s " .
172) HHJP, 7 /5 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
173) HHJP, 1 1 /5 /6 7 ,  p. 2, "Q uick ly C a rry  Out Financial Accounting in the 
C ollect ives  in an Open M anner".
174) We cannot c la im  o f cou rse  to have exhausted all the contradictions in 
these few paragraphs. A v e r y  important one arose  out of the conflicting 
c la im s o f  the private and co llect ive  s e c to r s .  The ear lies t  example
o f peasants refusing to se ll  the fe r t i l iz e r  fr o m  their  private plots to 
the co l le c t iv e  (which incidentally  was of quite genera l sign ificance in 
the ea r ly  months o f  1957) was one such instance. Contradictions 
between the co lle c t iv e  and state authorities also em erged  in the 
drawing-up o f  agricultural plans, the im plem entation o f  the CPCS 
System  and the establishment o f  agricultural p r ic e s .
(175) The aim here  is to provide a factual account o f  how the draft animal 
c r is is  developed  in Kiangsu. Its e con om ic  im plications are cons idered  
at g rea ter  length in the next chapter.
(176) HHJP, 1 8 /2 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "Sung-chiang Special D is tr ic t  Strengthens the 
W ork o f  Looking A fter  the Draft Animals fo r  Spring".
(177) HHJP, 2 4 /2 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "H w ai-y in  Special D is tr ic t  Investigates the 
Spring W ork o f  Protecting Draft A n im a ls" .
(178) HHJP, 8 /3 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "H sd -chou  Special D istr ic t  Strengthens Guidance 
in the W ork o f  Looking A fter  Draft A n im a ls" .
(179) Ibid. And HHJP, 1 3 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Q uick ly  Im prove the W ork o f  Caring 
fo r  the Young Shoots and Take Preventive A ction  against the C old " .
(180) HHJP, 1 3 /3 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "Show S e lf -R e lian ce  in Production  and O v e r ­
com e  the P o o r  Spring H arvest P r o s p e c t s " .  But see also HHJP,
1 5 /3 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 1 which mentioned the p oss ib il ity  o f  lim ited
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government aid in the supply of animal feed to some areas.
(181) HHJP, 1 8 /3 /  57, op. c i t . , p. 2. The use o f  human labour to pull 
ploughs was also advocated in an editoria l in HHJP, 2 3 /3 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , 
p . l .
(182) HHJP, 9 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "In All A reas  the Draft Animal Markets A re  
Doing a L ive ly  B u sin ess" .
(183) H HJP, 2 7 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "U rgent D irective  on the M ass M ovem ent to 
In crease  the N um bers o f  D raft A n im a ls".
(184) These figures are taken fro m  K. R. W alker in "Organization o f  
A gricu ltura l P rod u ct ion " ,  op. c i t . , p. 413. But see  also chapter five 
below .
(185) H HJP, 2 7 /3 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p . l .
(186) Ib id .
(187) H HJP, 7 /5 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p . l .
(188) HHJP, 3 /6 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "T h ere  Are Many Advantages in D ecentraliz ing 
the Feeding o f  Draft Cattle".
(189) Interestingly enough the p oor  treatment o f  draft animals was para lle led  
by  a deterioration  in the standard o f  tool repa irs  occas ion ed  by the 
lack  o f  any responsib ility  in the care  o f  these important items o f  
working capital. In one case , there had been an in crea se  o f  35.29%
in the num ber o f  sm all tools  needing repa ir .  (See HHJP, 1 9 /3 /5 7 ,  
p. 1, "E m phasize  the W ork o f  Repairing Old A gricu ltura l T o o ls " .  )
(190) H HJP, 1 3 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "G eneral Investigations Being Made by the 
Food  Grain Department o f  Grain Acquisitions in A ll  A r e a s " .
(191) H HJP, 1 5 /3 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "Strengthen Leadersh ip  O ver the F ree  Markets 
in the V i l la g e s " .
(192) HHJP, 1 0 /7 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "A  Call fo r  E conom y in the Consumption of
Food  Grains and the Fulfilm ent o f  the State P u rchase  Quota".
(193) HHJP, 1 2 /7 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "E con om ize  in the Consumption o f  Grain,
Make Rational D istributions and F u lfil the Sum m er State P u rchase 
Quota o f  F ood  G ra in s".
(194) H HJP, 1 6 /7 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Take a F irm  Hold o f  the W ork o f  Managing 
the F re e  M ark ets" .  And HHJP, 2 1 /7 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Take A ll N e c e ss a r y  
M easures  to Clamp Down on Black Markets and B lack -M ark et  P r i c e s " .
(195) HHJP, 2 6 /7 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "As a Matter o f  U rgency  We Must Get On with
the Planned P urchases  and Supply W ork fo r  the Sum m er H arvest" .
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(196) H HJP, 2 4 /7 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "The Peasants A re  Enthusiastically  Handing 
O ver Their  Public  Grain and Surplus G ra in".
(197) HHJP, 2 6 /7 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
(198) H HJP, 1 4 /8 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "P r o g r e s s  in the State Purchase  of Food
Grains Has R ecently  Been V e ry  Uneven".
(199) S im ilar  appeals w ere  still being made in O ctober ,  1957.
(200) HHJP, 6 /1 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  Editoria l.  And HHJP, 1 6 /1 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "The 
F ir s t  A l l -P r o v in c e  Con ference  o f  Ch'ti P arty  Com m ittee  S ecreta ries  
C lo s e s " .
(201) HHJP, 7 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "M ore  About the F ir s t  Y ear  o f  C o llect iv iza tion " .
(202) H HJP, 7 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 3, "Spread Abroad the Supe r io r ity  o f  A gricu ltura l
C ollect iv ization  Throughout the V illages and C it ie s " .
(203) H HJP, 1 3 /5 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "D rive  Out D issatisfaction ; Get C lear  What is 
Right and What is Wrong; and P e r s e v e r e  with the C o l le c t iv e s " .
(204) HHJP, 1 3 /9 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "The Peasants Who Withdrew fro m  Tung-shih 
C o llect ive  Have Subsequently R e - jo in e d " .  A fter  their  withdrawal old 
habits w ere  said to have r e -e m e r g e d ,  such as h igh -in terest  loans, 
m ortgaging o f  land as a co lla tera l fo r  loans, etc .
(205) HHJP, 2 2 /5 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Stop the Trade in Grain Coupons".
(206) Ibid .
(207) See fo r  exam ple H HJP, 1 7 /5 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "E xpose  the Erroneousness o f  
th e 'T h r e e -  I s m s ' " .  (These  w ere  bu reau cratism , sectar ian ism  and 
su b ject iv ism . )
(208) HHJP, 2 7 /8 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "It is Quite F a ir  fo r  High-Output Regions to 
Sell M ore  Surplus G ra in".
(209) These quotations are taken fro m  C F J P , 2 9 /8 /5 7 ,  "The Peasants in 
the Suburbs Refute the R ightists" ; and C F J P , 3 0 /8 /5 7 ,  "The C o l l e c ­
tives in the Suburbs Should Be Com plete ly  C onsolidated".
(210) The account that fo llow s is based on HHJP, 5 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit. ; and 
HHJP, 6 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 3.
(211) HHJP, 5 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
(212) HHJP, 2 6 /1 0 /5 7 ,  pp. 1 -2 , "The Draft Outline fo r  The D evelopm ent o f  
China's A gr icu ltu re , 1956-67 (R evised  Draft). "
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A gricu ltura l Production  in Kiangsu: 
a Quantitative Analysis
C H A P TE R  FIVE
PART II
Some Quantitative Indicators o f  Agricu ltura l Developm ent 
in Kiangsu During the 1950's
I Estim ates o f  the Total Arable and Sown A reas  and the 
Sown A re a  under Food Grains in Kiangsu: 1949-1957.
In a useful d iscu ss ion  o f  the d ifficu lties o f  interpreting o f f ic ia l  Chinese 
data Chao Kang has argued that until 1956-57 estim ates o f  arable area 
throughout the country contained a downward bias because  o f  u nder­
reporting. Only in the final year o f  the F irs t  F ive Year Plan (F F Y P ) did 
o ff ic ia l ly -p u b lish ed  figures becom e  "re la t ive ly  free  o f  d i s t o r t i o n " . ^  A 
sim ple exam ple will show that this contention applies to Kiangsu:
Table V. 1; Some estim ates o f  arable area 
in Kiangsu.______________________
Total arable area
1949a 51, 000, 000 m ou
1953b 7 7 ,2 8 0 ,0 0 0
1957° 9 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
S ources ; a TK P (Hong Kong), 2 4 /3 /5 0 ,  cited in
P rov inc ia l A gricu ltu ra l Statistics fo r  
Com m unist China, Washington, D . C . ,
1969, p . 1 1 0 .
b JM JP, 2 8 /9 /5 4 ,  cited in ibid. , p. 110.
c T K P , 2 1 /1 /5 8 ,  c ited in ibid. , p. 110
A cceptance  o f  these estim ates would have startling im plica tion s , fo r
we should have to explain a 52% rise  in the arable area  between 1949 and
1953 and a further in cre a se  o f  m o re  than 20% in the subsequent four ye a rs .
It is true that the 1949 figure is not com parable  with the la ter  ones because
o f  d ifferen ces  in geograph ica l coverage ;  when north and south Kiangsu w ere
re-united  as a single province  at the end o f  1952, t e r r i t o r y  approximating
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F o r  the sake o f  con s isten cy  this needs to be added to the 1949 arable area
shown in Table V. 1. On the assumption that it included 15, 000, 000 m ou o f  
(2 )arable land the total figure would becom e  66, 000, 000 m ou. H ow ever, this 
still leaves  an in crea se  o f  17% between 1949 and 1953 to be explained.
Fortunately, sufficient data are available to enable us to show not only
that the 1949 and 1953 figures  in V. 1 are g ross  u n d er -est im a tes ,  but
also to com pile  a rev ised  se r ies  o f  arable area estim ates fo r  the 1950 's.
To begin  with, i f  v e r y  large  changes in the arable area w ere  taking place
it is inconceivab le  that the fact would not have been recogn ized  by extensive
coverage  in the p rov in c ia l p r e s s .  Yet the subject o c cu rs  only ra re ly  in the
new spapers . M o re o v e r ,  where data are available they certa in ly  do not
indicate changes o f  the magnitude suggested by the table. F o r  exam ple,
one report stated that during the F F Y P  period  (1953-57 inclusive) the arable
(3)area o f  the prov ince  was extended by 2 ,700 , 000 m ou. If the 1957 figure
of 93, 000, 000 m ou w ere  accepted , this would suggest an area o f  90, 300, 000
m ou in 1952, with an overa ll  in crease  o f  2 .99%  during the five intervening
ye a rs .  E lsew here  it was reported  that during 1953-56 760, 000 m ou w ere
(4)rec la im ed , which would also indicate re lative ly  sm all changes. In sum, 
im proved  statistica l reporting m ust account fo r  a v e ry  large  part o f the 
in crea ses  in arable area shown in the above table.
Chao Kang's w ork  again provides a useful starting-point fo r  the c o m ­
pilation o f  a rev ised  se r ie s  o f  arable area estim ates . By accepting data 
published in 1957 as re liab le  and extrapolating backw ards , subtracting any 
cultivated land used in construction  ( fo r  exam ple , o f  roads , buildings,
to Hsii-chou Special District was recovered from Shantung and Anhwei.
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ir r iga tion  w orks) and adding in rec la im ed  land, he has p er fo rm ed  the 
rem arkable  feat o f deriving estim ates of the arable area  in every  province  
o f  China between 1 9 4 9 - 5 7 . ^  His figures fo r  Kiangsu are reproduced  below  
and we have added two columns showing the percentage change in each year 
and an index with 1949 as 100.0;
(5)
Table V. 2 : Arable area in Kiangsu, 1949-57
Total arable area Percentage change 
o ver  previous year
Index with
1949  = 1 0 0 . 0
1949 9 1 ,9 9 0 ,0 0 0  m ou - 100. 0
1950 9 1 ,9 8 0 ,0 0 0 - 0. 01 99.99
1951 9 1 ,9 8 0 ,0 0 0 0 99.99
1952 91 ,8 7 0 ,0 0 0 - 0. 12 99.87
1953 9 1 ,8 8 0 ,0 0 0 + 0. 01 99. 88
1954 9 1 ,8 3 0 ,0 0 0 - 0. 05 99. 83
1955 9 2 ,8 1 0 ,0 0 0 + 1.07 100.89
1956 9 3 ,0 3 0 ,0 0 0 + 0 .2 4 101.13
1957 9 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 - 0. 03 101.10
Note; F o r  purposes o f  com parability  Kiangsu 
data fo r  1949-52 include Hstf-chou 
Special D istr ict .  This applies throughout 
the chapter.
Source; Chao Kang, op. cit. , pp. 
Appendix Table 9.
294-295,
Chao 's finding that there was only a sm all in cre a se  in arable area
during the 1950's is m o re  readily  acceptable. In the fert ile  agricultural
regions o f  south Kiangsu population p ressu re  o ver  the cen tu r ies  m ust have
resulted in a high cultivation index and it can be assum ed that the area under
cultivation was approaching its upper lim it. In the p o o r e r  regions of the
north the scope  f o r  reclam ation  m ay have been g rea ter ,  although high co s ts ,
lack  o f  working capital and the fact that land already being cultivated was
(7)d isp laced  by la r g e - s c a le  w a te r -co n tro l  works m ade substantial additions
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H ow ever, acceptance o f  the general trend in Table V .2  is not the 
same as acceptance o f  its individual components and we must now consider
how reliab le  these are . Chao shows that o v e r  the whole period , the area
(8) (9)rec la im ed  by  state fa r m s ' in Kiangsu was 763, 000 mou, o f  this the
F F Y P  contribution was 617, 000 m ou. He also c ited  two re fe ren ces  from  the
journal China's A gricu ltura l Reclam ation  to the e ffect  that the total area
( 1 0 )of land rec la im ed  during 1950-57 was 760, 000 m ou, so that his estim ates 
would appear to be w e ll -b a sed . H ow ever, Wang W ei-p 'in g  cites the figure 
o f  760 ,000 m ou as the area rec la im ed  between 1953 and 1956 only.  ^ ^
Since Wang's book was itse l f  published in 1956, it is c le a r  that the addition 
to cultivated land resulting fr o m  reclam ation  in the eight years following 
'L iberat ion ' m ust have been considerab ly  in e xcess  o f  the figure used by 
Chao.
In o rd e r  to estim ate the arable area d isp laced  by  irr iga tion  construction
Chao's  approach is to assum e that fo r  every  100 m ou o f  n ew ly -irr igated
( 12)land, 3 .6  m ou was taken out of cultivation. This ratio is then applied
to the annual increm ents  in the irr iga ted  area o f  each prov ince .
We would quarre l with this approach on two grounds. The f ir s t  c o n ­
cerns  the d istinction  between additions to the irr iga ted  area and im p r o v e ­
ments in the existing irr iga ted  land. Chao's em phasis is wholly on the 
fo rm e r  and to the extent that this was like ly  to be the m a jo r  sou rce  o f  arable 
land d isp lacem ent, understandably so . H owever, im provem ents  in the 
irr iga ted  area w ere v e r y  significant in Kiangsu. F o r  exam ple, during the 
F F Y P  the net expansion in irr iga ted  land was 7, 330, 000 m ou, whereas the
to the arable area unlikely.
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area over  which im provem ents  in existing fac il it ies  w ere  made was double
(13)
this figure (14 ,730 , 000 m ou). It seem s m ost  unlikely that this was not
accom panied  by  som e decline in the arable area and i f  this is so Chao's 
estim ate of land withdrawn fro m  cultivation should be adjusted accord ingly .
It is a little unfair to c r i t ic iz e  Chao's  use o f  the 3. 6; 100. 0 ratio without
suggesting an alternative. But it is worth bearing in mind that extension o f
irr iga ted  land could be ca rr ie d  out on the basis  o f  s m a l l -s c a le  labou r-
intensive p ro je c ts  o r  la r g e - s c a le ,  re latively  capita l-in tensive  ones.
O bviously  the extent to which arable land was d isp laced  was a function o f  the
sca le  and technical nature o f  the p ro je c t  and so the average ratio might be
( i 4)totally  inappropriate to a particu lar prov ince . In the ear ly  1950 's, fo r
exam ple, north Kiangsu was d irect ly  affected by the Hwai R iver  Control
P r o je c t  and in 1951-2 the North Kiangsu Main Irr igation  Channel resulted
(15)in the "autom atic ir r ig a t io n "  of 5, 700, 000 m ou o f  agricultural land.
In view o f  the vast undertaking that this work represented  it m ay well be that
the average ratio is too low fo r  Kiangsu. The one p iece  o f  quantitative
inform ation  available support this conclusion , fo r  it was reported  in 1957
that recent b a s ic  construction  and irr igation  p ro je c ts  had taken away about
(16)3, 000, 000 m ou o f  cultivated land. The correspond ing  figure used by
Chao is only 862, 500 m ou - less  than 30% o f  the 1957 estim ate.
All in all then, even i f  the general trend indicated by Chao Kang's s e r ie s  
is acceptable , there are less  grounds for  confidence in his individual 
estim ates . Fortunately , this does not leave us with an insoluble prob lem  
thanks to an authoritative Chinese sou rce  o f  1957 which gives arable area 
data fo r  1950-55 in Kiangsu. These will serve  as the skeleton o f  our final 
rev ised  s e r ie s ;  _ ..
Table V .3 :  The arable area o f  Kiangsu
(excluding Shanghai), 1950-55)
Total arable area P ercentage  change
____________________  o v e r  previous year
1950 89, 460, 336 mou
1951
1952
91 ,053 ,7 77  
9 2 ,6 7 2 ,1 0 0  
9 3 ,9 4 3 ,5 8 4  
9 4 ,866 ,0 69  
9 4 ,9 4 7 ,0 6 5
+ 1. 8 
+ 1 .7
1953 + 1 .3
1954
1955 + 0 .09
+ 0 .9
Source : CKN YHTHYTSL, op. c i t . , pp. 992-998
Chao's  estim ates , it will be reca lled , suggested that there was
virtually  no change in the arable area between 1949 and 1954. But the data
shown above indicate a sm all but continuous in cre a se  throughout the period .
The Chinese v e rs io n  is the m o re  acceptable: in the im m ediate  p o s t - 1949
years  it is l ik e ly  that the re -estab lishm ent o f  peace brought about a r e c o v e r y
of arable land fro m  the d ep ressed  wartim e leve l .  In this resp ect ,  it is
interesting that C .C .  Chang's estim ate o f  Kiangsu's arable area in the ear ly
(17)
1930's was 9 1 ,6 6 9 ,0 0 0  m ou - a f igure that was re-attained  between 
1951 and 1952. A fter  1952 the sm a lle r  in crea ses  m ay  have re flected  genuine 
net additions to cultivated land brought about by the kind o f  reclam ation  
work which we e a r l ie r  argued was taking place in som e parts o f  the north.
All that we now require  are estim ates fo r  1956 and 1957. F ro m  another
authoritative so u rce  we know that the arable area in 1956 was 93 ,940 , 000 
(18)m ou. This o f  co u rse  im plies  a decline o f  just o v e r  1% com pared  with
1955, but this is eas ily  explained in term s of the p articu lar ly  high leve l  o f
(19)
construction  activity (inside and outside agriculture) in 1956, which 
m ust have d isp laced  a large amount o f  arable land. As fo r  1957, our
-3 4 2 -
e a r l ie r  analysis o f  agricultural conditions would suggest that there was
little change in the arable area during this year. Thus, the figure o f
94, 000, 000 m ou derived  from  a newspaper report o f  August, 1957 would
(20)seem  to be quite re liab le .
Our com plete  arable area se r ie s  is th ere fore  as fo llow s ;
Table V. 4; The arable area o f  Kiangsu 
(e x c l .  Shanghai), 1950-57.
Total arable area
1950 89, 460, 336 m ou
1951 9 1 ,053 , 777
1952 92 ,6 7 2 ,1 0 0
1953 9 3 ,9 4 3 ,5 8 4
1954 94 ,866 ,0 69
1955 9 4 ,947 ,0 65
1956 9 3 ,9 4 0 ,0 0 0
1957 9 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
We m ust now introduce the important d istinction between arable and
sown area. The f ir s t  s im ply  shows how much o f  the total surface  area is
used fo r  cultivation. Sown area  takes into account the fact that there is
som e land which can support m ore  than one crop  in a year  and it is linked
with arable area by the m ultiple cropping index (MCI), which is a m easure
(21)
o f the percentage o f  arable land on which m ore  than one crop  is grown.
Thus, a MCI o f  150 would indicate that two crops  a year  w ere  grown on 50%
o f  the arable area, while one o f  200 would m ean that the whole o f  the cultivated
, (2 2 )area was d ou b le -crop p ed .
Because  o f  lack  o f  data sown area estim ates are not available fo r  every
yea r .  H ow ever, sufficient in form ation  is available to give an indication
o f  the extent to which double -cropp ing  was practised  in Kiangsu and how far
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the total sown area  was extended during the F F Y P . The relevant inform ation
is set out below;
Table V. 5; Estim ates o f  total sown area in Kiangsu 
at the beginning and end o f  the F irs t  Five 
Y ear Plan.
1952‘
19531
1957'
A rab le  area MCI
92, 672, 100 m ou 160
9 3 ,9 4 3 ,5 8 4  165
9 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  172
Sown area 
( = a. a. x  MCI 
4- 100)_______
148 ,275 ,360  m ou
155 ,006 ,914
161 ,680 ,000
S ources ; A. a. : all f ro m  Table V .4 .
MCI : a Sun Ching-chih, op. c i t . , p. 56.
b U pper-M iddle  School Texts,
Chung-kuo ch in g -ch i  t i - l i  (An 
E con om ic  G eography of China),
2 v o l s . ,  Peking, July, 1956; 
vol.  2, p. 45.
To what extent the 3. 13% in crea se  in the MCI between 1952 and 1953
re flects  a genuine net r ise  in double cropping, continuing r e c o v e r y  fro m
w artim e conditions o r  s im ply  differing statistical covera g e  in the two sou rces
it is im p oss ib le  to say. But i f  we take the average 1952-53 estim ates o f  the
(23)arable area and MCI as a basis  fo r  com parison  with the 1957 figures it
is poss ib le  to show how multiple cropping can lead to in crea ses  in total output
in situations w here the cultivated area is rising s low ly  (o r  even declining).
Thus, while K iangsu's arable area increased  by only 0 .74%  during this period ,
the extension o f  double cropping was the sou rce  o f  a 6 .63%  rise  in the total
sown area . It w ill be apparent that this extension o f  the sown area r e p r e -
(24)sented an im provem ent in land productivity s ince , ce te r is  p ar ibu s , it
(25)resulted in an in cre a se  in average yields per unit o f  arable area. In
short, despite the lim itations on the expansion o f  arable land the peasants
-3 4 4 -
w ere  able to achieve significant r ises  in total output by farm ing existing 
land m o re  intensively .
Because  o f  d ifferent c lim atic  and other conditions the practice  o f
double cropping varied  con s iderab ly  throughout the prov ince ;
MCI in d ifferent areas o f  Kiangsu.
Year MCI
1956 197.7
1955 180.9
1955 196 .4
1955 168.6
150 .0  - 160.0
1957 145.0
Estim ated fro m  data in CKNYCCHW T, 
op. c i t . , p. 233, Table 22 and p. 234,
Table 23.
CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 237.
Approxim ate estim ate from  inform ation 
given above; see c h . 1, p . 43.
HHJP, 2 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Full o f  V ic to ry  
and Confidence We A dvance".
The pattern which the table reveals is a predictab le  one. Double 
cropping was m ost  extensively  practised  in the fert ile  areas south o f  the 
Yangtze, where a high population density, expanding urban s e c to r  and abun­
dant supplies o f  labour and other vital inputs (including water and natural 
f e r t i l iz e r s )  provided favourable demand and supply conditions. In the T 'a i  
Hu basin  a lm ost the entire arable area was d o u b le -crop p ed , the MCI in 
1957 being 194.
(27)The sam e factors  must also explain the high index in Nan-t'ung,
fo r  here  too natural and dem ographic  conditions favoured such intensive
farm ing. But in contrast to Kiangnan's ch a ra cter is t ic  cropping pattern of
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Table V. 6; The
aSung-chiang S .D . 
Soochow S. D. k
Nan-t'ung S .D .*5 
bY ang - chou S .D . 
Chinkiang S. D. °
dY en -ch 'en g  S .D .
Sources
r ice  fo llow ed  by  wheat, e con om ic  crops  (above all cotton) w ere m ost 
im portant in Nan-t 'ung, being grown in com binations with r ice  o r  wheat.
E lsew here  the growing o f  a second crop  was le ss  com m on . As the
table shows, a fam ilia r  north -south  d ichotom y existed , with double cropping
(28 )being p ractised  less  extensively  in the north. This was o f  cou rse  not
only a re flect ion  o f  d iffering c l im atic  conditions but also o f  different 
technical standards o f  cultivation and re so u rce  endowment patterns. This 
sim ple  d ichotom y had important im plications fo r  future plans to further 
extend m ultiple cropping in the prov ince . In creases  in total output resulting 
fro m  the planting o f  a second crop  w ere lim ited  not because  o f  a declining 
'm arginal product o f  double cropp ing ' curve (analogous to that o f  labour), 
but because  physica l fa c tor  constraints eventually prevented m o re  expansion. 
In addition to the inputs a lready m entioned, the su cce ss fu l  switch from  
single to double cropping required  adequate supplies o f  labour and draft 
animals to ensure that agricultural operations should be com pleted  on time 
during the m o re  concentrated  peak periods created  by the m o re  intensive 
cropping system . If these conditions w ere not m et the rhythm o f agricultural 
work was threatened and the e ffort  to ra ise  arable area  yields might b ecom e  
coun ter -p rod u ctive . What this meant in practica l term s  was that given 
existing fa ctor  supplies , the MCI was already approaching its upper lim it 
in south Kiangsu and Nan-t 'ung. It fo llow ed  that the burden o f  expansion 
rested  on those areas in the north o f  the province  w here there was still 
scope  fo r  such developm ent.
This interpretation  is substantiated by the targets contained in the 
Second and Third  Five Year Plans. In Sung-chiang, Soochow and Nan-t'ung
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Special D istr icts  em phasis was not so m uch on m o re  double cropping as 
on the need to im p rove  the existing cropping pattern. In Soochow, fo r
exam ple, the p ractice  o f  planting paddy and wheat should give way to raising 
(29)two crops  o f  r ic e .  But in north Kiangsu the irr iga t ion  works o f  the
previous years  had created  conditions in which it was fo r  the f irs t  tim e 
poss ib le  to contem plate the w id e -sp rea d  adoption o f  m ultiple cropping.
Thus, during the SF Y P  period  (1958-62) Hstf-chou and H w ai-yin  w ere to 
be tran s form ed  into a new double cropping r ice  and wheat region. In Yen- 
ch 'eng it was planned that the MCI would r ise  fro m  the current 145 to 182 
(by 1962) and 186 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . ^ ^
Although eco n o m ic  crop s  w ere  w idely  planted in Kiangsu, agricultural 
activity was centred  around the production o f  food  gra in s . A ccord in g ly ,  
it will be useful to conclude this introduction by attempting to estim ate 
what proportion  o f  total sown area these crops  represented . B ecause o f  
insufficient statistical in form ation  we shall only show the situation on the 
eve and at the end o f  the F ir s t  Plan.
F ir s t ,  1957; the following table gives a breakdown o f  the sown area
(31)planted under food  grains (including soya) in the prov ince ;
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Table V .7 ;  Sown area of food grains in Kiangsu 
(including Shanghai): 1957.__________
R ice  35, 770, 000 m ou
Wheat 31 ,2 3 0 ,0 0 0
Tubers 5, 320 ,000
C oa rse  grains 45 ,4 9 0 ,0 0 0
Soya 13 ,060 ,000
Total 130, 870, 000 m ou
S ources ; R ice ,  wheat and soya  fr o m  T L C S , 1959 
no. 6, op. cit. , p. 245.
Tubers and co a rse  grains fro m  Sun 
Ching-chih, op. c i t . , p. 57.
Unfortunately, this is the only year  in which such a detailed b re a k ­
down is available. H ow ever, on the basis  of som e sim ple  assumptions an 
approximate estim ate o f  total grain  sown area can be m ade fo r  1951, as 
fo llow s;
F ro m  the sou rces  used in V .7  we know that the output o f  tubers and 
co a rse  grains in 1957 was;
tubers 1 ,0 3 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  chin (=14.79%)
c o a rse  grains 5 ,9 5 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  ( = 85.21%)
Total 6 ,990 , 000, 000 chin (=100.0%)
And since the sown area o f  each category  is known, their  average yields 
can eas ily  be estim ated;
A verage yield  (1957) 
tubers 1 ,0 3 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  4- 5 ,3 2 0 ,0 0 0
= 194.36 chin per  m ou
co a rse  grains 5 ,9 5 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  “ 4 5 ,4 9 0 ,0 0 0
= 130.93 chin p er  m ou
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Now, it is p oss ib le  also to derive  the output o f  tubers and coa rse  
grains in 1951 f ro m  data showing the output of other food grains in that 
year;
Table V. 8; Output of food grains in Kiangsu in 1951. 
Total output o f  food  grains 20, 455, 000, 000 chin
of which;
r ice 9 ,9 8 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  chin
wheat 2 ,8 4 4 ,0 0 0 ,  000
soya 1 ,3 2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
Sub-total 14, 152 ,000 ,000  chin
T h e re fo re ,  output o f  tubers
+ co a r se  grains 2 0 ,4 5 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  minus
1 4 ,1 5 2 ,0 0 0 ,
= 6 ,3 0 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  chin
S ource ; Total output derived  fro m  in form ation  in
T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. c i t . , p. 244.
R ice ,  wheat and soya  output; ib id . , p. 245.
Let us assum e that the proportion  of total com bined  output represented  
by tubers and co a rse  grains individually in 1951 was the sam e as in 1957. 
Then;
Total output (19 51) 
tubers 6, 303, 000, 000 x 14. 79%
= 932, 000 ,000 chin
c o a rse  grains 6, 303, 000, 000 x 85. 21%
= 5 ,3 7 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  chin
If it is further assum ed that average yields o f  tubers and co a rse  grains
(32)rem ained at the 1957 le v e lv ' their sown areas can e a s ily  be computed;
Sown area (1951) 
tubers 932 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  ~ 194.36
= 4 ,7 9 5 ,2 2 5  m ou
co a rse  grains 5 ,371 , 000, 000 v  130. 93
= 41, 021, 920 m ou
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Since the sown areas of r ic e ,  wheat and soya  fo r  1951 are already
known, s im ple  addition o f  all the components w ill y ield  an estim ate o f
total grain  sown area in this year;
Table V. 9: An estim ate o f  total food  grain  sown area
in Kiangsu in 1951.__________________________
R ice  3 0 .9 0 0 ,0 0 0  mou
Wheat 2 8 ,7 9 0 ,0 0 0
Tubers 4 ,7 9 5 ,2 2 5
C oarse  grains ' 4 1 ,0 2 1 ,9 2 0
Soya 14 ,050 ,0 00
Total 119, 557, 145 m ou
S ource; R ice ,  wheat and soya  output fro m  T L C S ,
1951, no. 6, op. c i t . , p. 245.
The two estim ates o f  the sown area under food grains can now be
presented in a single table. F o r  purposes o f  com p a rison  the total arable
and sown area  data are also included;
Table V. 10; Total arable area, total sown area and 
food  grain sown area on the eve and at 
the end o f  the F F Y P .
1951-52 1957
Total arable area 9 1 ,053 ,7 77  m ou 94, 000, 000 m ou
Total sown area 148 ,275 ,360  161 ,680 ,000
Grain sown area 119, 557,145 130 ,870 ,000
Food grain  MCI 131.30 139-22
Note; Total sown area figure is fo r  1952.
A rab le  area and sown area  under food 
grains are fo r  1951.
The use o f  d ifferent base years m akes it im p oss ib le  to use these
figures fo r  p r e c is e  com parison . N everthe less , the table illustrates
w ell the nature o f  p r io r it ie s  within the agricultural s e c to r  during the
F irs t  Plan p er iod . Ignoring the prob lem  o f  d ifferent base y e a rs ,  the total
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sown area in creased  by 13 ,404 ,640  m ou while the extension o f  the sown
area under food  grains was 11 ,312 ,8 55  m ou. In other w ords 84 .39%  of
the area new ly planted under crops  was allocated to food  grains. C learly ,
the p r io r ity  given to growing m ore  food was a re flect ion  o f  the growing
consum ption requirem ents o f  an expanding population (particu larly  in the
c it ies ) .  But the figures also suggest the serious  prob lem  which confronted
the agricultural s e c to r  in Kiangsu: fo r  it was not on ly  m o re  food that was
needed, but also in creased  supplies o f raw m ateria ls  fo r  the fa c tor ies  in
the south of the p rov in ce . Yet despite a net addition o f  13 m illion  m ou to
the sown area o f  the p rov in ce , le ss  than two m ill ion  w ere  available for
(33)growing e co n o m ic  c r o p s .  ' Unless the sown area could be expanded 
much m o re  rapidly o r  substantial r ises  in yields achieved by som e other 
m eans, it is obvious that the ob ject ives  of attaining grain  s e l f - su f f ic ie n cy  
and maintaining adequate raw m ateria l supplies to industry could not 
be m et.
II Quantitative Trends in the Production  o f  Important 
Crops in Kiangsu: 1949-1957.
(1) Food  grains;
It w ill be usefu l to begin at an aggregate leve l by  considering the 
output o f  all food grains (including soya) in Kiangsu between 1949 and 
the end o f  the F ir s t  Plan. The relevant in form ation  is set out in 
Table V. 11;
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Table V. 11; Output o f  food grains (including soya) 
in Kiangsu and Shanghai.______________
Total output 
(m illion  chin)
Index with
1949 = 100
Index with 
1952 = 100
1949 13,250 100.00 61. 06
1950 16,800 126.79 77 .42
1 951 20 ,455 154.38 94. 26
1952 21 ,700 163.77 100.00
1953 23 ,400 176.60 107.83
1 954 23 ,000 173.58 105.99
1 955 25,740 194.26 118.62
1956 24,000 181.13 110.60
1957 25, 160 189.89 115 .94
S ources; 1949: Chung-kuo hsin -w en  (China News),
2 6 /9 /5 5  states that output in 1953 
was 76 .6%  above the 1949 leve l .  
The figure shown above is 76 .6%  
above 13,250 .
1950; TKP, 1 3 /1 /5 1 ,  cited in P rov in c ia l
Agricu ltura l Statistics fo r  Com m unist
China, op. cit. , p p . 114-115.
1951; TLCS, op. cit. , 1959, no. 6, p. 244
1952;
1953;
states that grain  production in 1957 was 
23% higher than in 1951. Given the 
1957 estim ate shown the 1951 figure 
is eas ily  derived .
This figure has been chosen fro m  three 
derived  estim ates ; in form ation  given by 
Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  op. cit. , p. 58 yields a 
f igure o f  21, 77 5 m ill ion  chin, which is 
v e r y  c lo se  to the figure of 21 ,7  56 
m illion  chin, which can be derived  from  
Chung-kuo h s in -w e n , op. c i t ; HHJP, 
1 0 /1 /5 8 ,  op. c i t . , states that food  grain 
production in 1957 was 17.2% above 
1952, which on the basis  o f  a 1957 
estim ate of 25, 160 again gives a 1952 
figure o f  about 21, 500 m illion  chin.
HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  p . 2, " C o r r e c t ly  U nder­
stand the Q uestion o f  the Peasants '
L evel o f  Grain Consum ption". The 
figure is c o r ro b o ra te d  by  the figure o f
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23, 540 given in C h 'ang-chou  kung-jen 
pao , 1 3 /1 2 /5 5 ,  "G ro ss  Output o f  Food 
Grains and Cotton is Higher than the 
1957 T a rg e t" .
1954; HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 2; and
C h 'ang-chou  kung-jen  p a o , 1 3 /1 2 /5 5 ,  
op. c i t .
1955; HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2; and
C h 'ang-chou  kung-jen  p a o , 1 3 /1 2 /5 5 ,op. at 
and Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  op. c i t . , p. 53.
1956; HHJP, 9 /1 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "Strive fo r  O verall
Production  In creases  in the Second Year 
o f  C o -op era t iv iza t ion " ;  and HHJP,
1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
1957; HHJP, 1 0 /1 /5 8 ,  op. c i t . ; see  also 
Kuang-ming jih p a o , 1 6 /1 2 /5 7 .
In 1949 the im m ediate task was to res tore  production  fro m  the
dep ressed  w artim e leve l  and between 1949-52 rapid p ro g re ss  was made
in this d irect ion , the s im ple  average rate o f  growth o f  grain output during
(34)
these years  being 21.26%  p. a. In som e parts o f  the province
r e c o v e r y  was even m o re  rapid; in north Kiangsu, fo r  exam ple, m any
areas benefitted fro m  a bum per autumn harvest in 1950 and at the beginning
of the following year there w ere  c la im s o f  p r e -w a r  leve ls  o f  output having
• „ (35)been re-attained.
Sources (continued);
Planning during these ear ly  years  was n e c e s s a r i ly  lim ited . Quite 
apart f r o m  p ress in g  polit ica l considerations which turned attention away 
fro m  e co n o m ic  m a tters ,  the statistical base which was essentia l to an 
effic ient planning system  s im ply  did not exist. N everth e less ,  targets 
w ere drawn up in north and south Kiangsu and they revea l som e interesting 
d iscrep an c ies  between planned and actual rates o f  growth during the 
'r e c o v e r y  p e r io d ' (1949-52);
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Table V. 12: Planned in creases  in grain  output in
north and south Kiangsu; 1950-1952.
Planned percentage in cre a se  in total 
grain  production o v e r  previous y e a r ;
NORTH KIANGSU SOUTH KIANGSU
(exc l .  Hstl-chou)
1950
1951
1952
S ources ; a SNJP, 1 /6 /5 0 ,  p . l ,  "Plans fo r  Raising
the Production  o f  Cotton and Food  Grain 
in South Kiangsu in 1950".
b D erived  fro m  in form ation  given in SPJP,
2 0 /2 /5 1 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2. 
c F ro m  SNJP, 3 /3 /5 1 ,  op. c i t . , p. 3.
d F ro m  S P J P , 2 0 /2 /5 1 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
e D erived  fro m  inform ation  given in SN JP,
9 /2 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
The estim ates shown in V. 11 would suggest that the p er form an ce  of 
agriculture in 1950 and 1951 considerab ly  exceeded  the expectations o f  
the planners in Kiangsu. (Actual output during these years  rose  by  26 .79%  
and 21. 76% resp ect ive ly .  ) It m ay be that such high growth rates contain 
an elem ent o f  statistical illus ion  and that the v e r y  large  in crea ses  w ere  the 
result o f im prov ing coverage  and data co lle c t ion .  The estim ates o f  Chao 
Kang, fo r  exam ple , show only a 8. 1% r ise  in grain  production in 1949-50 - 
although even his s e r ie s  concedes  an in crease  o f  17.24%  in the following 
y e a r . ^ ^  But as V . l l  ind icates, our estim ates fo r  1950 and 1951 are 
authoritatively based  and it is unlikely that the d iscrep a n c ies  can be 
entire ly  explained in these te rm s .
Although in south Kiangsu the rate o f  in cre a se  planned fo r  1952 was 
in line with the e a r l ie r  targets , this was not the case  in the north. The
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planned 20% in cre a se  in grain  production was w ell in e xcess  o f  the 
previous y e a r ’ s target, e sp e c ia l ly  when set against the c la im s (cited 
above) that p r e -w a r  levels  o f  output had already been  re-attained in som e 
parts o f the region. Could it be that this p roposed  expansion re flected  
what was taken to be a conservative  bias in e a r l ie r  plans, as shown by 
the v e r y  high rates of in crease  actually ach ieved? If so it is c le a r  that 
it was a m isca lcu la tion ,  fo r  in Kiangsu as a whole grain  output rose  by 
little m o re  than 6% in 1951-52 - rate o f  in crea se  which strong ly  suggests 
that the north Kiangsu plans rem ained unfulfilled.
B ecause  o f  the unusual conditions which favoured  rapid agricultural
r e c o v e r y  between 1949-52, a m o re  accurate m easu re  of the growth o f
food  grain  production  in the 1950's is given by  the index taking 1952 as 
(37)the b a s e -y e a r .  The sim ple  average rate o f  growth o f  grain output
o ver  the entire p er iod  (1949-57) is 11.24% p. a. , a f igure which would 
indicate a rem arkable  p er form an ce  by any standards; but between 1952- 
57 it falls to a le s s  im p re ss iv e  3. 19% p. a. Even this s im ple  average is 
m isleading , fo r  it gives the im p ress ion  o f  a consistent trend -line  through­
out the period , w hereas a graph would reveal leve ls  o f  output fluctuating 
con s iderab ly  y ea r  by  yea r .  To a large  extent the d irect ion  o f  such annual 
changes can be explained in term s  o f  c lim atic  conditions, although it is 
m uch m o re  d ifficu lt to say how far  the s ize  o f  the changes was due on the 
one hand to natural fa ctors  and on the other to m an-m ade  p o licy  d ec is ion s .  
The co rre la t io n  between production and natural conditions, though obvious
enough, is in fact worth em phasizing. A fter  all, the annual fluctuations
(38)in grain output w ere  certa in ly  not m arginal and as such they serv e  to
rem ind that fo r  all the attempts to raise productiv ity  by  institutional o r
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o r  other m eans , agriculture in Kiangsu was still subject to fo r c e s  beyond 
the contro l o f  the p lanners. Favourable natural conditions in 1953 and 
(esp ec ia lly )  1955 w ere  a guarantee that harvests  would be good. By 
contrast, 1954 and 1956 w ere  years o f  severe natural d isa s te rs .  In 1954
3 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  m ou o f  agricultural land (33 .2%  o f  K iangsu 's  arable area) 
w ere  affected and in 1956, m o re  than 4 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  m ou (over  5 0 % ) .^ ^
These facts alone w ere  sufficient to keep production  at low  leve ls  during 
these y e a rs .  Not that the e ffects  o f  these d isa sters  w ere  the sam e through­
out the p rov in ce .  In 1954 the r ice  crop  was m ost  s e r io u s ly  hit and a
d r y - c r o p  region  like H sii-chou Special D istr ict  was able to in crea se  its
(40)grain  output by  400 m ill ion  chin. In 1956 it was the northern wheat
areas that w ere  w orst  affected and the predom inantly r ice -p rod u c in g  
d istr ic ts  o f  Soochow and Sungchiang actually ra ised  grain  production 7 .7%
(41)above the 1955 b u m p er-h a rves t  leve l.
The im pact o f the natural d isasters  o f  1956 on planning is w ell i l lu s ­
trated by  the exper ience  o f  a num ber o f  individual Specia l D is tr ic ts .  A 
news broad cast  o f  3 0 /1 2 /5 5  stated that in 1956 Hsti-chou Special D istr ic t
planned to in cre a se  grain output by 17.4%  above the 1955 leve l.  In Yen-
(42)ch 'eng the correspond ing  figure was 50. 5% (s ic ) .  In the event, far
fro m  grain  production  rising in north Kiangsu it was n e c e s s a r y  to tran s fer
grain  f r o m  other areas to help the peasants affected by  the d isa sters .
A lm ost  2, 000 m ill ion  chin o f  grain  w ere transported  to the d isa ster -h it
(43)regions o f  Hsti-chou, H wai-yin  and Y en -ch 'en g  and in all o v e r  2, 500 
m ill ion  chin w ere  sent fr o m  15 provinces  to the d isa ster  areas of Kiangsu
(44)during 1956. Even in Soochow the good 1956 p er fo rm an ce  could not
com pa re  with the 1 9 % in cre a se  that had been anticipated in the f irs t  month
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But o f  cou rse  m an-m ade  factors  also im pinged upon the p er form an ce
o f  the agricultural s e c to r  in Kiangsu. In the e a r l ie r  part o f  this thesis
it was argued that the e con om ic  im pact o f  the ea r l ie s t  institutional changes
was probably  slight. N or during the " f ir s t  h ig h -t id e "  is there any real
evidence that the w idespread  establishment o f  lo w e r - le v e l  co -o p e ra t iv e s
brought about any breakthrough in the agricultural s e c to r ;  indeed in m any
ways the new units seem  to have created  as m any p rob lem s as they had
solved  old ones . But as we attempted to show in the last chapter there is
som e evidence that during 1956 the greater  organizational advantages o f
the fu l ly -so c ia l is t  co l le c t iv e s  did su cceed  in averting the w orst  e ffects
o f  that y e a r 's  d isa s te rs .  This is borne out by the data shown in Table
V. 11, fo r  despite  the grea ter  ser iou sn ess  o f  the 1956 d isa sters  com pared
with those o f  1954, total grain  production was neverthe less  4 .35%  higher
in the latter yea r .  H ow ever, the su ccess  was s h o r t - l iv e d  and in 1957
p rob lem s assoc ia ted  with the institutional fra m ew ork  o f  the co lle c t iv es
(46)appear to have hindered agricultural developm ent.
In any ca se ,  the situation (v is -a -v is  food gra ins) at the end o f  1957
was one which o f fe red  little encouragem ent to the planners in Kiangsu. To
be sure , during th e  F F Y P  period  total output had grow n at the creditable
average rate o f  3. 19% p. a. But taking 1953 as the base year, growth was
a m e re  1. 88% p. a. (1953-57 ), suggesting a p er fo rm an ce  that was far  fro m  
(47)gratifying. M ost significant o f  all, grain  output in 1957 was actually
below  the F F Y P  target (even though it had been su rpassed  in the bum per 
year  o f  1955). At the end o f  1955 the 1957 grain  target was stated to be
of the year.
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25, 520 m ill ion  chin. E arly  in 1957 this f igure was again cited, but
it was now coupled with a higher estim ate; thus total planned output was
(49)given as 25, 500-28, 000 m ill ion  chin. It m ay be that the p lanners,
encouraged by  the bum per harvest o f 1955 and anxious to achieve a high
rate o f  growth in the last yea r  o f  the F irs t  Plan, w ere  hopeful that the
e a r l ie r  target o f  25, 500 m illion  chin could be surpassed . Indeed, a short
tim e la ter  the target was sp e c i f ica l ly  given in another artic le  as 27, 500-
(51)28 ,000  m illion  chin. But as the prob lem s o f  1957 began to em erge
m o re  c le a r ly ,  a downward rev is ion  was apparently m ade, fo r  in Septem ber
(52)of that yea r  a figure  o f  25, 500 m illion  chin was once m o r e  cited. On
this basis  actual output in 1957 was 1.33%  below  the F F Y P  target, although
when set against the figure o f  28, 000 m illion  chin the shortfall is 10. 14%.
W hichever figure is chosen  there is no doubt that the rate o f  growth of
total grain  output during the F F Y P  was a serious  disappointment. Perhaps
the c le a re s t  indication o f  the gravity o f  the situation cam e in an artic le  in
the 'P e o p le 's  D aily ' which starkly pointed out that i f  grain  output continued
to r ise  by  only 3% a year  it would take 23 years b e fo re  the Twelve Year
(53)Plan target was attained in Kiangsu!
So far we have looked at the production o f  food  grains without re fe ren ce  
to population growth. If our estim ates are converted  to a per  capita basis  
the gravity  o f  the situation at the end o f  the F F Y P  em erges  even m o re  
c lea r ly .  Thus, the following table shows grain output per head o f  total 
population in Kiangsu during 1949-57;
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Table V. 13; Output o f  food grains (inc. soya) per head 
o f  total population in Kiangsu; 1949-57.
1949
1950
1951
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
P e r  capita output 
(including Shanghai)
303 .9  chin
376. 8
448. 6
465. 4
490. 8
516.3
470. 7
482. 6
P e r  capita output 
(excluding Shanghai)
343 .3  chin
427.0
510.2 
531. 0 
561.8 
594. 9
544.3 
559. 8
Source : D erived  by  dividing total output in Table V. 11
b y  the population data given in Appendix B.
These figures can now be converted  to two index s e r ie s ,  one taking 1949
as the base year  and the other, 1952:
Table V. 14: Two index se r ies  o f  per  capita food  grain
output in Kiangsu: 1949-1957._____________
P E R  C A PITA  OUTPUT 
(including Shanghai)
PE R  C A PITA  OUTPUT 
(excluding Shanghai)
Index with Index with Index with Index with
1949 =100 1952 = 100 1949 = 100 1952 = 100
1949 100.00 65 .30 100.00 64. 65
1950 123.99 80.96 124.38 80.41
1951 147.61 96.39 148.62 96. 08
1952 153.14 100.00 154.68 100.00
1953 161.50 105.46 163.65 105.80
1954 155.22 101.35 157.82 102.03
1955 169.89 110.94 173.29 112.03
1956 154.89 101.14 158.55 102.50
1957 158.80 103.70 163.06 105.42
S ource : Table V. 13.
Data fo r  Kiangsu (including Shanghai) have been presented  in the interests  
o f con s isten cy  s ince  the estim ates given in V. 11 also include production in the
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M unicipality. H ow ever, the point has already been m ade that Shanghai,
though geog ra p h ica lly  part o f  K iangsu, was in m any ways a separate e con om ic
entity and fo r  the purpose o f analyzing trends in the p er  capita  output o f food  
grains it w ill be m ost usefu l to exclude it.
F ro m  Table V. 14 the s im ple  average rate o f  growth o f  per  capita food  
grain output can eas ily  be calculated and the following results  are obtained 
fo r  Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai);
1949-57 7. 88% p. a.
1952-57 1.08%  p. a.
(54)V e ry  rapid grow th during the 're co v e ry  y e a rs ' is again resp on sib le  fo r  
the m uch h igher rate o f  grow th record ed  over  the p eriod  as a w hole. But fo r  
reasons a lready  given it is  the growth achieved during the sh orter  p eriod  that 
m ore  accu ra te ly  re fle cts  the p erform an ce  o f the agricu ltu ra l s e c to r . On this 
showing it is  c le a r  that agricu lture in Kiangsu was fa iling  to m eet the demands 
p laced  on it, the output o f food  grains b a re ly  keeping pace with the grow th o f 
population. Indeed, i f  1953 (a fa ir ly  average year in  term s o f natural conditions) 
is  taken as a b a se , p er  capita  grow th b ecom es  negative; the sim ple average 
is  - 0. 09% fo r  1953-57.
To sum m arize  the argument so far; in 1957 the output of food  grains
(including soya) was below  the en d -year  target o f  the F F Y P . In per capita
term s the situation was p a rticu la r ly  seriou s  fo r  during the last fou r years
o f the F ir s t  Plan gra in  production  had risen  by le ss  than total population.
M o re o v e r ,  the evidence suggests that between 1952 and 1957 planned growth
(in any m eaningful sen se) had not m ateria lized  at all. Instead o f  steady annual
in cre a s e s , output had fluctuated w idely  year by y e a r . The tran sform ation
o f  the institutional fram ew ork  of agricu lture had not been  accom panied  by a
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corresp on d in g  breakthrough in production .
How did this p erform a n ce  com pare with that of other regions in China? 
U nfortunately, such a question  is not easy  to answ er becau se  o f  the d ifficu lty  
o f  obtaining sa tis fa cto ry  estim ates o f  grain  production  e lsew h ere  in the 
country. H ow ever, the follow ing tables w ill give som e indication  o f the p lace 
o f K iangsu v is -a -v is  the other p rov in ces  o f East China and China as a w hole.
The f ir s t  table shows the growth o f  total grain output in China and East
China during 1949-57;
Table V. 15; Simple average annual rates o f  growth of 
total food  grain production; som e 
com parative  ind icators .____________________
China (1) 
China (2)
Anhwei
Chekiang
Kiangsu
1949-1957 
+ 8 .52%
n. a.
+ 19.09% 
+ 10.71%  
+ 11. 24%
S ources;
1952-1957 
+ 4 .08%
+ 1.14%
+ 7 .54%
+ 2 .16%  
+ 3 .19%
1953-1957 
+ 4 .49%
+ 2 .86%
+ 14.66% 
+ 2 .27%
+ 1.88%
China (1); Estim ated fro m  Chao Kang, op. c i t . , 
pp. 302-303, Appendix Table 13.
China (2); Estim ated by  O. L. Dawson; see his 
Com m unist China's A gricu lture ; its 
Developm ent and Future Potentia l, 
P ra e g e r ,  1970; p. 187, Table 12.
Anhwei; F ro m  Chao Kang, op. cit. , pp. 302-03
Chekiang: Ibid.
Kiangsu; See above, Table V . l l .
O ver the entire period  since 1949 Kiangsu em erges  v e ry  w ell,  its growth
being exceeded  only by  that o f  Anhwei. H ow ever, during the years  o f  the
F irs t  Plan the situation is less  favourable, part icu lar ly  when 1953 is taken
as the base year. Not only was the growth o f  grain production  le ss  than that
o f the neighbouring East China provinces  but it also appears to have been
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below  the national average. Bearing in mind that south Kiangsu contained 
one o f  the r ichest  grain  producing areas in the country, this is perhaps the 
m ost  telling indication o f  the p r o v in c e ’ s poor  p er fo rm a n ce  during the F F Y P  
period .
Com parative per  capita data are harder still to com e  by but the following
table m ay  serv e  to indicate the underlying trends;
Table Y . 16; P e r  capita output o f  food  grains; som e 
com parative  f igures .______________________
China (2)
1953
564.60 chin
1957
580 .80  chin
Anhwei 478 .55 684 .52
Chekiang 624. 45 616 .60
Kiangsu 561.80 559.80
Sources : China (2) : F ro m  O. L. Dawson, op. cit. , 
p. 187, Table 12.
Anhwei; D erived  by  dividing total output 
as given by Chao Kang (op. cit. , 
pp. 302-303) by  the population 
estim ate o f  Perkins (op. cit. , 
p. 212, Table A. 5).
Chekiang Ibid.
Kiangsu; See above Table V. 13.
If these data are now presented in percentage term s  the relative
standing o f  the d ifferent regions can eas ily  be shown;
Table V. 17; P e r  capita output o f  food  grains in Kiangsu 
exp ressed  as a percentage o f  per capita 
output in Anhwei, Chekiang and China.
(P e r  capita output in 
Kiangsu as percentage 
o f  per  capita output in;)
1953 1957
China (2) 99. 50 96 .38
Anhwei 117.40 81. 78
Chekiang 89. 97 90. 79
Source ; Table V. 
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16.
At the end o f  the F F Y P  per  capita levels  o f  grain  output w ere low er in 
Kiangsu than in all the other areas shown. But it is the com parison  with 
the national data which is once m o re  m ost  revealing: that per  capita output 
in Kiangsu was below  that o f  China at the end o f  the f irs t  year  o f  the Plan 
was evidence enough o f  a be low -a vera ge  p er form an ce ;  but by 1957 the 
situation had deteriorated  still further, fo r  while production  per head had 
r isen  o v e r  the country as a whole, it had declined in Kiangsu, with the result 
that the gap between the provincia l and national f igures  had in creased  from  
0. 5% to 3 .6% .
The obvious conclusion  that em erges  from  this b r ie f  d iscu ss ion  o f  
com parative  trends is that Kiangsu in the 1950's could not be cons idered  a 
r ich  grain  p rov in ce .  H ow ever, this statement m ust be p laced  in its p rop er  
context. The figures shown above are p rov in ce -w id e  averages and (as will 
be shown la ter)  they conceal v e r y  considerab le  d ifferen ces  in production 
between areas . It is these in tra -prov in c ia l  d ifferentia ls ,  m o re  gen era lly  
sum m arized  as the 'e co n o m ic  d ichotom y ' between north and south Kiangsu, 
which explain the apparent contradiction  between the p ro v in ce 's  traditional 
reputation as a r ich  gra in -producing  area and its apparently p oor  showing 
during the F irs t  Plan period . If Kiangnan alone w ere  con s idered , fo r  
exam ple , p er  capita  leve ls  o f  grain output would com pare  favourably not only 
with China but also with the other East China p rov in ces .  In other words it 
was the re lative ly  backward agriculture o f  north Kiangsu which was 
depressing  average levels  o f  production in the p rov in ce .
P e r  capita  output o f  food  grains m ust not be confused with per  capita 
consum ption. The use of grain  fo r  purposes other than human consumption
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( fo r  exam ple, seed  and animal feed  requirem ents) has to be taken into 
account and allowances made fo r  any state le v ie s .  T h e re fo re ,  in o rd e r  to 
arrive  at an approxim ation o f  grain consumption during the F F Y P  period  
we m ust now attempt to estim ate f irs t ,  the net extraction  fro m  agriculture 
and second, the edible weight o f  the g ross  per capita figure  that is left.
Table V. 18 presents  the bas ic  data relating to state acquisitions (via 
central purchases and taxation) and state supplies o f  food grain in Kiangsu 
during the Plan period . Inform ation fo r  1953-56 is reasonably  com plete 
but absence o f  data m akes it n e c e s sa r y  to make som e estim ates o f  our 
own fo r  1957.
N otice that alternative figures could be obtained fo r  1956-57; an
article  published in Septem ber, 1957 (55) stated that because  o f  the 1956
d isasters  governm ent grain purchases had been reduced by m ore  than
1,310 m ill ion  chin while central supplies had r isen  by 968 m illion . This
would suggest that central purchases and taxes in 1956-57 totalled 7 ,390
(56)m ill ion  chin, leaving 21, 110 m illion  chin available fo r  the rural areas.
H ow ever, it seem s like ly  that the data cited in this artic le  re fe r re d  to the 
s e v e re ly -h it  d isa ster  regions o f  Hstl-chou, H wai-yin , Y en -ch 'en g  and 
Yangchou and ignored  the fact that state acquisitions m ay  well have in creased  
in Sung-chiang and Soochow, where there w ere  bum per harvests  in 1956.
F o r  this reason  the figures given in the table on the following page seem  
m o re  acceptable .
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The bracketed  estim ates fo r  1957 are rough approxim ations; we argued 
in the last chapter that grain purchase quotas w ere  not m et in 1957 and 
th ere fore  a state acquisition figure low er  than the 7, 600 m illion  chin is 
p re fe ra b le .  In view  of the evidence relating to the 1957 grain  acquisition 
c r is is  a lready given a figure o f  7, 000 m illion  chin (8% below  target) seem s 
not unreasonable . The 1957 rural and urban central supply data are s im ply  
the averages o f  the previous years and total central supply is o f  cou rse  
their  sum.
The last line o f  Table V. 18 shows the total amount o f  grain available 
fo r  all purposes in the rural s e c to r  o f  Kiangsu. If appropriate deductions 
are now m ade fo r  seed  and feed  requirem ents it will be poss ib le  to estim ate 
leve ls  o f  grain  consum ption among the peasants; see  Table V. 19 on the 
following page.
The edible weight estim ates suggest the considerab le  su ccess  o f  the 
CPCS system . One o f  the striking ch aracter is t ics  o f  grain  production 
during the F F Y P  p er iod  in Kiangsu was its susceptib ility  to quite severe  
annual fluctuations. But V. 19 indicates that contro l o v e r  grain supplies 
perm itted  the governm ent to cushion the peasants against shortfalls  in 
total production. In this resp ect  there can be little doubt that the experience  
o f  the p o s t - 1949 years contrasted  sharply with the situation be fo re  1949. 
There is no lack  o f  genera l evidence that d isasters  in the e a r l ie r  decades 
o f  the century w ere  often accom panied  by  fam ine. Yet in the 1950's despite 
the two severe  natural d isa ster  years  there is nothing to suggest deaths 
resulting fr o m  starvation. The achievement that this represents  is p a r t icu ­
la r ly  apparent in the last three years o f  the F irs t  Plan; notwithstanding
-3 6 7 -
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a 6 .76%  drop in total grain  production between 1955 and 1956, average 
p er  capita availability o f  food grains in the rural areas o f  the prov ince  fell 
by  a m e re  0 .76% . Indeed total grain availability in 1956 was actually 0 .78%  
higher than it had been in the previous bum per-harvest year! M ore o v e r ,  
despite the disappointing p er form an ce  o f  agriculture in 1957, grain  availa­
b ility  was at its highest leve l in this year.
H ow ever, this su cce ss  was not unconditional. A fter  all, state grain
acquisitions w ere  not s im ply  designed to ensure supplies o f  food  to the
peasants; rather, they w ere to provide the basis  o f  the agricultural co n -
(57)tribution to e con om ic  developm ent. In Kiangsu the cost  o f  maintaining
(even slightly in creas in g)  grain supplies in the rural areas was instability
(58)in the stocks held by  the governm ent. C learly , such instability was not
com patible  with the m o re  fundamental econ om ic  demands p laced upon 
agriculture . In short, against the w elfare  su cce ss  o f  the CPCS schem e in 
Kiangsu m ust be set its fa ilure  to fulfil its e co n o m ica l ly  m o re  important 
developm ental ro le .
If we accept the edible weight estim ates shown in V. 19 as prox ies  fo r
actual average grain  consum ption in rural Kiangsu we can now com pare
their c a lo r i f i c  content with the two estim ates o f  daily  ca lo r ie  requirem ents
(59)which w ere  used in an e a r l ie r  chapter. ' Thus;
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Table V .2 0 ;  A com parison  o f  ca lo r ie  availability fro m  
per  capita grain consum ption and ca lor ie  
requ irem en ts .________________________________
D aily ca lo r ie  content As % 2054 As % 1900
o f  grain  consum ption ca lo r ies  ca lor ies
1 9 5 3 - 5 4 1429.41 69. 59 75.23
1 9 5 4 - 5 5 1347.93 65.62 70 .94
1955-56 1589.00 77. 36 83. 63
1956-57 1576.99 76. 78 83. 00
1957-58 1636.07 79 .65 86. 11
S o u r c e s : Tables V. 19 and II. 11.
The question o f  how m any ca lo r ies  are required  per  day in o rd er
to m eet  adequate health requirem ents is an e x trem ely  com plicated  one
and to answer it would take us beyond the confines o f  the present chapter.
Suffice it to say that recent studies have suggested that e a r l ie r  estim ates
m ay have been set too high. T h ere fore  it is the 1900 ca lo r ie s  that provide
( 60 )the m o re  acceptable standard in the table above. If this is so ,  it would
appear that during the last half o f  the F F Y P  period  c e r e a ls ,  tubers and 
soya provided  the peasants in Kiangsu with alm ost 85% o f  their daily 
ca lo r ie  requirem ent, the figure showing v irtually  no change between 1955 
and 1956 though increas in g  in the final year o f  the plan.
But grains w ere  only one part (albeit the m ost  im portant) o f  the Chinese
(61)diet. They w ere supplemented by a sm all but s ignificant quantity of 
m eat o r  fish  and (esp ec ia lly )  vegetables and these m ust be added in i f  we 
are to obtain a reasonably  accurate estimate o f  consum ption leve ls .  
Unfortunately, sp e c i f ic  in form ation  on this aspect o f  p easants ’ diets in 
Kiangsu is not available and it is n e c e s s a r y  to extrapolate fro m  the little 
data obtainable fo r  other areas. T .H . Shen has argued that in China
-3 7 0 -
" .  . . about 80% o f  the ca lo r ie s  are derived  fro m  ce re a ls  . . . H ow ever,
such a figure conflicts  with studies conducted by the Chinese after 1949
which indicated that the proportion  o f  ca lo r ie s  com ing fro m  grain  was m uch
low er .  The point is brought out in the following table:
Table V .2 1 ;  Consumption per  head o f  grain  and 
vegetables  in 3 prov in ces  o f  China.
Kwangsi, 1956 Hupeh, 1956 Chekiang, 1955 
Grain consum ption*  436. 5 chin 530. 1 chin 450 .9  chin
Vegetable consum ption 172.0 192 .5  182.0
Vegetable as % o f
grain  consum ption 39 .40  36.31 40.36
* The orig ina l data are for  u n p rocessed  grain; these have been
reduced by 10% to bring them in line with the figures for
p r o c e s s e d  grain shown in e a r l ie r  tab les .
S o u r c e s :
Kwangsi: F ro m  K uang-hsi j ih -p a o , 1 0 /1 1 /5 7 ,  p. 2,
"The D ifference  between the L ives o f  
W orkers  and Peasants is Rea lly  Not 
G reat" .
Hupeh; H u-pei j ih -p a o , 1 1 /8 /5 7 ,  "On the Basis
o f  an Expansion o f  Production  the Living 
Standards o f  the Peop le  in Our P rov in ce  
Have Im proved M agnificently" .
Chekiang: Che-chiang j ih -p a o , 6 /4 /5 7 ,  " A  Survey
of the Standard o f  Living o f  Peasants in 
Chekiang P r o v in c e " .
On the reasonable assumption that the ca lo r i f ic  content o f  vegetables
(63)and grains is about the sam e these figures would suggest that vegetables
contributed rather m o re  to the Chinese diet than Shen ind icates . But two
points need to be m ade; f irs t ,  it was in the in terests  o f  the authorities to
show a high consum ption o f  vegetables  in o rd e r  to dem onstrate  the existence
o f  as varied  a diet as p oss ib le .  A ccord in g ly ,  the f igures  shown in V .21  m ay
represent m axim a. Second, p er  capita output o f  grain  in Kiangsu was less
(64)than that o f  all three p rov inces  shown and it could be that there was a
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s im ila r  gap in vegetable intakes. In view of these considerations we shall
assume that in Kiangsu as a whole food grains accounted fo r  70% o f  the total
ca lo r ie  intake. On this basis  estim ates o f  the consum ption of grains and
other foods can now be made;
Table V .2 2 ;  P e r  capita ca lo r ie  intake fr o m  grains
and other foods in rural areas o f  K iangsu.
Daily  ca lo r ie  intake As % 2054 As % 1900
_______________________ ca lo r ie s  calo ries
1953-54 2042.01 99 .42  107.47
1954-55 1925.61 93 .75  101.35
1955-56 2270 .00  110.52 119.47
1956-57 2252 .84  109.68 118.57
1957-58 2337 .24  113.79 123.01
Source : C a lorie  data fro m  Table V .2 0 .
The inclusion  o f  foods fro m  sou rces  other than ce re a ls  and tubers t ra n s ­
fo rm s  the situation portrayed  in V. 20, in which ca lo r ie  supplies w ere  c o n ­
sistently below  requ irem ents, into one in which there was gen era lly  a 
surplus. In particu lar , during the last three years  o f  the F F Y P  food
supplies w ere  con s iderab ly  higher than the standard requirem ent demanded 
(no m atter whether 1900 o r  2054 ca lo r ie s  is taken as this standard). Only
in 1954-55 does the situation appear to have b e co m e  rather tight - a
( 66 )re flect ion  o f  that y e a r 's  grain acquisition c r is is  and an indication of the 
subsequent im provem ent in governm ent control o v e r  grain .
H ow ever, som e qualifications have yet to be added. F irs t ,  notice that 
the figures shown in V .2 0  and V .2 2  are broad averages ; they not only c o n ­
cea l in tra -reg ion a l d ifferen ces  within Kiangsu (to be con s idered  below) but 
also d ifferen ces  in food requirem ents within the rural population. The 
ca lo r ie  needs o f  ch ildren  and the old are less  than those o f  the adult population.
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T h e re fo re ,  in interpreting the low (even inadequate) leve ls  o f consum ption 
in 1953-54 and 1954-55, it should be rem em b ered  that a h igher-than-average 
f igure would have been available to m em bers  o f  the rural labour fo r c e .
The second  point concerns  the distinction between the private and
co l le c t iv e  s e c to r  in agriculture . Despite their sm all s ize  the private
plots w ere  an im portant sou rce  o f  food  production: fo r  exam ple, it has been
estim ated that on average the "m odal private p lot"  supplied 284 ca lo r ie s
(67 \per head per day in 1956. On the assumption that the average private
(68 )
plot in Kiangsu was sm a lle r  by2J?-25% than the m odal f igure , its 
contribution to peasants ' total ca lo r ie  intake can be shown. Take, fo r  
exam ple , 1956;
Table V .2 3 :  The ca lo r i f ic  contribution o f  the private
and co llective  s e cto rs  in Kiangsu; 1956.
C a lor ies  fr o m  private plots; 77. 5% x 284 = 220
C a lories  fr o m  co llec t iv e  s e cto r ;  2252.84
Total 2472.84
C learly , the private plot was o f  som e s ign ificance . In 1956 its potential
contribution was alm ost 10% o f the total supply o f  ca lo r ie s  available to
peasants in Kiangsu. In areas where food supplied by  the co llect ive  s e cto r
was already m o re  than adequate, the im portance o f  the supplem entary
production on the private plots m ay have been p r im a r i ly  as a sou rce  o f
in com e. But w here consum ption was low the role  o f  the private s e c to r  was
m o re  im m ediate s ince  it could help to ensure that the ca lo r ie  intake o f
peasants was maintained at an adequate level.
Finally, consideration  m ust be given to regional d ifferen ces  in c o n ­
sumption within Kiangsu. F a r  fro m  the CPCS system  having brought about
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equality in consum ption throughout the prov ince , su rpr is in g ly  wide
differentia ls  continued to exist until the end o f  the F F Y P .  The amount o f
grain retained by  any given area in Kiangsu was determ ined  by three
cr ite r ia ;  the leve l o f  grain  production; the e ffects  o f  natural d isa sters ;
(69)and traditional standards o f  living and levels  o f  consum ption. Soochow,
Sung-chiang and Chinkiang Specia l D istr ic ts ,  where agriculture was 
re la tive ly  advanced and standards o f  living high, should be perm itted to 
retain an appropriately  high proportion  o f  their  output. In the backward 
regions o f  H sii-chou and H wai-yin  yields w ere low er  and there fore  c o n ­
sumption was corresp on d in g ly  reduced. Nan-t'ung and Y en -ch 'en g  occup ied  
a spec ia l p lace ; m uch o f  the arable area here  was planted under e con om ic  
crops  (e sp e c ia l ly  cotton) and in o rd e r  to ensure adequate incentives to 
grow  these crops  grain  supplies w ere  guaranteed by  the state. The p o l icy  
o f  de liberate ly  maintaining d ifferences  in consum ption had o f  cou rse  a 
strong e co n o m ic  r a is o n -d 'e t r e ,  fo r  an extractive p o l icy  which placed  too 
great a burden on high-output areas in the interests  o f  egalitarian distribution 
was l ik e ly  to have disincentive effects  and ultim ately be counter-productive .
Fortunately , estim ates o f  average per capita grain  consum ption are
available fo r  all eight Special D istr icts  in Kiangsu in 1955 and 1 9 5 6 .^ ^
(71)H ow ever, it seem s like ly  that they are exp ressed  in term s  o f  raw grain 
and fo r  this reason  we shall adjust them downwards by  10% in o rd e r  to bring 
them in line with the data presented in e a r l ie r  tab les . The rev ised  
estim ates are shown below  in Table V. 24;
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Table V. 24; Estim ates o f  per  capita grain  consumption 
and its ca lo r i f ic  content in the eight Special 
D istr icts  o f  Kiangsu.__________________________
1955-56 1956-57
P e r  capita 
grain  
consum ption
Daily
ca lo r ie
content
P e r  capita 
grain  
consum ption
Daily
ca lo r ie
content
Hsti-chou 356 .40  chin 1304.52 398 .70  chin 1459.35
H wai-yin 372 .06 1361.84 374.13 1369.42
Y en -ch 'en g 391 .95 1434.64 418 .68 1532.48
Yang-chou 399 .96* 1463.96 418 .95 1533.47
Nan-t'ung 398 .88 1460.01 399-42 1461.99
Chinkiang 457 .83 1675.78 501 .84 1836.87
Soochow 532.35 1948.55 520.47 1905.06
Sung-chiang 508.23 1860.26 536.48 1963.66
* The figure fo r  per capita grain consum ption fo r  Yang-chou 
given in HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2 is 544. 4 chin (1955- 
1956). Given the leve l o f yields in Yang-chou, which w ere 
actually less  than in Nan-t 'ung, this m ust su re ly  be a m i s ­
print fo r  444. 4 chin (a fact which is further supported by  
the Yang-chou  figure fo r  1956-57) and it has been so taken 
in calculating the estim ates shown above.
Source ; HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2. But all the
orig inal estim ates have been rev ised  down­
wards by  10%.
The way in which average data can concea l significant d ifferences  
em erges  str ik ingly  fr o m  the table. In 1955-56 peasants i n  Soochow had 
175 .95 chin m o r e  grain  than their  counterparts in Hsti-chou. This r e p r e ­
sented a d i fferen ce  o f  644 ca lo r ie s  (a lm ost 50%). It is true that the gap 
narrow ed  to 43. 39% in the following year, although in form ation  o v e r  a 
longer  p er iod  would be required  be fo re  we could speak o f  there being a 
definite trend in this d irect ion . N onetheless, it is interesting that despite 
Soochow and Sung-chiang having achieved bum per harvests  in 1956 and 
Hsii-Hwai having been m ost  se v e re ly  hit by  the d is a s te r s ,  grain consum ption
in the latter area rose  by  6. 09% o v e r  1955, com pa red  with only 1. 57% in
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A m o re  accurate com parative  analysis o f consum ption levels  in Kiangsu 
requires  the inclusion  o f  foods other than grain. At an in tra -prov in c ia l  
leve l  this is p art icu lar ly  important since it alters not only the absolute 
consum ption leve ls  of all areas but also their relative le v e ls .  This is 
because  the proportion  o f  total food  intake represented  by grains was 
undoubtedly higher in the p oor  agricultural regiona (Hstl-Hwai) than in the 
rich  ones (T 'a i  Hu). S pec ific  in form ation  on this is not available but in 
o rd e r  to derive  estim ates o f  overa ll  consumption we shall make the s im p l i ­
fying assumptions that the ratio o f  ca lo r ies  fro m  grains to total ca lor ie  
intake was 75% in Hsti-Hwai; 70% in Nan-t'ung, Y en -ch 'en g  and Yang-chou; 
and 65% in the remaining Special D istr ic ts .  The results  fo llow  in Table 
V. 25 on the following page;
T'ai Hu (Soochow and Sung-chiang).
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The extent o f  the fam iliar  econ om ic  d ichotom y between north and south
Kiangsu is dem onstrated  v e r y  v iv id ly  by  these f igu res .  In 1955, fo r
exam ple, the d ifferen ce  between the ca lo r ie  intake o f  peasants in Hstt-chou
and in Soochow was an astonishing 1258.41 (a gap o f  72 .35% ). Although
(72)this was reduced, in 1956 peasants in Sung-chiang still  consum ed 1195 
m ore  ca lo r ie s  than those in H wai-yin . Such figures su re ly  provide c o n ­
vincing evidence o f  the re levance  o f  the d istinction we have often drawn 
between the agricultural econom ies  o f  the north and south. This point is 
perhaps m ade even m o re  fo rce fu l ly  i f  the data in V .2 5  are re -a rra n g e d  into 
a sm a lle r  num ber o f  regional ca tegor ies ;
Table V .2 6 ;  Daily average ca lo r ie  intake per  head 
o f  rural population; m o r e  com parative 
in d ica to rs ._________________________________
Total Index with Total Index with
ca lor ie  Hsti-Hwai ca lo r ie  Hsti-Hwai
intake = 100.0 intake = 100.0
Hsti-Hwai 1777.58 100.00 1885.85 100.00
Y en -ch 'en g  - Nan-
t'ung - Yang-chou 2075.53 116.76 2156.16 114.33
Chinkiang - Soochow
-S u n g -ch ia n g  2812.61 158.23 2925 .94  155.15
T 'a i  Hu* 2929.86 164.82 2975 .94  157.80
* I . e . ,  Soochow and Sung-chiang.
Source ; Table V .2 5 .
To sum up; a com parative  analysis indicates that in a v e r y  real
sense there w ere  two econom ies  in Kiangsu, the geographica l d ivid ing-line
being the Yangtze. At the extrem es  the contrast was p articu lar ly  great.
In the chron ic  g ra in -d e f ic it  areas o f  Hsti-Hwai the peasants w ere living
(73)at little m o re  than subsistence  leve l - and this in the m i d - 1950's . v ' 
Indeed i f  the c r ite r io n  o f  2054 ca lo r ie s  is accepted there would actually
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appear to have been insufficient grain and other food  supplies to m eet even
(74)m inim um  requ irem ents. But in T 'a i  Hu food  supplies w ere apparently
so abundant as to provide the peasants with a substantial surplus above 
their needs . Chinkiang enjoyed slightly low er  consum ption standards than 
Soochow and Sung-chiang, and Yang-chou, Y en -ch 'en g  and Nan-t'ung 
slightly higher than those o f  Hstf-Hwai; but in no case  was the d ifference  
large  enough to alter the essentia lly  dichotom ous nature o f  Kiangsu's a g r i ­
cultural s e c to r .  In this resp ect  it is o f  som e in terest that per capita 
consum ption in the im portant e con om ic  crop  areas o f  Y en -ch 'en g  and Nan- 
t'ung was so c lo se  to that of the poorest  areas in the north. The point was 
made e a r l ie r  that grain  fo r  these regions had to be guaranteed by the state 
in o rd e r  to ensure adequate incentives to continue growing non -food  cro p s .  
But Table V .2 5  suggests that such state supplies w ere  b a re ly  sufficient to 
m eet this need. The fact that the m ost  im portant cotton producting d istr ic t ,  
N an-t 'ung, decided  in 1957 to contract the sown area  o f  cotton in favour o f
expanding the area planted under food grains gives strong support to this
r . (75)hypothesis .
There is one d ifferentia l which should finally  be con s idered  and that 
is the gap between consum ption in the c it ies  and in the countryside.
O ffic ia l in form ation  on rural and urban grain consum ption is shown on the 
following page;
-3 7 9 -
Table V .2 7 ;  Annual per capita grain  consum ption in 
rural and urban Kiangsu.________________
Grain consum ption Grain consum ption
p er  head o f  rural p er  head o f  urban
population______ population______
1955-56 484 .9  chin 413 .6  chin
1956-57 482 .3  chin 456 .0  chin
Source ; HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
(Strictly  speaking, con s is ten cy  requires  
that these data be rev ised  downwards by  
10% in o rd e r  to bring them into line with 
e a r l ie r  ta b le s . H ow ever, since concern  
here  is with relative leve ls  o f grain 
consumption such calculations are not 
n e c e s s a r y . )
As in other p oor  countries ,  d ifferences  (rea l o r  supposed) in urban
and rural living standards have been the source  o f  tension and so an ob ject
o f  e con om ic  p o l icy  in China. In Kiangsu, fo r  exam ple , som e maintained
that peasants had less  to eat than ca d res ,  w ork ers  and urban residents
( 7 6 )genera lly . Indeed the data shown in V .27  w ere  published e x p re s s ly  to
prove  that rural consum ption standards w ere even higher than those in the
c it ie s .  The sam e point was made in respect  to the findings o f  a sam ple
survey  ca rr ie d  out in Chiang-tu h s ien , which revea led  the following
sca le  o f  grain  rations;
Table V .2 8 ;  A verage  annual per  capita  grain rations 
in Chiang-tu hsien (Y ang-chou  S . D . ) . *
Peasants 500 chin
W orkers  408
Cadres 356
Urban residents 336
* The figures have been averaged out fo r  adults 
and children.
Source ; HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
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of alm ost 50% between urban residents and peasants argued strongly  that
rural living standards w ere eve ry  bit as high as those in the c it ies .  But
such a conclusion  is not warranted because o f  the incom plete  nature o f  the
data. F o r  although statistical in form ation  is not available for  Kiangsu,
studies m ade in other parts o f  China during the 1950's show c le a r ly  that
the d ifference  in leve ls  o f  consumption is elim inated and in fact reversed
(77)when sou rces  o f  foods other than grains are taken into account. In
other w ord s ,  urban inhabitants consum ed sufficiently  m o r e  m eat, fish, 
eggs and vegetables  to o ffset  the advantage which the peasants enjoyed in 
term s o f  grain  rations alone. There is no reason  to doubt that this was 
also the case  in Kiangsu. The overw helm ingly  large  proportion  o f  arable 
land sown under vegetables  in the suburbs of Shanghai and the much greater  
em phasis p laced  on the rearing o f  da iry  and m eat cattle indicate as much.
We would conclude th ere fore  that while the peasants in Kiangsu consum ed 
m o re  grain  than those living in the cities the overa ll  quality o f  the urban 
diet was neverthe less  su p erior  to that of the rural areas .
Much o f  this sect ion  has been concerned  with patterns o f  consumption
in Kiangsu but let us conclude it by returning to the questions o f  productivity
(78)leve ls  and growth o f  food  grain  output during the 1950 's.
The short descr ip t ion  o f  rural conditions in Kiangsu given in the f irst
(79)chapter showed agriculture becom ing p o o re r  the further north one 
m oved . The p er  capita consum ption data just presented  im plied  a s im ila r  
pattern. The following estim ates o f  food  grain yields give a m ore  quantitative 
indication o f  the regional d ifferen ces  in productiv ity  that existed  at the end 
o f  the F irs t  Plan; .
On the surface the 22. 6% gap between workers and peasants and that
Table V. 29: Relative levels  o f  productiv ity  in Kiangsu
as shown by average yields of grain in 
5 Special D istr ic ts ;  1957.__________________
A verage  yield
a
Hsti-chou 181.00 chin p er  mou
bH w ai-yin  193.00
Y e n -ch 'e n g C 230 .00
dSoochow 600 .19
Sung-chiang6 592.00
Sources ; a HHJP, 1 9 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "A  Simple Introduction 
to the Construction  Plans fo r  the Hstf- 
Hwai Region.
b HHJP, 1 4 /1 /5 8 .
c HHJP, 2 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "F u ll  o f  Confidence and 
Trusting in V ic to ry  Let Us A dvance".  (The 
figure shown is an average o f  the 220-240 
ch in /m ou  given in this a rt ic le .  )
d HHJP, 2 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "The High-Output A reas  
Have the Conditions fo r  a Great Leap 
F orw a rd " .
e TK P (Peking), 1 3 /1 1 /5 7 .
W hatever the pattern o f agricu ltural growth s in ce  'L ib e ra tio n ', it had
not su cceed ed  in elim inating the wide gap betw een north and south. F ood
grain  yields in T 'a i  Hu w ere  still three tim es as high as those in Hsd-Hwai.
N everth eless  the evidence suggests that som e p ro g re ss  tow ards narrow ing
the gap was m ade in the F F Y P  yea rs ;  although the two estim ates are not
exa ctly  com parable  the c la im  that average grain  y ie lds in H sd-H w ai had
risen  by 50% between 1 9 5 3 -5 7 ^ ^  would certa in ly  indicate a m ore  rapid
rate o f  growth than in T 'a i  Hu, where grain  output in cre a se d  by 3 .49%  p. a.
(81 \
o v e r  the sam e period . The fact that grain  yields in Y en -ch 'en g  (1957)
w ere  only 20% higher than those o f  H wai-yin  (see  V. 29) also points to 
rapid developm ent in the far north of the prov ince : agricultural plans o f
1951 anticipated a gap o f  144. 83% between yields o f  food  grain in the two
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regions; i f  these planned yields are taken as a base  against which to assess
the levels  actually attained in 1957, H w ai-y in 's  s im ple  average growth rate o f
(831grain  is 38 .79% , com pared  with only 10.33% in Y en -ch 'en g . Finally, it
is worth record ing  that between 1949-57 the growth o f  total grain production 
in H wai-yin  was m o r e  than three tim es as fast as in Sung-chiang - 29. 17% p. a. 
com pared  with 8. 07% p. a. in short, we m ay tentatively conclude that
rapid growth in the northernm ost areas of Kiangsu had gone som e way to 
narrow ing the productiv ity  gap.
Encouraging as such trends w ere ,  their im pact on the traditional regional
pattern of agriculture was m inim al and at the end o f  the F F Y P  average yields
o f food  grains in Soochow w ere still 231. 6% higher than in H sd-chou ! Put in
another way yields in Hsti-Hwai w ere  only 51. 8% o f  the prov inc ia l average
(851figure while in T 'a i  Hu they w ere 64% above this leve l .  ' In the intervening
region  along the coast and in L i-h s ia -h o  yields exceeded  the provincia l figure 
(861
by 13.7%. Thus, the high yields o f  T 'a i  Hu ensured that although this area
com p r ised  only 15% o f  Kiangsu's total arable area, it contributed 31.6%  o f  its 
(871total grain  output. By contrast, Hsti-Hwai had 43% o f  the total arable area
(881but produced only 21. 2% o f  grain  output. ' The rem aining 47. 3% o f  output 
cam e fro m  L i -h s ia -h o  and the coasta l regions (with 42% o f total arable area).
Given the high leve ls  o f  productiv ity  attained in the south it is not surpris ing 
that at the end o f  the F irs t  Plan it was to the u n d er-deve lop ed  areas on Kiangsu's 
northern bo rd e rs  that the planners turned as a sou rce  o f  future growth. If only 
their  rapid growth of y ie lds  could be maintained and land utilization in creased , 
the contribution to overa ll  agricultural developm ent p ro m ise d  to be v e r y  s ig n i­
ficant. Changes in the com posit ion  o f  output w ere  also im portant. Hitherto
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Hsti-Hwai had been a d r y - c r o p  area with coa rse  grains assuming specia l
im portance . In H w ai-y in  53% o f  the sown area under food  crops  supported
(89) (90)’ ’m isce llan eou s  g ra in s "  such as sweet pota toes , m a ize ,  kaoliang.
(91)
Hsti-chou accounted fo r  a m e re  1% o f Kiangsu's r ice  output. Small wonder
that agricultural plans drawn up in late 1957 and ea r ly  1958 foresaw  the 
em ergen ce  o f  a new paddy region  in this area.
In many ways the picture that has em erged  in this sect ion  is a p e ss im is t ic  
one. O vera ll,  it is true, Kiangsu had maintained a positive  rate o f  growth of 
grain  production  during the F F Y P  period , indicating that the still ove rw h e lm ­
ingly 'traditional' agriculture had not yet com plete ly  run out o f  growth potential. 
N or was it m e re  expansion of the arable area that had yielded this growth:
between 1951-57 total grain  output had in creased  by 23% while the area planted
(92)under food  grains had expanded by only 9 .46% . C lea r ly ,  r ises  in yields
had made the m a jo r  contribution to the growth in grain production.
H ow ever, the per  capita data suggest a d ifferent interpretation. In 
particu lar , the negative average growth o f  the last four  years o f  the F irs t  
Plan seem ed  to im ply  that the growth capacity of the agricultural s e c to r  was 
reaching its l im it . Many p rob lem s rem ained unsolved. M ost obv iously , the 
wide fluctuations in output showed how difficult it was to conduct lo n g -te rm  
planning and the considerab le  regional d ifferences  in production  and in food 
consum ption provided  further evidence o f  instability. Adm ittedly the CPCS 
system  had s u cce ss fu l ly  cushioned the peasants against the serious  shortfalls  
in output o f  1956, but this su ccess  was less  important in e con om ic  term s  than 
the failure to use state acquisitions as the basis  fo r  agricultural developm ent. 
Our final judgement th ere fore  m ust be that the p er fo rm an ce  o f  agriculture in
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Kiangsu during the F F Y P  period  as revealed  by  trends in the production of 
food grains was v e r y  disappointing indeed.
(2) R i c e ;
R ice  m ay  be con s idered  the single m ost  im portant food  crop  in Kiangsu.
Not only is it a fine grain  and so m uch to be p re fe r re d  as human staple food
(93)but it also has the highest energy  y ie ld  per unit area  o f  all grains. In the
e a r ly  1930's only eight o f  the then 61 hsien did not have som e arable land 
(94)under this crop  and although r ice  cultivation was p articu lar ly  associated
with Kiangnan natural conditions perm itted  it to be grow n throughout the
prov ince . As e lsew here  in China, the individual varie t ies  o f  r ice  w ere legion ,
each differing fro m  the next in its adaptability to lo c a l  e c o lo g ica l  conditions
and its date o f  ripening. But at the m ost  general leve l  they could be grouped
(95)
in two ca tegor ies ;  the glutinous v a r ie t ie s ,  used m ain ly  fo r  making r i c e -  
wine and spec ia l pastr ies ;  and the much m ore  im portant non-glutinous 
v a r ie t ie s ^ ^ )  which form ed  the staple diet o f so m any o f  the peasants.
We begin our quantitative analysis by  presenting data relating to the 
area planted under r ic e ,  its total production and average yield during the 
1950 ' s ;
-3 8 5 -
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The arable area under r ice  must be distinguished fro m  the sown area 
(hence also the two yield  f igures ),  the distinction s im p ly  reflecting the fact 
that som e arable land supported two crops  of r ice  in a year. This d istinction 
was not s ignificant in Kiangsu until the second half o f  the F irs t  Plan and the 
table shows the r ice  arable and sown areas d iffering on ly  in 1956 and 1957.
It is in fact certa in  that double cropping o f  r ice  was being p ractised  e x p e r i ­
m entally  in 1955 but in the absence o f  any inform ation on the area affected and 
in the knowledge that it can only have been m argina l, the arable and sown 
area estim ates have been allowed to rem ain the sam e in this year.
The sou rces  to Table V. 30 indicate that many o f  the estim ates are in te r ­
polated and we had better  begin  by explaining how these w ere  arr ived  at. As 
far as the arable area under r ice  is concerned , a glance at the lo ca l  n ew s­
papers shows a fa ir ly  c le a r  pattern; between 1951-54 little change took p lace ; 
in 1955 there was m oderate  expansion, which was intensified in the following 
year, though stabilizing around this leve l  in 1957. Sim ultaneously, there was 
a m odest  extension o f  double -cropp ing  o f  paddy in the latter part o f  the plan 
(e sp ec ia lly  1956).
With this general pattern in mind it can be assum ed that the area under 
r ice  rem ained unchanged in 1952. H owever, s ince  1951-52 was within the 
'r e c o v e r y  p er iod ' it is like ly  that land productiv ity  (output per  unit area) was 
still rising. Unfortunately, the available evidence is insufficient to allow a 
d irect  estim ate o f  1952 yields to be m ade and th ere fore  we have s im ply  
assumed that total output in 1952 rose  by the sam e proportion  as total grain 
output. F r o m  this the yield  o f  342. 75 chin per m ou is obtained.
Inform ation fo r  1953 is notably lacking. V e ry  co ld  weather o c c u rre d  in
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D e ce m b e r ,  1952 and there w ere  fros ts  as late as A p ril ,  1953. But these
adverse conditions appear to have had their m ost  ser iou s  e ffect  upon the wheat
(97)harvest, fo r  exam ple , in H w ai-yin  Special D istr ict .  The r ice  crop  was
relative ly  unaffected so that in May, 1953 the ‘P e o p le 's  D aily ' was able to 
speak o f  the com pletion  o f  r ice  sowing and the healthy condition o f  the r ice  
shoots in Kiangsu. M o re o v e r ,  the opening of the North Kiangsu Irrigation
Channel (in June, 1952) was expected to raise grain production  by 1 ,810 m illion  
chin annually and this m ust have had a benefic ia l e f fect  on r ice  yields in the 
northern half o f  the p rov in ce . In short, r ice  probably  did re lative ly  w ell in 
1953. But how w e l l?  An e a r l ie r  table showed total grain  output rising by 
7. 83% in 1953. If we are right in arguing that the adverse  natural conditions 
m ost ly  affected crops  other than r ice ,  r ice  output presu m ab ly  in creased  by 
m o re  than this amount. Thus, in V. 30 we have assum ed that total r ice  p r o ­
duction rose  by 10% to 11, 650 m illion  chin, average y ie lds there fore  being 
375 .20  chin per  m ou.
Although con s idered  one o f  the two 'd isaster  y e a r s '  o f  the F F Y P , the 
natural ca lam ities  o f  1954 w ere  m ost ly  confined to the su m m er and autumn 
months. This would suggest that o f  the food gra ins, r ice  was the m ost  
se r io u s ly  threatened. Suppose we begin with the s im plifying assumption that 
the fall in grain  production  during this year was ca r r ie d  wholly by r ice ;  s ince
(99)r ice  represented  alm ost 60% o f  total grain  output and the latter declined
by 1.71%  in 1954, it can be shown that r ice  production m ust have fallen by
about 4%. This is the proportionate change that is fo llow ed  in the table. R ice
( 100 )arable and sown areas are assum ed to have rem ained at the 1953 level 
and o f  cou rse  fr o m  the output and area data a yield  estim ate can be found.
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With 1955-57 we are on much f irm e r  ground. The area  estim ates of 
32, 380, 000 m ou cited by Wang W ei-p 'in g  are substantiated by  a v e r y  s im ila r  
figure given in a national new spaper. As a lready m entioned, it is true
that the experim ental d oub le -cropp ing  of r ice  during 1955 m akes the equality 
between arable and sown areas not s tr ic t ly  accurate . But in view  of the 
lim ited  nature o f  these tr ia ls  the om iss io n  is justifiab le . The 1955 total 
output figure also com es  fro m  an authoritative so u rce .  S im ilarly , with the 
data fo r  1956 and 1957. In the latter year, it might be added that Sun Ching- 
chih cites a total output figure which is ex trem ely  c lo se  to that o f  the g e o ­
graphical journal: in fact, the d ifference  is probably  one o f  co vera g e ,  Sun
(i 02)including production  in Shanghai.
F o r  purposes o f  analysis the following table shows the percentage change 
in the area, output and yield  of r ice  in each year between 1951-57:
Table Y .3 1 ;  Annual percentage change in area, output 
and yield  o f  r ice  in Kiangsu: 1951-57.
Arable
area
Sown
area
Total
output
Average
yields
(arable
area)
Average
yields
(sown
area)
1952 0 0 + 6 .09 + 6.11 + 6.11
1953 + 0 .49 + 0.49 + 10.00 + 9 .47 + 9 .47
1954 0 0 - 3 .85 - 3. 85 - 3 .8 5
1955 + 4 .2 8 + 4 .28 + 12.28 + 7 .67 + 7 .67
1956 + 9 .67 + 11. 49 - 3 .98 - 12 .44 - 13.87
1957 - 0 .93 - 0.91 + 9 . H + 10.13 + 10.11
Source : Table V .3 0 .
Annual changes in total output reveal a s im ila r  pattern to that fo r  all 
food  grains. No consistent trend exists over  the whole p er iod  but rather 
there is a susceptib ility  to significant annual fluctuations. N everthe less ,
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there are som e interesting d ifferen ces  between the two s e r ie s .  F o r  exam ple, 
both show a decline in 1954 and 1956, but whereas the fall in total grain 
production  is m uch grea ter  in the latter year , in the case  o f  r ice  it is about 
the sam e in both y e a rs .  We have a lready argued that natural conditions in 
1954 w ere part icu lar ly  unfavourable to r ice  and this m ust explain the poor  
showing o f  this c ro p  v i s - a -v i s  grains as a whole. In 1956 the much greater  
fall in the production  o f  all food grains might suggest that r ice  was unaffected 
by  the d isa s te rs .  H ow ever, an examination o f  trends in the area planted and 
yields w ill revea l that this was not the case ; that y ie lds  o f  r ice  in fact fe ll  
v e r y  d ram atica lly  in 1956 and only because o f  an expansion in the arable and 
sown areas was a com m ensurate  decline in total output avoided.
In o r d e r  to a ssess  the p er form an ce  o f  agriculture during the F irs t  Plan 
period  1952 should be taken as the base year. But it is 1951 that is chosen  
in the T i - l i  chih shih artic le  as the basis  fo r  judging the e n d -o f -P la n  output 
f igure . This is o f  co u rse  significant, fo r  the cho ice  in i t se l f  is undoubtedly 
a re flect ion  o f  the p o o r  p er form an ce  o f  the F F Y P . With 1951 as the base 
the s im ple  average growth o f  r ice  production is 5. 33% p. a. ; i f  the F F Y P  
period  'p ro p e r '  is con s id ered , the figure drops to 4 .89% . M o re o v e r ,  a 
further shortening o f  the period  to 1953-57 shows an annual rate o f  growth of 
only 3 .28%  - not m uch m ore  than half that fo r  the 1951-57 period  as a whole.
In per  capita  term s  the picture is even w orse ;
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Table V. 32: Output o f  r ice  per head o f  rural population
in Kiangsu (exc l .  Shanghai) during 1951-1957.
P e r  capita Index with Index with
output 1951 = 100 1952 =
( chin)
1951 279 .36 100.00 95 .75
1952 291 .75 104.44 100.00
1953 315 .94 113.09 108.29
1954 299 . 1 0 107.07 102.52
1955 330.69 118.37 113.35
1956 312 .72 111.94 107.19
1957 336 .05 120.29 115.18
S ources : Table V. 30 and Appendix B.
Thus, the s im ple  average per capita growth rate is 3 .38%  (1951-57) 
o r  3. 04% during the F F Y P  p er iod , cons iderab ly  le ss  than that of total output.
But it would be wrong to con s ider  the p er form an ce  o f  the r ice  s e c to r  a 
fa ilure  s im ply  because  o f  the un im press ive  total and p er  capita growth rates 
that w ere  attained. C om pared  with the growth o f  total grain  output the rates 
o f  in cre a se  in r ice  output actually look quite high. Given the im portance  (both 
in quantitative and qualitative te rm s )  o f  r ice  in the Kiangsu agricultural 
econom y, this at least was a m easu re  o f  s u cce s s .
Consideration  m ust now be given to th e  sou rces  o f  the growth in r ice  out­
put during the 1950 's . Table V .31  shows that between 1951-54 no significant
(103)change o c c u rr e d  in the arable area planted under r i c e v and that changes
(104)in total output th ere fo re  re flected  changes in average y ie lds . But in 1955
it is n e c e s s a r y  f o r  the f irs t  tim e to distinguish between changes in the arable
(105)area and average y ie ld s .  The im portance o f  the two sou rces  of growth
is c le a r ly  seen  in V. 34; on its own the in crease  in land productiv ity  would have 
ra ised  total r ice  output to a little o v e r  12, 000 m ill ion  chin; but because  o f  the
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simultaneous expansion in the cultivated area production  rose  by a further 
500 m illion  chin, making the 1954-55 in crease  the la rg es t  during the whole 
F F Y P  period .
In 1955 yield  and area changes worked in the sam e d irect ion . But the
s ign ificance  o f  acreage  expansion is even m o re  apparent in 1956, when land
(106)productiv ity  actually declined . The effect  o f  land rec lam ation  and c o n ­
solidation and the rationalization o f  cropping patterns was to ra ise  the arable 
area under r ice  by  n ear ly  10%. H ow ever, the im portance  o f  this was even 
grea ter  than the in cre a se  itse lf  ind icates, fo r  in contrast to the pattern o f  the 
previous year average yields o f  r ice  w ere falling in 1956. It was only because  
o f  the offsetting e ffect  o f  the area expansion th ere fore  that total production in 
1956 did not decline m uch m o re  precip itous ly . If the expansion o f  arable 
area had not taken p lace  total output would have fallen  to 11, 186 m illion  chin, 
the low est leve l  s ince  1952.
In 1957 arable area  played a m o re  o r  less  neutral ro le  and output o f  r ice
la rg e ly  fo llow ed  the change in y ie lds . Adm ittedly, the evidence on this is
not com plete ly  w ater-tight, fo r  there are reports  o f  planned and actual
(107)extensions in the area  under r ic e .  But statistical evidence in favour of
a figure s ignificantly  higher than that used in Table V. 30 does not appear to 
be available. In any ca se ,  even i f  the arable area under r ice  was increasing  
in som e areas during 1957, e lsew here  it is like ly  that the d isp lacem ent o f  land 
by  rural construction  and the disenchantment among peasants following the 
poor  p er fo rm an ce  o f  1956 w ere working in the opposite  d irect ion .
O ver the p er iod  1951-57 the e ffects  on total r ice  production  o f  the
in crea se  in arable area, on the one hand and unit area yields on the other can
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now be shown. With 1951 as the base year the honours are shared about 
equally, y ie lds having r isen  by an average 2 .66%  p. a. com pared  with 2 .31%  
p. a. fo r  arable area. But what is m ost  interesting , as subsequent yea rs  are 
taken as the ba se ,  changes in arable area are found to play a p r o g r e ss iv e ly  
m o re  im portant ro le  v i s - a -v i s  total output changes. F o r  exam ple, during the 
F F Y P  yea rs  (1952-57) the annual growth of r ice  arable is  2 .77%  but only 1. 86% 
fo r  r ice  y ie ld s . M ost striking o f  all, when 1953 is taken as the base year 
yields are actually shown to have declined (by 0. 04% p. a. ): only because  o f  
the 3. 33% average annual r ise  in the arable area was total output able to m a in ­
tain its positive  growth o f  3 .28%  p. a. In short, we would conclude that m ost  
o f  the growth in total r ice  production during the F F Y P  (all o f  it i f  the last four 
yea rs  alone are con s idered )  cam e fro m  arable area  expansion, with productiv ity  
in cre a se s  playing a m in or  ro le .
In such bald te rm s  this is an im portant finding, s ince  it would presum ab ly
be argued that such a pattern augured badly fo r  the future, arable area
expansion being a m o r e  lim ited  sou rce  o f  output growth than in crea ses  in land
productiv ity  (given the high index o f  cultivation in Kiangsu). But against this
it might be argued that the identification of productiv ity  with changes in yields
is unduly re s tr ic t iv e  to the extent that rationalization o f  the cropping pattern
( fo r  exam ple , by  substituting r ice  fo r  low er-y ie ld in g  c ro p s )  is itse l f  a kind
of productiv ity  change. If accepted , this would throw different light upon the
data in Tables V. 30 and V .3 1 ,  fo r  instead o f  interpreting them in term s o f
either area expansion oj: productiv ity  r ises  as m utually exc lus ive  ca tegor ies ,
the cho ice  is between two different kinds o f  productiv ity  change. Does it then
m atter that area expansion rather than in creases  in yields was the engine o f
growth during the F ir s t  P lan? The answer is that it d o e s .  To begin with,
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growth based  on an extension o f  the arable area resulting fro m  a change in 
the cropping pattern is still l ike ly  to be o f  lim ited  application. In a geograp h ­
ica l  sense this is  obvious enough; i f  the c lim atic  fa c tors  are not appropriate, 
r ice  cannot be substituted fo r ,  say, m ille t ,  no m atter how desirab le  such a 
change m ay be . But m o r e  than this, the gain fr o m  changing o v e r  to r ice  cu lt i ­
vation is not the sam e as the in crease  in r ice  production  that resu lts . What 
happens is in the nature o f  a t r a d e -o f f  and the in cre a se  in r ice  output has to be 
balanced against the lo ss  in production of whatever c ro p  it has rep laced . By 
contrast, im provem ents  in productiv ity  arising fro m  in cre a se s  in yields are 
not constrained  in the sam e way. As long as the appropriate inputs are ava il­
able in the c o r r e c t  quantities and com binations yields m ay  be in creased  w ith­
out re fe ren ce  to natural conditions.
To sum up; the d istinction between changes in arable area  and p ro d u c ­
tivity rem ains a valid  one. It fo llow s that the p er fo rm a n ce  o f  r ice  in the 1950's 
was less  encouraging than its growth rate might suggest. It is true that fo r  
the whole p er iod ,  1951-57, arable area expansion and yie ld  in cre a se s  c o n t r i ­
buted about equally to the growth o f  total output, but instead o f  the latter fa c tor  
becom ing m o r e  im portant o ver  tim e it in fact becam e le s s  so .  The result was 
that in cre a se s  in total output cam e to re ly  m ore  and m o r e  on extending the 
cultivated area o f  r ic e .
There rem ains to be con s idered  one further so u rce  o f  in creased  p ro d u c ­
tivity - the d ou b le -crop p in g  o f  r ic e .  In m any parts o f  southern China this 
was a lready a com m on  p ractice  ( fo r  exam ple, Fukien, Kwang-tung, Kwangsi) 
but in Kiangsu its introduction during the m i d - 1950's m arked  something o f  an 
innovation. The hope was o f  cou rse  that by growing two crop s  of r ice  on the
sam e p iece  o f  land annual production would be sign ificantly  in creased , but
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Shigeru Ishikawa has pointed to three kinds of d iff icu lties  associated  
with the double cropping o f  r ice ;  technica l, e con om ic  and organizational. ^  
T echn ica l constraints are given by natural conditions, e s p e c ia l ly  the c lim atic  
demand that there be 220 f r o s t - f r e e  days available fo r  cultivation. ^ T h e  
e con om ic  constraints are associated  with the need fo r  in crea sed  supplies o f  
inputs such as w ater, fe r t i l iz e r s ,  draft animals and labour. F inally , the 
organizational p rob lem  relates to the in creased  labour requirem ent during the 
peak p e r iod s .  B ecause  o f  these s tr ic t  demands d ou b le -crop p in g  o f  r ice  was 
not poss ib le  throughout a large  part o f  Kiangsu. The notable exception  was 
T 'a i  Hu and it was here  that the expansion o f  r ice  double cropping was planned 
to take place in the latter part o f  the F irs t  Plan. In Sung-chiang, fo r  exam ple, 
the available growing period  extended fro m  about 20 A p r il  until 3 O ctober  and 
there w ere  253 f r o s t - f r e e  days.^ ^  Rainfall was plentiful, the so il  fe rt i le ,  
irr iga t ion  fac il it ies  w ere  good and there was an abundant supply o f  labour. 
S im ilar  conditions also existed  in neighbouring Soochow.
B y 1955 experim ents to grow  two crops  o f  r ice  a year  w ere  under way in 
the T 'a i  Hu region . So su cce ss fu l  w ere  these that e a r ly  in the following year 
it was c la im ed  that ". . . the extension of double cropping o f  r ice  can bring 
about a great leap forw ard  in r ice  production". ^  ^
But what did these experim ents show ? By how m uch could total output 
o f  r ice  in Kiangsu be in crea sed  as a result o f  d ou b le -crop p in g  ? The following 
table showing the yields o f  d ou b le -crop p ed  r ice  in tr ia l  areas of four hsien 
in Sung-chiang Special D istr ict  go som e way to answering these questions;
without affecting the output of other crops.
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It would be tempting but wrong to conclude fro m  these figures that the 
extension o f  double -cropped  r ice  held the key to the in cre a se d  production of 
grain  needed so m uch in Kiangsu. Certain ly  there is no denying that the gains 
m ade in the tr ia ls  w ere  v e r y  im p re s s iv e .  But we should not in fer too m uch 
fro m  them. F o r  one thing the area o ver  which the experim ents  w ere c o n ­
ducted was tiny and c le a r ly  there can have been no danger o f  shortages o f  
c r it ica l  inputs causing the kind o f  bottlenecks that might w ell o c c u r  i f  double 
cropping w ere  practised  o v e r  a w ider area. Further, it is l ik e ly  that the 
tr ia ls  w ere  c a rr ie d  out in those d istr ic ts  where conditions w ere  particu lar ly  
favourable . In this resp ect  it is interesting that the average single cropping 
yields fo r  Sung-chiang hsien are cons iderab ly  higher than the 1956 average 
r ice  yield fo r  Sung-chiang Specia l D istr ict  as a whole. jn short, the
table above shows the potential o f  double cropping o f  r ice  under the optimal 
'te ch n ica l1 conditions and its va lidity  needs to be tested  against the broad er  
conditions (e sp e c ia l ly  where they relate to labour and draft animal supplies) 
o f  the T 'a i  Hu region . This we shall do presently .
F ir s t  though it is worth sum m ariz ing som e o f  the m ain  lesson s  which 
the experim ents in Sung-chiang w ere  felt to have taught, fo r  they bring out 
v e r y  c le a r ly  the nature o f  the demands made by the cultivation o f  two crops  
o f  r ice  a year. To som e extent they w ere  the sam e as those which applied to 
the cultivation o f  one crop  o f  r ice  - fo r  exam ple , the need to choose  e a r ly -  
maturing and h igh-y ie ld ing va riet ies  o f  seed, to plough deeply  and gen era lly  
prepare  the land as m eticu lou sly  as p oss ib le .  F e r t i l iz e r  application was 
p art icu lar ly  em phasized  and it was pointed out that the fa ilure  to apply base 
fe r t i l iz e r  had been  responsib le  fo r  the low yield o f  the f ir s t  r ice  c rop  in
v ( 113)Nan-hui (this despite  an in cre a se  in to p -d re ss in g ) .
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But other p rob lem s  w ere  uniquely associated  with double cropping.
M ost obvious perhaps was the m uch m o re  c r it ica l  timing of agricultural 
operations. When the f irs t  r ice  c rop  had ripened not only  did it have to be 
harvested  as quick ly  as p oss ib le  but it was also essentia l to s im ultaneously 
c a r r y  out ploughing and transplanting in o rd e r  to ensure a bum per second 
crop .   ^ As the Sung-chiang artic le  concluded, " .  . . because  o f  the seasonal
nature o f  the double cropping of r ice  . . . plans m ust be made in respect  to the 
organization  o f  labour and the use o f  draft animals and tools  in o rd e r  to 
ensure that ploughing and sowing are com pleted  on tim e. P articu lar  attention 
m ust be given to making preparations fo r  the 'turn-around* period  o f  the two 
c rop s  o f  r ice ,^  ^  otherw ise  the other phases o f  w ork will overlap  and 
b ecom e  m ixed -up ; t im e will than be lost and this m ay  have an adverse 
effect  on the attempt to in crea se  production. ^
Such considerations  are the starting point o f  an analysis made by K. R.
W alker o f  the demand and supply conditions o f  labour and draft animals fo r
the double cropping o f  r ice  in a number o f  central and southern p rov inces  o f  
( i l 7 )China. In it are presented  data fo r  Kiangsu which appear to show a
seriou s  shortage o f  both these fa c to rs ,  threatening the feasib ility  o f  w id e ­
spread double cropping o f  r ice  in the p rov in ce . H ow ever, the data relate to 
the whole o f  Kiangsu whereas (as has been argued above) it was principa lly  
in the two Specia l D istr icts  o f  Soochow and Sung-chiang that attempts to 
extend double cropping actually took p lace in 1956-57. Below  th ere fore ,  
estim ates o f  labour and draft animals supply conditions fo r  these sp ec if ic  
areas are introduced into the b a s ic  fram ew ork  used by K. R. W alker in o rd e r  
to test the validity o f  his hypothesis in the T 'a i  Hu region .
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The following table shows the relationship between required and avail­
able supplies o f  labour during the peak sum m er season  in the double cropping
r ice  areas o f  Soochow and Sung-chiang:
Table V. 34; Demand and supply conditions o f  labour in 
the peak sum m er season  in Soochow and 
Sung-chiang Special D is tr ic ts ;  1956.______
Soochow 
Sung-chiang
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A re a Number M aximum A verage Given
s e rv ice d o f  days possib le area o f current
per available burden o f land per ag r icu l -
standard fo r  fu l f i l ­ land per unweighted tural
labour ment o f labour unit o f labour
unit per w ork unit agricultural 
labour 
f o r c e  (i. e. 
total a. a.
4- agric .
labour
fo r c e )
supply, 
num ber of 
days r e ­
quired to 
com plete  
work o f  
harvesting 
f irs t  r ice  
and planting 
second crop
(mou) 
0 .1274 15
(mou)
1.91
(mou)
3 .9 0
4.61
30. 61 
36. 19
S ou rces ; The bas ic  fram ew ork  is  that used by K. R.
W alker, "Organization  o f  A gricu ltura l P r o ­
duction", _o£1_cit_. , p. 411, Table 3.
(1) Taken from  ibid. , p. 410, Table 2.
(2) Ib id .,  p. 411, Table 3.
(3) That is ,  (1) x  (2).
(4) Cited in CKN YCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 207, 
Table 1.
(5) That is ,  (4) 4 - ( l ) .
The second  and fifth colum ns are the m ost  im portant and they point to 
the ex istence  o f  a wide gap between the demand fo r  and supply of labour. The 
peak sum m er season  w ork  had to be com pleted  within 15 days but the availa ­
b ility  o f  labour was such that it could only be com pleted  within 30-36 days in
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the two Special D is tr ic ts .  In fact the gap m ay have been  even w ider , s ince 
the supply o f  labour shown does not take account either o f  the structure o f  
the labour fo r c e  (not all m em bers  would be equally strong) o r  o f  the fact that 
not all m e m b e rs  would be able to participate in r ice  cultivation work.
The demand and supply conditions fo r  the other c r i t ic a l  fa c tor  o f  p r o ­
duction, draft anim als, are shown below;
Soochow
Sung-chiang
(mou)
1 . 6 8 6
Sources
Table V. 3 5; Demand and supply conditions o f  draft animals 
in the peak sum m er season  in Sung-chiang and 
Soochow S .D . 's .  ; 1956.
( 1 ) (2) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 )
A rea N um ber M aximum A verage Given
se rv ice d o f  days poss ib le area o f current
per available burden o f land per draft
draft fo r  fu l f i l ­ land per unweighted animal
animal ment of draft draft supply,
p er  day w ork animal animal 
unit ( i . e .  
total a. a. 
4- num ber 
o f  draft 
an im als )
number 
o f  days 
required  
to com plete  
w ork at 
peak sum m er 
season
15
( i )
(2 )
( 3 )
( 4 )
( 5)
(mou) 
25. 29
(mou)
64
37
37. 96 
21 .95
This is the estim ate fo r  the r ice  areas o f  
south China made by K. R. Walker in 
"Organization o f  A gricu ltu ra l P rod u ct ion " ,  
op. c i t . , p. 413.
Table V. 34.
That is ,  (1) x (2).
CKNYCCHWT, op. cit. , p. 220, Table 14. 
That is ,  (4) f- (1)
In contrast to the labour supply situation this table shows that draft 
animals supply conditions d iffered  significantly between the two reg ions . In 
Soochow there was a seriou s  'draft animal gap' but in Sung-chiang the supply
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o f animals seem s to have been adequate to m eet the requirem ents o f  double 
cropping r ice .  In other w ord s , we m ay suppose that the draft animal 
situation posed  a m o re  serious  constraint upon double cropping plans in 
Soochow than in Sung-chiang. In this context it is interesting that the d ou b le - 
cropped  r ice  area in Sung-chiang was around 9% o f  the r ice  arable area 
com pared  with only 3 -4%  in Soochow.
However, we should be carefu l not to make too m uch o f  this. F or  one thing,
Sung-chiang was confronted  by a m o re  serious  labour shortage than Soochow.
Second, the ex trem ely  important distinction between total available animals
and working animals is ignored  in Table V .3 5 .  Yet as was shown in the
previous chapter, a v e r y  large  proportion  o f  animals was affected by i l l -
health in 1956-57.^ ^  If the calculations of V .3 5  w ere  re -w ork ed  in term s
o f  working animals only, it is c le a r  that in Sung-chiang as w ell as Soochow a
shortage o f  draft animals would e m erge .  Finally, it is worth noting that the
average data shown concea l la rge  lo ca l  d ifferen ces ;  in Sung-chiang Special
D istr ict  the burden o f  arable land per  beast ranged fro m  161 mou in Wusih
hsien and 172 m ou in P ao -sh an  to little m ore  than 30 m ou in Sung-chiang and
T 'a i  h s ien . In Chin-shan it was a m ere  18 m ou - the low est figure in the 
( 120 )prov ince .
The in form ation  so far  presented reveals a substantial gap between the 
availability and needs o f  the two m ost  important fa c tors  o f  production in T 'a i  
Hu. But it is im portant not to confuse these gaps with the traditional factor  
shortages which had always o c c u rr e d  during the peak periods  o f  cultivating 
one crop  o f  r i c e .  In the latter case  the relevant relationship was that between 
total arable area  and total available supplies o f  labour and draft animals;
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with double cropping this relationship did not apply unless two crops  w ere 
grown o v e r  the whole s in g le -c ro p p e d  area. In other w ord s ,  the gaps shown 
in V. 34 and V. 35 represent the extrem e situation in which a second  crop  of 
r ice  is planted o v e r  the entire arable area o f  r ic e .  In p ractice  this ra re ly  
happened. The extent to which the gaps were operational th ere fore  depended 
on the proportion  o f  the r ice  arable area supporting a second  c ro p .  The 
sm a lle r  this w as, the m o re  like ly  it was that fa c to r  shortages could be o v e r ­
co m e .
These points are worth making because  o f  the c ircum stantia l evidence
which suggests that they m ay  have had a significant e ffect  upon the plans fo r
the extension o f  r ice  double cropping in Kiangsu. F o r  despite  the considerab le
p re ssu re  to extend the d ou b le -crop p ed  area in 1956-57, only a m odest
expansion in fact took p lace . As Table V. 30 ind icates , only  1.66%  o f  the
r ice  arable area was under two crops  in 1956 and no further expansion took
place in the following y e a r .  We have already stated that in 1956 the MCI fo r
r ice  in Sung-chiang was about 109 and 103-104 in Soochow . Even the plan to
in cre a se  this to 11 0 in Soochow by 1957^ was by  no means ambitious when
com pared  with what was being attempted in other p ro v in ce s .  We would suggest
that this m odest  though pragm atic  p o licy  was a deliberate  attempt to avoid
the fa ctor  supply bottlenecks which threatened to underm ine double cropping
on a large  sca le .  Indeed the point was made exp lic it ly  in an artic le  which
warned against introducing double cropping o f  r ice  o v e r  too wide an area in
( 122 )o rd e r  to ensure adequate supplies o f  labour, fe r t i l iz e r s  and seeds .  '
M ore sp e c i f ica l ly ,  it was argued that since a labour unit could only se rv ice
about one m ou in the paddy areas , double cropping o f  r ice  should be lim ited
(123)to 10-15% o f  the arable area. A  later  artic le  gave 10% as the upper
lim it. <124>
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It is o f  particu lar  in terest that the MCI fo r  r ice  was so low  in Kiangsu, 
fo r  i f  we are right in postulating a d irect  relationship between the severity  
o f  fa c to r  shortages and the geographica l extent of double cropping we m ay 
expect the gains (in term s  o f  unit area y ie lds) to have been  grea ter  in Kiangsu 
than in other prov in ces  w here the d ou b le -crop p ed  r ice  area  was m ore  
extensive . Fortunately , data are available which perm it  a tentative
test o f this hypothesis and these are reproduced  in the table below;
Table V .3 6 ;  The area  under d o u b le -crop p ed  r ice  and 
the yields attained in s ix  prov in ces  o f  
China; 1956.
Kiangsu
Chekiang
Kwangsi
Hunan
Kiangsi
Anhwei
Double 
cropping 
r ice  area 
as % o f  
r ice  arable 
area
1 . 6 6  
25.31 
60. 90 
23. 86 
16. 90 
32. 83
Yields 
o f  single - 
cropped  
r ice
(ch in / mou) 
410 
513 
450 
363 
3 50 
371
Yields 
o f  d ou b le - 
cropped  
r ice
(ch in /m ou ) 
690 
690 
550 
452 
473 
487
Double 
cropping 
yields as 
% o f  s in g le - 
cropped 
yields______
168.29 
134.50 
122 .22  
124.52 
135. 14 
131.27
Note; Yields are actually "antic ipated". 
CKNYCCHW T, op. cit. , pp. 126-127.S ou rce ;
Although the usual caveat about not in ferrin g  too m uch from  the figu res 
applies here  (s tr ic t ly  speaking, we should con sid er  fa c to rs  such as natural 
conditions and ava ilab ility  o f  all relevant inputs in each  p rov in ce ), they n ever ' 
th eless  give som e support to the hypothesis suggested  above. The p rov in ce  
with the sm a llest sown area  o f  r ice  (Kiangsu) ach ieved  the greatest in crea se  
in yields while K w angsi, with the la rg es t sown area , ra ised  y ie lds least.
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To sum up: the technical and other requirem ents o f  d ou b le -crop p ed  r ice
meant that its extension  could only be cons idered  in the south o f  Kiangsu 
and the area chosen was alm ost wholly confined to T 'a i  Hu. E arly  e x p e r i ­
ments suggested that the output potential o f  a second  c r o p  o f  r ice  was c o n ­
siderab le  as long as supplies o f  all inputs could be ensured. H ow ever, our 
own estim ates suggest that la r g e -s c a le  expansion was ruled out because  o f  
potentially severe shortages o f  labour and draft anim als. The Kiangsu planners 
them selves  s e e n  to have taken account o f  such fa c to r s ,  f o r  in 1956 and 1957 
only a lim ited  expansion in the double cropping o f  r ice  took p lace . As a 
result it seem s that the bottlenecks which o c c u rr e d  in areas where double 
cropping was ca r r ie d  out o ver  a w ider area w ere avoided in Kiangsu.
We conclude this section  by b r ie f ly  considering  relative  leve ls  o f  land 
and labour productiv ity  in the production of r ice  in d ifferent parts o f  the 
p rov in ce . Unfortunately, data are not available in sufficient quantity to be 
able to do this in any detail, but the partial p icture outlined here will be 
suggestive o f  the overa ll  situation. F ir s t ,  two m easu res  o f  land and labour 
productiv ity  are shown fo r  four  Special D istr icts  in 1956. A verage  estim ates 
fo r  all Kiangsu are also given as a base against which the other figures can 
be set:
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Table V .3 7 ;  Output o f  r ice  p er  head o f  agricultural 
labour fo r c e  and per  m ou o f  land in 4
Output per 
head of 
ag ricu ltural 
labour fo r c e
Index with 
Kiangsu 
average 
= 100
Output per 
m ou o f  
arable 
land
Index with 
Kiangsu 
average 
= 100
Kiangsu (av)
(chin) 
671 .00 100.00
(chin) 
340 .13 100.00
Soochow S. D. 1 ,5 6 7 .3 2 233.58 476 139.95
Sung-chiang S .D . 1 ,4 6 1 .0 8 217 .75 477 140.24
Nan-t'ung S .D . 214 .95 32. 03 317 93. 20
Y ang - chou S .D . 872.09 129.97 289 84. 97
S ources :
Kiangsu: Total labour*force  in agricu lture  assum ed to
be 18, 000, 000, derived  f r o m  data in HHJP, 
2 0 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "P r o g r e s s  in the Winter Production  
M ovem ent Throughout K iangsu". Other data 
fro m  Table V .3 0 .
Soochow; Sung-chiang; Nan-t 'ung; Yang-chou:
F r o m  CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 234, Table 23, 
fo r  output and yield data. A gricu ltura l labour 
fo r c e  fro m  ibid. , p. 207, Table 1.
F o r  purposes o f  com p a rison  the yield  estim ates are the m ost  re liab le .  
The pattern which they revea l is fa ir ly  predictab le : In T 'a i  Hu output per unit
area was m uch higher than e lsew here  and alm ost half as m uch again as the 
prov inc ia l f igure . By contrast, Nan-t'ung and - som ewhat su rpr is in g ly  - 
Y ang-chou cam e out rather below  average. Doubtless i f  in form ation  w ere 
available fo r  other areas o f  north Kiangsu, they would show even low er 
leve ls  o f  productiv ity .
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Although the p re -e m in e n ce  o f  Soochow and Sung-chiang em erges  even 
m o re  c le a r ly  fro m  the labour productiv ity  m easu res  interpretation  o f  these 
figures is m o re  d ifficu lt. They are based on the total agricultural labour 
f o r c e  in each d is tr ic t  and th ere fore  their com parability  depends upon the 
proportion  o f  this f o r c e  engaged in r ice  cultivation being the sam e throughout. 
But there is no way o f  knowing how far  this was actually the case  so that 
the d ifferen ces  in output per  head m ust be con s idered  an approxim ate re flect ion  
o f  the real situation. This is p art icu lar ly  so in N an-t 'ung where the ex trem ely  
low leve l  o f  labour productiv ity  was probably  la rg e ly  a re flect ion  o f  the 
g rea ter  amount o f  tim e spent in growing e con om ic  c rop s  (pr incipa lly  cotton).
A c o r o l la r y  o f  T 'a i  Hu's higher leve l o f  productiv ity  was that it produced 
an amount o f  r ice  that was d isproportionate  to the arable area  planted under 
this c ro p .  This point is  w ell brought out by  the following data:
Table V .3 8 :  R ice  production in 1956:
a regional breakdown.
A rab le
area
under
r ice
As % o f
Kiangsu
r ice
arable
area
Average  
yield 
per unit 
area  of 
arable 
land
As % o f  
Kiangsu 
yield
Total 
output 
o f  r ice
As % i 
total 
output 
Kiang;
(mou) (ch in / mou) (m ill .
chin)
Soochow 8 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 22. 81 476 139 .95 3855.60 31 .92
Sung-chiang 3 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0 9. 57 477 140 .24 1621.80 13.43
Nan-t'ung 1 ,9 8 0 ,0 0 0 5. 58 317 93. 20 627.66 5 .20
Y ang - chou 8 ,5 7 0 ,0 0 0 24. 13 289 84 .97 2476.73 20. 51
Chinkiang 6 ,6 8 0 ,0 0 0 18.81 289 84.97 1930.52 15.98
S ou rces ; Soochow, Sung-chiang, Nan-t'ung and Yang- 
chou; from  CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 234, 
Table 23.
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S ou rces ; (continued)
Chinkiang; a broad cast  o f 6 /1 0 /5 5  gave the 
r ice  arable area in Chinkiang as 6 .68  m ill ,
m ou and this is the f igure used above. Wang
W e i-p 'in g ,  op. cit. , suggests that in 1955 
average r ice  yields w ere  the sam e as in Yang- 
chou - hence the cho ice  o f  289 chin in the table. 
Total output is then area  tim es yield .
In other w ord s ,  with little m o re  than 30% o f the total arable area o f  
r ice  in the p rov ince  Soochow and Sung-chiang w ere  producing alm ost half o f 
its total r ice  output. Indeed the figures understate the contribution o f  these 
two Special D istr icts  s ince  the additional production  aris ing fro m  the double 
cropping o f  r ice  in T 'a i  Hu is not included. It is a pity that s im ila r  in fo r ­
m ation is not available fo r  the beginning o f  the F F Y P  so that we could examine 
how far this contribution had declined o r  in creased  o v e r  the period . H ow ­
e v e r ,  extrapolating fro m  our e a r l ie r  conclusions  relating to total grain
production  and bearing in mind the em phasis on d ou b le -crop p in g  in T 'a i  Hu, 
there can be little doubt that the latter was the ca se .
(3) Wheat;
Although produced  in m uch sm a ller  quantity than r ic e ,  wheat was eas ily
the second  m ost  im portant food  crop  in Kiangsu. Indeed in a large  part o f
the p rov in ce ,  e s p e c ia l ly  north o f  the Yangtze w here conditions w ere  less
favourable to r ice  cultivation it was the m ost  im portant. N evertheless  it
would be wrong to suggest a r ice -w h eat  d ichotom y in Kiangsu; the north
growing wheat and the south r ice .  Although wheat accounted fo r  m o re  than
30% o f  the total grain  area in Hsti-Hwai and this reg ion  contributed about
(126)half o f  total wheat production . Sun Ching-chih  was at pains to point out
the wide d istribution  o f  the c ro p  throughout the p rov in ce .  In Kiangnan, fo r
exam ple , (e sp e c ia l ly  near Soochow, Wusih, C h 'ang-chou  and Chinkiang) the
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proportion  o f  the arable area under wheat was about the sam e as in the far
, (127) n o r t h .v ’
Wheat was the ch ie f  w inter c rop  in Kiangsu. In the north it was com m on ly  
rotated with soyabeans and other "m is ce l la n e o u s 11 gra ins; further south in 
L i -h s ia -h o  and Kiang-nan the m ost  usual rotation system  was with r ice .
The b a s ic  data relating to the sown area, average yields and total output
o f wheat in Kiangsu during the 1950's are presented  in Table V. 39:
Table V .3 9 :  Sown area, total output and average yields 
o f  wheat in Kiangsu: 1951-57.______________
Sown area Total output A verage  yields
(mou) (m ill ,  chin) (chin per
1951 2 8 ,7 9 0 ,0 0 0 2 ,8 4 4 .0 0 98. 78
1952 3 1 ,8 5 8 ,0 0 0 3 ,3 0 4 .3 5 103.70
1953 3 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 ,9 2 0 .0 0 89- 84
1954 3 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,6 5 0 .0 0 110.61
1955 3 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,9 1 2 .4 8 115. 00
1956 3 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,6 0 0 .0 0 10,5. 80
1957 3 1 ,2 3 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,0 9 1 .0 0 98. 97
S ou rces :
1951 and TLCS, 1951, no. 6, op. cit. ,
1957:
1952:
1953:
1954
1955
1956
p. 245.
Total output derived  fr o m  in form ation  in JM JP , 
1 2 /7 /5 4 ,  p. 2, "Wheat Output in Kiangsu Is 15% 
Higher Than in the Y ear B e fo re  L a st" .
Sown area fro m  JM JP, 2 3 /9 /5 4 ,  "Kiangsu P e a s ­
ants A re  About To Start Autumn Sowing". Total 
output derived  fro m  in form ation  in JM JP , 9 /6 /5 4 ,  
p. 1, "B um per Wheat H arvest on the Fifty M illion  
Mou o f  Wheat in Shensi and K iangsu".
Sown area fro m  JM JP, 9 /6 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
Wang W ei-p 'in g ,  op. c it .  , p. 61.
Sown area fr o m  JM JP , 8 /6 /5 6 ,  p . l ,  "Kwangtung 
and Kiangsi G enera lly  Get Bum per Spring Harvest.' 
Total output fr o m  JM JP, 5 /7 /5 6 ,  " Increased  P r o ­
duction in K iangsi 's  Sum m er H arvest" .
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Estim ates o f  wheat acreage  and output are m o re  read ily  available than
fo r  r ice  and few er  interpolations are n e ce s sa ry .  1952 is the only year  in
which no yield  o r  area data are available at all, though in 1954 a cho ice  has
(128}to be m ade between different published estim ates .
In 1954 then two d ifferent sou rces  give the wheat sown area in Kiangsu
as 30, 000, 000 mou^ and 33, 000, 000 m ou. The reason  fo r  using the
latter f igure is  twofold; f irs t ,  it ta llies  with an estim ate which can be derived
fro m  a third s o u r c e ; ^ ^ ^  second , given the 1953 and 1955 sown areas shown
above, a figure as low as 30 m illion  m ou in 1954 would make no sense at all.
The ch o ice  o f  a total output figure in 1954 ( fo r  which two estim ates are also
(132)available) is  m o r e  d ifficu lt. The poss ib ilit ies  are 3, 500 m ill ion  chin' '
(133)and 3, 800 m ill ion  chin. A cceptance  o f  the latter would mean that the
average yield  in 1954 was actually m arg ina lly  above that o f  1955; in view 
o f the p art icu lar ly  favourable natural conditions in 1955 this is su re ly  
unacceptable. On the other hand, there is som e evidence that the d isasters  
o f  1954 left the wheat crop  re lative ly  unaffected and that output m ay have 
r isen  above the 1953 leve l.  In this case  the low er  figure o f  3, 500 m illion  
chin also b e co m e s  unacceptable. In these c ircu m stan ces  a com p ro m ise  
solution is n e ce s sa ry ;  hence the average o f  the two estim ates which is used 
in Table V. 39.
We are left with the need to derive  the sown area  a n d /o r  yield  o f  wheat
fo r  1952. If yields w ere  assum ed to be the sam e as in 1951 the wheat sown
area would be about 33. 5 m ill ion  m ou. But s ince  the sown area in the following
year  was a m ill ion  m ou less  than this it is c le a r  that y ie lds m ust have been
higher than in 1951. This is in fact borne out by  r e fe re n ce s  to 1952 having
been the best year  fo r  wheat b e fo re  1954.(134) ^
7 Another sou rce  suggests that
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average wheat y ie lds  in north Kiangsu w ere 15% higher than in the previous 
y e a r ,  but i f  this in cre a se  w ere  applicable throughout the province  1952
yields would be 113.6  chin p er  m ou and the sown area  only  just 29 m ill ion  
m ou - which is  obv iou sly  too low in relation to our sown area figure for  
1953. C learly , the truth lies  between these two ex trem es  and we have th e r e ­
fo re  assum ed that in 1952 average yields o f  wheat w ere  about 5% higher than 
in 1951. F ro m  this are obtained the estim ates shown in the table.
Follow ing the approach o f  the previous sect ion  the annual percentage 
changes in acreage  and output can now be shown;
Table V .4 0 ;  Annual percentage change in area, output 
and yield  o f  wheat in Kiangsu; 1951-57.
Sown area Total output A verage  yields
1 951 - - -
1952 + 10.66 + 16.19 + 4 .98
1953 + 2 .02 - 11.63 - 13.37
1 954 + 1. 54 + 25. 00 + 23 .12
1 95 5 + 3 .03 + 7. 19 + 3 .97
1956 0 - 7 .99 - 8. 00
1957 - 8. 15 - 14 .14 - 6 .46
Source ; Table V. 39.
Like r ic e ,  wheat exhibited no steady trend in any one d irect ion  though 
it is  interesting that the pattern o f  fluctuations d iffered  fro m  those o f  r ice  
and total grain  output. The seriou s  decline in wheat production  in 1953 was 
w holly  a re flect ion  o f  falling yields resulting fro m  adverse  natural conditions 
e a r l ie r  in that yea r .  In June, 1953 it was reported  that persistent cold  
weather had affected about half the area under wheat in the province  and 
caused sev ere  lo s se s .^  Indeed H wai-yin  was d e c la re d  a d isa ster  area
and food was dispatched in an attempt to stabilize  grain  p r ice s  in the region .
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the northern half o f  the prov ince  the wheat harvest was l ik e ly  to be only
(137)40-50%  o f  what had or ig in a lly  been anticipated.
1954 stands in total contrast to the poor  p er fo rm a n ce  of the preceding 
yea r  and the v e r y  substantial r ise  in wheat output seem s all the m ore  s u r ­
prising in v iew  o f  the fact that this was o f f ic ia l ly  term ed  a 'd isaster  y e a r ' .
But the point has a lready been m ade that wheat rem ained re lative ly  unaffected 
by these ca la m it ies .  Thus, in spring, 1954 it was reported  that the growing
conditions fo r  wheat w ere  v e r y  good, 90% o f  K iangsu's sown area having
(138)already been weeded (in som e cases  tw ice) and fe rt i l ized .  Of cou rse
the 25% rise  in output (23% in crea se  in yields) shown in V .4 0  exaggerates 
the rea l situation because  o f  the abnorm ally  low base o f  1953. A m ore  
meaningful com p a r ison  is with 1952 and on this basis  wheat y ields show a much 
le s s  dram atic  r ise  o f  6 .66%  (10 .46%  in the case  o f  total output). N onetheless, 
the contrast between the p er form an ce  o f  r ice  and wheat in 1953 and 1954 is 
a striking one and serv es  to dem onstrate how m isleading aggregate grain  
production  data can be.
The estim ates fo r  1955 and 1956 require little com m ent. Output, sown
area and yields o f  wheat all m oved  in the same d irect ion  as those o f  r ic e ,
although the quantitative changes in both years w ere  le ss  strong. In 1955
output and yields o f  wheat in creased  by  a sm a ller  p roportion , while in 1956
yields declined  by only 8% com pared  with 12% fo r  r ic e .  In the latter case
the explanation seem s to have been that wheat was le s s  affected  by the adverse
natural conditions. Thus, although declining wheat output was anticipated in
(139)
Chinkiang Special D istr ict ,  another report looked  forw ard  to production
Even though 40% of the affected area was replanted, it was admitted that in
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how,
(141)
in Sung-chiang, Soochow, Nan-t'ung and Hsii-chou fulfilling and even exceeding
(140)planned targets .  In Sooc  it was even c la im ed  that wheat yields
w ere 25% higher than in 1955.
The m ost  interesting data are undoubtedly those fo r  1957 when wheat 
output showed the m ost  spectacu lar  decline during the whole period . H ith er­
to changes in production  had la rg e ly  re flected  changes in y ie ld s , but in 1957 
not only did y ie lds fall quite sharply but there was a lso a serious  decline in 
the sown area  under wheat.  ^ In contrast to the exp er ien ce  o f  e a r l ie r
y e a rs ,  on this o c c a s io n  it appears to have been m an-m ade  as m uch as natural 
fa c tors  which w ere  responsib le  fo r  the disappointing p er fo rm a n ce .  As ear ly  
as January reports  indicated that the wheat c ro p  was suffering as a result 
o f  p oor  p r o g r e ss  in the w inter production  m o v e m e n t . ^ ^  The effects  o f
heavy rain w ere  com pounded by the apparent indolence o f  peasants who showed
(144)little inclination to c le a r  the wheat fie lds o f  w ater. As a result the crop
began to show signs o f  r o o t -r o t  and a M arch  report spoke o f  a 30% failure
(145)rate fo r  wheat in som e parts o f  the prov ince .
It is  p oss ib le  that a s im ila r  lack  o f  enthusiasm on the part o f the peasants 
(hardly surpris ing  in view  o f the r igours o f  1956) was responsib le  fo r  the v e ry  
large  decline in the wheat sown area  in 1957.  ^ At any rate there is a
good deal o f  evidence to support the downward trend shown in the table above. 
In Chinkiang the wheat acreage  was said to have fa llen  by  m o re  than 200, 000
m o u /  in H w ai-y in  the correspond ing  figure m ay  have been a m illion
(148) (149)m ou. A  declining sown area  was admitted fo r  H sif-chou. And
m ost  staggering o f  all, c ircum stantia l evidence suggests that in Yang-chou
the area planted under wheat was 75% down on 1 9 5 6 .^ ^ ^  In late 1957 the
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wheat sowing being 30% behind plans in north Kiangsu and even m o re  in the
r (151) south.
seriousness of the situation emerged clearly from reports which spoke of
B ecause  o f  the p oor  p er form an ce  o f  wheat in 1957 (the en d -year  o f  the
period  we have been  considering ) average growth o v e r  the entire period  looks
v e r y  u n im p ress ive .  The following table illustrates  the point:
Table V. 41; The p er form an ce  o f  wheat in Kiangsu during 
the 1 9 5 0 ' s as shown by the s im ple  average 
annual rate o f  growth.__________________________
1951-57 1952-57
Simple average growth of:
Sown area 1.41% p .a .  - 0 . 3 3 %  p. a.
Yields 0 .03%  p. a. - 0 .91%  p. a.
Total output 1.45%  p. a. - 1 .29%  p. a.
Source : Table V .3 9 .
As be fo re  the situation in per capita term s looks even m o re  seriou s ;
Table V .4 2 ;  Output of wheat p er  head o f  rural population 
in Kiangsu (exc l .  Shanghai); 1951-1957 .
P e r  capita output
(chin)
1951 79.59
1952 91 .02
1953 79.19
1954 97 .46
1955 102.86
1956 93.21
1957 78 .82
S ources ; Table V .3 9  and Appendix B.
If the low  1953 figure  is ignored  the per capita estim ates  fall neatly into 
two p er iods ; up to 1955 output per  head shows a consisten tly  strong upward
trend; but therea fter  it falls o ff  rapidly and in 1957 actually reaches  its low est
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leve l  fo r  the whole period . Between 1951-55 the average rate o f  growth o f  
per  capita wheat output is + 7 .31%  p. a. , com pared  with - 11.69% in 1955-57. 
F o r  the F F Y P  p er iod  (1952-57) the figure is - 2. 68% p. a.
The preced ing  pages have shown that the p er fo rm an ce  of wheat during 
the F F Y P  p er iod  in Kiangsu was v e r y  poor  indeed. Natural fa ctors  w ere  to 
som e extent responsib le  fo r  annual fluctuations, but in la ter  years  p a r t i ­
cu lar ly , neglect  o f  fa rm  operations association  with wheat production  also 
contributed to the fa ilure  to generate growth. F o r  m ost  o f  the years low 
yields w ere  o ffse t  by an expanding sown area. H ow ever, in 1957 this expansion 
was abruptly re v e rse d .  The result was that at the end o f  the F ir s t  Plan not 
only was total wheat production  falling but per capita output was also low er  
than it had been at the beginning o f  the period .
We began this sect ion  by  making the point that though m ost  readily  
identified with the d r y - c r o p  regions o f  north Kiangsu, wheat was in fact grown 
throughout the p rov in ce . F o r  example the three Specia l D istr icts  o f  Sung- 
chiang, Soochow  and Yang-chou (p r im a r ily  regarded  as r ice -p ro d u c in g  areas) 
accounted fo r  about 30% o f the total sown area o f  wheat in Kiangsu.^  ^ ^
And even i f  Hstl-Hwai did contribute about half o f  all wheat produced,^ 
its leve ls  o f  productiv ity  could still not com pare  with those o f  other regions 
w here wheat was less  important;
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Table V .4 3 :  Average  yields o f  wheat in d ifferent 
parts o f  Kiangsu in 1955.___________
Average  wheat y ie ld  Index with Kiangsu
_______________________  average = 100.00
(chin per  mou)
Kiangsu 115.0 100.00
Hsti-Hwai
L i-h s ia -h o
Coastal region  o f  north Kiangsu 
Chinkiang - Y ang-chou 
T 'a i  Hu
1 02 . 0 88 .70
125. 0 108.70
157. 0 136.52
98 .9 86.00
123.4 107.30
S ource : Wang W ei-p 'in g ,  op. cit. , p. 61.
Thus, average yields in Hsti-Hwai w ere m o re  than 10% below  the 
prov incia l average . M ore  genera lly , the four Specia l D istr icts  which 
accounted fo r  perhaps 25, 000, 000 out of the total 34, 000, 000 m ou o f  wheat
C lea r ly  the full potential o f  the m ost  important wheat regions in Kiangsu 
was yet to be rea lized .
(4) Soyabeans;
B ecause  o f  its status as a 'r ich  c r o p '  it is worth considering  trends in 
soya  production  if  only to see  how far they bear  out any conclusions  reached 
in e a r l ie r  parts o f  this chapter. That is ,  any evidence o f  soya expansion 
m ay be taken to be indicative o f  gen era lly  healthy agricultural conditions. 
C on verse ly , soya  contraction  m ay  re flec t  deteriorating trends in the rural 
s e c to r .
(154)(1956) w ere  p r e c is e ly  those in which land productiv ity  was low est.
Soya is both a food  and econ om ic  c rop .  It has a high nutritional content, 
is a r ich  sou rce  o f  oil and, as a legum e, helps maintain an adequate leve l
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esp e c ia l ly  Hsti-Hwai (which according to one sou rce  accounted fo r  about 70% 
o f  total output)^ also along the north bank o f  the Yangtze. It was
com m on ly  planted in rotation with wheat o r  "m isce llan eou s"  grains and s o m e ­
tim es in conjunction with m a ize .  Although detailed in form ation  on soya sown 
area is lacking, the following fragm entary data fo r  four  Special D istr icts  are 
suggestive o f  the pattern o f  d istribution just d escr ibed :
Table V .4 4 ;  Sown area o f  soya in 4 Specia l D istr icts  
in Kiangsu; 1956. ______________________
(155)
of nitrogen in the soil. Cultivation in Kiangsu was mainly in the north,
Sown area
Soochow 250, 000 m ou
Sung-chiang 60 ,000
Nan-t'ung 650 ,000
Y ang-chou  1 ,0 1 0 ,0 0 0
Source ; CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 234, Table 23.
Bearing in mind that the total sown area m ay have been between 11-14
m ill ion  m ou,  ^ the v e r y  high degree  o f  concentration  o f  soya  in Hstf-chou,
H w ai-y in  and other areas is evident.
The following table shows the total output o f  soya  in Kiangsu between
1952-57. D irec t  estim ates are not available, but f r o m  two se r ie s  o f  total 
grain  output (one including, the other excluding, soya  production) the relevant 
f igures  can be derived .
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Table V. 45; Total output of soya in Kiangsu; 1952-57 .
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
( i )
Total output 
o f  food  grains 
(incl.  soya)
(m ill ,  chin) 
21 ,700
23 ,400
23 .000  
25,740
24 .000  
25, 160
(2 )
Index o f  total 
food  grain 
output (exc l .  
soya) with 
previous 
year -  100. 00*
( 100 . 0 )
108.3
9 8 .4  
1 1 2 . 2
9 3 .4
120 .4
(3)
Total output 
of food  grains 
(exc l .  soya)
(m ill ,  chin)
19,570 
21 ,190
20.850
23,400
21.850 
23,560
(4)
Total output 
o f  soya  (i. e.
(1) minus (3)).
(m ill ,  chin) 
2, 130 
2,210  
2, 150 
2 ,340  
2, 150 
1,600
* Except 1957 which takes 1952 = 100.
S ources  and notes;
(1) Table V. 11.
(2) N ung-ts 'un kung-tso t'ung-hsttn (Statistical W ork
Bulletin), 1958, no. 2, p. 21, "A  C om parison  of 
the State of Grain P roduction  In crease  Among 
China's P rov in ces  During the F F Y P  P e r io d " .
(3) Sun Ching-chih, op. c i t . , p. 57, gives food  grain
output in Kiangsu in 1957 as 23, 560 m illion  chin
(excluding so y a ) . F ro m  this can be derived  the 
output fo r  other years  by  using the index in (2).
If 1957 is excluded the figures dem onstrate a rem arkable  stability, with 
production  slightly  below  average in 1954 and 1956 and slightly above average 
in 1955. During these years  soya  seem s to have played a neutral ro le ,  
showing no sign o f  growth o r  decline . H owever, i f  converted  to a per  capita 
basis  the estim ates would show a downward trend. Of co u rse  when 1957 is 
included the p icture  w orsens  m arked ly , total output at the end o f  the F irs t  
Plan having fallen by  about 25% o v e r  the previous y e a rs .
In the absence o f  m o re  detailed in form ation  on the sown area  and yields
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o f soya  it would obv iously  be hazardous to draw any f i rm  conclusions  fro m  
the data presented  in this short section . H ow ever, the lack  o f  any growth in 
total output, the decline in per  capita output and the sharp fall in soya  p r o ­
duction in the last year  o f  the F F Y P  could all be interpreted  as co rro b o ra t iv e  
evidence o f  the fa ilure  o f  Kiangsu agriculture to fulfil its planned targets . 
Certain ly  there is nothing in the soya output figures to contradict the picture 
o f  a disappointing agricultural p er form an ce  which has em erged  so c le a r ly  
in e a r l ie r  parts o f  this chapter.
(5) A  note on the changing com posit ion  o f  grain  output in the I9 5 0 fs ;
To what extent was there a significant shift in the structure o f  food  grain 
production in Kiangsu during the F F Y P  p e r io d ?  A usefu l starting-point is 
provided  by  data presented  at the beginning o f  this chapter:
Table V. 46 : The sown areas of various  food grains in 
Kiangsu; 1951 and 1957.
Sown area As % o f  Sown area As % o f
1951 total grain 1957 total grain
sown area sown area
(excl. (exc l .
soya) soya)
(mou) (mou)
R ice 3 0 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0 29.29  3 5 ,7 7 0 ,0 0 0 30. 36
Wheat 2 8 ,7 9 0 ,0 0 0 27 .29  3 1 ,2 3 0 ,0 0 0 26. 51
Tubers 4 ,7 9 5 ,0 0 0 4 .5 4  5 ,320 ,000 4. 52
C oa rse  grains 4 1 ,0 2 1 ,9 2 0 38 .88  4 5 ,4 9 0 ,0 0 0 38. 61
Total 105, 507,145 100.00 117 ,810 ,000 100.00
S ou rces : Tables V. 7 and V. 9-
Although in absolute term s the sown area  o f  e v e r y  ca tegory  showed 
a substantial in cre a se  during these s ix  yea rs ,  in relative  term s  (and it is 
this that we are in terested  in here ) the changes that took p lace  w ere  v e r y
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slight. Indeed i f  we distinguish only between fine grains ( r ic e  and wheat) 
and co a rse  grains (including tubers) the situation is v irtua lly  the sam e in 
both the b a s e -  and en d -years ;
Table V .4 7 ;  The sown areas o f  fine grains and 
co a rse  grains in 1951 and 1957.
AS A PERCEN TAGE OF T O T A L  SOWN AR EA 
OF GRAIN (EXCLUDING SOYA)
1951 1957
Fine grains 56 .58 56.87
C oa rse  grains 43 .42  43.13
S ource ; Table V. 46.
The only  significant change that took place was within the fine grains 
ca tegory  as the relative position  o f  r ice  im proved  at the expense o f  a 
decline in the sown area o f  wheat.
It is a pity that annual sown area data are not available fro m  which a 
detailed breakdown o f  the structural com posit ion  o f  grain  production  could 
be m ade fo r  the entire p er iod . H ow ever, estim ates o f  r ic e ,  wheat and total 
food  output (excluding soya) are of cou rse  available and fro m  these it is 
p oss ib le  to derive  an output o f  c o a rse  grains and tubers . Though not
as accurate a re fle c t ion  o f  structural changes as the sown data would be, 
these will se rv e  as a useful check on the broad  findings o f  Table V .4 6  - 
p art icu lar ly  as the f igures  shown there do not exact ly  co incide  with the 
F F Y P  period ;
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Table V. 48: Output of r ice ,  wheat and co a rse  grains
(incl. tubers) in Kiangsu during the F F Y P .
Output of 
all food 
grains 
(exc l .  soya)
Output o f  Output of 
r ice  wheat
Output o f  
r ice  plus 
wheat
Output o f  
co a rse  
grains plus 
tubers
1952 19,570 10,591 3 ,3 0 4 .3 5 13, 895 .35 5, 674. 65
1953 21 ,190 11,650 2, 920 14,570 6 ,620
1954 20 ,850 11,202 3,650 14,852 5,998
1955 23 ,400 12,578 3 ,9 1 2 .4 8 1 0 ,4 9 0 .4 8 6 ,9 0 9 .5 2
1956 21 ,850 12,078 3, 600 15,678 6, 172
1957 23 ,560 13,178 3,091 16,269 7,291
Note; All f igures are in m ill ion  chin.
S ources ; Tables V. 30, V .3 9  and V. 45.
F ro m  this it is p oss ib le  to show the output of the various  ca tegor ies  
as a proportion  o f  total grain output;
Table V .4 9 :  Output o f  fine grains and co a r se  grains
as a proportion  of total food  grain 
production (excluding soya)._____________
R ice Wheat R ice  + 
wheat 
(fine 
gra in s)
C oarse
grains
(in c l.
tubers)
1952 54. 12 16. 88 71 .00 29. 00
1953 54.98 13.78 68 .76 31. 24
1954 53.73 17. 51 7 1 .2 4 28. 76
1955 53.75 16.72 70 .47 29. 53
1956 55.28 16. 48 71. 76 28. 24
1957 55.93 13. 12 69. 05 30. 95
Source ; Table V .4 8 .
B road ly  speaking these figures support our e a r l ie r  contention that there 
was no s ignificant shift in the relative im portance o f  c o a r se  and fine grains 
in Kiangsu. The m ost  interesting change took p lace within the fine grain 
ca tegory  as r ice  expanded at the expense of wheat. This at least represented
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a rationalization o f  the cropping pattern; not only was r ice  p re fe r re d  as a
staple food  but it also had the highest energy y ie lds o f  all grains (while those
(159)o f wheat w ere the low est). '  In these term s the sw itch  from  wheat to 
r ice  p rom ised  to bring both person a l and econ om ic  ben efits .
(6) Cotton;
Attention has so far  been fo cu ssed  exc lu s ive ly  on trends in the production  
o f  food  crops  in Kiangsu. But the province  was also an im portant produ cer  
o f  e con om ic  crop s  and indeed in the context o f  the F F Y P  the increasing  
demand fo r  food  supplies by  the rapidly growing population together with the 
p ressu re  to supply increas in g  amounts o f  raw m ater ia ls  to the industrial 
s e c to r  made the distribution o f  land between grain  and e con om ic  crop s  a 
c ru c ia l  is su e .
In this sect ion  we examine the p er form an ce  of the e co n o m ic  c ro p  s e c to r  
in Kiangsu by  analyzing trends in the production o f  cotton. The choice  o f  
cotton is an obvious one; it was e a s ily  the m ost  im portant cash  c ro p ,  a ccou n ­
ting f o r  66 .7%  o f  the total e con om ic  c ro p  area in 1 9 5 7 ; ^ ^ )  i n  addition 
Kiangsu was traditionally  one o f  the m a jo r  p rodu cers  o f  raw cotton and 
finished textile  goods in China - a position which it maintained during the 
1950’ s.
Fortunately sufficient data are available to allow us to draw up a se r ie s  
o f  cotton estim ates fo r  the entire 1949-57 period . These are shown in 
Table V. 50;
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Table V . 50; Sown area, total output and average yields
of cotton in Kiangsu; 1949-57 .______________
Sown area Total output Average  yields
(mou) (m ill ,  chin) (chin per m ou)
1949 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 92. 40 13.20
1950 6 ,5 5 0 ,0 0 0 119.055 18. 18
1951 8 ,2 2 0 ,0 0 0 189.00 22 .99
1952 9 ,1 0 5 ,5 9 0 260 .42 28. 60
1953 9 ,5 7 0 ,0 0 0 360 .68 37 .69
1954 10 ,000 ,0 00 218.93 21 .89
1955 11 ,084 ,580 474 .42 42. 80
1956 1 0 ,053 ,1 75 253 .34 25 .20
1957 10 ,007 ,0 00 381.00 38.07
S ou rces:
Total output;
Sown area;
A verage  
y ie ld s ;
1951 fro m  T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. c i t . , p. 245.
1952-57: N ung-ts 'un kung-tso t'ung-hsttn, 
1958, no. 4, p. 8, "A  C om p arison  of the State 
o f  Cotton Production  Am ong the P rov in ces  
o f  China" gives an index o f  cotton output with 
the previous year as 100. Since we know the 
output o f  cotton in 1957 fro m  T L C S , 1959, 
no. 6, op. c i t . , p. 245, figures can be e s t i ­
mated fo r  the other y e a rs .
1949 from  JPRS, 1962, no. 11438, cited in 
P rov in c ia l  A gricu ltura l S ta t is t ics , p. 113.
1950: see text below .
1951 and 1957; T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. c i t . 
p. 245.
1953: Kuang-ming jih -pao , 1 9 /4 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . 
A lso  JM JP, 1 8 /4 /5 4 ,  "A s A Matter o f  U rg ­
ency  Increase  the Output o f  Food  Grains and 
Cotton and Supplem entary Food  P ro d u c ts "  
yields this f igure.
1954; H sin -w en  pao, 2 0 /5 /5 4 ,  cited in 
P rov in c ia l  A gricu ltu ra l S ta t is t ics , op. c i t . , 
p . 113.
1949, 1952, 1955 and 1956; fro m  TLCS,
1957, no. 10, "Cotton Production  in China", 
p. 467.
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Note: Estim ates fo r  years in which no sou rces  are 
given are either d er ived  fro m  existing data o r  
interpolated, as d iscu sse d  below .
M ost o f  the f igures  can com m and a considerab le  m easu re  o f  confidence 
although in som e cases  it has been n e c e s sa r y  to choose  between conflicting 
estim ates and in o thers , where no data at all are available, to make our own. 
In 1950 fo r  exam ple prov inc ia l estim ates have to be m ade on the basis  o f  
the following in form ation ;
Table V. 51: Estim ates o f  sown area and total output
o f cotton in north and south Kiangsu; 1950.
North Kiangsu
South Kiangsu
Sown area
3, 540, 000 mou* 
3 , 5 5 5 , 437b
av. 3 ,5 4 7 ,7 1 8 .5
o ver  3, 000, 000 m ou
Total output 
60, 000,000 chin<
59, 820 ,000  chin 
5 8 ,2 9 0 ,000f
av. 5 9 ,055 ,0 00
S ou rces ; a S P J P , 8 /9 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "Hopes fo r  a Bum per H a r ­
vest in M ost of the Cotton F ields o f  North 
K iangsu".
b S P J P , 4 /1 0 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "The Cotton Production  
Situation in North K iangsu".
c S P J P , 2 0 /2 /5 1 ,  p . l ,  "D irec t iv e  by the North 
Kiangsu Adm inistration  on the Implementation 
o f  the Plans fo r  In creased  Production  in 1951".
d SN JP, 3 0 /9 /5 1 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
e SN JP, 3 / 3 / 51, op. cit. , p. 3.
f  SN JP, 3 0 /9 /  51, op. cit. , p. 2.
By adding up the figures fo r  north and south Kiangsu (using an average
where m o re  than one is available) the estim ates shown in V. 50 are obtained. 
They have one part icu lar ly  interesting im plication  which is that sown area in 
1950 is low er  than that o f  the previous year. Is this feasib le  in view o f  what 
has been e a r l ie r  said about the rapid growth o f  the ' r e c o v e r y  p e r io d 1? The
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answer is that it is  and an analysis of why such a contraction  should have
taken place throws interesting light on the d ifficu lties  confronting the planners
in the distribution o f  land between food  and econ om ic  c rop s  in these early  
(161)y e a r s .
B y 1949 the effects  o f  war had reduced the cotton acreage  to only a 
fra ct ion  of its p r e -w a r  leve l.  W artim e conditions w ere  in fact m ore  
damaging to cotton than to other crops  as peasants inevitably abandoned 
the production  o f  cash  crops  in favour of planting m o r e  grain . Thus, in 
north Kiangsu the cotton sown area fe ll  from  o ver  6, 000, 000 m ou to only 
2, 000, 000 m ou between 1937 and 1938 while yields also declined  fro m  24 
chin to 10 chin per  m o u J  Although the restoration  o f  ’n o r m a l1 c o n ­
ditions in 1949 e ffected  som e im provem ent sown area and yields both rem ained 
d ep ressed . F o r  one thing cotton fa rm e rs  hesitated to expand production,
falling v ic t im  to rum ours that "you  won't be able to se ll  any extra cotton you 
(163)p ro d u ce "  and in som e areas output even continued to decline . The
situation was exacerbated , at least in the north, by f loods  which caused
cotton  lo s s e s  in H w ai-yin  and Y en -ch 'en g  S pecia l D is tr ic ts  and led  to shortages
actors
(165)
(164)o f  inputs fo r  1950. That fac  such as these caused a decline in the
sown area  seem s beyond doubt.
But a m o re  seriou s  prob lem  was em erging fro m  a d ifferent quarter, fo r
throughout 1950 and into 1951 there is c lea r  evidence that cotton plans w ere
disrupted by the fa ilure  to establish  a rational p r ice  ratio between cotton and
food grains. In May, 1950 it was reported  that peasants in south Kiangsu
(166)w ere  d isobeying o rd e rs  to grow  cotton and planting other crop s  instead. 
Although it was admitted that peasants lacked capital to purchase fe r t i l iz e r s ,
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that cotton seed  quality was p oor  and that cadres  w ere  failing to encourage 
cotton production, the principa l fa ctor  was said to be the low p r ice  o f  
cotton^ which had convinced the peasants that cotton cultivation was 
unprofitable.
The c r i t ica l  nature o f  the situation em erged  m ost  c le a r ly  in a 
fascinating " le tter  to the cotton fa r m e r s " ,  issued  by the East China D epart­
ment o f  A gricu ltu re  in an attempt to explain the im portance  o f  the in creased  
production  targets fo r  cotton.^ n  conceded  that cotton p r ice s  had been
set too low in the past and that cotton fa rm ers  had su ffered  lo s s e s .  Food 
shortages caused by the natural d isasters  led to fears  among som e peasants 
that i f  they expanded their  cotton acreage  they would be unable to obtain 
enough grain fo r  their  consum ption n e e d s . Furtherm ore, the food shortages 
resulted in d isproportionate  r ises  in grain p r ices  which aggravated peasants ' 
fe a rs .  On top o f  this there w ere  delays in cotton purchases because o f  the 
tardy establishm ent o f  the Cotton P rocu rem en t A gency, while enem y bombing 
o f  the textile m ills  in Shanghai brought work there to a halt, limiting the 
sales outlets fo r  cotton and depressing  p r ic e s .  Not su rpr is ing ly  was
there a m arked  lack  o f  enthusiasm fo r  planting cotton in 1950!
But, the open letter  argued, such prob lem s w ere  rapidly being o v e r ­
com e . A ccord in g  to the o ff ic ia l  p r ice  p o licy , each chin of (ginned) cotton 
should exchange fo r  at least 6. 5 chin of un p rocessed  r ic e .  Given a m inim um  
yield  o f  25 chin p er  m ou for  im proved  cotton, fa rm e rs  could there fore  
expect to r e ce ive  162. 5 chin o f  r ice  fo r  each m ou planted under cotton.
Since m uch o f  the land in question was unsuitable fo r  paddy cultivation and 
would only support d ry  crops  it was c le a r  that cotton was by far  the m ost
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profitab le  cro p . In addition, the gen era l e con om ic  environm ent had im proved ; 
p r ice s  had stab ilized ; governm ent loans to buy good -qu a lity  seed s , f e r t i ­
l iz e r s  and p estic id es  w ere available; and the textile  fa c to r ie s  w ere restorin g
(170)production leve ls  and so exerting an upward p re ssu re  on raw cotton p r i c e s /
D espite such rea ssu ra n ce s , the d ifficu lties  w ere not im m ediately
o v e rco m e  and peasant disinclination to plant cotton continued into 1951. In
an attempt to produce m o re  r ice  peasants in som e parts o f  Sung-chiang
Special D istr ict  planted only 30% o f  the total arable area  under cotton,
(171)com pared  with 70% b e fore  the war. There w ere  continuing reports
o f lack  of inputs and peasant con cern  that they would be unable to sell  all
their  output. It is l ik e ly  that the m ain factor  inhibiting cotton expansion was
a still irrationa l p r ice  ratio between grain and cotton. At any rate, the
anticipated in cre a se  in the cotton sown area only appears to have finally got
under way when the cotton -gra in  ratio was rev ised  upwards by m o re  than
30% in the spring o f 1951.^  ^ It is  true that as late as Septem ber and
O ctober  there w ere  re fe ren ces  to the stabilization o f  cotton p r ice s  being
(173)prevented by specu lative activ ities  and c r it ic is m  o f the "high p r ice
m en ta lity" o f  cotton  fa rm e rs  and th eir  reluctance to se ll.^  But such
rem aining d ifficu lties  w ere brought under con tro l by the publication  o f laws 
designed  to regulate the sale o f  cotton in Kiangsu.^
To sum up then, there is no lack  o f  evidence to support our contention 
that the sown area  of cotton declined between 1949 and 1950. H ow ever, we 
should add that although they w ere still at a low le v e l ,  yields did in crease  
and by an amount sufficient to o ffset  the sown area d ec lin e . The overa ll  
result was that total cotton output in creased  in 1950.
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The on ly  other m a jo r  prob lem  concerns the sown area in 1956. The
estim ate in V. 50 indicates a fall o f  10% o ver  1955. But two other sou rces
actually suggest an in crease  o f  about the same proportion , to 12 ,000 ,0 00
m ou.  ^ Even i f  they are not conclusive  there are various reasons fo r
p re fe rr in g  the low er  f igure . To begin with, the sou rces  fro m  which it is
derived  are both authoritative and date from  1957-58 - a tim e when, as was
e a r l ie r  argued, data should have been m ost re liab le .  By contrast, Wang's
estim ate m ust have been based on p re lim in ary  in form ation  (s ince  his book
was published in D e ce m b e r ,  1956) and the artic le  in the 'P e o p le 's  Daily '
was published only m id -w ay  through 1956, when the sown area o f  cotton
m ay still  have been only approxim ately known. There is other evidence to
support our ch o ice ;  in 1956 the natural d isasters  m ade conditions particu larly
difficult in Hsti-chou, H wai-yin  and Y en -ch 'en g , the last two o f  which w ere
im portant cotton producing areas . In Y en -ch 'en g  fo r  exam ple the entire
(177)arable area was f looded  during the autumn. In these c ircum stances
it seem s m ost  l ik e ly  that em phasis was p laced on the need to res tore  food
production  and that cotton production was re lative ly  neg lected . Certain ly
it seem s inconce ivab le  that the sown area o f  cotton should have in creased
(178^significantly in such conditions.
Having d iscu ssed  the m o re  prob lem atic  o f  the estim ates in Table V. 50 
we can now attempt to analyze the trends and fluctuations which they reveal.
To this end two tables are now presented. The f irs t  gives the annual p e r ­
centage changes in area , output and yields fo r  the entire 1949-57 period ; 
the second  relates to the F F Y P  period  only and is in the fo rm  o f  an index 
with 1952 as the base year;
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Table V. 52; Annual percentage changes in sown area, 
total output and average yields of 
cottony 1949-19 5 7 . _____________________
Sown area Total output A verage yields
1949 - - -
1950 - 6 .43 + 28 .85 + 37.73
1951 + 25. 50 + 58.75 + 26.46
1952 + 10.77 + 37.79 + 24.40
1953 + 5. 10 + 38.50 + 31 .78
1954 + 4 .49 - 39 .30 - 41 .92
1955 + 10.85 +116.70 + 95. 52
1956 - 9 .30 - 46 .60 - 41 .12
1957 - 0 .46 + 50.39 + 51.07
Source ; Table V. 50.
Table V. 53; An index o f  sown area, total output and
average yields o f  cotton in Kiangsu
during the F F Y P
Sown area Total output A verage yields
1952 100.00 100.00 100.00
1953 105.10 138.50 131.78
1954 109.82 84.07 76. 54
1955 121.73 186.17 149.65
1956 110.41 97. 28 88. 11
1957 109.90 146.30 133. 11
S ource ; Table V. 50.
The absence o f  a uniform  trend and the ex istence  o f  annual fluctuations 
have a lready been  noted in the context o f  food  gra ins. But nowhere were 
the fluctuations as severe  o r  as chron ic  as in the case  o f  cotton output and 
y ie lds . L arge  in cre a se s  w ere  to be expected during the 'r e c o v e r y  years  1 
but it is startling to find that the average annual fluctuation (in either 
d irection ) in total cotton output in Kiangsu was 58. 30% fo r  1952-57, com pared  
with only 41 .80%  during 1949-52. F o r  average yields the figures w ere
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52.28%  and 29. 55% resp ect ive ly .  Bearing in mind that Kiangsu 's  cotton
( i  79)production ranked fourth in China such wide variations obv iously  had
serious  im plications  fo r  the fulfilment o f  national cotton plans.
The national s ign ificance  o f  K iangsu ’ s p er form an ce  is well suggested 
by  the figures showing the proportion  o f  total d om est ic  cotton output c o n tr i ­
buted by  Kiangsu between 1952 and 1957. Far  fro m  there being a steadily 
rising o r  even constant trend, supplies o f  raw m ateria ls  fro m  the province 
fluctuated w idely  yea r  by year;
Table V. 54: K iangsu's contribution to total d om estic  
cotton output: 1952-57.____________________
Percentage  o f  total 
cotton production  in China 
contributed by  Kiangsu;
9 .9 9  
15.35 
10.28
15.62
8 .77
11.62
Based on total cotton output data given in 
W ei-ta  ti sh ih -n ien , op. cit. , p. 105 and 
Table V. 50.
When the fact that average yields o f  raw cotton in Kiangsu exceeded  
those o f  China as a whole in only two years during the entire 1949-57 period  
is added to the instability dem onstrated by the above f igu res ,  the d ifficu lties 
o f  m eeting national textile production targets em erges  c le a r ly .  ^
A com p a rison  o f  Tables V. 11 and V. 50 will revea l that the d irect ion  
o f  annual changes in the total output of food  grains and cotton was the sam e. 
To som e extent the sam e factors  w ere  responsib le ; the decline in cotton
production in 1954 and 1956 can be explained by the natural d isasters  o f
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1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Sources ;
those years and the large  in crease  in 1955 c le a r ly  re flects  that y e a r 's  
unprecedentedly favourable growing conditions. In view  o f the extent of 
the annual fluctuations it is worth emphasizing that natural conditions m ay 
have played an even m o re  central role in the production  o f  cotton - partly 
because  in the event o f  flooding o r  drought the r e c o v e r y  o f  food  crops  tended 
to r e ce iv e  the highest p r io r ity  and partly because such a large  proportion  
o f  the cotton area  was situated in regions susceptib le  to natural d isa sters .  
The fact that average yields o f  cotton in H wai-yin Specia l D istr ict  w ere a 
m ere  s ix  chin per  m ou in 1956 underlines both these points.^  ^  ^ H owever, 
technical fa ctors  could also be important. In the rec la im ed  coasta l area o f  
north Kiangsu where about a third o f  all the p ro v in ce 's  cotton was grown, 
methods o f  cultivation w ere  reported  to be ca re le ss  and this can only have
re in forced  the e ffect  o f  natural d isasters  in holding back r ises  in p rodu c-
. • (182) tivity.
The e ffect  o f  institutional changes upon cotton p er form an ce  in Kiangsu 
is difficult to assess  on the basis  o f any ob ject ive  evidence. The low levels  
o f  yields in 1954 and 1956 and the high leve l o f  1955 a cco rd  so c lo s e ly  with 
what we know of natural conditions in these years that it is tempting to 
regard  the role  o f  other factors  as a purely  residual elem ent. Perhaps 
what has em erged  m ost  c le a r ly  fro m  the e a r l ie r  d iscu ss ion  as the m ost  
im portant m an-m ade  influence upon cotton production was the p r ice  p o licy  
adopted by  the planners; the grain ;cotton  ratio was lik e ly  to be a m ore  
significant determinant o f  output than changes in the actual structure o f  
farm ing.
The way in which p o licy  uncertainty could affect cotton production has
been dem onstrated  in the context o f  1950-51, when the fa ilure  to set a
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suffic iently  high p r ice  caused peasants to plant food  o r  other crops  in
p re feren ce  to cotton. This was a particu lar instance o f  the conflict  between
cotton and grain  fo r  the use o f  lim ited  arable land - a con flict  which against
the background o f  the slow growth rates achieved by agriculture during the
F F Y P  m ust have b e co m e  in creas in g ly  acute. In Kiangsu this prob lem
demanded urgent attention in the last years o f  the Plan. Until 1955 the
cotton sown area displayed a consistently  upward trend, increasing  by m ore
than 20% o v e r  the b a s e -y e a r  (1952). But in 1956 a substantial contraction
(183)took p lace which continued into 1957. There is som e evidence to
suggest that this decline re flected  a deliberate d ec is ion  by  the planners.
Writing in 1956 Wang W ei-p 'in g  re fe rre d  to the need to contract the cotton
acreage in favour o f  m o re  food grains in coasta l north Kiangsu and along
the Yangtze^ and the following year it was o f f ic ia l ly  admitted that
adjustments in the allocation o f  land between cotton and food crops  had
b e co m e  n e ce s sa ry .  The area affected was Nan-t'ung Special D istr ict ,  the
centre o f  cotton production in the province . H ere, in spite o f  the fact that
grain s e l f - s u f f i c ie n cy  had never  been achieved, the sown area under cotton
had been extended fro m  1, 692, 000 mou (1949) to 4, 038, 000 mou (1956)^
so that this one d is tr ic t  grew  m o re  than 40% o f  all cotton in Kiangsu. Such
rapid expansion had exacerbated  an already chron ic  grain  defic it  and
affected not only human consum ption but also supplies o f  fodder  to draft
animals and other d om estic  l ivestock . The burden on the state to maintain
consum ption leve ls  m ust have been considerab le .^  1956  per
capita grain  consum ption rem ained virtually  static while in m ost  other areas
(187)it in creased  significantly . It is reasonable to in fer  that the food
shortages caused peasant d issatis faction  on a wide sca le  in Nan-t'ung and
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200, 000 m ou so gained was to be used principa lly  fo r  the cultivation of
food crops  and it was hoped that thereby grain output in the Special D istr ict
( 188}would be ra ised  by 11%.
necessitated in 1957 a 5% contraction in the cotton sown area. The
In other parts o f  the province  too cotton contraction  was taking p lace ,
(189)the area m ainly affected being T 'a i  Hu. The planned sown area of
cotton in Soochow in 1950 fo r  example was 800, 000 m o J  but the figure 
actually attained was only 620, 000 mou.^  ^  ^ Although the irrational gra in -  
cotton p r ice  ratio m ust have been la rg e ly  responsib le  fo r  this 25% shortfall 
it is interesting that in the following year the target was reduced to
740 ,000  m o u J   ^  ^ Contraction, not expansion, apparently continued to be
em phasized  and in 1956 the reported  sown area was still the same as in
age
(194)
(193)
1950 (620 ,000  m ou). S im ilarly , in Sung-chiang the cotton acrea
seem s to have been reduced by 340, 000 mou between 1950 and 1956.
E lsew here  how ever  a re v e rse  p ro ce ss  was under way. By the end of
the F ir s t  Plan period  the coasta l areas o f  north Kiangsu ( for  example P in -
hai, She-yang, T a -feng  and T ung-t 'a i  hsien) contained about 25% o f  the total
cotton acreage  in Kiangsu; 2, 500, 000 mou com pared  with only 700, 000 m ou
(195)in 1949. Although input and fa ctor  s ca rc it ie s  s till  kept yields low  it
was c le a r  that the rationalization o f  cropping patterns and further land
reclam ation  would ensure the continuing im portance o f  this region  as a
cotton p rodu cer .  There was also a v e r y  substantial extension o f  cotton in
Hsti-Hwai where v e r y  little o f  this c rop  had been grown in the past. In
H wai-yin  plans fo r  1957 anticipated an increase  o f  250 ,000  m ou o v e r  the
(196)previous year, a r ise  of m o re  than 40%.
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An interesting indication o f  the changing geographica l distribution of 
cotton production in Kiangsu is given by the following figures which show the 
proportion  o f  the total sown area and total output of cotton accounted fo r  by 
T 'a i  Hu and Nan-t'ung in 1931 and 1956. Although such long -run  com parisons  
are rea lly  the subject o f  the next chapter it will do no harm  to anticipate 
that d iscu ss ion  and conclude this section  by presenting these regional data;
Table V. 55; Some indicators o f  the changing 
geographical distribution o f  
cotton production in Kiangsu.
Cotton sown area as a Cotton output as a
percentage o f  the total percentage o f  the total
sown area in Kiangsu; output in Kiangsu;
1931 1956 1931 1956
Soochow Special 
D istr ict 10. 01 7. 36 8 .6 0 10. 22
Sung-chiang 
Special D istr ict 23 .95 15. 52 24. 04 19.70
Nan-t'ung Special 
D istr ict 37. 89 39. 19 37. 17 40. 44
S ources ; 1931 data based on in form ation  in H B , op. c i t . , 
p p . 189-199; and p p .203-205 .
1956 data based on CKNYCCHW T, op. cit. , 
p . 234.
What em erges  m ost  c le a r ly  fro m  this table is the sharp contraction  of
the cotton area in Soochow and Sung-chiang (T 'a i  Hu). In 1956 Soochow had
re-attained only tw o-th ird  o f  its p r e -w a r  sown area and in Sung-chiang the
same figure was le ss  than 60%. It is interesting how ever  that because o f
im proved  land productiv ity  their relative positions in term s  o f  total output
w ere m uch less  affected. Indeed Soochow was actually contributing m ore
to total output in 1956 than it had been 25 years e a r l ie r  in spite o f  a 25%
(197)decline in its cotton a creage . N an-t 'ung 's  posit ion  was about the sam e
in both periods  which is what the rapid expansion between 1949 and 1956
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would suggest.
The decline o f  what m ay be called  the ‘Yangtze cotton b e l t 1 was of 
c ou rse  s im p ly  a re flect ion  o f  the growing im portance  o f  the 'new' cotton 
areas o f  the north. The extension o f  cotton in H w ai-y in  has a lready been 
rem arked  upon and i f  data w ere  available there is little doubt that a s im ila r  
pattern would be observab le  in H sii-chou in the 1950's .  A m easure  o f  the 
changes taking p lace  is that the proportion  o f  K iangsu's total sown area 
represented  by  Chinkiang, Y en -ch 'en g , H wai-yin  and Hsti-chou in creased  
fro m  b a re ly  20% in 1931 to m o r e  than 33% in 1 9 5 6 .^ ^ ^  But because of 
the re la tive ly  low -y ie ld in g  nature o f  m uch o f  this new land the contribution 
to total output by  these regions rose  by much less  fr o m  22. 10% (1931) to 
26. 55% (1956).
Ill An Examination o f  Three  Important F actors  o f  Production  in A gricu lture  
in Kiangsu; Labour, Draft Animals and P ig s .
(1) L abou r ;
In the in troductory  chapter re fe ren ce  was made to the high population
density  in m uch o f  K iangsu. This m ight have suggested  not m e re ly  an
adequate supply o f  labour, but indeed the existence  o f  "su rp lu s "  labour.
If proved  this would have ex trem ely  important im plications  since in theory
it could be m ob il ized  fo r  developm ent in both the agricultural and industrial 
(199)s e c t o r s .
"Surp lus" labour is often said to exist i f  the m argina l product o f labour 
can be shown to be zero  o r  negative. But such an approach is too restr ic t iv e ,  
m ost  obv iously  because  it fails  to recogn ize  the seasonal nature o f  a g r icu l­
tural operatio  s. At peak periods  the entire labour f o r c e  is l ike ly  to be
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fully em ployed , but at other tim es unemployment m ay exist on a large
sca le .  This was certa in ly  the case  in China where m any peasants w ere
( 2 0 0 )traditionally  without w ork during the winter m onths. '
F orm idable  as the theoretica l ob jections to the concept of "su rp lu s "  
labour m a y b e ,  the d ifficu lties  o f  establishing its ex istence  em p ir ica l ly  are 
even greater . The analysis o f  double cropping o f  r ice  in T 'a i  Hu made 
e a r l ie r  certa in ly  indicated that labour supplies w ere  inadequate to m eet the 
demands which its w idespread  adoption would crea te .  H ow ever, that analysis 
was lim ited  both in term s  o f  the geographica l area  and the cropping pattern 
which it con s id ered . In o rd e r  to give weight to those conclusions an attempt 
must now be made to examine the relationship between labour supply and 
demand throughout the p rov in ce .
The average amount o f  arable land per  head o f  agricultural population
in Kiangsu was 2 .3 8  m ou in 1957^  ^  ^ although o f  c o u rse  there w ere  s ign i-
( 202)ficant regional varia tions. But such figures fail to show the adequacy
o r  otherw ise  o f  labour supplies since the required  relationship is that 
between arable land and the agricultural labour f o r c e . Fortunately data are 
available which perm it  the arable area per  head o f  labour fo r c e  to be 
estim ated fo r  each Special D istr ict  in Kiangsu at the end o f  the F F Y P  period  
and the findings are presented  in the following table;
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Table V. 56; The relationship between arable land and 
the agricultural labour f o r c e  in Kiangsu; 
1956 /1957 .*
Soochow
Sung-chiang
Chinkiang
Yang-chou
Nan-t'ung
Y en -ch 'en g
Hw ai - yin
Hsti-chou
Arable  area
(mou)
9, 590,000
5 .1 2 0 .0 0 0
8 .3 9 0 .0 0 0
13 .480 .0 00
9 .2 1 0 . 0 0 0
1 0.9 9 0 . 0 0 0  
1 8 ,000 ,0 00  
15, 770, 000
Agricu ltura l 
labour fo r c e
Arable area 
per  head o f  
ag ri cultural 
labour fo r c e
(mou)
2 .4 6 0 .0 0 0
1.1 1 0 . 0 0 0
1 .490 .00 0
2 .8 4 0 .0 0 0
2 . 920. 000
1 ,800 ,00 0
2 .4 0 0 .0 0 0
2 .1 0 0 .0 0 0
3 .90
4. 61
5. 63 
4. 75 
3. 15
6 . 11 
7. 50 
7. 51
* Data fo r  Soochow, Sung-chiang, Chinkiang, Yang-chou 
and Nan-t'ung are fo r  1956. The rest  r e fe r  to 1957.
S ou rces ; Soochow, Sung-chiang, Chinkiang, Yang-chou 
and Nan-t'ung; all data f r o m  CKNYCCHW T, 
op. c i t . , p. 207, Table 1.
Y en-ch 'en g ; arable area  fr o m  HHJP, 8 /1 /5 7 ,  
op. c i t . , p. 2.
Hwai-yin ; arable area f r o m  record ed  broadcast.
Hsti-chou; arable area f r o m  HHJP, 1 9 /1 2 /5 7 ,  
op. cit.
Y en -ch 'en g , H wai-yin , Hstf-chou; agricultural 
labour fo r c e  estim ates d er ived  fro m  HHJP, 
2 0 /1 2 /5 7  and ibid. , 2 4 /1 2 /5 7  (Table ; " P r o g r e s s  
in the Winter Production  M ovem ent Throughout 
K iangsu". )
Regional d ifferen ces  w ere  v e ry  con s iderab le , e sp e c ia l ly  between north 
and south; thus the p er  capita burden o f  arable land in Hstf-Hwai was about 
twice that o f  T 'a i  Hu. The m ost  favourable m an-land  ratio was in Nan-t'ung 
but this a rea 's  com parative  advantage was o ffset  by the w idespread  cultivation 
o f  a c ro p  (cotton) which had p articu larly  high labour requ irem ents.
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If our term s o f  re fe ren ce  are those o f  V. 34 it is c le a r  that a serious  
'labour gap' existed  in every  part o f  the prov ince . H ow ever, the figure o f  
1. 91 m ou used in that table as a c r ite r io n  fo r  m easuring the adequacy o f  
labour applied s p e c i f ica l ly  to the peak sum m er p er iod  o f  the double cropping 
o f  r ic e .  This pattern o f  cultivation was confined to a re la tive ly  sm all part 
o f  Kiangsu and even i f  it was s im ila r  in term s o f  its demands on labour to 
other double cropping patterns ( fo r  example r ice  and wheat), we m ay  suppose 
that it had m uch le ss  re levance  in areas where only one crop  was grown in a 
year. Not that this n e c e s s a r i ly  indicates the absence o f  a labour supply 
prob lem  in, say  Hsti-Hwai: on the contrary , the benefits o f cultivating only
a single c rop  m ay have been balanced by the m uch grea ter  burden o f  arable 
land per  head o f  agricultural labour so that the o v era ll  situation rem ained 
the sam e as in areas further south.
That labour d e fic ien c ies  o c c u rre d  where a double cropping pattern o f
sum m er paddy fo llow ed  by  winter wheat was practised  is evidenced by the
case o f  H s in -m in -e rh  APC in Wu hsien (Soochow Special D istr ict ) .  In June
the wheat harvest  and transplanting o f  the r ice  seedlings needed to be ca rr ie d
out s im ultaneously. Com pletion o f  these tasks required  18,340 labour days
(203)but only 11, 600 w ere  available in the APC. The result was a defic it  o f
6 ,740  labour days (58% o f  the total available). Put in a d ifferent way, during 
this peak period  the m axim um  arable land that could be se rv ice d  by a labour 
unit was 2. 5 m ou a day; the actual burden was m o re  than twice this, 5 .42  
mou.
A second peak p er iod  o c c u rre d  at the end o f  O ctober  and beginning o f  
N ovem ber when little m o re  than two weeks w ere  available fo r  harvesting
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the paddy and sowing the wheat. Demand fo r  labour during this period  was
14, 100 labour days but actual supply in H sin -m in -e rh  C o llect ive  was only
8, 140. M o re o v e r ,  i f  the threshing o f  the harvested  r ice  w ere  included in
the demand calculations requirem ents w ere ra ised  to 20 ,280  days, resulting
(204)in an overa l l  d e fic it  of 12, 140 labour days.
In other regions cropping patterns w ere m o re  com plica ted . Take fo r  
exam ple the rotation o f  r ic e ,  wheat and cotton p ractised  in a co l le c t iv e  in 
Nan-t'ung hsien; during the peak sum m er period  labour requirem ents w ere 
as fo llow s;
harvesting wheat 4, 090 labour days
working in cotton fields 3 ,640
transplanting the paddy 3 ,680
Total 11,410
The tim e available fo r  this work was se v e re ly  lim ited . The harvesting o f
wheat, transplanting o f  r ice  and preparation o f  the so il  fo r  the cotton all
had to be com pleted  within 15-18 d a y s . ^ ^ ^  On the op tim istic  assumption
of  a 95% rate o f  work attendance and given the labour f o r c e  o f  457, only
6 ,620  labour days w ere  available fo r  the op era t ion s . ) Once again this
left a s izeable  de fic it  o f  4 ,790  labour days.
Doubtless exam ples such as these could be m ultip lied  m any tim es o v e r .  
If so , we m ay  sa fe ly  conclude not only that the concept o f  "su rp lu s "  labour 
had little applicability  to agricultural conditions in Kiangsu but that attempts 
to introduce o r  extend double cropping w ere  bound to be constrained by a 
ser iou s  shortage o f  labour. This shortage threatened to be all the m o re  
c r it ica l  in view  o f the fact that the profitable rec lam ation  o f  new arable land 
was lim ited , leaving the burden of in creased  production  to be ca rr ie d  by
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F a ctors  other than a slow  rate o f  natural in cre a se  could  contribute to
a labour d e fic ie n cy  in agriculture . M igration fro m  the countryside had a
long h is tory  in China and data cited by  C. B. Howe have shown that the s ize
o f the rural outflow could reach  v e r y  serious  p r o p o r t io n s . Traditionally ,
the reasons fo r  this exodus w ere  land lessn ess , harsh  conditions following
a p oor  harvest and o f  cou rse  the m ateria l attraction o f  h igher living standards
in the c it ie s .  In the 1950's the d is location  which often accom panied  the
rapid institutional changes in agriculture provided the peasants with a further
incentive to leave their  v i l la ges .  The account o f  the co -op era t iv iza t ion  and
co llec t iv iza t ion  cam paigns given in previous chapters has provided sufficient
evidence o f  the ser iou sn ess  o f  such d islocation  to show that such fo rce s
must have been at w ork  in Kiangsu. Indeed the p rox im ity  o f  a highly
developed urban s e c to r  such as existed in the south o f  the province  can only
have intensified any m ig ra to ry  trends out o f  the rural s e c to r .  The fact that
net m igration  was responsib le  fop 33 .6%  o f  Shanghai's total population
(208')growth during 1949-57 is one indication o f  the strength o f  those trends,
bearing in mind that the la rgest  num ber o f  im m igrants w ill have com e from  
rural Kiangsu. When other c it ies  such as Nanking, Wusih, Soochow, etc . 
are taken into account it is c le a r  that the total num ber of peasants involved 
will have been v e r y  con s iderab le . In short, we would argue that m igration  
was a s ignificant contributory  fa c to r  to the labour shortage which we have 
o b served  in Kiangsu agricu lture .
The contradiction  between the private and co l le c t iv e  s e cto rs  within the 
new institutional fram ew ork  has already been re fe r r e d  to. A further m a n i­
festation  o f  the sam e contradiction  was the p re fe re n ce  o f  peasants to work
-4 3 9 -
higher yields.
on their own plots rather than in the co llect ive  f ie ld s .  Although in form ation  
on this aspect o f  the AP C s is notably lacking it seem s reasonable to suppose 
that it existed  to a sufficient extent to exacerbate  the agricultural 'labour
gap'-
There w ere  o f  cou rse  ways o f  circum venting this 'labour gap1. In a
paddy-whe at-cotton  area  such as Nan-t'ung the fa ctor  constraint might be
eased by changing the cropping pattern; fo r  exam ple by planting an e a r ly -
ripening varie ty  o f  r ice  and substituting bar ley  fo r  wheat. The r ice  could
then be harvested  e a r l ie r ,  the b a r ley  be sown im m ediate ly  afterwards and
(209)m o re  tim e be left f o r  the preparation  o f  the cotton f ie ld s .  A s im ila r
solution was p roposed  in a co l le c t iv e  in Hsing-hua hsien where labour supply 
conditions required  36 days fo r  the com pletion  o f  w ork which had to be ca rr ie d  
out within 15 days. Here it was suggested that the tim e available for  a g r i ­
cultural operations might be lengthened by the construction  o f  better irr igation  
(2 1 0 )fa c i l it ie s .  But there was a negative side to these s ch em es . The r e ­
organization  o f  cropping patterns might extend the growing period  but yields
o f  late paddy w ere  higher than those of the ear ly  va rie t ies  and wheat enjoyed
( 2 1 1 )a higher e co n o m ic  value than bar ley .
A  different approach was to in crease  the w ork load by raising the rate
o f attendance o r  extending the amount o f  work done in a day. However, such
p oss ib ilit ies  w ere  lim ited . Even if  the num ber o f  days w orked per  unit o f
( 2 1 2 ) ,labour per  year  was re la tive ly  sm all,  the greatest e fforts  w ere  made
during the peak per iods  to m ob il ize  all available peasants, including w om en 
and those whose age precluded  them fro m  w ork at other t im es .  In other 
w ord s , the scope  fo r  increasing  agricultural participation  cam e in the non-
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peak months o f  the yea r  when its potential contribution to easing labour
shortages was the sm a llest .  As fo r  extending the working day, the fact that
it a lready lasted  14 hours during the peak sum m er p er iod  suggests that this
(213)too was unlikely to y ie ld  substantial benefits.
In view  o f  these obstac les  it was inevitable that delays should o c c u r  and
in som e cases  that agricultural operations should be ign ored  altogether. It
was admitted that during the peak sum m er p er iod , when the wheat harvest
was im m ediate ly  fo llow ed  by the transplanting o f  r i c e ,  preparation  o f  the
cotton fields was often delayed until the transplanting had been com pleted  -
despite the fact that this was p r e c is e ly  the tim e when weeds tended to f lour ish
(214)and weaken the growing c r o p s .  In 1956 wheat d e liver ies  to the granaries
w ere  delayed becuase  o f  the long time spent by  peasants in transplanting
r ice ;  the resu lt was that the grain in store  was in fected  by damp and 
(215)m ildew . In addition, the inability to com plete  transplanting on time
meant that r ice  yields too w ere  likely  to be adverse ly  affected.
We m ay conclude this d iscu ss ion  o f  labour conditions in Kiangsu by
attempting to quantify the extent to which the shortage o f  this fa c tor  m ay
have constrained agricu ltural operations in single cropping reg ions . Data
cited by  K. R. W alker show that the harvesting o f  r ic e  at the peak sum m er
(216)
period  requ ired  3 .03  labour days per  m ou and this can be used as a
p roxy  fo r  the m axim um  p re ssu re  upon labour under a single cropping system .
Converted  to m o re  fam iliar  term s the area se rv ice a b le  by a unit o f  labour
was 0 .33  m ou p er  day^ ^  and on the assumption that 15 days w ere  available
fo r  the com pletion  o f  the work, the m axim um  burden o f  arable land per unit
(218)
o f  labour was 4. 95 m ou. When this figure is com pared  with the data
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showing the actual burden o f  land per  head o f  the agricu ltural labour fo r c e  
(see  Table V. 56) it w ill  be seen that in only three Specia l D istr icts  - Yen- 
ch 'eng, H w ai-y in  and Hsfi-chou - w ere labour supplies insufficient to m eet 
this demand. H ow ever, the full iron y  o f  the situation is that it was in these 
v e r y  areas (e sp ec ia lly  Hsfi-Hwai) that single cropping was m ost  com m on ly  
p ractised  in Kiangsu. E lsew here  som e fo rm  o f double cropping was like ly  
to be found which m ade the 4 .9 5  m ou cr ite r ion  inapplicable. Our conclusion  
is that even in single cropping areas labour defic its  w ere  likely  to be a 
serious  prob lem .
(2) Draft an im als ;
In the absence o f  m echanization draft animals w ere  the ch ief sou rce  o f  
tractive  pow er in the agricultural se c to r .  During the 1950's virtually  all 
the arable land continued to be ploughed and harrow ed with im plem ents pulled 
by  animals (m ost ly  oxen o r  w ater-bu ffa loes) .  They w ere  also required  fo r  
other purp oses , such as turning the w ater-w heels  used fo r  irr igation  o r  for  
rural transport,  and together with pigs they represented  the m ost  important 
sou rce  o f  fe r t i l iz e r .
The shortage o f  draft animals in Kiangsu has been  noted at various
points in this th es is .  The m ost  dram atic  evidence o f  the serious  situation
was the sharp decline in animal numbers in 1956 and 1957. H ow ever, this
m e r e ly  underlined a prob lem  whose orig ins went back to the years  b e fore  
(219)1949. Data have also been presented to show that the s ca rc ity  of draft
pow er was a c r i t ic a l  constraint in the attempt to extend double cropping o f  
r ice  (and by  extension other fo rm s  o f  multiple cropping). By the end o f  
1957 it was c le a r  that there was an urgent need to im p rove  draft animal
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care  and in cre a se  their  num bers i f  agricultural growth was not to be 
further underm ined.
The f ir s t  table in this section  presents the available in form ation
relating to the draft animal population of Kiangsu in the 1950's. Estim ates
are also given o f  the p er  capita burden o f  arable land*.
Table V. 57; Draft animal num bers and the burden 
o f  arable land upon them; 1952, 1956 
and 1957.
1952
1956
1957
Total num ber 
o f  draft 
anim als
1 . 7 9 0 . 000
2 .0 8 0 .0 0 0
1 ,880 ,00 0
Arable  area Total num ber
per animal
(mou)
51.77
45. 16 
50. 00
of working 
draft animals
n. a.
1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  
1 ,4 0 2 ,9 8 5
Arable area 
per working 
animal
(mou)
n. a.
62. 63
67. 00
S o u r c e s ;
Total draft 1951 - T L C S , 1959, no. 6 , op. cit. , p. 247.
animals. 1 955  _ D erived  by subtracting the net defic it
o f  200, 000 in 1957 (see  above, ch. 4, 
p . 311), as given in HHJP, 2 7 /3 /5 7 ,  
op. c i t . , p. 1 , f r o m  the total no. o f  draft 
animals in 1957.
W o rking 
draft 
an im als ;
1957 - H TN YKH TP, 1958, no. 2, op. cit.
1956 - HHJP, 2 7 /3 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p . l .  A lso
H TN YKH TP, op. c i t .
1957 - Nung-ts 'ung kung-tso t'ung hsttn, 1957,
no. 8 , pp. 22 -23 , g ives the burden o f  
arable land per  head o f  draft animal as 
67 mou. This yields the working animal 
population shown above.
The 5% in cre a se  in animal numbers between 1952 and 1957 was
negligib le  when set against the arable area which they w ere  required  to
s e r v ic e .  The burden o f  arable land per head o f  working animals was in fact
(220 )the heaviest in the whole country. Given that the m axim um  burden was
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of 3, 100 ,000. In other w ord s , Kiangsu's animal population at the end o f  
the F F Y P  was m o re  than 30% below  what was needed - less  than half if  
working animals only w ere  considered .
Pred ictab ly , the supply situation varied  con s iderab ly  throughout the
p rov in ce .  Availab ility  was greatest (in term s o f  absolute num bers) in the
north and about half o f  all animals w ere  found in the two Special D istr icts
(2 22 )o f H w ai-y in  and H sii-chou . The m ost com m on  draft anim al in Kiangsu
(223) (224)was the " co m m o n  oxen ",  although w ater-bu ffa loes  7 tended to p r e ­
dominate in the south because  o f  their  pecu liar  adaptability to the wet and 
sticky  conditions of the paddy f ie ld s .  A much sm a lle r  num ber o f  donkeys, 
m ules and h o rse s  w ere  also used, particu larly  in the far  north. Although a 
detailed breakdown o f  animals into these ca tegor ies  cannot be m ade, the 
1952 plans o f  north and south Kiangsu provide an interesting re flect ion  o f  the 
different needs o f  each broad  region; in the north of the province  the planned
in cre a se  consisted  o f  55, 000 com m on  oxen, 5, 000 m ules and only 5, 000
( 2 2 5 }
w ater-bu ffa loes  (7 .69%  of the total). Out o f  a planned in crease  o f
20, 000 animals south o f  the Yangtze, 7, 000 w ere  to be w ater-bu ffa loes  (3 5%)
, , (22*>) and the rest  com m on  oxen.
The s ign ifican ce  o f  regiona l variations m anifested  its e lf  in the re la tion ­
ship betw een draft anim al supplies and arable land w hich they im plied .
A  p r io r i  the concentration  o f  animals in the north suggested a correspond ing ly  
heav ier  burden fo r  those in the rest  o f  the prov ince  - a pattern which is 
borne out by the following table;
about 30 mou, the minimum draft animal requirement was in excess
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Table V. 58: The relationship between draft animals
and arable land in 5 Specia l D istr icts  o f 
Kiangsu; 1956._____________________________
Soochow
Sung-chiang
Nan-t'ung
Yang-chou
Chinkiang
Average  arable 
area per  working 
draft animal
64 m ou
37
79
64
62
Total arable area T h ere fore ,  total
num ber o f  working 
draft animals
9, 590, 000 m ou
5 .120 .00 0
9 .2 1 0 .0 0 0
13,480 ,000
8 ,3 9 0 ,0 0 0
149,844 
138,378 
116,582 
210 ,625 
135,323
CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 220 and p. 207 
(227)
Source ; _______________  _____
With the single exception  o f  Sung-chiang the figures reveal a
gap between draft animal requirem ents and availability o f  v e ry  serious
p roportions . On average, each working animal in Soochow , Chinkiang,
Yang-chou and Nan-t'ung was responsib le  fo r  the ploughing and harrowing
of  67. 25 m ou o f  land, a burden that was h op e less ly  beyond their  capacity .
This f igure contrasts with one o f  34 m ou in H sd-H w ai at about the same 
(228)t im e .
That the lop -s ided  d istribution o f  draft animals im plied  an uneven 
anim al-land ratio throughout Kiangsu is obvious enough. What is less  
im m ediate ly  apparent is that it also posed an obstacle  to the im plem entation 
o f  the kind o f  m easu res  being proposed  towards the end o f  the F F Y P  period . 
In Hsti-Hwai the m o st  usual pattern o f  cultivation was either the planting of 
one crop  a year o r  three crops  e v e ry  two y e a rs .  M o re o v e r  as this tended 
to be a d ry  c ro p  reg ion  the cultivation requirem ents w ere  less  r igorous than 
where paddy was grown. Both sets o f  factors  tended to reduce the m arginal 
utility o f  draft anim als. Yet this was the v e ry  area w here they w ere m ost  
num erous. By contrast, further south not only was paddy the single m ost
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im portant crop  but double -cropp ing  was also extensively  p ractised  (and 
plans foresaw  its further expansion). The result was heavy demands upon 
draft animals and a correspond ing ly  higher m argina l utility o f  this factor .
In short, the particu lar  d istribution o f  animals in Kiangsu had a high 
opportunity cost  in the sense that a m o re  rational a llocation  could have 
lessened  the contradiction  which existed in m any areas between the ava ila ­
b ility  o f  this fa c tor  o f  production and the demands p laced  upon it.
D e fic ien c ies  o f  labour and draft animals provided  one strand o f  the 
argument in favour o f  m echanization  and it w ill be appropriate to conclude 
this d iscu ss ion  by considering  the role  o f  m echanized  agriculture in Kiangsu 
during the 1950 's.
The conclusions  suggested by  investigations into the role  o f  m ech a n i­
zation in various parts o f Kiangsu hardly  suggested an overw helm ing case 
in favour o f  it; " .  . . Our im p re ss io n  is that except in a few  individual cases
m echanized  cultivation does not lead to a decline in peasant in com es . But
(230)it is d ifficult to say how far it ra ises  them . . . ,,v H ow ever, the
cautionary tone o f  this rem ark  was m o re  a re flect ion  o f  the difficulties 
which arose  in the im plem entation o f  m echanization than o f  its in trinsic  
value. The so u rce  o f  m any o f  these d ifficu lties was the fact that m ech an i­
zation involved the introduction of a m odern  input into a predom inantly 
traditional agricultural se c to r .  The inexperience  o f  peasants in handling
m odern  m ach in ery  resu lted  in in fe r io r  cultivation; f o r  exam ple, they w ere
(231)unable to contro l the depth o f  ploughing o r  to break  up the so il  as
finely  as was requ ired . In such c ircu m stan ces  any benefits resulting fro m
the use o f  tra c tors  could eas ily  be offset by the extra  w ork  that was n e c e s sa r y
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afterwards in o rd e r  to rem ove  the d e fic ien c ies .
There is  also evidence that where m echanized  cultivation was 
experim enta lly  introduced active opposition fo llow ed  fro m  peasants who 
feared  that its adoption would rob them o f  w ork points and so reduce their 
in com e . The investigations ca rr ie d  out in the prov ince  agreed that m ech a n i­
zation would not be w e lcom ed  in areas where there was a large labour fo rce
(232)and few subsid iary  outlets, but in general it was argued that it would
re lease  labour fo r  m o re  rem unerative work. In any c a s e ,  the poss ib le  
loss  in w ork points had to be balanced against the p oss ib le  in crea se  in 
production.
M o re o v e r ,  on m o re  str ic t ly  econ om ic  grounds there was a strong case
in favour o f  the use o f  m achines as the following data indicate;
Table V. 59: The relative costs  of m echanized  cultivation
and ploughing with draft anim als, as shown 
by data fro m  W u-hsien , Soochow S. P . ;  1956.
Average  cost  per A verage  cost  per
m ou using draft m ou using m ach inery
 animals  ________________________
LABOUR (feeding and looking 
after animals and
ploughing the fie lds)  2 .8  ytian
ANIMAL FEED 1. 6
DEPRECIATION + OTHER 
EXPENSES 0 .3
Total 4 .7  ytian 3 .9  ytian
Source ; CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 206.
In other w ord s ,  i f  the above example w ere  representative  m ech a n i­
zation p rom ised  to cut costs  by  about 20%. Even bearing in mind the high 
initial outlay this was obv iously  a significant d ifferentia l. A  further 
im portant cons ideration  was that when they w ere  not being used m achines
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em ployed fo r  perhaps less  than 100 days in a year needed continual care
(233)and attention.
required a minimum of maintenance, whereas draft animals which were
The suggestion that m echanization should begin by  em bracing
stationary agricultural operations o r  rural subs id iary  w ork only, ^
while m eeting the ob jections o f  peasants who accused  tractors  o f  robbing
them of w ork  points, actually made little e con om ic  sense , s ince it could
do little to ease the d ifficu lties  caused by fa ctor  shortages . A fter  all, it
was the field  operations that w ere the source  o f  the m ost  acute prob lem s
and it was here  that m echanization 's  potential contribution was greatest.
N everth e less , it was fo r  such a static operation  (albeit an ex trem ely
im portant one, irr igation ) that m achines w ere  m ost  used in Kiangsu during
the F F Y P  p er iod . By the end o f  1956 over  7 ,000  water-pumps w ere irrigating
(235)alm ost 5, 000, 000 in the p rov in ce . Although this represented  little
m o re  than 5% o f  the total arable area the average figure belied  the im p o r ­
tance o f  m a ch in e -d r iv en  irr igation  in individual areas ; the m ost  outstanding
example was Soochow where 30% o f the arable area  was irr igated  by these 
(236)m odern  m eth od s .
M odest as these achievements appear, they w ere  quite substantial when
set against the developm ent o f  m echanized  ploughing. During the F irs t
Plan period  19 tra ctor -s ta t ion s  w ere set up with 440 tra ctors  serv ic ing
9 2 0 , 000 m ou; a further 882, 000 m ou cam e under the aegis o f  12 state
(237)m echanized  fa rm s .  As o f  1957 then 1 ,80 2 ,0 0 0  m ou w ere  cultivated
by m echanica l m eans. This was less  than 2% o f  K iangsu 's  total arable
area.
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The d ifficu lties  which had arisen  at an experim ental leve l  showed that
m echanization  provided  neither an easy  nor a rapid solution to the shortages
o f  labour and draft animals which existed in the agricultural se c to r .  Its
potential contribution to raising e f f ic ien cy  and productiv ity  m ay have been
considerab le  but it was c le a r  that there w ere m any p rob lem s to be o v e rco m e
(238)
b e fore  it could be introduced on a wide sca le .  In the m eantim e, fa ctor
shortages w ere  like ly  to rem ain  a serious  constraint upon agricultural 
growth based  on the extension of the sown area.
(3) Pigs
Consideration  o f  trends in pig production is im portant fo r  two reasons:
f irs t  because  during the 1950's pigs w ere one o f  the m o st  important sou rces
(239)of  peasant in co m e ; '  second, because  they w ere  a unique sou rce  o f  food
and natural f e r t i l iz e r .  Not su rpr is ing ly  did exhortations to ra ise  m o re  pigs 
becom e  in crea s in g ly  com m on  in the F F Y P  period .
Although com plete  data are not available, the following figures give
som e indication of the changes taking place during the 1950's;
Table V .6 0 ;  P ig num bers in Kiangsu between 
1949 and 1957._____________________
Total num ber Index with
of pigs  1952 = 100
1949 5, 000,000 83. 33
1952 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 100.00
1 95 4 5 ,3 7 0 ,0 0 0 89. 50
1 9 5 5 5 ,10 0 ,0 0 0 85. 00
1956 6 ,8 7 0 ,0 0 0 114.50
1957 9 ,8 9 0 ,0 0 0 164.83
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Sources;
1949 Sun Ching-chih, op. c i t , p. 68 states that a
pig population of m o r e  that 10 m illion  in 1957 
(but incl. Shanghai) was o v e r  100% higher than 
in 1949.
1952 T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. c i t . , p. 247. A lso
HHJP, 1 0 /1 /5 8 ,  op. cit.
1954 HHJP, 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 3 states that the
num ber o f  pigs in 1956 was 1, 500, 000 m o re  
than in 1954.
1955 HHJP, 2 5 /2 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "D irect ive  on the
D evelopm ent o f  Pig R ea rin g "  states that the 
pig population in 1956 was 3 5% above that of 
the previous year.
1956 HHJP, 7 /5 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .  A lso  HHJP,
2 5 /2 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
1957 T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. c i t . , p. 247.
The absence o f  in form ation  fo r  1953 m ay  not be accidental i f  data fo r
T 'a i -h s in g  hsien  (Y ang-chou  Special D istr ict)  are anything to go by. This
was an im portant p ig -b reed in g  region  and the data showed that pig num bers,
having c lim bed  steadily  between 1949 and 1952, showed a sharp decline o f
(240)n ear ly  29% in 1953. The p oor  showing was attributed to the im p le ­
mentation o f  the CPCS schem e which was said to have destroyed  the 
traditional com plem entarity  between agriculture and subsid iaries .^  ^  ^
Thus, in the past peasants had p r o ce s s e d  their c rop s  them selves  and been 
able to use le f t - o v e r  products (for  exam ple, wheat husks, vegetable skins,
etc. ) as feed  fo r  the p igs . As a result the animals had m ultiplied, earning
(242)cash  fo r  the peasants ' and providing rich  fe r t i l iz e r  fo r  their fie lds .
But state p ro ce ss in g  o f  raw grain  and oil seeds which accom panied  the
new acquisition p o l icy  destroyed  this c y c le ,  causing a shortage o f  feed  and
a contraction  in p ig -re a r in g .  Some fodder was supplied by the state but it
was only available in sm all quantities and at high p r ic e s .  In any ca se ,
because  o f  the lack  o f  human food the b a r ley  that was meant fo r  the pigs
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The sharp decline in pig num bers had serious  im plications for  peasant
living standards: in 1955 per capita incom e was 23 ytian less  than in the
1 9 3 0 ' s and 9. 1 ytian below  the 1951 leve l.   ^ ^  A c o r o l la r y  of this was a
shortage o f  investm ent funds. 40% o f  rural households in T 'a i-h s in g
lacked sufficient capital f o r  raising pigs and w ere  com pelled  to sell off their
animals b e fo re  they had been p ro p e r ly  fattened. Bank loans did little to
help the peasants: studies indicated that a household rearing two animals
(244)required  43 ytian, but only 10 ytian was available fo r  each pig. P o l ic y
changes w ere  urgently  needed to halt the downward trend. State feed  supplies 
should be in crea sed , the use o f  substitute feed encouraged  and the purchase 
p r ice  o f  pigs and fe r t i l iz e r  ra ised  to a m o re  rational leve l .
It seem s like ly  that the relevance o f  the T 'a i-hsing  experience  went 
far beyond the confines o f  this one hsien and the fact  that total pig numbers 
declined  between 1952-55 suggests that s im ila r  fo r c e s  w ere at work through­
out the p rov in ce .  H ow ever, in 1956 an in crease  in purchase p r ice s  and 
feed  supplies brought about a noticeable im provem ent. So rapidly did pig 
num bers in cre a se  during this year that at the beginning o f  1957 planners
w ere  able to contem plate a target o f  8 ,600 , 000 - 10, 000, 000 animals by
(245)the end o f  that yea r .  Despite reports  o f  continuing p rob lem s o f  feed
s ca rc ity  the upward trend was maintained. A further 10% rise  in the p u r ­
chase p r ice  o f  pigs and a reduction in taxes (m easures  which w ere expected 
to ra ise  in com e by m o re  than 30, 000, 000 yiian)^  ^ doubtless contributed 
to the v e r y  rapid expansion in p ig -breed ing  which was said to have taken 
place in the f ir s t  half o f  1 9 5 7 .^ ^ ^  So rapid was the r e c o v e r y  o f  the last
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was sometimes consumed by the peasants them selves.
two years o f  the F F Y P  that in spite o f  the shortfalls  in e a r l ie r  years the 
s im ple average rate o f  growth in pig num bers during the Plan was still 
12.97%  p. a.^248)
Within the agricultural se c to r  the m ost  important e con om ic  ro le  o f
(249)the pig was as a supplier o f  f e r t i l iz e r .  and som e illustrations o f  this
will usefu lly  conclude our d iscu ss ion . The f irs t  is  taken fro m  T 'a i-h s in g  
hsien;
Table V .6 1 :  The effect  o f in creased  supplies o f  pig
m anure, as shown by the experience  of 
2 APCs in T fai-hsing hsien: 1956.______
Liu Ch 'iao APC Ta Kung APC
A re a  fe rt i l ized  p er  pig 1. 6 m ou 3. 06 m ou
A verage  y ields:
wheat 253 ch in /m ou  136 ch in /m ou
b a r le y  263 142
naked b a r ley  251 181
Source : JM JP, 2 2 /1 0 /5 6 ,  op. cit.
In this case  there was a d irect  co rre la tion  between the rate o f
fe r t i l iz e r  application (and so the num ber o f  p igs) and the leve l o f  yields
attained.
The exper ience  o f  a co l le c t iv e  in C h 'in g -p 'u  hsien provided a c o n ­
vincing dem onstration  o f  the im pact o f  an expansion in p ig -breed ing  upon
(250)agricultural production  v ia  in creased  supplies o f  o rgan ic  fe r t i l iz e r .
The APC or ig in a lly  contained 30 m ou o f  in fertile  land, yielding only 80 
chin o f  raw wheat and 300 chin o f  unhusked r ice  per  m ou. H owever, 
between 1954-56 the application o f  m o re  fe r t i l iz e r  perm itted  by a rapid 
in crea se  in pig num bers had transform ed  the situation:
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Table V. 62; The relationship between p ig -breed ing  
and agricultural production; the case 
o f  C hin-lien  A P C , C h 'in g -p 'u  hsien; 
1954-56.
Total 
num ber 
o f  pigs 
bred
Amount of 
manure 
produced
Rate of
fe r t i l iz e r
application
A verage  
yields of 
r ice
Ave rage 
yields o f  
wheat
( chin) (ch in / mou) (ch in / mou) (ch in / mou)
1954 1,980 1 ,400 , 000 500 500 100
1955 3 ,964 2 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0 1,050 540 110
1956 6, 856 5 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 2, 050 540 190
Source; HHJP, 1 3 /1 /5 7 , op. cit. , p. 2.
In other w ord s , the m o re  than threefold  r ise  in pig num bers had 
enabled average yields of r ice  to in crease  by 8% and wheat by 37. 5% within 
two y e a rs .  In addition, the sca le  o f  p ig -breed ing  perm itted  the co llect ive  
to se ll  452 animals to the state thereby raising m e m b e r s '  incom e (as well 
as contributing to grea ter  m eat supplies in the urban se cto r ) .
Ch in -lien  APC e x p re s s ly  used 100 m ou o f  its arable land fo r  growing 
feed crops  fo r  the pigs and this inevitably raised  the question; could this 
land not have been m o re  profitab ly  em ployed in the production o f  grain for  
human consum ption? The answer provided further p ro o f  of the e con om ic  
benefits o f  p ig -re a r in g .  The 100 m ou would produce 50, 000 chin of r ice  and 
wheat. H ow ever, it could also produce enough feed  to rear  800 pigs and in 
turn the m anure f r o m  these pigs would yield an extra  67, 000 chin o f  food  
gra ins. Thus, the d ec is ion  to divert l00 m ou o f  land to p ig -breed ing
purposes actually resulted in a net gain o f  17, 000 chin o f  grain fo r  c o n ­
sumption by  the peasants.
-4 5 3 -
IV Som e Concluding R em ark s ;
In this chapter som e o f  the m ore  important quantitative indicators  of 
agricultural developm ent in Kiangsu have been presented  and analyzed.
The picture that em erges  is not a happy one. Between 1949 and 1952 rapid 
in cre a se s  in output did take p lace ; but they did not represent net growth so 
m uch as r e c o v e r y  fro m  the d ep ressed  levels  o f  e co n o m ic  activity caused 
by  m o re  than ten years  o f  war. A  m ore  rea lis t ic  assessm en t  should c o n ­
s ider  the p er form an ce  o f  the F F Y P  period  and in these term s  there can be 
no doubt that the achievem ents o f  the agricultural s e c to r  in Kiangsu w ere 
less  than im p re ss iv e .
The ro le  o f  agricu lture  in econ om ic  developm ent was c ru c ia l, fo r  it
had to supply food  and raw m ateria ls  to the c ities  as w ell as maintain (and
in cre a se ) leve ls  o f  consum ption and produ ctiv ity  within its own s e cto r . Yet
during the F irs t  Plan p eriod  the output o f food  grains did little  m ore  than
keep pace with population growth and in som e individual instances the rate
(252)
of  growth was actually negative. At the end o f  the Plan production
targets fo r  both grain  and cotton rem ained unfulfilled. In addition, the 
production o f  all crops  was susceptib le  to wide annual fluctuations during 
the 1950 's . The m ost  striking example was that o f  cotton. M an-m ade 
factors  w ere  only  partia lly  responsib le  but the fact that the instability also 
re flected  natural conditions was little com fort  s ince  it dem onstrated  the 
p reca r iou sn ess  o f  planning where such fo r c e s  could still not be controlled .
The quantitative in d ica tors  also underlined the va lid ity  o f the econ om ic
d ichotom y betw een north and south Kiangsu which has been  p roposed  at
variou s points in this th es is . Y ields in the south w ere  con sisten tly  shown
to be h igher than those in the north and the d ifferentia l was re flected  by the
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standard of living in each region . Nor w ere the gaps significantly reduced 
during the F F Y P  period .
The technolog ica l fram ew ork  o f  agriculture in Kiangsu rem ained m o re  
o r  less  unchanged during the 1950 's. The nature o f  e co n o m ic  p r ior it ies  
precluded  agricultural m echanization on a large  sca le  and lim ited  the 
availability o f  m od ern  inputs to the agricultural s e c to r .  As a result 
agricultural developm ent was dependent on institutional change and the 
im provem ent o f  traditional techniques o f  production.
There is som e evidence that institutional r e fo rm  did benefit a g r i ­
cultural production  and in 1956 in particu lar the organizational capacity  o f  
the co l le c t iv e s  contributed significantly to averting the w orst  e ffects  o f  
the natural d isa s te rs .  H owever, there is also ample evidence o f  the d i s ­
ruptive effects  o f the co -o p e ra t iv e s  and co lle c t iv es  and on balance it was 
probably  these effects  which had the greater  im pact. The situation was 
aggravated by  p e r iod ic  c r is e s  associated  with state acquisition and pricing 
p o l i c i e s .
But even i f  the two "h igh -t id es"  had not taken p lace , would the p e r f o r ­
m ance o f  the agricultural s e c to r  have been s ignificantly  d ifferent?  The 
answer is that it p robably  would not. A num ber o f  w riters  have argued
that during the 1950's the scope  fo r  raising agricultural productiv ity  on
(253)the basis  of the traditional technology was reaching its l im it  in China.
That positive  rates o f  growth could be achieved in Kiangsu shows that this 
was not so in any absolute sense . R e-organ ization  o f  cropping patterns, 
the substitution o f  h igh- fo r  low -y ie ld ing  c r o p s ,  higher fe r t i l iz e r  appli­
cations, m o re  carefu l and intensive cultivation - all these factors  could
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still yield in cre a se s  in productiv ity . H ow ever, the question was not 
s im ply  whether the traditional technology could generate som e growth, but 
whether it could support sustained growth at a leve l  com m ensurate  with the 
demands of overa l l  e con om ic  developm ent. And in these term s there was 
som e doubt about the v iability  o f  a developm ental p o licy  based on traditional 
methods and indigenous investm ent by the agricultural s e c to r .
A c o r o l la r y  o f  agricu lture 's  p oor  p er form an ce  in Kiangsu was the slow 
im provem ent in living standards. In an analysis o f  changes in consum ption 
standards we w ere able to show that between 1953-55 there was an in crease  
in per  capita food  consum ption (rura l population) o f  something in excess  of 
10%, but that therea fter  levels  o f  consum ption rem ained the same o r  even 
declined slightly. Even m o re  serious than the stagnation which this im plied  
was the enorm ous gap which existed between the rich  and poor  areas o f  the 
province  (e sp e c ia l ly  T 'a i  Hu and Hsti-Hwai). Just as at the time of land 
re fo rm  considerations  of e con om ic  e f f ic ien cy  had prevented an egalitarian 
distribution o f  re -a l lo ca te d  land so s im ila r  considerations  ensured a 
continuing d isparity  between standards o f  living, at least in term s o f  food  
consum ption, within Kiangsu. Unless rapid growth was forthcom ing in 
areas such as H sli-chou and H wai-yin this further m anifestation o f  the 
d ichotom y between the north and the south would m e r e ly  be perpetuated.
An aspect o f  agricultural developm ent which throws m o re  light on 
changes in living standards are the trends in peasant incom es  observab le  
in the 1950 's . Unfortunately, only fragm entary in form ation  is available 
but this will be sufficient to indicate levels  o f  rural in com e and regional 
d ifferentia ls  in the final years  o f  the F F Y P . F ir s t ,  Table V .6 3  shows
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average per  capita incom e in the whole province  during 1955-57;
Table V .6 3 ;  L evels  o f  rural incom e in Kiangsu 
during 1955-57.______________________
A verage incom e per 
head, rural population.
1955 68. 50 ytlan
1956 49 .80
1957 67 .00
Sources
1955;
1956;
1957;
Nung-ts 'un kung-tso t 'ung-hsdn, 1957, no. 4, 
"An Analysis o f Peasant Incom es and Advances 
in Living Standards in China” , p. 4 states that 
average rural incom e in 56, 000 households o f  
Kiangsu was 454 ytlan p er  h .h .  F ro m  data in 
the Population Appendix, we know that the 
average s ize  o f  h .h .  (ru ra l)  in Kiangsu in 1955 
was 4 .376  persons and average per  capita 
in com es  m ust th ere fore  have been 103.75 ytlan. 
H ow ever, f rom  N ung-ts 'un  kung-tso t 'ung-hstln , 
op. c i t . , we also know that this figure is r e p r e ­
sentative o f  Kiangnan only and th ere fo re ,  on 
the basis  o f  in com e differentia ls  in Soochow, 
Chinkiang and Sung-chiang S. D. s and the whole 
o f  Kiangsu (see below ) we have derived  the 
figure shown in the table, ic & 1 1 U W U i i l i i c i d u i e .
Nung-ts 'un kung-tso t 'ung-hstln , 1957, 
op. c i t . , p. 4.
HTNYKHTP, 1958, no. 2, op. cit.
no. 4,
These figu res need little  com m ent, fo r  the pattern which they revea l
is v e r y  m uch what our e a r l ie r  analysis o f  food consum ption standards would 
suggest. In the wake o f  the natural d isasters  and i l l - e f fe c ts  o f  co llect iv iza t ion  
rural in com e fe l l  by  m o r e  than 27% between 1955 and 1956, though there was 
an alm ost com plete  r e c o v e r y  in the following year. Although data fo r  the 
e a r l ie r  years  are not available it seem s safe to assum e that the incom e 
leve ls  o f 1955 and 1957 w ere  the highest attained during the F F Y P  period .
A fascinating sou rce  o f  in form ation  on changes in incom es  was a report
o f  the investigation ca rr ie d  out by F e i  H siao-t 'ung  into rural conditions
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in the Kiangnan village o f  K 'a i-hs ien -kun g . This was the v e ry  v illage
(255)which had been the subject o f  a study by Fei in the 1930's and the
ob ject  o f  his return v is it  in 1956 was to a ssess  the changes that had taken
place in the intervening years  - particu larly  o f  co u rse  since 1949. But
his findings w ere  not calculated to please the authorities in Kiangsu, for
they suggested that peasant incom es in 1956 w ere  on ly  5% higher than they
had been in 1936 and led F ei to conclude that . . no great advances have
.. (256)been made in Chinese peasant in c o m e s" .
Against this background it is hardly surpris ing  that F e i was vehem ently
attacked fo r  his supposedly "r igh tis t"  tendencies and accused  o f  having
d eliberate ly  fa ls if ied  his m ateria l.  It was pointed out that 1936 was the
year in which in com es  had been highest b e fore  1949 w hereas 1956 was a
p articu lar ly  poor  y e a r .  M oreover, his data w ere  in c o r r e c t  and it was
cla im ed that rev ised  calculations would show that average rural incom es
in Kiangsu w ere  22% above the 1936 leve l .  In any ca se ,  F ei had m ade no
attempt to show changes in the distribution o f  in com e between c la s s e s .  Had
he done so , he would have d is co v e re d  that the "labouring peasants" had
m ade substantial gains in the 1950's and vastly  im p roved  their relative 
(257)position.
Although F e i 's  long standing as a s o c io -e c o n o m ic  analyst and knowledge 
o f  conditions in south Kiangsu obv iously  gave his investigation an unusual 
degree  o f  authority, we should be carefu l in extrapolating fro m  his c o n ­
c lus ion s . By his own argument the principal reason  why incom es had not 
rapidly in crea sed  was the decline in the silk industry, which had played a 
p articu lar ly  im portant role  in K 'a i-h s ien -k u n g 's  v illage  econom y. As such,
(254)
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the situation Fei was examining may well have been untypical. Moreover,
his c r i t i c s ’ argument that a c la ss  analysis of in com e distribution would 
reveal significant im provem ents  fo r  the poor  peasants was probably  a valid 
one. A ll  in all, while F e i 's  findings provided a salutary antidote to all 
the c la im s being made on behalf o f  the c o l le c t iv e s ,  their  im portance  lay 
v e r y  much in the context o f  the area they w ere  concern ed  with.
There w ere  also o f  cou rse  regional variations in in com es;
"B ecau se  o f  d ifferen ces  in natural conditions, the sort  o f  
crop s  grow n and differing standards o f  m anagem ent and le a d e r ­
ship, peasant incom es  va ry  between reg ions . Indeed because 
o f  the availability and strength of labour they m ay d iffer  even 
within a single co l le c t iv e .  Where conditions are good per 
capita annual rural incom e m a y b e  as high as 100-200 ytian.
But w here they are p oor ,  in com es m ay be as low  as 20 yilan - 
and in t im es of severe  natural d isasters  they m ay  disappear 
altogether. "  (258)
Although this statement was made in the context o f  China as a whole,
it applied p e r fe c t ly  well in Kiangsu. The re lative ly  h igh ly -developed  rural
econ om y o f the Yangtze Delta region  made it a h ig h -in com e region  while
the relative backwardness o f  the north tended to d ep ress  incom e le v e ls .
In 1955 fo r  exam ple average per capita incom e north o f  the Yangtze ranged
fro m  a low o f  30 ytian per year to a high o f  80 ytian. Yet in the south the
correspond ing  figures w ere  95 ytian in Chinkiang Specia l D istr ict ,  105 in
(259)Soochow and 115 ytian in Sung-chiang. In 1956, although there was a
general dec line , the geographica l spread rem ained v e r y  apparent;
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Table V. 64; Regional incom e differentia ls  
in Kiangsu in 1956.____________
P e r  capita net Index with
rural incom e Kiangsu average
incom e = 100
Kiangsu 49. 80 yd an 100.00
Sung-chiang 78. 30 157.23
Soochow 77. 62 155. 86
Chinkiang 70. 30 141.16
Y ang-chou 44. 30 88. 96
Nan-t'ung 42. 20 84. 74
Y en -ch 'en g 39. 62 79. 56
Hsti-chou 35.42 71. 12
H wai-yin 28. 22 56. 67
City suburbs 70 .42 141.41
Source : Nung-ts 'ung kung-tso t'ung hsttn, 1957,
no. 4, op. c i t . , p. 4.
The true s ign ificance  o f  the e con om ic  d ichotom y between north and
south Kiangsu e m erges  v e r y  fo r c ib ly  from  these f igu res .  Between Sung-
chiang (the r ichest  Special D istr ict )  and H wai-yin  (the p oorest )  there was
an in com e gap o f  177.46%, m o re  than twice as large  as that observed  e a r l ie r
(260 )fo r  food  consum ption. Even when the co m p a rison  is broadened, there
is still a huge d ifferen ce  o f  136.99% between in com es  in Hsii-Hwai and the 
three Special D istr icts  o f Kiangnan. M o re o v e r ,  because  of the high levels  
attained in these three areas incom e in eve ry  one o f  the remaining five 
D istr icts  was below  the provincia l average. It could be argued that the 
incidence  o f  the 1956 natural d isasters  had the e ffect  o f  exaggerating the 
north -south  d ichotom y, but this does not appear to be the case ,  fo r  in 1957 
average rural in com e in Sung-chiang was still 179.25%  higher than in 
Hwai-yin .
Notes to Chapter Five
(1) Chao Kang, op. c i t . , pp. 202-03.
(2) H HJP, 1 9 /1 2 /5 7 ,  gives the arable area o f  H stl-chou S. D. (1957) 
as 1 5, 770, 000 m ou.
(3) HHJP, 1 0 /1 /5 8 ,  "A  Review o f  A gricu ltura l Production  in Kiangsu and 
Future P r o s p e c t s ” .
(4) Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  Shui-hsiang Chiang-su (W atery  K iangsu), Shanghai,
New Knowledge Publishing H ouse, 1956: p. 68.
(5) "R e c la im e d "  land here  includes that re co v e re d  through the destruction  
o f  boundaries , g rav es ,  etc. (e sp ec ia lly  during the two "high tides ").
(6) Chao Kang, op. cit. , esp. pp. 280-295 (Appendix, Tables 1-9).
(7) Notably, the p ro je c t  f o r  controlling the Hwai R iv er  which d irect ly  
affected the rural s e c to r  in the northern half o f  Kiangsu.
(8) R eclam ation  ca rr ie d  out by  bodies other than state farm s is reckoned
to have been insignificant (with the important exception  o f  Heilungchiang). 
See Chao Kang, op. c i t . , pp. 204-05.
(9) Ib id . , p. 282, Appendix Table 2. His figures are as fo llow s:
A re a  o f  rec la im ed  land
1949 0
1950 11,000
1951 2 9 , 0 0 0
1952 106,000
1953 50,000
1954 51,000
1955 1 1 1 ,000
1956 212 ,000
1957 193,000
(10) I b id . , p . 283.
(11) Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  op. c i t . , p. 68
(12) Chao Kang, op. c i t . , p. 206. The 3 .6 :1 0 0 .0  ratio is the average given
in C h ing-ch i yen chiu (E con om ic  R esearch ),  1965, no. 3.
(13) T L C S , 1959, no. 6, "The Role of Kiangsu A gricu ltu re  in the D ev e lop ­
ment o f  the Great L ea p" ,  p. 245.
(14) In fa irness  to Chao, s ince  his con cern  is with agriculture at the 
national leve l  the average ratio is acceptable as long as any prov incia l 
b iases  can ce l  each other out.
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Sun Ching-chih , op. c i t . , pp. 53a-54. Sun provides  a good sum m ary 
o f  the construction  w ork ca rr ie d  out in Kiangsu in the ear ly  1950 's.
HHJP, 1 0 /7 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
C .C .  Chang, An Estim ate o f  China's F arm s and C r o p s , Nanking,
1932. P erk ins , op. c i t . , p. 236, follows Liu and Yeh and adopts a 
round figure o f  9 2 , 000, 000 m ou.
CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 126. Note also that a v e r y  s im ila r  f igure 
(94, 347, 830 m ou) can be derived  from  in form ation  given in HHJP, 
3 1 /8 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "D irect ive  on Improving Autumn-Sowing W ork".
F o r  an indication o f  the sca le  o f  construction  activity  in Kiangsu in 
1956, see  above chapter four.
H HJP, 3 1 /8 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .  The exact figure is 93, 972, 600 mou.
It is true that HHJP, 1 /1 /5 8 ,  op. c i t . , c la im ed  that the arable area 
in Kiangsu had been extended by 2, 700, 000 m ou in the F irs t  Plan 
period  and on the basis  o f  the data shown in Table V. 3 this would give 
a 1957 estim ate o f  9 5 ,3 7 2 ,0 0 0  m ou. H ow ever, there are two reasons 
fo r  re jecting  this: f irs t ,  i f  an in crease  o f  1. 5% in arable area had been
achieved in 1956-57 it would have im plied  that substantial reclam ation  
had taken p lace  during 1957 - but there is no evidence to suggest that 
this did in fact o c c u r .  Second, there is no way o f  knowing what 1952 
base figure was being used in the HHJP, 1 /1 /5 8  report; it is quite
poss ib le  that it was d ifferent from  that shown in V. 3.
In other w ord s ,  MCI = s. a. x  100/ a. a.
A  MCI in ex ce ss  o f  200 would show that treb le  cropping existed.
The 1952-53 average data are as follows;
arable area 9 3 ,3 0 7 ,8 4 2  mou
MCI 162 .5
sown area 151 ,625 ,243  m ou
Note too that the com p a rison  o f  1952/53 and 1957 gives an indication of 
the F F Y P  p e r fo rm a n ce ,  since the 1952/53 average MCI probably 
represents  the p r e -w a r  extent o f  double cropping in the p rov in ce . This 
is borne out by  C .C .  Chang's data which suggest a prov incia l MCI 
o f  163. 64 in the e a r ly  1930 's.
Actually  ce ter is  paribus assumptions are not s tr ic t ly  n e ce ssa ry ;  the 
result is the sam e as long as the in crease  in output resulting fro m  the 
growing o f  the second crop  is not o ffset  by  a decline  in the yield o f  
the f irs t .
N otice the d istinction between arable area and sown area y ields; given 
an arable area of 100 m ou, a MCI o f  140 and average yields o f  300 
chin per m ou ( f ir s t  crop )  and 150 chin (second  crop ) ,  the average yield
per  unit o f arable area is 360 chin, but the average sown area  yield is 
only 257. 14 chin. The d istinction is c le a r ly  c ru c ia l ly  important in 
any assessm en t  o f  agricultural p er form an ce ,  although Chinese sou rces  
do not always make it c le a r  which concept is being used.
Sun C hing-chih , op. c i t . , p. 91. See also above, ch. 1, note (68).
Actually  the MCI o f  196. 4 m ay  overstate  the amount of double cropping 
in Nan-t 'ung. F o r  exam ple, f rom  other data in CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , 
pp. 233 -4 , a figure  o f  187. 08 can be derived  fo r  1956. And T L H P , vo l.  
24, n o . l ,  F e b . ,  1956, cites a figure o f  approxim ately  190.
Although data are not available, there can be no doubt that double 
cropping was least com m on  in H wai-yin and H sd -ch ou  Special D is tr ic ts .
HHJP, 2 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "Conditions in the High-Output A reas  Favour a 
Great Leap F o rw a rd " .
HHJP, 2 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
Until 1956 food  grains w ere defined to include r ic e ,  wheat, tubers, 
co a rse  grains and soyabeans. A new definition adopted in that year 
excluded soyabeans fro m  the c lass if ica tion . Throughout this chapter, 
unless otherw ise  stated grains will be taken to include soya.
Some would ob ject  that it is unlikely fo r  average yields to have rem ained 
constant o ver  this p er iod . H ow ever, without accurate quantitative 
indicators  it is im p oss ib le  to know how far (if  at all) y ields changed. 
M o re o v e r ,  as we shall see la ter ,  average wheat y ie lds w ere  at their 
1951 leve l  in 1957. In any case ,  any in crea se  in yields o f  tubers and 
co a rse  grains would have been relatively  sm all and certa in ly  not o f 
sufficient magnitude to alter the following argument.
13 ,404 ,6 40  m ou minus the 11 ,312 ,8 55  allocated to grains leaves 
2, 091 ,785 m ou. But this does not represent the area available to 
e con om ic  c rop s  s ince  som e land would have been  used fo r  growing 
vegetab les , green  fe r t i l iz e rs  and other n o n -e co n o m ic  c ro p s .
To what extent food  grain production in 1952 was back at p re -w a r  
leve ls  it is d ifficult to say because  o f  p rob lem s associated  with p r e -  
1949 data. H ow ever, this aspect is con s idered  at grea ter  length in 
the final chapter.
See S P J P , 2 0 /2 /5 1 ,  op. cit. , p. 2. The exceptions w ere  H wai-yin  and 
parts o f  Y en -ch 'en g  Special D is tr ic ts ,  where flooding led to production 
d ec lin es .  (R em em b er  that at this time north Kiangsu did not include 
Hstt-chou. )
Chao Kang, op. cit. , p. 304, Appendix Table 14.
1952 is also the b a s e -y e a r  fo r  m easuring the p er form an ce  o f  a g r i ­
culture during the F F Y P  (1953-57).
Absolute change over  Percentage  change
previous year o v e r  previous year
Annual changes in total grain output during 1952-57 were as follows:
1953 + 1, 700 m ill ,  chin + 7 .83
1 95 4 400 - 1.71
1 9 5 5 + 2 ,740 + 11.91
1956 - 1,740 - 6 .76
1957 + 1,160 - 4. 83
(Source: Table V. 11)
HHJP, 9 /6 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "M ore  Than Nine M illion  A ffected  Peasants 
in Kiangsu O vercom e  Natural D isa s te rs " .
B roadcast  record in g ,  3 0 /1 2 /5 5 .
HHJP, 1 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t .
H HJP, 2 2 /1 /5 6 ,  "C r it ic iz e  R ightist-C onservative  Thought and Raise 
the Increased-O utput T a rg e ts " .
HHJP, 9 /6 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
HHJP, 1 2 /9 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "The P o l ic y  o f  Central Purchase  and Central 
Supply o f  Food  Grains is V e r y  Fine I "
HHJP, 2 1 /1 /5 6 ,  "Soochow  Special D istr ict  Will B ecom e  Even R ich e r " .
I have to admit that the generalizations in this paragraph are far  fro m  
sa t is fa ctory ,  but until a great deal m o re  in form ation  be co m e s  ava il­
able which might perm it a separation o f  the e ffects  o f  natural and m an- 
m ade factors  on the p er form an ce  o f  agriculture  there seem s little 
point in trying to extend what has a lready been  said in e a r l ie r  chapters 
about the relationship between institutional change and agricultural 
productiv ity .
It is interesting that T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. cit. , pp. 244-247, takes 
1951 as its base year and so achieves a higher rate o f  growth (alm ost 
4% p. a. during 1951-57).
C h fang-chou kung-jen  p a o , 1 3 /1 2 /5 5 ,  "G ro ss  Output of Food Grains 
and Cotton A re  Higher than the 1957 T a rg e t" .  The artic le  cited a 
grain  production  o f  25 ,740  m illion  chin fo r  1955 and pointed out that 
this was 220 m ill ion  chin higher than the 1957 planned output.
HHJP, 9 /1 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p . l .
It might be thought too that at this stage the planners w ere  unaware o f  
the extent of the falls  in production in 1956. H ow ever, HHJP, 2 2 /1 /5 7 ,  
op. c i t . , p. 2, s p e c i f ica l ly  states that the 1956 grain  targets w ere  not 
m et. The same artic le  makes c lea r  the u rgen cy  of the current situation 
and the anxiety of the planners to achieve a good harvest in 1957.
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JM JP , 2 9 /1 /5 7 ,  "This  Year Kiangsu's A gricu ltu ra l and Subsidiary- 
G ross  Value Output Must Increase  by Nineteen P e r  Cent O ver Last 
Y e a r " .
HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 7 ,  "The Situation Regarding the Anticipated Fulfilm ent 
o f  This Y e a r 's  Plan and the P re -F u lf i lm en t  o f  the F ive Year Plan in 
All S ectors  o f  the National E conom y and Education in Kiangsu".
JMJP, 1 0 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "Do We Want to Make a L e a p ?  A re  We Able to 
Make a L ea p ?  Do We Dare to Make a L e a p ? "
Between 1949-52 the average growth o f  per  capita grain production 
was 18. 23% p. a.
HHJP, 1 2 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
That is 8 ,700  minus 1,310 m illion  chin.
Idea lly  the acqu isition  o f  the agricu ltural surplus should m eet the 
food  dem ands o f  the rural and urban s e c to r s ; p rov id e  raw m ateria ls  
fo r  em ergent in d u stries ; and furnish exp orts .
The instability  between state purchases and state supplies was 
em phasized  in HHJP, 1 2 /1 /  58, op. cit.
See above, chapter two, Table II. 11.
This would certa in ly  not be a unanimous cho ice ; fo r  exam ple , in his 
recent book O. L . Dawson continues to use a figure  o f  2, 100 ca lo r ies  
as a daily  m inim um  requirem ent. (Dawson, op. c i t . , p. 187, Table 12. )
"S ignificant" because  o f  their  fat and protein  content which helped to 
balance what otherw ise  would have been a s e r io u s ly  deficient diet.
T .H .  Shen, A gricu ltura l R esou rces  o f  China, Ithaca, New York; 
C ornell  U niversity  P r e s s ,  1951, p. 166.
Shen, op. c i t . , pp. 378-379, Appendix Table 4, shows the num ber o f  
ca lo r ie s  p er  k ilogram  to be m uch the sam e fo r  both cerea ls  and 
v e g e ta b le s .
If p er  capita grain  output in Kiangsu (1957) is 100 the index fo r  the 
other prov inces  is ;
See P erk ins , op. cit. , p. 302, Table F .2 .
R em em b er  that we are only dealing with the ca lo r ie  content o f  the 
Kiangsu rural diet, not its nutritional content. The distinction is 
im portant fo r  as Shen (op. c i t . , p. 165) points out, "the purposes of
Chekiang
Hupeh
Kwangsi
139.82 
157.52 
123.01
food  production is to m eet the nutritional needs o f  the population.
To sa tis fy  hunger is not enough . . . "
(66) See K. R. W alker in The China Q u arterly , op. cit. , pp. 26-28 .
(67) The sam e author in Planning in Chinese A gricu ltu re , op. cit. , p. 32.
(68) The average arable area per head in Kiangsu was around 2 .4  - 2. 5 
m ou. T h e re fo re ,  i f  the m axim um  5% cr ite r io n  fo r  private plots 
w ere  being en forced  in the province the average s ize  o f  plot would 
have been about 0. 12 m ou. This is in fact v e r y  c lo se  to the m odal 
figure o f  84. 5 m etres  per household. But K. R. W alker has shown 
that the actual c r ite r io n  operating in the final years o f  the F irs t  Plan 
was le s s  than 5% and so it is reasonable to suppose that the average 
s ize  o f  plot in Kiangsu was less  than the m odal f igure . Indeed it m ay 
be that the assumption made in the text o v e r -e s t im a te s  the im portance 
o f  the private p lo ts '  contribution to food consum ption in the p rov in ce .
(69) HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
(70) Ibid.
(71) The reasons fo r  thinking this are*, f irs t ,  the data do not tally with the 
state acquisition figures given e a r lie r ;  second , the authorities would 
naturally wish to show consumption levels  to be as high as poss ib le  
and expressing  data in term s of raw grain  would be one way o f  doing 
th is .
(72) Or had at their  d isposa l fo r  consumption.
(73) An indication o f  the situation in e a r l ie r  years is given by T i - l i  hstfeh 
p ao , vo l.  25, no. 2, A p r il ,  1959 which states that in 1949 average per 
capita availability o f food  grains in H w ai-yin  Special D istr ict  was 
about 180 chin!
(74) The qualification relating to the d ifferent c a lo r i f ic  requirem ents 
within the rural population should of co u rse  be borne in mind.
(75) HHJP, 2 0 /4 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Nan-t 'ung Special D istr ict  Adjusts the Sown 
A reas  o f  Cotton and Food  G ra ins" .  See also below .
(76) HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
(77) See, fo r  exam ple , the following data f r o m  Che-chiang jih -p ao ,
6 /4 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . :
-4 6 6 -
Grain
Meat
Fish
Eggs
Vegetable oil
Vegetables
Soya
P e r  capita 
consumption 
of industrial 
w orkers
( i )
486 chin
11 .5  chin 
2 2 .4  chin 
37 .8  eggs
6 .3  chin
160.3 chin
3 .3  chin
P er  capita 
consum ption 
o f  peasants
( 2 )
501 chin 
5. 4 chin
15.3 chin
15.3 eggs 
3 . 2 chin
182.0 chin 
2 .0  chin
(2) as a 
percentage 
of (1)
103. 1
46. 9
68 .3  
40. 5 
49. 2 
113. 5 
60 . 6
K uang-hsi j ih -p a o , 1 0 /1 1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2 shows industrial staff 
and w ork ers  rece iv ing  about 5% m o re  vegetables  than peasants.
Since som e o f  the issues  impinging on these questions are m o re  
e a s ily  con s idered  in the context o f  individual c r o p s ,  their d iscu ss ion  
will be postponed until la ter  in the chapter. The aim here will s im ply  
be to give a b r ie f  overv iew  o f  the situation.
See above, chapter one, pp. 40-47 .
Sun Ching-chih, op. c i t . , p. 115.
JM JP, 4 /2 /5 8 .  And HHJP, 2 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
SPJP, 20 / 2 /5 1 ,  op. cit. , p. 2 gives the following planned yields o f  
g ra in s ;
Hw ai - y in ; 5 8 chin/ m ou
Y en -ch 'en g  142 ch in /m ou .
That is;
1951 planned yield 1957 actual yield
H w ai-yin  
Y en -ch 'en g
58 chin = 100 
142 = 100
193 chin = 332 .76  
230 = 161.97
The data are as fo llow s;
H wai-yin
Total output, 1949 Total output, 1957
Sung-chiang
Sources;
900 m illion  chin 
1,240
3, 000 m ill ion  chin 
2, 040
T i - l i -h s t ie h -p a o , vo l.  25, no. 2, A p ril ,
1959, op. c i t .
HHJP, 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  p . l ,  "F ood  Grain In­
cre a se s  in Sung-chiang S .D . Have Not 
Reached their C e il in g"  states that food  grain 
output had r isen  by  800 m ill ,  chin since
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1949. And TK P (Peking), 1 3 /1 1 /5 7 ,  
op. c i t . , gives 1957 output as 2 ,040  m il l ,  
chin. T h ere fo re ,  1949 output is 2, 040 
less  800 m ill .  chin.
Hua-tung nung-yeh k 'o-hstteh t 'u n g -p a o , (East China Agricu ltura l 
Scientific  B ulletin ), herea fter  HTNYKHTP, 1958, no. 2 (February ), 
"M ob ilize  the Kiangsu Party  and Struggle to Fulfil the 12 Year Plan 
fo r  A gricu ltura l D evelopm ent Ahead o f  T im e " .
Chi-hua ch ing -ch i (Planned E con om y ), 1957, no. 4, A pril.  The artic le  
broke  down Kiangsu into three broad agricultural regions: Hsii-Hwai
(though also including two hsien  from  Y en -ch 'en g  S. D. ); T 'a i  Hu 
(Soochow and Sung-chiang); and L i -h s ia -h o  and the coasta l reg ions , 
em bracing  the other areas o f  the province .
Ib id . But as mentioned in note (86) Hsii-Hwai here  includes Fou-ning
and P in -ha i hsien  fro m  Y en-ch 'eng  S .D . H TN Y K H TP, 1958, no. 2,
op. c i t . , gives the arable area in Hsti-Hwai to be 37% o f  Kiangsu's 
total arable area.
In Chinese, t sa - l ia n g .
T i - l i  h stleh -pao , vo l.  25, no. 2, op. c i t .
T L C S , 1959, n o . 6, op. cit.
See above Table V. 10.
F o r  exam ple, during 1952-55 the energy  y ie lds  o f  r ic e ,  wheat and 
sweet potatoes fo r  China w ere  as fo llow s:
See the data in H B, op. cit. , pp. 142-143.
In Chinese, n i l .
H sien or  keng.
See, fo r  exam ple , JM JP, 2 /6 /5 3 .
JM JP, 2 7 /5 /5 3 .  The sam e sou rce  also noted that the food grain sown 
area expansion of around 200, 000 m ou had m o st ly  been under paddy - 
hence the in crease  o f  150, 000 m ou in the r ice  sown and arable areas 
shown in Table V. 30.
Ibid.
C a lor ies  p er  hectare
R ice
Sweet potatoes 
Wheat
6 .278  m illion  
4. 715 
2. 354
(99) Chi-hua ch in g -c h i , op. c i t . , and Sun Ching-chih , op. cit. , p. 57, 
both give a figure o f  59%.
( 1 0 0 )
( 1 0 1 )
( 102)
(103)
(104)
(105)
(106)
Actually , JM JP , 1 9 /1 1 /5 4 ,  "This Year K iangsu's Grain Production  
Will Increase  By a Thousand M illion  Chin" gives the area under r ice  
as 30, 000, 000 m ou. But this contradicts  the evidence for  the e a r l ie r  
years  and it has th ere fore  been re jected . In any ca se ,  it m ay  sim ply  
be a v e r y  rough, rounded approximation.
T K P , 7 /8 /5 5 .
S un 's  r ice  output figure is 13,422 m illion  chin (op. c i t . , p. 57). The 
d ifferen ce  between this estim ate and that o f  TLCS would indicate that 
Shanghai's r ice  output was a m e re  244 m ill ion  chin.
Changes in the sown area under r ice  - that is ,  the question of doub le - 
cropping o f  paddy - are cons idered  later  in this section .
The sm all d iscrep a n cy  in the percentage change o f  total output and 
average yields in 1952 is s im ply  the result o f  rounding up the total 
f igure.
Why such an expansion in the arable area o f  r ice  should have taken 
p lace in 1955 can only be guessed  at: perhaps it la rg e ly  arose  from  
the m o re  rapid pace o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion ,  one aspect o f  which was 
land consolidation . In any case  there is a little circum stantia l 
evidence to support the 4% rise  in r ice  arable area shown in Table 
V .3 0 :  f o r  exam ple , HHJP, 1 1 /3 /5 6 ,  "R aise  the Rate o f  Land 
Utilization and Strive fo r  W idespread Bum per H a rves ts "  re fe rs  to 
150, 000 m ou o f  land having been converted  fro m  dry  to wet c rop s .
And Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  op. cit. , also speaks o f  260, 000 m ou o f  d ry  
land having been converted  to paddy cultivation in 1955.
Evidence in support o f  the large  in crease  in the r ice  arable area in 
1956 is con s iderab le . F o r  exam ple, Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  o p . c i t . , p. 6 9 , 
cites the following planned changes in cropping patterns in Kiangsu 
during this year:
T 'a i  Hu paddy region; 2, 000, 000 m ou to be converted  from
single to d ou b le -cropp ing  paddy.
L i -h s ia -h o  paddy- 7, 300, 000 m ou to be converted  from  the
wheat area; hsien  varie ty  to the keng va rie ty  o f  non-
glutinous r ic e .  (The im portance  o f  such 
a change is well indicated in JM JP, 2 /2 /5 6 ,  
"Kiangsu 's  A gricu ltu ra l Production  Has 
Unlimited P otentia l"  which stated that in 
T 'a i  Hu in 1955 half the r ice  grown was 
low-output, e a r ly -  and m edium -m aturing 
upland non-glutinous ( i . e .  hsien) r ic e .
If the late -m aturing  keng variety  w ere  
sown in its p lace damage by the r ice  stem
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(107)
(108)
(109)
( 1 1 0 )
( 1 1 1 )
( 112)
(113)
(114)
b o r e r  could be avoided and per  m ou yields 
in creased  by o v e r  100 chin. This would 
result in a r ise  o f  120 m illion  chin in 
grain output. )
Hsti-Hwai m is c e l l -  2, 300, 000 m ou to be converted  from
aneous grain  region: growing d ry  crops  to the cultivation o f
wet c r o p s .
Note too , HHJP, 1 7 /3 /5 6 ,  "B ig  S uccess  in Spring Ploughing 
Preparations Throughout the P r o v in c e " ,  which stated that planned 
changes in cropping patterns would affect 25, 000, 000 m ou in Kiangsu.
See, fo r  exam ple , HHJP, 1 7 /1 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "A  New Rice-Cultivating 
Hsien E m erges  in North K iangsu". A lso  H H JP, 2 /4 /5 7 ,  p . 2,
"R apid ly  R eso lve  the W ater-W heel P r o b le m " .  On actual achievements 
see HHJP, 2 3 /9 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "A  Bum per H arvest on the H wai-yin P la in" ;  
and HHJP, 1 7 /1 0 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "What Has Been the Source  o f  This Y ear 's  
Bum per H a r v e s t ? "
S. Ishikawa, "Changes in the Structure o f  A gricu ltura l Production  in 
Mainland China" in W. A. Douglas Jackson (ed. ), A grarian  P o l ic ie s  
and P rob lem s  in Com m unist and non-C om m unist C ou n tries , University 
o f  Washington P r e s s ,  Seattle and London, 1971; pp. 346-377.
Ibid . , p. 357. But a figure o f  195 days is cited in M inistry of 
A gr icu ltu re , Department o f  Food  Grain Production , Shui-tao sheng- 
ch 'an  ch i-sh u  t s 'a n -k 'a o  tzu - l iao  (M aterials  Relating to the Investi­
gation o f  Techniques o f  Paddy R ice  P rod u ct ion ) , herea fter  STSCCSTKTL, 
Peking, 1956; pp. 321-330, "An Initial Sum m ary o f  T r ia l Double 
Cropping o f  R ice  in Sung-chiang Special D is tr ic t  in 1955".
Ibid . , C lim atic  re cord s  showed that only on ce , in 1922, had fros t  
o c c u rr e d  as late as 20 A pril.
JM JP, 2 /2 /5 6 ,  op. cit.
CKNYCCHWT, op. cit. , p. 234 cites a figure o f  477 chin per  m ou 
(1956).
S TSC C ST K T L, op. c i t . , pp. 325-326. The application o f  base f e r t i ­
l i z e r  ( ch i- fe j  ) and to p -d re ss in g  ( ch u i - fe i ) was ex trem ely  important 
throughout the growing period , but e sp e c ia l ly  at certa in  cru cia l 
periods  such as after sowing and be fore  the earing stage. Ideally 10 
chin o f  nitrogenous equivalent (nutrient value) o f  base fe r t i l iz e r  w ere  
requ ired  fo r  the f irs t  r ice  crop  plus 10 chin o f  ammonium sulphate 
equivalent, 10 chin o f  'ear ing ' fe r t i l iz e r  and 4 chin o f  'pe lle t ' f e r t i ­
l i z e r  as top d ress in g .  F o r  the second crop  15 tan o f  pig manure 
needed to be applied per  mou.
Two cases  dem onstrate w ell the im portance o f  the c o r r e c t  timing o f  
these operations: in one APC in Chin-shan hsien  the sowing o f  the sec end 
r ice  crop  was ca rr ie d  out on the second day after the f irs t  had been
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(115)
(116)
(117)
(118)
119
120 
121 
122
123
124
(125)
(126)
(127)
(128)
(129)
harvested  and yields of 474 chin per m ou w ere  achieved. But in 
Nan-hui hsien, where sowing only got under way on the fifth day 
after harvesting , ripening was delayed and yields w ere only 340 
chin. Ib id . , p. 328.
That is ,  the harvesting o f  the f irs t  and transplanting of the second. 
STSC C ST K T L, op. cit. , p. 330.
K. R. W alker, "Organization of A gricu ltura l P rod u ction " ,  op. c i t . , 
e sp e c ia l ly  pp. 405-417.
H HJP, 1 7 /2 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Strive F o r  Even G reater  Plans to Extend 
the Double Cropping o f  R ic e "  gives a figure o f  m o r e  than 300, 000 
m ou under two crops  o f  paddy in Sung-chiang S. D. , which is slightly 
le ss  than 9% o f  the r ice  arable area. Since we know from  CKNYCCHWI 
op. cit. , p. 233, that the area o f  r ice  double cropping in T 'a i  Hu was 
620, 000 m ou (1956), it can be assum ed that Soochow  accounted fo r  
som e 320, 000 m ou - i. e. between 3% and 4% o f  its r ice  arable area.
See above, chapter four.
CKN YCCH W T, op. c i t . , p. 220, Table 14.
H HJP, 2 1 /1 /5 6 ,  "Soochow  Special D istr ict  Will B ecom e  Even R ich e r " .  
H HJP, 1 7 /2 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
Ibid. See also HHJP, 9 /1 /5 7 ,  which mentions a 15% cr iter ion .
HHJP, 7 /8 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "A  Bum per H arvest F o r  the Whole o f  the F irs t  
C rop o f  D ouble -C ropped  R ice  in Sung-chiang Special D is tr ic t " .  See 
also HHJP, 1 /1 2 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "The Increase  in Food  Grain Production  
in Sung-chiang Special D istr ict  Has Not Reached Its C eiling".
(But note that the 10-15% u p p er -l im it  was not always followed; in 
F en g -h s ien  hsien  fo r  example the r ice  MCI was reported  to have 
reached  116.2 in 1957. See HHJP, 1 0 /1 1 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "A  Bum per 
H arvest f o r  the D ouble-C ropped  R ice  in F en g -h s ien  H sien . ")
This hypothesis assum es ce ter is  paribus conditions.
Sun C hing-chih , op. c i t . , p. 59.
Ibid.
It is true that Sun Ching-chih cites output and sown area figures 
that are v e r y  slightly higher than those in TL.CS, but it is c le a r  that 
the d ifferen ces  m e r e ly  re flec t  the fact that the fo r m e r  sou rce  includes 
Shanghai while the latter does not.
JM JP, 1 2 /7 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
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(130)
(131)
(1.32)
(1.33)
( 134)
(1.35)
(1.36)
(1.37)
(1.38)
(3.39) 
(140) 
( H I )  
(142)
(1.43)
(1.44) 
(145)
HHJP, 1 7 /9 /5 5 ,  "In O rder  to Fulfil and O v e r - fu lf i l  Planned T argets ,  
Strive to Com plete the Autumn Sowing" speaks o f  an anticipated 
in cre a se  in the sown area o f  wheat o f  2. 1% o v e r  1954. Given the 
1955 sown area  in V .3 9 ,  this would yield a 1954 sown area o f  
33, 300, 000 m ou, which is v e r y  c lo se  to the one we have used.
JM JP , 9 /6 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
JM JP, 1 2 /7 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
F o r  exam ple see JM JP, 9 /6 /5 4 ,  op. c i t . , p. 1; and JM JP, 1 2 /7 /5 4 ,  
op. c i t . , p. 2.
See S P J P , 3 /1 0 /5 2 ,  op. c i t .
JMJP, 2 /6 /5 3 ,  op. c i t . In som e areas fro s ts  continued until as 
late as A pril .
Ibid. Even this was regarded  as a m easu re  o f  the su ccess  with 
which the d isa sters  had been combatted!
K uang-m ing jih -p a o  (P ek ing), 1 9 /4 /5 4 ,  "K iangsu Peasants 
E n th usiastica lly  In crease  the P roduction  o f  F ood  and C otton".
HHJP, 2 9 /6 /5 6 ,  "O ffset  the L osses  in Wheat and Guarantee 
Increased  Output fo r  the Whole Y ear" .
JMJP, 5 /7 /5 6 ,  "Increased  Production  in Kiangsu 's  Sum m er 
H arvest" .
Ibid. But Soochow was one o f  the two Specia l D istr icts  which 
achieved bum per harvests  in 1956.
Such a decline would have been less  seriou s  had it been com pensated 
fo r  by  a correspond ing  r ise  in the sown area o f  another (p re ferab ly  
h igh er-y ie ld in g )  c rop .  But there is no evidence o f  such a su bsti­
tution.
See fo r  exam ple HHJP, 9 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Strive fo r  A ll-R ound  In creases  
in the Second Year o f  C o -op era t iv iza tion "  which stated that 30% o f  
the wheat crop  had failed to sprout o r  done so on ly  partially.
HHJP, 1 0 /2 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "Make E fforts to O v ercom e  the Spring 
Flooding o f  the Wheat F ie ld s " .
HHJP, 2 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "An Urgent Announcement by  the Department 
o f  A gricu lture  in Kiangsu on the Need to Make Rapid E fforts to Take 
M easures  to Ensure the Full Growth o f  the Sum m er C ro p " .
JMJP, 9 / 6 / 5 4 ,  op. cit . , p . l .
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(146)
(147)
(148)
(149)
(150)
(151)
(152)
(153)
(154)
(155)
(156)
(157)
(158)
(159)
( 1 6 0 )
Actually  lack  o f  enthusiasm fo r  wheat cultivation was a perennial 
p rob lem  and Sun Ching-chih (op. c i t . , p. 60) m ade the point that 
peasants in both north and south Kiangsu tended to cultivate this 
crop  c a r e le s s ly .  In Hstt-Hwai the fault was attributed to that reg ion 's  
susceptib ility  to natural d isa ste rs .  In L i -h s ia -h o  and south o f  the 
Yangtze the reason  lay  in the r ice -w heat double cropping pattern - 
that is ,  s ince  wheat took second  place to r ice  it consequently 
re ce iv e d  less  attention.
HHJP, 2 4 /1 0 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "M ake Plans fo r  the C om pletion  o f the Sowing 
o f the 'T h ree  W heats' " .
HHJP, 6 /6 /5 7 ,  gives H w ai-y in 's  sown area o f  wheat as something 
o v e r  7, 000, 000 m ou which is about a m illion  m ou less  than the 
8, 1 50, 000 m ou reported  in m id  - 1956 (see  H HJP, 2 3 /7 /5 6 ) .
HHJP, 2 9 /6 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "H sti-chou Special D istr ic t  Settles On M easures 
in an Attempt to Achieve a Bum per Autumn H arvest" .
Y ang-chou 's  sown area of wheat in 1956 was 4, 370, 000 m ou (see  
CKN YCCH W T, op. c i t . , p. 234). Yet m id -w a y  through 1957 a f igure 
o f  only 1, 070, 000 m ou was cited (in HHJP, 2 1 /6 /5 7 ) .
H H JP, 2 4 /1 0 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
See CKN YCC H W T, op. c i t . , p. 234, Table 23.
Sun Ching-ch ih , op. cit. , p. 59.
That is ,  Hstl-Hwai and Chinkiang - Yang-chou; the wheat sown 
areas fo r  these Special D istr icts  w ere as fo llow s ;
Hstt-chou 8 ,9 6 0 ,0 0 0  m ou
H wai-yin  8 ,150 , 000
Chinkiang 3 ,4 5 0 ,0 0 0
Yang-chou 4 ,3 7 0 ,0 0 0
Total 24, 930, 000 m ou
See T .H . Shen, op. c i t . , pp. 247-250.
T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. cit. , p. 246.
Ibid. , p. 245 suggests 13, 060, 000 m ou fo r  1957. Ta-kung jih -pao  
(Hong Kong), 1 7 /8 /5 4  mentions a f igure o f  1 3 ,600 ,0 00  m ou. And 
HHJP, 8 /7 /5 7 ,  "Sum m er Sowing in Kiangsu is B a s ica l ly  C om pleted"  
cites 11, 500, 000 m ou.
C oa rse  grains and tubers aie s im ply  the residual; that is total 
grain  output (e x c l .  soya) less  r ice  and wheat.
See above note (93).
Sun Ching-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 62.
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(162)
(163)
(164)
(165)
(166)
(167)
(168)
(169)
(170)
(171)
(172)
(173)
(174)
(175)
(161) F o r  a good account o f  such problem s at the national leve l see
D .H . P erk ins , "M arket Control and Planning in Com m unist China", 
H arvard U niversity  P r e s s , 1966; e s p e c ia l ly  pp. 33-38 .
S P J P , 4 /1 0 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "The Cotton Production  Situation in North 
Kiangsu."
C F J P , 1 6 /4 /4 9 ,  "Continue the Work o f  ’R es is t  the U .S. ; Support 
K o r e a 1 with the D evelopm ent o f  a Spring-Ploughing Production  
M ovem ent" .
See SPJP, 2 /3 /5 0 ;  and SPJP, 4 /1 0 /5 0 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
Evidence o f  declining cotton sown area in south Kiangsu can be 
found in the following 1950 estim ates fo r  Soochow  S .D . :
planned s. a. - 800,000 m ou (SN JP, 1 /6 /5 0 )
actual s. a. - 620,000 (SN JP, 1 6 /4 /5 1 ) .
H s in -S oo -ch ou  pao, 1 5 /5 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "C ontraction  o f  the Sown A re a  of 
Cotton Has O ccu rred  in Quite a Few P la c e s " .  The current cotton- 
grain ratio was 1 chin o f  ginned cotton per  6 .5  chin o f  un p rocessed  
r ice  (t a - m i ) .
The purchase p r ice  o f  cotton in 1950 was low er  than it had been in 
1949.
H sin -S o o -ch o u  pao, 2 0 /5 /5 0 ,  p. 2, "A  Letter  to the Cotton F a r m e r s " .  
Ibid.
Although Hsin S oo -ch ou  pao was a south Kiangsu new spaper, s im ila r  
p rob lem s  w ere  o ccu rr in g  in the north o f  the prov ince : see , fo r
exam ple, S P J P , 4 /1 0 /5 0 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
SNJP, 6 /4 /5 1 ,  p . l ,  "Cotton F a rm e rs  in Sung-chiang Special 
D is tr ic t  Extend their Cotton Planting".
HHJP, 9 /3 /5 1 ,  "D irect ive  on Guaranteeing the P r ic e  Ratio Between 
Cotton and F ood  G ra in s" .  The new ratio stipulated that 1 chin of 
cotton should exchange fo r  8 .5  chin o f  u n p rocessed  r ice .
Hsin S oo -ch ou  p ao , 1 8 /1 0 /5 2 ,  p . 2, "Cotton Speculation Is Raising 
P r ic e s  " .
SN JP, 2 6 /9 /5 1 ,  p. 1, "A  Bum per Cotton H arvest fo r  South Kiangsu 
This Year; A ll A reas  A re  Urgently P re ss in g  Ahead with State 
Purchase  W ork ".
Hsin S oo -ch ou  p a o , 5 /1 0 /5 1 ,  p. 2, "P ro v is io n a l  Regulations Governing 
the Methods o f  Exchanging Cotton in South K iangsu". And ibid. ,
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1 8 /1 0 /5 1 ,  p. 2, "P ro v is io n a l  Methods fo r  Saving Cotton F ibre  
Supplies in North Kiangsu".
(176) Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  op. cit. , p. 63; and JM JP, 7 /6 /5 6 ,  p . l ,  "The 
Young Shoots A re  Flourishing on the Six M illion  Ch'ing o f  Cotton 
Throughout the Country".
(177) HHJP, 8 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Thoroughly  Sum Up the Lessons  and E xperien ce
Gained fro m  the Im provem ents in A gricu ltu ra l Production  During the
Past Y e a r " .
(178) We might add finally  that fro m  a variety  of sou rces  it is poss ib le
to arr ive  at an estim ate o f  cotton sown area o f  about 7 ,340 , 000 m ou 
(1956) fo r  the five Special D istr icts  of Soochow, Sung-chiang, Nan- 
t 'ung, Yang-chou and H wai-yin . It is su re ly  inconceivable  that the 
three remaining Special D istr icts  could have added the remaining 
4, 500, 000 m ou n e c e s s a r y  to make up the total to 12, 000, 000 m ou - 
e sp e c ia l ly  as one o f  them, Chinkiang, was not an important cotton 
producing region.
(179) T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. cit. , p. 246.
(180) A verage  yields of cotton in China w ere  as fo llow s ;
1949 22 chin per  m ou
1950 24
1951 25
1952 31
1953 30
1954 26
1955 35
1956 31
1957 38
(W ei-ta  ti sh ih -n ien , op. c i t . , p. 107)
(181) H HJP, 1 7 /1 0 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "P u rch ases  of New Cotton A re  Increasing 
D aily  in Kiangsu".
(182) See T L C S , 1959, no. 6, op. cit. , p. 246.
(183) H ow ever, as a proportion  o f  total sown area  in Kiangsu cotton 
maintained its relative position; in 1957 the f igure was 6. 19% 
com pared  with 6. 14% in 1952.
(184) Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  op. c i t . , p. 63.
(185) HHJP, 2 0 /4 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Nan-t'ung Special D is tr ic t  Adjusts the Sown 
A reas  o f  Cotton and Food  G ra ins".
(186) Although sp e c i f ic  in form ation  is not available fo r  N an-t 'ung, HHJP, 
1 2 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 2 has a re fe ren ce  to the CPCS system  being able
to guarantee food  supplies to peasants in the cotton areas . Between
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(1.87) 
( 188) 
( 1-8 9 )
(3-90)
( 191 )
( 1 9 2 ) 
(193) 
(3.94)
(195)
(196)
(3.97)
(198)
( 3. 9 9 ) 
(200 )
1955 and 1957 grain was dispatched to 3, 680, 000 cotton fa rm e rs  in 
Nan-t 'ung, Y en -ch 'en g  and Sung-chiang Specia l D is tr ic ts .
See above Table V .2 5 .
H HJP, 2 0 /4 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
In Soochow and Sung-chiang, hsien such as Chiang-yin , T 'a i - t s 'a n g ,  
P ao -sh an , C h 'uan-sha , Nan-hui and F en g -h s ien  w ere  v e r y  
im portant centres of cotton production. This was of cou rse  not 
unconnected with their  p rox im ity  to the textile manufacturing cities 
o f  Shanghai and Wusih.
SN JP, 1 /6 /5 0 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
SNJP, 1 6 /4 /5 1 ,  p. 2, "Peasants of Soochow Special D istr ict  Extend 
Th eir  Cotton Sown A r e a " .
SN JP, 3 /3 /5 1 ,  op. c i t . , p. 3.
CKN YCCHW T, op. cit. , p. 234, Table 23.
This is  the d ifferen ce  between the planned sown area figure fo r  
1950 (1, 900, 000 mou) given in SNJP, 1 /6 /5 0 ,  op. c i t . , p . l ,  
and the 1956 figure  o f  1, 560, 000 m ou fro m  CKN YCCHW T, op. c i t . , 
p. 234, Table 23.
Sun Ching-ch ih , op. c i t . , p. 63.
HHJP, 2 3 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "Peasants in the New Cotton A re a  Enthusi­
astica lly  P rep are  the Land, C ollect  F e r t i l iz e r s  and Make Ready 
fo r  Sow ing". See also W en-hui p a o , 2 8 /1 0 /5 7 ,  "Ssu-yang Hsien 
Has B ecom e  a Paddy-W heat-C otton  R eg ion ".
Average  yields in Soochow rose  fro m  24. 15 chin per  m ou (1931) to 
3 5 chin (1956).
F r o m  in form ation  in H B, op. c i t . , pp. 189-199 and pp. 203-205; 
and CKN YCCHWT, op. cit. , p. 234 (in the latter case  deducting the 
cotton sown areas o f  Yang-chou, Soochow, Sung-chiang and Nan-t'ung 
S. D. s fr o m  the provincia l total given in V. 50).
This o f cou rse  is the b a s ic  point behind the Lewis and R a n is -F e i  
m odels  o f  e co n o m ic  developm ent. See W. A. L ew is , "E con om ic  
D evelopm ent with Unlimited Supplies o f  L a bou r"  in The M anchester 
School, May, 1954. And G. Ranis and J. L .H .  F e i ,  "A  T h eory  o f  
E con om ic  D evelopm ent" in A m erican  E con om ic  R ev iew , 1961.
See Buck, op. c i t . , p. 295. But even this statement needs qualification; 
even i f  they w ere  unem ployed in the sense o f  per form ing  no a g r icu l ­
tural tasks peasants might use their tim e pursuing subsid iaries  or
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carry ing  out im portant w ork such as repairing their tools  or  
h o u se s .
(201) See above chapter one.
(202) Availab ility  o f arable land per head o f  agricultural population in 
the five m ost  densely-populated  Special D istr icts  o f  Kiangsu in 
1956 was as fo llow s;
Arab le  area A gricu ltura l P e r  capita
population arable area
Soochow 9 ,5 9 0 ,0 0 0  5 ,160 , 000 1.86 m ou
Sung-chiang 5 ,1 2 0 ,0 0 0  2 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0  2 .23
Chinkiang 8 ,3 9 0 ,0 0 0  3 ,7 1 0 ,0 0 0  2 .26
Y ang-chou 13 ,480 ,000  6 ,5 8 0 ,0 0 0  2 .0 5
Nan-t'ung 9 ,2 1 0 ,0 0 0  5 ,42 0 ,0 0 0  1 .70
Source ; CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 207, Table 1.
(203) CKN YCCHW T, op. cit. , pp. 213-214.
(204) Ib id . , p p .214-215.
(205) Ibid. , p. 215.
(206) That is ,  457 x  15 x 0. 95. Ibid . , p. 217.
(207) C .B .  Howe, Em ploym ent and E conom ic  Growth in Urban China
1949-1957, Cam bridge University P r e s s ,  1971; e sp ec ia lly  pp. 63-69•
(208) Ib id . ,  p. 65.
(209) CKN YCCHW T, op. cit. , p . 217.
(210) HHJP, 3 1 /1 0 /5 6 ,  "The L ate -P addy  Regions Should Guarantee That 
the Autumn H arvest and Sowing Do Not Get D elayed".
(211) In any ca se ,  in Nan-t'ung hsien, where such re -organ iza t ion  did
take p lace , there was still a labour defic it  at certa in  peak per iods . 
See CKN YCC H W T, op. cit. , p . 217.
(212) CKN YCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 207, Table 2 reveals  that the average
num ber o f  labour days worked per year by each unit o f  labour in
five co lle c t iv es  in four hsien ranged fro m  130 to 208. The average 
was little m o r e  than 160.
(213) But note that the suggestion was made in L iu -lu  APC that each unit 
o f  labour should c a r r y  out 20% m ore  w ork p er  day. See HHJP, 
3 1 /1 0 /5 6 ,  op. cit. ,
(214) CKN YCCHW T, op. c i t . , p . 219.
(215) Ib id .
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(217
(218
(219
(220
(221
(222
(223
(224
(225
(226
(227
(228
(229
(216
(230)
(231)
(232)
(233)
K. R. W alker in "Organization of A gricu ltura l P roduction " ,  
op. c i t . , p. 410, Table 2.
That is ,  1 *— 3. 03 = 0. 33 mou.
0 .33  x 15 = 4. 95 m ou.
B uck 's  data show that on average there was w ell under one draft 
animal per  farm  in Kiangsu. See S ta t is t ics , op. c i t . , p. 131,
Table 5. See also below  chapter six.
Nung-ts 'un kung-tso t'ung-hsttn, 1957, no. 8, op. c i t . , pp. 22-23 .
This is the figure c ited  in the authoritative H TN YKH TP, 1958, 
no. 2, op. cit.
Sun Ching- ch ih , op. cit. , p . 68.
Huang -n iu .
Shui-n iu .
SPJP, 2 7 /2 /5 2 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
SN JP, 9 /2 /5 2 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
The m o re  favourable draft anim al-land ratio in Sung-chiang was 
noted in the d iscu ss ion  o f  the extension o f  d ou b le -crop p ed  r ice  in 
T 'a i  Hu- See above, p p .400-401.
It is worth noting that even the Special D is tr ic t  data concea led  v e r y  
wide lo ca l  variations. F o r  som e idea o f  the range that was p oss ib le  
between hsien  see CKNYCCHW T, pp. 220-221.
Not that fa c to r  shortages w ere on their  own sufficient justification  
fo r  m echanization . Other c r i te r ia  such as its ability to raise 
output and incom e also needed to be taken into account. Of cou rse ,  
all these factors  w ere  not mutually exc lus ive : ce ter is  paribus the
rem ova l o f  labour and draft animal s ca rc it ie s  v ia  the introduction 
o f  p o w e r -d r iv e n  m ach inery  should lead to higher output (and so too, 
in com e).
CKNYCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 205.
The depth of the furrow s had an im portant bearing on the final 
y ie ld s .
CKN YCCHW T, op. cit. , p. 207.
A reduction in draft animals would also m ean that land used for  
grazing and housing them could now be used fo r  growing grains.
This was not insignificant, fo r  it was estim ated that the amount of
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land needed to support one draft animal could produce enough grain 
to feed five people a year.1
(234)
(235)
(236)
(237)
(238)
(239)
(240)
(241)
CKN YCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 227. This was the pattern that had been 
fo llow ed in Japan.
Ib id . ,  p. 228, Table 19- The distribution by  Special D istr icts  was 
as fo llow s
Soochow 2, 888, 000 m ou
Sung-chiang 263, 000
Chinkiang 1, 236, 000
Y ang-chou 456, 000
Nan-t'ung 18,000
Y en -ch 'en g  76, 000
H wai-yin  28, 000
Hsti-chou 13, 000
It is interesting that m ach ine-pow ered  irr iga t ion  was m uch less  
im portant in Sung-chiang, the other part o f  T 'a i  Hu, in view  of 
our e a r l ie r  finding that the supply o f  draft animals posed much 
le ss  o f  a prob lem  here .
HHJP, 1 0 /1 /5 8 ,  op. c i t .
In any ca se ,  unless econ om ic  p r ior it ies  w ere  changed, there was 
little chance o f  industry being able to supply large  quantities o f 
m ach in ery  and other m odern  agricultural inputs.
F o r  exam ple, in one APC in C h 'in g -p 'u  hsien  (Sung-chiang S .D . ) 
in com e fro m  p ig -breed ing  represented  35 .3%  of total agricultural 
and subsid iary  incom e in 1956. See HHJP, 1 3 /1 /5 7 ,  p. 2, "In 
Ch in -lien  APC Each M em ber on A verage R a ises  M ore  Than One 
P ig " .
JMJP, 2 2 /1 0 /5 6 ,  "The Tradition of C lo s e ly  Co-ord inating A g r i ­
cultural and Subsidiary Production  Must Be P r e s e r v e d " .  The c o m ­
plete se r ie s  o f  f igures  in T 'a i-h s in g  are as fo llow s:
Total num ber o f  pigs
P r e -w a r 900 ,000
1949 300 ,000
1950 450 ,000
1951 500,000
1952 520,000
1953 370 ,000
1954 450,000
1955 330 ,000
P ig -re a r in g  w as, o f  c ou rse ,  regarded as a subsidiary .
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(242)
(243)
(244)
(245)
(246)
(247)
(248)
(249)
(250)
(251)
(252)
(253)
(254)
(255)
(256)
Pigs accounted fo r  33-44%  o f  fa rm  incom e in T 'a i  hsing and in 
som e cases  as much as 50%. See JM JP, 2 2 /1 0 /5 6 ,  op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
HHJP, 9 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p . l .
HHJP, 1 /3 /5 7 ,  p. 1, "F r o m  Today Kiangsu R a ises  the Purchase 
P r ic e  of P ig s " .  F o r  an individual peasant this r ise  in p r ice  
meant an in crea se  o f  6 .6  ytian fro m  the sale o f  a 140-chin pig.
HHJP, 3 /8 /5 7 ,  p. 3, "M ore  Pork  Coming On To the Market As 
Pig Production  R is e s " .
The v e r y  definite upward trend in pig num bers after 1955 contrasts 
sharply  with the definite downward trend in the draft animal popu­
lation. There is no doubt that one o f  the m ain reasons fo r  this 
d ifferent behaviour was the im plication  o f  co l lect iv iza t ion  fo r  each 
ca tegory  o f  animals. Many of the p rob lem s associated  with draft 
animals stem m ed fro m  the fact that they w ere  p o o r ly  cared  for  
under co l le c t iv e  ow nership. H ow ever, pigs rem ained in private 
hands and w ere th ere fore  not susceptible  to the sam e m ism a n a ge ­
ment (and slaughter) that afflicted the oxen and vater buffa loes. 
H ence, pig num bers w ere able to r ise  while those of draft animals 
w ere  sharply falling.
Each pig was capable o f  producing m o re  than 30 k ilogram s o f  
ammonium sulphate equivalent a year.
HHJP, 1 3 /1 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
Ibid.
F o r  exam ple, wheat and soya.
See fo r  exam ple , D .H . P erk ins, op. c i t . , p p . 189-191. And 
e s p e c ia l ly  S. Ishikawa, "Changes in the Structure o f  Agricu ltura l 
Production  in Mainland China", in W. A. Douglas Jackson (ed. ), 
A grarian  P o l ic ie s  and P rob lem s in Com m unist and non-Com m unist 
C ou n tries , U niversity of Washington P r e s s ,  Seattle and London, 
1971; pp. 346-377.
HHJP, 5 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
Fei H siao -t 'ung , Peasant Life in China, New York, O xford Uni­
v e r s ity  P r e s s ,  1946.
HHJP, 5 /9 /5 7 ,  op. cit.
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(257) Ibid.
(258) N ung-ts 'un kung-tso  t'ung hsiin, 1957, no. 4, op. c i t . , p. 3.
(259) Ibid. , p. 4.
(260) See above, Table V. 25.
(261) The figures  are;
Sung-chiang 
Hw ai - yin
111.7 ytian (T K P , 13 /1 1 /5 7 )
40 .0  (HHJP, 1 4 /1 /5 8 ) .
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CH APTE R SIX
Long-Run Changes in the Agricu ltura l Sector  o f 
Kiangsu and P rosp ects  fo r  the Future
Up to this point em phasis has been on an analysis o f  the nature and 
p er form an ce  o f  the agricultural se c to r  in Kiangsu during the 1950 's. In 
this concluding chapter an attempt will be made to broaden  the d iscu ss ion  
by  considering  changes in agriculture over  a longer  p er iod .  Specifica lly ,  
we shall try  to com pa re  levels  o f  agricultural production  and productiv ity  in 
the 1950's with those o f  the 1930's .
Some o f  the d ifficu lties  o f  interpretation o f  p re -1949  sou rces  are c o n ­
s idered  below , but it is worth em phasizing at the outset that in general 
these are so form idable  that an examination o f  agricultural trends during 
the 1 9 3 0 's is m o re  the subject o f  another thesis than o f  a short chapter such 
as this. Of n e ce ss ity  th ere fore  m uch detail will have to be ignored  and any 
conclusions regarding quantitative trends should be regarded  as extrem ely  
tentative. Indeed the value o f  the e x e rc is e  is m o re  in the questions it ra ises  
than in any answers which it p rop oses .
The arrangem ent o f  the chapter is s im ple . We begin  by  considering  the 
quality o f  available statistics  f o r  Kiangsu in the 1930 's . There follows the 
m ain section  in which estim ates o f  sown area, total output and average yields 
o f  the principal crops  are presented together with other indicators  of the 
e f f ic ien cy  o f  agricultural production. These fo rm  the basis  o f  the assessm en t 
o f  long -run  changes in the agricultural s e c to r  o f  the p rov in ce .  The chapter 
ends with a v e r y  b r ie f  sum m ary o f  the p rospects  fo r  future agricultural 
developm ent on the eve o f  the Great Leap F orw ard  in Kiangsu.
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I Some D esu ltory  Com m ents on the Availability  and Quality o f  A gricu ltura l
Statistics fo r  Kiangsu in the 19 3 0 's .
Statistical in form ation  published in the 1930's poses  much greater
prob lem s o f  interpretation  than that of the p o s t - 1949 p er iod .  In the 1950's
there is no evidence o f  deliberate  fa ls if ication  by  the governm ent authorities
and in fact there is  good reason  to be lieve  that the large  volum e o f  statistics
published up to and including 1957 gives an in crea s in g ly  accurate picture o f
e con om ic  tren d s. U nfortunately the quality - though not the quantity - of
data fo r  the yea rs  be fo re  1949 is le s s  reliable  as the uncertain  polit ica l
( 1)
situation, the absence o f  a national statistical system  and the non -un iform ity
(2 )of m easu res  all bedevilled  the co llec t ion  o f  accurate quantitative in fo r ­
mation.
The best-know n sou rce  o f  in form ation  fo r  the 1930's is undoubtedly
J. Li. B u ck 's  Land U tilization  in China, published in three volum es in 1937.
It was certa in ly  the m ost  com prehensive  and p ro fess ion a l o f  all the in vesti-
(3)
gations into agricultural conditions that w ere conducted in the 1930's and 
in view o f  the enormous amount o f  data it contains it is not surpris ing that 
it has com e  to be looked upon as the standard sou rce  o f  in form ation  on the 
Chinese e con om y  under the Nationalist (Kuomintang) Governm ent.
The data that are the basis  o f  B uck 's  study w ere  taken fro m  16,786 farm s 
in 168 lo ca lit ie s  sca ttered  throughout 154 hsien in 22 p rov in ces .  An im p o r ­
tant feature was the use o f  sp ec ia lly  trained graduates o f  the C ollege o f  
A gricu lture  and F o r e s t r y  in Nanking University as regional investigators , 
each one being responsib le  fo r  the se lect ion  and training o f  lo ca l  m en who 
would conduct f ie ld  surveys as a m ic r o  leve l.
-4 8 3 -
Kiangsu fe l l  into two of the eight agricultural regions into which Buck
(4)divided China fo r  the purpose o f  his analysis; v iz .  , the w inter-w heat/
kaoliang and Yangtze r ice /w h ea t  reg ions . The fact that these areas contained
45% o f all the farm s surveyed  suggests that the coverage  o f  Kiangsu m ay be
su p erior  to that o f  other p rov in ces .  But to put this into p erspective  it also
needs to be borne in mind that they contained 47% o f  C hina ’ s total arable
(5)area and agricultural population. In any case ,  a m o r e  important c o n s id e r ­
ation was the proportion  o f  Kiangsu farm s investigated by  Buck and on this 
basis  the situation was less  satisfactory ;
Table VI. 1; The proportion  of fa rm  fam ilies  in Kiangsu 
investigated by Buck.__________________________
W IN TER -W H E AT/ 
KAOLIANG REGION:
Kuan-yiln
YANGTZE RICE/ 
WHEAT REGION:
Ch 'ang-shu 
Fou-ning 
H wai-yin  
I-hsing 
Chiang -ning 
Chiang-tu (1)
(2 )
K'un-shan
T 'a i
Tung-t 'a i 
Wusih (1)
(2 )
Wu - chin (1)
(2 )
(3 )
Y en -ch 'en g  (1)
( 2 )
( 3 )
( 4 )
No. of
villages
studied
No. o f  
farm  
fam ilies  
studied
3
1
12
22
21
7
3
8 
28
4
4
5 
9
7 
20 
14 
13
8
1
99
101
75
102
100
72
107
93
83
99
46
61
112
111
100
100
100
78
97
144
No. o f  fa rm  
fam ilies  
studied as % 
of total farm  
fam ilies  in 
the hsien
0. 13
0 . 066  
0. 042 
0. 142 
0. 156 
0.088 
0 . 068  
0.059 
0. 191 
0. 061 
0. 037 
0. 040 
0. 073 
0. 073 
0 . 066  
0 . 066 
0. 057 
0. 045 
0.056 
0. 083
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S ources : Columns 1 and 2 fr o m  Buck, Statistical V o lu m e ,
op. c i t . , p. 466 and pp. 468-469 .
Columns 3 from  hsien agricultural household 
data f r o m  Chang H sin -i  (C. C. Chang) in 
T 'u n g -ch i  ytieh-pao (Statistical M onthly), vo l .  2, 
n o . 7, p p .23-51 .
Thus, even i f  the Kiangsu sam ple is la rg e r  than that o f  other areas the 
d ifference  is c le a r ly  o f  m inim al significance when coverage  is viewed in 
relation to the geographica l area and agricultural population o f  the prov ince .
As Table VI. 1 shows, B uck 's  investigations em braced  le s s  than a quarter  of 
all hsien (13 out o f  6 1 ) ^  and on average included about eight out o f  every
10,000 farm  households!
It fo llow s o f  c o u rse  that the validity  o f  Buck 's  findings depended c r i t i ­
ca lly  on his cho ice  o f  sam ple . Although care  was taken to investigate areas 
representative  of the various patterns o f  farm ing in China, there w ere m any 
p ractica l  d ifficu lties  and Buck was h im se lf  fo r c e d  to admit that " . . .  there
m ay be som e bias in the data, probably  resulting in the se lect ion  o f  sam ples
(7)better  than a v era ge" .  A s im ila r  conclusion  was reached  by other w riters
who argued that the p rob lem s o f  obtaining in form ation  fro m  such a vast
population distributed o v e r  so wide an area m ay  have d irected  the enquiries
towards " .  . . m o re  a c ce ss ib le  and probably  com pa ra tive ly  b e t te r -o f f  lo ca lit ies
( 8}with a h igher ratio o f  cultivated land to total a rea " .  Further, on the
assumption that m any o f  the Nanking graduates would have com e  fro m  Kiangsu, 
we m ay  also suppose that their  contacts w ere with the b e t te r -o f f  fa r m e r s .
In short, there is strong evidence o f  Buck having used a 'r ich  peasant' 
sam ple.
There is one other consideration  which underlines the need fo r  caution
in the use of B uck 's  data. This is connected with the fact that m o re  than one
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fo r  each hsien ca tegory  there are alarm ingly wide variations in the estim ates
o f  sown area, y ields and total output. The point can e a s i ly  be illustrated:
Table VI. 2; The d ifficu lties o f interpreting Buck 's  data;
variations in hsien estim ates based on his 
d ifferent sam ples ._____________________________
sample is shown for four of the Kiangsu hsien and that within the samples
WHEAT:
Y en -ch 'en g  (1) 
( 2 )
(3 )
(4 )
( 1 ) 
(2 ) 
( 3 )
( 1 ) 
(2 )
W u-chin
Wusih
Sown area 
(mou)
12,354 
372,679 
16,472 
131,776
775,720 
1 ,054 ,36 0  
946 ,000
1 ,05 5 ,3 0 0  
751 ,825
Total output 
(chin)
107 ,049 ,360  
150 ,425 ,540  
143 ,669, 020
115 ,375 ,940
9 1 ,9 2 5 ,6 4 0
Average  yields 
(ch in /m ou)
138.00 
142.66 
151.87
109.32
122.27
RICE;
Y en -ch 'en g  (1) 
(2 )
( 3 )
( 4 )
B A RLEY :
Y en -ch 'en g  (1)
(2 )
( 3 )
( 4 )
0 (s ic )  
1 ,795 ,44 8  
988 ,320  
1 ,875 ,74 9
32 .944  
238 ,844
32 .944
267,670
544 ,613 ,241  
4 5 6 ,0 8 0 ,0 3 0  
554 ,227 ,550
51 ,177 ,1 00
7 7 ,8 0 3 ,6 4 0
303.32 
461.47 
295.46
214.27 
290.67
Source ; Buck, Statistical V olum e, op. c i t .
N ote ; Total arable area fo r  each hsien is available
fro m  Buck, ch. 2, Table 1; so is the proportion  
o f  arable area planted under each c ro p ,  from  
which the crop  sown area  given above is derived  
The yield  is taken fro m  the "m ost  frequent y ield  
estim ates (Table 11, ch. 6), converted  fro m  
quintals per hectare  to chin p er  m ou by  dividing 
by  15 and multiplying by  200. Total output is 
then s im ply  y ield  tim es sown area.
These exam ples are not exhaustive: s im ila r  d iscrep a n c ies  could be
shown fo r  other c r o p s .  But they are sufficient to show how carefu l we m ust 
be in extrapolating fr o m  Buck 's  data. The m ost  extrem e case is that o f the 
r ice  sown area in Y en -ch 'en g  h s ie n ; on the basis  o f  the f irs t  sam ple we would 
conclude that no r ice  was grown in the h s ien ; yet the fourth sam ple yields 
a sown area o f  alm ost two m illion  m ou. In the face  o f  such conflicting data 
it is obv iously  im p oss ib le  to know which is the m ost  representative  estim ate 
(at least, without re fe ren ce  to other so u rce s ) .  And even if  it is argued that 
an average will give a m ore  reliable  f igure, that w ill hard ly  afford much 
confidence in any estim ates made fo r  those hsien w here only one sam ple is
(9)available.
All these considerations strongly  suggest that the data co lle c ted  by  Buck
should be used v e r y  jud ic ious ly  indeed. It is a pity that in the past the
( 10 )access ib i l i ty  o f  his w ork and the fact that it is in English ' has led to a 
neg lect  o f  other im portant sou rces  (e sp ec ia lly  in Chinese). The result m ay 
well have been a too uncrit ica l acceptance of his findings and a d istorted  
im p re ss io n  o f  agricultural conditions in China during the 1930's.
The second  m a jo r  sou rce  o f  in form ation  on trends in agriculture b e fore
1949 are the crop  reports  issued  by  the National A gricu ltu ra l R esearch
Bureau (N. A. R. B. ). ^  ^  Their  or ig in  was a national su rvey  organ ized  by
C .C .  Chang between 19^9 and 1931 and designed to c o l le c t  in form ation  on
( 12 )arable area, population, crop  area and crop  yields in "n o rm a l"  y e a r s . '  '
Coverage  in the N. A. R. B. reports  was much m o re  extensive than that of
(13)
Buck since  they em braced  o v e r  90% o f  all hsien in 22 p ro v in ce s .  By
1937 there w ere  som e 6 ,300  crop  reporters  responsib le  fo r  sending in
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Despite their  w ider coverage  and greater  t im e -sp a n  the N. A. R. B. data
(14)cannot be accepted  without qualification. F or  exam ple it has been suggested1
that the arable area  figures  used by the Bureau are u n d e r -e s t im a te s , since
they are u ltim ately  based  on land tax re co rd s .  At a genera l leve l  there is
certa in ly  no lack  o f  evidence to show that landowners did often attempt to
m inim ize their  tax burden by  under-reporting  the amount o f  land they owned.
Buck recogn ized  the p rob lem  when he attempted to adjust the arable area
(15)data o f  the N. A. R. B. in o r d e r  to com pensate fo r  the downward bias .
N everth e less , although he noted that follow ing the reg istra tion  and surveying
o f  land in four hsien  near Shanghai M. . . the cultivated land surveyed is between
12.6 and 35 per  cent grea ter  than the amount fo r m e r ly  reported  fo r  taxation
(16)and averaged o v e r  22 per  cent greater  . . . "  it is interesting that the 
arable area  estim ates o f  the Bureau in respect  to Kiangsu w ere  used unchanged 
by  Buck. In this case  at least, a m odicum  o f  confidence in the available 
in form ation  m ay  be justifiable .
Other c r i t i c is m s  o f  the N. A. R. B. approach can be sum m arized  b r ie f ly .
F ir s t , the concept o f  the "n orm al y e a r "  was v e ry  im p re c is e  and there was
no way o f  ensuring that all c rop  rep orters  would in terpret its meaning in
the sam e way. Next, in spite o f  their  wide geographica l coverage  only a few
reports  cam e fro m  each hsien; n or  could their  representativeness  be known.
F in ally , there was a gen era l point that " . . . the a ccu ra cy  o f the reports  was
v e r y  much left to the m e r c y  of the unpaid field  re p o r te r s ,  who could and m ay
(17)have fi l led  out the survey  schedules without painstaking fie ld  investigations".
Chang H s in - i 's  arable area and yield estim ates have already been
information from  every part of the country.
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m entioned. The sam e author was responsib le  fo r  a unique study o f  a g r i -
m g \
cultural conditions in Kiangsu. Not only did this contain estim ates of
total surface  area, arable area and population, as well as the sown area 
and yields o f  all im portant crop s  fo r  the province  as a w hole, but it also 
gives a breakdown o f  this in form ation  by individual h s ie n . As such it is the 
m ost  detailed sou rce  o f  quantitative in form ation  fo r  Kiangsu in the 1930 's.
The estim ates o f  total, irr iga ted  and arable area, and o f  population, cited 
by  Chang m ay  be taken to represent the actual situation at the beginning o f  
the 1930 ' s . But the sown area, yield and total output f igures  re fe r  to 
"a v e ra g e "  o r  "n o r m a l"  conditions and so have to be used with som e caution. 
His data w ere  co lle c ted  by  co rresp on d en ce ,  the head o r  'p ostm aster ' o f  
eve ry  hsien being required  to fi l l  in "rough estim ates o f  the agricultural
(19)situation" within their  area.
An o c ca s io n a lly  useful i f  uncertain  sou rce  m ater ia l fo r  various aspects 
o f  agriculture in Kiangsu during the late 1920's and ea r ly  1930's is the 
M inistry  of Industry's Handbook, cited e a r l ie r  in this th es is .  The uncertainty 
stem s fro m  its e c le c t ic  approach and cava lier  attitude towards the data which 
it p resents . Some o f  these com e fro m  the M in istry 's  own investigations 
but other estim ates are s im p ly  reproduced , usually  without com m ent, f ro m  
a variety  o f  s o u r ce s .  There is often no indication o f  the year to which the 
figures apply and the units are not always standardized, production  som etim es  
being e x p ressed  in term s  o f  capacity , som etim es  in te rm s  of weight. Where 
m o re  than a single estim ate is given there is gen era lly  no attempt to explain 
any d is c re p a n c ie s .  But in spite o f  all d iff icu lt ies ,  the Handbook remains 
a useful independent sou rce .
II The Structure and Level o f  Agricu ltura l Production  in Kiangsu During 
the 1930 ' s .
In o rd e r  to p lace the analysis o f  agricultural production  into p ersp ective
the table below  presents  som e estim ates o f  arable and sown area in Kiangsu
during the e a r ly  1930 's . Estim ates fo r  1951-52 and 1957 are also included.
Table VI. 3: Total arable area, total sown area and
food grain sown area in Kiangsu in the 
1 9 3 0 's and the 1950's .
Total arable area 
Total sown area
Multiple cropping 
index
Grain sown area
Fbod grain multiple 
cropping index
E arly  1930's
91 ,681 ,5 80
150 .010 .000
163.62
115 .780 .000  
126.28
1951-1952
9 2 ,6 7 2 ,1 0 0  
148,275, 360
160.00
105 ,507 ,145
113.85
1957
94 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
161 ,680 ,000
172.00
117 ,810 ,000
125.83
Note; All area figures are in m ou.
Sources : 1 9 3 0 's ; B a sic  data f r o m  Chang H sin - i ,  An
Estim ate of China's F arm s and C r o p s , 
op. c i t . ; and sam e author in T 'ung- 
ch i-ytteh-pao, v o l . 2, n o . 7, op. cit.
1950 's ; F ro m  Table V. 10. But since Chang's 
estim ates exclude soya, rape and 
other crop s  not used extensively  for  
human consum ption, s im ila r  adjust­
ments have been m ade to the 1950's data.
When set against those o f  the 1950's the estim ates o f  arable and sown 
area in the e a r ly  1930's look  v e ry  plausible. Since 1952 m arked  the end o f  
the 'r e c o v e r y  p e r io d ' ,  we should expect bas ic  ind icators  of agricultural 
developm ent to have reached levels  com m ensurate  with those o f  the p r e -w a r  
p er iod  and this is what Table VI. 3 indicate. The f igures  do, it is true, 
suggest that land utilization on the eve of the F F Y P  was not quite as high as 
in the 1930's ,  although the d ifference  is sm all enough to be within the m argin  
o f  statistica l e r r o r .  The sam e cannot be said fo r  the gap between the grain
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sown area f ig u res ,  but b e fore  it is concluded that food  grain  production
re co v e re d  re lative ly  s low ly  fro m  p r e -w a r  le v e ls ,  it should be rem em b ered
(20 )that the post-1949 estim ate re fe rs  to 1951 and m ay  th ere fore  not fully
re fle c t  the im pact o f  the re c o v e r y  y e a rs .  Indeed an indication o f  the speed
of  p o st -w a r  r e c o v e r y  m ay be gained fro m  another sou rce  which stated that
( 2 1 )the total arable area at the end o f  1946 was only 85 ,305 , 000 m ou. If
this is c o r r e c t ,  the achievem ents o f  the im m ediate post-1949  years m ay be 
even greater  than is suggested by  the table above.
Consideration  o f  the 1957 estim ates indicates that during the F F Y P  
period  the rate of land utilization in the province reached  a leve l not prev iou s ly  
attained. Not only was there an in crease  in the total arable area - a c o n ­
s iderab le  achievement in view of the com petition fo r  land between farming 
and building (including irr igation ) - but there was also an expansion of 
multiple cropping which added m o re  than 11, 000, 000 m ou to the sown area 
o f  the ear ly  1930 's. Further, although the food grain  MCI in 1957 was 
slightly below  that o f  the 1930 's, in absolute term s the area planted under 
food grains was h igher. Finally, these changes w ere  also the sou rce  o f  
shifts in the structure o f  agricultural production;
Table VI. 4; The changing structure o f  agricultural 
production in Kiangsu.__________________
1930's 1957
Total sown area 
(o f  which);
Food  grains 
Soya
Other
150, 010, 000 m ou 16 1, 680, 000 m ou
115 ,780 ,000  
19 ,332 ,000
14,898 , 000
117 ,810 ,000
13.060 .000
30 .810 .0 00
S o u r c e s ; Total and grain sown areas fro m  Table VI. 3. 
Soya sown area f r o m  Chang H sin - i ,  op. cit. ; 
and Table V. 7.
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In other w ord s ,  m o r e  intensive land utilization after 1949, esp ec ia l ly  
through the extension o f  m ultiple cropping , had im portant im plications for  
the growing o f  all kinds o f  c r o p s .  The sown area under grains was extended 
in o r d e r  to m eet  the in creas in g  demand fo r  food while a contraction  of the 
soya area and a r ise  in the overa ll  MCI perm itted  m o re  land to be devoted 
to the cultivation o f  non -gra in  crops  such as green  f e r t i l iz e r  and industrial 
c r o p s .
We can now p ro ce e d  to the central task o f  this sect ion  which is to derive  
estim ates o f  the sown area, yields and total output o f  the m o re  important 
c rop s  in Kiangsu. The f ir s t  to be cons idered  is r ice  and the following 
table presents  data relating to this c rop  taken fro m  a va rie ty  o f  p r e -w a r  
s o u r c e s ;
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Table VI. 5; Estim ates of arable area, average yields
and total output of rice in Kiangsu
before 1949.
Sown area Average yields Total outpu
(mou) (ch in / mou) (m ill,  chin)
TSINLING UNIVERSITY:
"N o rm a l"  year 10 ,651 .0 0
A verage  p. a. f ro m
1926/27 - 1931/32 7, 195.00
1931 5 , 9 2 7 . 0 0
1932 8 ,6 7 3 .0 0
N. A. R. B. ;
1931 18 ,055 ,000 287.00 5 ,1 8 1 ,7 9
1932 18 ,778 ,000 420 .00 7 ,8 8 6 .7 6
1933 2 8 ,3 3 0 ,0 0 0 375.63 10 ,641 .59
1934 2 6 ,1 1 3 ,0 0 0 280.43 7 ,3 2 2 .9 6
1935 2 9 ,1 8 9 ,0 0 0 3 7 9 . 1 0 1 1 ,0 6 5 .5 4
1936 3 0 ,5 0 4 ,0 0 0 405.16 12 ,358 .96
1937 2 9 ,3 5 1 ,0 0 0 393.01 11 ,535 .1 0
Av. 1933-37 2 8 ,6 9 7 ,4 0 0 366 .64 10 ,521 .5 8
1946 3 4 ,040 ,0 00 371.93 12 ,660 .36
1947 2 8 ,2 7 9 ,0 0 0 429.87 12 ,156 .21
CHANG HSIN-I;
"A v e ra g e "  year 31 ,6 4 1 ,0 0 0 274.60 8 ,6 8 8 .5 0
J. L. BUCK;
1929-33 45 ,556 ,5 77 432.82 19 ,717 .58
W .K . T'ANG:
1931 5 ,9 2 7 .0 0
1932 8 ,6 7 3 .0 0
1933 9 ,9 6 6 .0 0
1934 10 ,231 .00
Sources; 
Tsinling Univ.
N. A. R. B. ;
Chung-nung yUeh-k 'an, herea fter  CNYK, 
issue  unknown, "A  Study o f  Crops in 
E v ery  P r o v in c e " ,  undertaken after 
N ovem ber, 1932 by the Dept, o f  A g r ic u l ­
tural E con om ics  in Tsinling University.
CNYK, vo l.  8, no. 5, May, 1947, pp. 87-90 , 
fo r  non-glutinous r ice  data.
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(N. A. R. B. ) Nung-pao (A gricu ltura l Journal) vo l.  2,
n o . 30, 3 0 /1 0 /3 5 ;  and ibid. , vo l .  2, n o . 34, 
1 0 /1 2 /3 5 ,  fo r  yield and sown area estim ates 
o f  glutinous r ice  in 1933 and 1934.
CNYK, vo l. 7, n o . l ;  vo l .  9, no. 3; and vol.
9, no. 8 fo r  various data relating to 1946 
and 1947.
Chang H sin -i ;  An Estimate o f  China's F arm s and C r o p s ,
op. c i t .
J. L. Buck; Statistical V o lu m e , op. c i t .
W .K . T 'ang She-hui ch ing -ch i ytfeh-pao, v o l . l ,  n o . l ,
January, 1934, W .K . T 'ang, "R ev iew  of the 
R ice  Market in 1933". The 1931 and 1932 
figures are obv iou sly  taken from  the Tsinling 
University study cited above.
N o te s ;
Some o f  the d iscrep an cies  between d ifferent sou rces  arise  
because  glutinous r ice  is som etim es  included, som etim es 
excluded. F o r  exam ple, W .K . T 'ang con firm s  that the 1931 
Tsinling U niversity  estim ate excludes glutinous r ice  and 
though he denies that this is the case  in 1932, com parison  
with other sou rces  suggests that he m ay be m istaken. In any 
ca se ,  because  o f  the uncertainty o v e r  the inclusion  o f  glutinous 
r ic e ,  the data presented by T 'ang and Tsinling U niversity 
m ust be treated v e r y  cautiously.
With Buck, Chang and the N. A. R. B. , sufficient data are f o r ­
tunately available fo r  an estim ate to be m ade o f  non-glutinous 
+ glutinous r ice  - which we must do in o rd e r  to provide a 
com parability  with the 1950's .  In the case  o f  the N. A. R. B. , 
sown area and yield  figures are available fo r  e v e ry  yea r  shown 
fo r  non-glutinous r ice  and so total output can eas ily  be 
d er ived . As fo r  glutinous r ic e ,  except fo r  1936, at least two 
out of the three m easures  (area , yield  and output) are ava il­
able fo r  the third to be calculated. In 1936 a yield figure 
has been estim ated by assuming that the percentage change 
o v e r  193 5 was the sam e as fo r  non-glutinous r ic e .  Once 
glutinous and non-glutinous data have been found total r ice  
data are eas ily  obtained by s im ple  addition. (The same 
p roced u re  has been fo llow ed in the case  o f  Chang's data 
which likewise includes estim ates fo r  glutinous and non- 
glutinous variet ies  o f  r i c e . )
Buck also provides  data fo r  both kinds. H ow ever, because 
his study includes a sm all proportion  o f  the hsien in Kiangsu 
the y ie ld  figure shown is the average o f  his "m ost  frequent 
y ie ld s " ,  weighted by  the r ice  acreage  in each loca lity .  Sown 
area  data being available, total output is o f cou rse  s im ply  the 
sown area m ultiplied by the weighted average yield.
Sources; (continued)
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in their calculations only the data fro m  Buck, Chang and the N. A. R. B. can
be used to estim ate the sown area and output o f  r ic e .  But even among these
there are wide d is cre p a n c ie s .  F o r  exam ple, B uck 's  y ield  is alm ost 60%
higher than that o f  Chang and his sown area is also b ig ger  (by 44%). In the
latter case  the c lo se  m easure  of agreem ent between Chang and the N. A. R. B.
has been taken as a reason  fo r  re jecting the Buck figure and we have derived
a final sown area by  s im ply  averaging the remaining data. Thus;
2 8 ,6 9 7 ,4 0 0  + 31 ,641 , 000 2 = 30, 169, 200 m ou .
Not only does this estim ate look reasonable in the light o f  our analysis 
o f  r ice  production  in the 1950's but as an average, it also com pensates fo r  
the p oss ib le  downward bias in the N. A. R. B. sown area  figure.
The choice  o f  an average yield  o f  r ice  poses  a m o r e  intractable prob lem .
The crux  o f  the m atter  has been put succinctly  by Chao Kang who points out
that " .  . . there m ust be sampling e r r o r s  in Buck 's  and the N. A. R. B. y ie ld
data fo r  individual p ro v in ce s ,  yet the exact nature o f  the p oss ib le  b iases  in
(22)the two sets cannot be d eterm ined". Doubtless the sam e could also be
said of Chang's data. That Buck 's  estim ate is too high is v e ry  probable 
fo r  reasons given e a r l ie r .  Not only is it at variance  with those o f  other 
con tem porary  w riters  but it is som e 11% above the highest leve l attained in 
the 1950's (in the bu m p er-h arvest  year o f  1955). M o re o v e r ,  it is worth 
pointing out that B uck 's  figure is not the highest that he c ites ; that is given 
by his "best y ie ld "  w hereas the one shown in VI. 5 is the "m ost  frequent 
y ie ld "  and so presum ab ly  a m easu re  o f  what could be expected  in norm al 
cond it ions .
Because of the failure of the other sources to include glutinous rice
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Some authors have attempted to ov e rco m e  such difficu lties  by averaging
the available data. Liu and Yeh use the average o f  Buck and N. A. R. B. in
(23)o r d e r  to estim ate r ice  y ie lds  in the 1930 's. The downward adjustment
to Buck 's  figure that results is o f cou rse  acceptable , but there appears to
be no evidence to show why the N. A. R. B. yield  should be rev ised  upwards.
Why not dow nw ards? N or are their arguments always convincing; they cite
the fact that their  results show Kiangsu to have a "substantia l"  r ice  surplus
to be "quite consistent with com m on  knowledge o f  r ice  supply" in the 
(24)p rov in ce .  Yet another sou rce  shows that 28 out o f  61 hsien had insufficient
(25)supplies o f  r ice  and only nine a c le a r  surplus. Indeed because insufficient
r ice  was produced fo r  lo ca l  consum ption the prov ince  was a net im p orter  
o f  this particu lar  grain.
But fo r  all the drawbacks of this approach, without any convincing
reason  fo r  accepting are particu lar estim ate it seem s l ik e ly  that taking an
average figure is the m ost  acceptable co m p ro m is e .  At least the in crease
in sam ple s ize  m ay  reduce the m argin  o f  e r r o r .  Our average yield  o f  r ice
fo r  Kiangsu is then derived  as fo llow s;
Buck 432. 82 chin per  m ou
N .A . R. B. 366 .64
Chang
H sin -i  274 .60
A verage  358. 02 chin per  m ou .
Thus, our estim ates of the sown area and output o f  r ice  can now be 
sum m arized ;
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Table VI. 6: Estim ates o f  sown area, average yield  and
total output o f  r ice  in Kiangsu during the l9 3 0 's
Sown area 30 ,1 6 9 ,2 0 0  m ou
A verage  yield 358 chin per m ou
Total output 1 0 ,8 0 0 .5  m illion  chin.
Next, wheat; the b a s ic  available data are presented  in Table VI. 7:
Table VI. 7: Estim ates o f  sown area , average yields and
total output of wheat in Kiangsu b e fore  1949.
Sown area 
(mou)
TSINLING UNIVERSITY (1):
"N o rm a l"  year 
Average  p. a. f ro m  
1926/27 - 1931/32
1931
1932
TSINLING UNIVERSITY (2 ) : 
"N o rm a l"  year  4 2 ,1 1 7 ,0 0 0
1931
1932
1933
4 1 .6 6 1 .0 0 0
4 2 .4 5 6 .0 0 0
3 8 .771 .0 00
Average yields 
(ch in /m ou)
131.7
143. 8 
137.2 
136.6
Total output 
(m i l l . chin)
7 .9 1 0 .0
5, 551.0
6 .0 6 1 .0
5 .8 3 7 .0
5, 510.0
5 .9 9 2 .0
5 .8 2 8 .0
5 .2 9 8 .0
N. A. R. B. :
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
Av. 1931-37
1946
1947
CHANG HSIN-I: 
"A v e ra g e "  year
3 3 .712 .0 00
3 4 .657 .0 00
31 .5 0 7 .0 0 0
3 2 .634 .0 00
3 4 .1 5 0 .0 0 0
3 2 .1 3 8 .0 0 0
3 2 .2 4 3 .0 0 0
3 3 ,0 0 4 ,4 3 0
2 6 .1 8 8 .0 0 0  
3 2 ,7 2 1 ,0 0 0
4 2 ,1 2 7 ,0 0 0
192.9
185.9
177.9 
188. 0 
168. 1 
170.4  
166.2
178.6
162.9 
193.8
132. 0
6 .5 0 6 .4
6 .4 4 6 .2
5 .6 0 8 .2  
6, 135.2
5 .7 4 3 .4
5 .4 7 5 .2
5 .3 6 0 .5
5 ,8 9 6 .4 4
4 .2 6 8 .6
6 .3 3 6 .7
5, 514.0
J. L. BUCK: 
1929-33 39 ,753 ,1 33 146.7 5 ,8 3 1 .7 8
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Tsinling U n iv .( l ) :  CNYK, op. c i t . , citing the investigation
conducted by Tsinling U niversity after 
N ovem ber 1932.
Tsinling Univ. (2); Chung-hang y iieh -k 'an , (CHYK), vo l.  7,
n o . l ,  July, 1933. The figures are said 
to have been drawn fro m  o v e r  100, 000 
reports co l le c ted  and used by the 
Department o f  A gricu ltura l Statistics 
at Tsinling.
N. A. R. B. : 1931-37 and 1946 estim ates of sown
area and total output fro m  CNYK, vo l .  8, 
no. 5, May, 1947, op. c i t . , pp. 87-90 . 
1947 sown area  and output fro m  CN YK, 
v o l . 9, n o .8 .
Chang H sin -i :  An Estimate o f  China's F arm s and
C r o p s , op. c i t .
J. L. Buck; Statistical V o lu m e , op. c i t . (The
estim ates shown are weighted by B uck 's  
l o c a l i t ie s . )
N otes ;
F. K. Hsti, "R eview  of the Wheat M arket in 1933" in She-hui 
ch in g -ch i  ytteh-pao, v o l . l ,  n o . l ,  Jan. 1934, op. cit. , also 
c ites the 1931 and 1932 total output estim ates o f  Tsinling 
U niversity  (1) and adds a 1933 estim ate of 5 ,054  m illion  chin. 
H ow ever, he m y ster iou s ly  states that all three estim ates are 
fro m  Chang H sin -i .
Wu T 'e h - fe n g ,  F e i-ch 'a n g  sh ih -ch 'i  chih nung-min ( The 
Peasants in N orm al T im e s ) , Shanghai, 1936, p. 72 also 
cites  Chang's sown area and total output estim ates and c la im s 
that they are representative o f  "n o rm a l"  yea rs .
If the high "n o rm a l"  figure o f  Tsinling U niversity (1) and the low 
N. A. R. B. figure  fo r  1 9 4 6 ^ ^  are ignored , there is a b r o a d  m easure  
o f  agreem ent on the leve l o f  wheat output being attained in Kiangsu in the 
1930 's. M o re o v e r ,  except fo r  the N. A. R. B . all the sou rces  show ap p rox i­
m ately  the sam e leve ls  o f  yields and sown area.
S ources:
Without detailed in form ation  o f  the ways in which the various estim ates 
shown in VI. 7 w ere  co llec ted  the d irect ion  and s ize  o f  poss ib le  b iases  cannot
be known. One w riter  has argued that the se lect ion  c r i te r ia  used by Buck
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has resulted in a s e r io u s ly  b iassed  wheat sam ple in those areas where
(27)wheat was not the m a jo r  c rop  and that in consequence his yields o v e r -
(28)state the true position . Unfortunately, this does little to help us obtain
a reliab le  estim ate fo r  Kiangsu. F o r  even i f  we w ere  to accept that there 
was such a b ias ,  how big should we assume it to b e ?  It would obviously  be 
tempting to make a downward adjustment o f  10% and so bring Buck 's  figure 
in line with those o f  Tsinling U niversity (2) and Chang H sin -i .  But such an 
approach would lack  s c ien tif ic  foundation. In any ca se ,  how could we allow 
fo r  p oss ib le  b iases  in those other s o u r c e s ?
There rem ains the question of how to treat the N. A. R. B. data.
If, as was suggested e a r l ie r ,  the Bureau 's  area  estim ates are too low , it 
is c le a r  that the y ie lds  shown in Table VI. 7 (which are derived  sim ply  by 
dividing total output by  sown area) must be too high. A llowing fo r  this goes 
som e way towards narrowing the gap between the N. A. R. B. figures and 
those o f  other s o u r ce s .  But to eliminate the yield d ifferentia l altogether 
means raising the N. A. R. B. sown area by 25%. In view  o f the fact that the 
Bureau 's  u n d er-rep ort in g  im plied  by  our calculations o f  the r ice  acreage  was 
c lo s e r  to 5% we are bound to question such a large  adjustment.
Since there is insufficient inform ation fro m  other sou rces  to provide 
answers to these questions there seem s to be no ch o ice  except to s teer  a 
m iddle co u rse  on the basis  o f  som e sim ple assum ptions. Our p rocedure  
will th ere fore  be as fo llow s ; in o rd e r  to com pensate fo r  the probable under-
(29)reporting the N. A. R. B. sown area estim ate will be adjusted upwards by 
15% (that is ,  roughly m idway between the 5% upward rev is ion  im plied  by  the 
r ice  calculations and the 25% required  to bring the Bureau figure into line
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with those o f  Buck, Chang, etc . ). This rev ised  figure  com bined with total
output then gives a rev ised  N. A. R. B. y ie ld . The rest  is sim ple and consists
o f  averaging the total output and sown area data o f  Buck, Chang, Tsinling (2) 
and the N. A. R. B. to derive  final estim ates o f  all the d es ired  quantities 
(including average y ie lds).
Calculation o f  rev ised  N-A- R  B. sown area and yie ld  ;
Sown area, 1931-37: 3 3 ,0 0 4 ,4 3 0  x  115%
= 37, 955, 094. 5 m ou
Total output: 
A verage  yield;
5, 896. 44 m il l io n  chin (see VI. 7)
5, 896 ,440 , 000 4- 37 ,955 , 094. 5 
= 155.35 chin p er  mou.
Calculation o f  Kiangsu sown area and total output;
Sown area
N . A . R . B .  (1931-37) 
Chang H sin - i  
Buck
Tsinling (2)
(av. 1931-33)
A verage
37, 955, 094. 5 m ou 
42, 127,000 
39 ,753 ,133
40 ,962 ,6 70
40, 199 ,474 .38  m ou
Total output
5, 896. 44 m ill ,  chin 
5, 514.00 
5 ,8 3 1 .7 8
5 ,7 0 6 .0 0
5,737 . 06 m i l l . chin
E x p ressed  in round num bers, final estim ates o f  wheat area and
production in Kiangsu in the 1930's can be sum m arized ;
Table VI. 8; Estim ates o f  sown area, average y ield  and
total wheat output in Kiangsu during the 1930's.
Sown area 4 0 ,1 9 9 ,5 0 0
Total output 
A verage  yield
5,737
142.71
m ou
m illion  chin 
chin per  m ou
The final food  crop  con s idered  is soya. A ll available data relating 
to its acreage  and production are shown below;
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Table VI. 9: Estim ates of sown area, average yields and
total output of soya in Kiangsu before 1949.
Sown area 
(mou)
TSINLING UNIVERSITY:
"N o rm a l"  year 
Average p. a. f ro m  
1926/27 - 1931 32
1931
1932
N. A. R. B. :
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
Av. 1931-37 
1946
CHANG HSIN-I: 
"A v e ra g e "  year
J. L. BUCK: 
1929-33
12 .341 .000
12 .782 .000
14 .652 .000
13 .991 .0 00
13 .350 .000
12 .146 .000
12 .347 .000
13 ,092 ,7 10  
5 ,3 2 2 ,0 0 0
1 9 , 1 2 1 , 0 0 0
17 ,336 ,987
S o u r c e s ; 
Tsinling Univ: 
N. A. R. B. :
Chang H sin -i:
J. L. Buck;
A verage yields 
(ch in / mou)
168.80
213 .00
1 9 1 . 0 0  
93 .70
131.00 
193.40 
194.10
168.23
186.00
120.04
113.20
Total output 
(m ill ,  chin)
3 .3 9 1 .0 0
2.296.00
2 .1 4 1 .0 0
2 .6 8 4 .0 0
2 .0 8 3 .6 0
2 .7 2 2 .6 0  
2 ,806.20
1 .3 1 1 .0 0
1 .7 4 9 .0 0
2 .3 4 9 .0 0  
2 ,3 9 6 .8 0
2 .2 0 2 .6 1  
989 . 00
2 ,2 9 5 .2 3
1 ,9 6 2 .5 5
CNYK, N ovem ber , 1932, op. c i t .
CNYK, vo l.  8, no. 5, May, 1947, op. c i t . 
pp. 87-90 . (All y ield  estim ates are 
derived  fro m  sown area and total output. )
An Estim ate o f  China's Farm s and C r o p s , 
op. c i t . (But the orig ina l data contains 
som e m inor  in con s isten c ies  and the 
f igures shown above are co r re c te d  by 
summing his hsien  data in T 'u n g -ch i  yiieh 
p ao , vol.  2, no. 7, op. c i t . , pp. 3 5 -3 8 . )
Statistics V olum e, op. cit. (The estim ates 
are weighted by B uck 's  lo ca l it ie s .  )
The p roced u re  fo r  obtaining soya  estim ates can be set out v e r y  b r ie f ly .  
The prob lem s are sssen tia lly  the sam e as in the case  o f  wheat; all sou rces
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o f  the N. A. R. B. contrasts with the high sown area and low yield used by
Buck and Chang. It can be assum ed that under-rep ortin g  of area by the
N. A. R. B. is  again the m a jo r  sou rce  of the d is c re p a n c ie s ,  but the fam iliar
prob lem  of quantifying it m akes adjustment e x trem ely  d ifficu lt. Our attempt
to re co n c i le  the various  sou rces  consists  th ere fore  in taking an average
o f  the sown area  and total output o f  the Bureau, Buck and Chang. The
following resu lts  are then obtained;
Table VI. 10; Estim ates o f  sown area, average yield and
total output o f  soya  in Kiangsu during the 1930*5.
Sown area 16 ,583 ,9 00  mou
Total output 2, 153. 50 m illion  chin
A verage  yield  129.85 chin per  m ou
So m any estim ates o f  the sown area a n d /or  production  o f  cotton in 
Kiangsu be fo re  1949 are available that to include them all would mean 
burdening the text with a table o f  unwieldy length. F o r  this reason  only a 
sum m ary  is presented  h ere ,  the detailed in form ation  being reproduced  in 
an appendix.
show sim ilar estim ates of total output but the low sown area and high yield
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Table VI. 11; Sum m ary o f  available cotton estim ates 
fo r  the 1930 ' s .___________________________
Sown area  A verage y ie lds Total output
STATISTICAL OFFICE 
OF THE CHINESE 
COTTON INDUSTRY:
Av. 1926-32 8 ,3 3 2 ,7 2 9 .4 3
COTTON M ILL OWNERS’
ASSOCIATION:
Av. 1929-32 141.42
J. L. BUCK:
1929-33 11 ,258 ,4 98  33 .59  378 .14
CHANG HSIN-I:
"A v e ra g e "  year
(un corrected )  12 ,010 ,000  28 .00  336.28
(co r re c te d )  11 ,091 ,0 00  28 .20  311.62
N. A. R. B . :
Av. 1931-37 11 ,614 ,8 60  30.56 355 .04
WANG TZU -C H IA;
Av. 1931-37 10 ,348 ,0 00  19.08 197.42
Source ; Appendix E.
The f ir s t  two estim ates are so far  rem oved  fro m  any o f  the others
that it seem s reasonable to re je c t  them. In addition, s ince  the or ig in  o f
Wang T z u -c h ia 's  data is not known and his yield and output f igures  look
unacceptably low , his estim ates will not be included in our calcu lations.
As fo r  the in con s isten c ies  between the two Chang s o u r ce s ,  insofar  as it is
based  on his detailed hsien  in form ation  the " c o r r e c t e d "  figure is the m ore
acceptable . Fortunately , the data which rem ain show a considerab le
s im ila r ity  and the final estim ates o f  the p r e -w a r  sown area and output o f
cotton m a y b e  obtained by averaging the Buck, Chang ( " c o r r e c t e d " )  and
N. A. R. B. inform ation :
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Sown area 11 ,321 ,453  mou
Total output 348 .27 m illion  chin
A verage  y ie ld  30 .76  chin per m ou
This concludes our attempt to derive  estim ates o f  the sown area and 
output (including y ie lds) o f  som e o f  the m ore  im portant food  and econ om ic  
crops  in the p r e -w a r  period . What has em erged  m ost  c le a r ly  fro m  it are 
the im m ense  d ifficu lties  o f  interpreting con tem porary  quantitative so u rce s .  
In particu lar , lack  o f  m ethodolog ica l in form ation  and the consequent 
inability to determ ine the s ize  o r  even d irect ion  o f  p oss ib le  bias are 
form idable  obstac les  to achieving reliable  estim ates . As a result the p r o ­
cedure gen era lly  adopted here has been s im ply  to take an average o f  the 
m o re  convincing available data. In view of the obvious w eaknesses inherent 
in this crude approach the quantitative indicators  that have been presented 
should be regarded  as being v e r y  approxim ate. H ow ever, there is no need 
fo r  undue p e ss im ism , fo r  the c lo se  m easure  o f  agreem ent between many 
o f  the available estim ates and the expectation that by taking an average a 
w ider e ffective  sam ple is obtained give som e hope that the results do 
adequately re f le c t  leve ls  o f  production in Kiangsu in the 1930's.
There rem ains one last e x e rc is e  which is to give an indication o f  the 
supply o f  one o f  the m ost  important agricultural fa c to rs  o f  production, draft 
animals. This is a m o re  straightforw ard task, as relevant data are ava il­
able fro m  only one so u rce ,  the N. A. R. B. These we shall s im ply  accept 
as a basis  f o r  com p a rison  with the 1950's and accord in g ly  they are r e p r o ­
duced below  without com m ent;
Table VI. 12; Estim ates of sown area, average yield
and total output of cotton in Kiangsu
in the 1930 's ._______________________________
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Table VI. 13; The supply of draft animals in Kiangsu
before 1949.
W ater 
buffaloes
Com m on 
draft oxen
H orses
Mules
Donkeys
Total draft 
animals
1934
830.000
1 .396 .00 0
128.000
125.000
750.000
3 . 2 2 9 .0 0 0
S o u r c e s ;
1935
798.000 
1 ,235 , 000
19 0 .0 00
265.000
887.000
3 ,3 7 5 ,0 0 0
1946
719 .000
1 ,0 8 8 ,0 0 0
69 , 000
38 ,000
486 .000
2 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0
1934
1935
1946
1947
N ung-pao, v o l . 3, n o .12 . 
Ib id . , vo l .  3, no. 26. 
CNYK, vo l.  7, no. 1. 
Ib id .,  v o l . 9, no. 5.
1947
522.000
1 .047 .00 0
64 .000
81.000
666.000
2 .3 8 0 .0 0 0
III A B r ie f  D igress ion ; The Impact o f  the S ino-Japanese War upon the
A gricu ltura l S ector  in K iangsu.
This is an aspect o f  Kiangsu's agricultural h is tory  that has not so far
(30)been con s idered . H ow ever, since the next sect ion  is concerned
e x c lu s ive ly  with a com p a rison  o f  the rural econom y between two d iscre te  
periods  (the 1930's and the 1950's) it w ill be useful to p re fa ce  that d iscu ss ion  
with som e consideration  o f  agricultural conditions in the province  im m ediate ly  
after the conclusion  o f  the Sino-Japanese War.
(31)The following table, based on data fro m  the N. A. R. B. , shows the 
changes in sown area and output of r ic e ,  wheat, soya  and cotton that took 
p lace between the 1930's and 1946;
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Table VI. 14; The im pact of war on the agricultural 
econom y: sown area and output of four
important crops  in the 1930's and 1946.
R ice Wheat Soya Cotton
SOWN AREA:
1931-37
1946
% change
T O T A L  OUTPUT:
1931-37
1946
% change
AVERAGE YIELD:
1931-37
1946
% change
2 8 ,6 9 7 ,0 0 0  33 ,004 ,4 30  13 ,092 ,7 10  11 ,614 ,860  
34 ,040 , 000 26 ,1 8 8 ,0 0 0  5 ,3 2 2 ,0 0 0  8 ,65 3 ,0 0 0
+ 18.62
10 ,521 .5 8  
12 ,660 .36
+ 20.33
366 .64  
371.93
+ 1 .44
- 20 .65
5 ,8 9 6 .4 4  
4 ,2 6 8 .6 0
- 27.61
178.6
162.9
+ 8 .79
- 59 .35
2 ,2 0 2 .6 1  
989 .00
- 55 .10
168.23 
186 .00
+ 10.56
- 25 .50
355 .04  
302.86
- 14 .70
30. 56 
35. 00
+ 14.53
N otes ; (1) A re a  units are in mou; total output in m illion  
chin and yields in chin per  m ou.
(2) 1930's r ice  data are fo r  1933-37.
Sources ; F ro m  N. A. R. B. as given in Tables VI. 5,
VI. 7, VI. 9 and VI. 11.
The m ost  striking effect  o f  the war was on c ro p  a creage ,  the total 
sown area of the four  crops  falling by about 15%. This trend was p r e d ic ­
table; as transport was disrupted and com m odity  exchange becam e d i f f i ­
cult it was inevitable that cultivation should be curtailed . Cash crops  w ere 
like ly  to be w orst  affected and as the table shows, in Kiangsu the m ost 
seriou s  declines  w ere indeed experienced  by soya  and cotton. In fact, 
the true im pact m ay be under-stated  by the f igures  shown in VI. 14. F or  
exam ple, the cultivation o f  cotton was at its low est leve l  som e years  be fore  
1946. Wang T z u -ch ia 's  estim ates show that the sown area o f  cotton fell
by  25% in the f irs t  year  after war was dec lared  (1937-38 ) and continued to
(32)decline until 1943 when it was a m ere  45 .87%  o f the 1932-37 figure .
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The s izeab le  contraction  in the wheat acreage  is at f ir s t  m o re  surpris ing . 
H ow ever, m uch o f  the wheat produced in Kiangsu in the 1930's was m a r ­
keted and the lo s s  m ay  th ere fore  be attributable to trade disruption.
The single exception  to the genera lly  deteriorating trend was the 
substantial expansion in the cultivation o f  r ice  which appears to have taken 
p lace . This we m ay assum e to have been a re flect ion  o f  the overwhelm ing 
em phasis on the production o f  high energy-y ie ld ing  food  crops  fo r  human 
consum ption. The gain was of cou rse  la rge ly  at the expense o f  other cro p s ;
as le ss  cotton and soya  w ere  grown so m ore  land becam e available for
.  (33)r ice .
A decline in the num ber of draft animals was another consequence of 
war. Table VI. 13 suggests that the supply o f  draft animals o f  all kinds in 
Kiangsu in 1946 was only 72% o f  the p r e -w a r  leve l .  Donkeys, m ules and 
horses  w ere  m ost  d ire ct ly  affected since they w ere  so eas ily  conscr ip ted  
into m ilita ry  use; thus, num bers o f  donkeys fe ll  by  alm ost a half; o f  
h orses  by m o re  than a half; and o f  m ules by  a staggering 85%. By c o n ­
trast, availability o f  com m on  draft oxen and w ater-bu ffa loes  after the war 
was still 90% o f  the p r e -w a r  leve l ,  although m any o f  those that did survive 
m ust have been weakened by d isea se ,  malnutrition and general lack  o f  ca re .
That a decline in the s ize  o f  the agricultural labour fo r c e  (tem porary
o r  permanent) also took p lace seem s unquestionable. It fo llow s that between
1937 and 1945 the supply o f  the two m ost  important fa c to rs  of production in
the agricultural s e c to r  - whose num bers w ere already insufficient to c a r r y
out farm  w ork even in norm al conditions - was further eroded. The result
can only have been  that agricultural operations w ere  d is located  as it becam e
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in crea s in g ly  difficult to maintain standards o f  cultivation and com plete  
sowing and harvesting on tim e. Against this background the in crease  in 
yields shown in VI. 14 invites considerab le  s ce p t ic ism . The sm all r ise  
in r ice  yields m ay  admittedly have re flected  a concentration  of e ffort  into 
the cultivation o f  this r ich  food  c rop .  But why soya  and cotton yields in 
1946 should have been 10. 5% and 14. 5% higher than b e fo re  the war is much 
le s s  easy  to understand. Perhaps the figures concea l a decline which took 
p lace in the late 1930's o r  ear ly  1940's o r  perhaps they are s im ply  e r r o r s .  
In any ca se ,  they do not alter the overa ll  p icture , fo r  even with these 
im provem ents  in yields total output of both crops  (as w ell as o f  wheat) 
still  shows a m arked ly  downward trend.
IV The A gricu ltura l Sector  in the 1930's and 1950’ s ;
Some Indicators o f  Long-Run Change in K iangsu.
In o rd e r  to provide a variety  o f  bases  fo r  co m p a rison , in addition to 
the average sown area and output of r i c e ,  wheat, soya and cotton in the 
1930's the following table includes four estim ates of the same in the 1950's 
an average fo r  1952-57; and individual estim ates fo r  the beginning and end
(34)o f  the F F Y P  (1952 and 1957) and fo r  the best year  within the period .
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RICE:
Av. 1933-37
Av. 1952-57
1952
1957
Table VI. 15: Sown area, total output and average yields
of rice, wheat, soya and cotton:
1 9 3 0 's and 195 0 ' s .___________________________
Sown area 
(mou)
30 ,1 6 9 ,2 0 0
32 ,733 ,3 33
3 0 .9 0 0 .0 0 0
3 5 .5 1 0 .0 0 0
A verage yield  
(ch in /m ou )
358 .00
362.92 
342 .75 
371.11
Total output 
(m ill ,  chin)
10 .800 .50
11 .879 .5 0
1 0 . 5 9 1 . 0 0
13 .178 .0 0
WHEAT:
Av. 1933-37
Av. 1952-57 
1952 
1957 
1955
40 ,199 ,5 00
32 ,7 6 4 ,6 7 0
31 .8 5 8 .0 0 0
3 1 .2 3 0 .0 0 0
3 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
142.71
104.17 
103.70 
98.97 
115.00
5, 737 .00
3 ,4 1 2 .9 7  
3, 304 .35  
3 ,0 9 1 .0 0  
3 ,9 1 2 .4 8
SOYA:
Av. 1931-37
A v . 1952-57
1952
1957
16 ,583 ,900  
N. a.
14 .050 .0 00
13 .060 .000
129.85
N. a. 
94.31 
98.93
2 ,1 5 3 .5 0
N. a.
1 .3 2 5 .0 0
1 . 2 9 2 .0 0
COTTON:
Av. 1931-37
Av. 1952-57 
1952 
1957 
1955
11 ,321 ,453
9 ,9 7 0 ,0 5 7 .5  
9 ,1 0 5 ,5 9 0
1 0 ,007 ,0 00
11 ,084 ,580
30.76
32. 58 
28. 60 
38. 07 
42. 80
348.27
324.80
260 .42  
381 .00
474.42
S ources: I 9 3 0 's : Tables VI. 6, VI. 8, VI. 10 and VI. 12.
1950's; R ice ,  wheat and cotton fro m  V .3 0 ,  V. 39 
and V. 50. Soya fro m  T L C S , 1959, no. 6, 
op. c i t . , p. 245.
The im plications o f  these data are m o re  read ily  understood i f  they
are converted  to an index, taking the average p r e -w a r  figure as the base;
RICE:
1933-37
1952-57
1952
1957
WHEAT:
1931-37
1952-57
1952
1957
1955
SOYA:
1931-37
1952
1957
COTTON:
1931-37
1952-57
1952
1957
1955
Table VI. 16; An index o f  the changes in the sown area,
average yield  and total output of r ic e ,  wheat, 
soya  and cotton between the 1930's and 1950 's, 
with 1930's average f igure = 100.00____________
Sown area
100.00
Average yields Total output
108.50 
102.42 
117.70
100.00
81. 51 
79 .25  
77. 69 
84. 58
100.00
84 .72
78 .75
100.00
88 . 06 
80.49 
88. 39 
97.91
100.00
101.37 
95. 74 
103.66
100.00
72 .99  
72. 66 
69 .35  
80. 58
100.00
72. 69 
76. 19
100.00
105.92 
92. 98 
123.76 
139.14
100.00
109.99 
98 . 06 
122 . 01
100.00
59.49 
57.60 
53.88 
68 . 20
100.00
61. 59 
60. 00
100.00
93.26  
74 .78  
109.40 
136.22
Source; Table VI. 15.
Consideration  o f  the r ice  estim ates suggests an optim istic  assessm en t 
o f  p o s t - 1949 developm ents in Kiangsu. Both the arable area and average 
yields o f  r ice  in crea sed  during the F F Y P  period . On average r ice  p r o ­
duction was 10% above the p r e -w a r  level in these yea rs  and in the last 
year  o f  the Plan the d ifferential was approaching 25%. H ow ever, it was 
significant that area expansion, not r ises  in yields contributed m ost  to the 
in crea se  in total output. To the extent that this re flected  the inability o f
the traditional technology to generate r ises  in productiv ity  it indicated that
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the p rosp ects  fo r  future growth w ere  lim ited. M o re o v e r ,  the extension 
o f  the arable area under r ice  did not n e ce s sa r i ly  represent a net extension 
since the expansion o f  one crop  might be offset  by  the contraction  o f  another. 
Not that such substitution could cancel out the positive  effects  o f the in crease  
in r ice  cultivation: there was still a net gain because  o f  the high energy 
content o f  r i c e ,  which ensured that one m ou o f  paddy yie lded  m o re  grain 
(in c a lo r i f ic  te rm s)  than one m ou o f  any other food  c ro p .
Another way in which r ice  production in the 1950's had im proved  on 
that o f  the 1930's related to the com posit ion  o f  its output. N. A. R. B. data 
reveal that b e fo re  the war glutinous r ice  co m p r ise d  about 13. 5% o f  total 
output. This was m ainly used fo r  making wine and spec ia l pastries  (for 
exam ple, cakes fo r  fe st iva ls ) ;  it was not the staple food  fo r  human c o n ­
sumption. In the 1950's part o f  the rationalization of the structure o f  a g r i ­
cultural production  took the fo rm  o f  con vers ion  o f  land under glutinous r ice
to the cultivation o f  non-glutinous r ic e .  During the F F Y P  fo r  example
(35)7, 120, 000 m ou w ere reported  to have been affected in this way. If it is 
assumed that the average yield o f  non-glutinous r ice  on this land was 3 50 
chin per m ou the change in cropping pattern would have in creased  food 
supplies by  2 ,492  m illion  chin. To this extent the in crea se  in the total 
output of r ice  between the 1930's and 1950's is in real term s understated 
by  the data presented  in Table VI. 15.
The wheat estim ates reveal a m ore  depressing  p icture . During 1952- 
57 the 20% fall in sown area (com pared  with the p r e -w a r  figure) com bined 
with the 25% fall in yields resulted in a decline in total output of about 40% 
o v e r  the p r e -w a r  leve l .  N or was there any sign o f  r e c o v e r y  within the
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period ; on the con trary , both sown area and yields w ere  low er  at the end 
o f  the F F Y P  than they had been at the beginning. Even in the best year ,
1955, production  was o ver  30% down on the average f igure o f  the 1930 's.
In view  o f  the v e r y  wide gaps between the two per iods  it would seem  
reasonable to conclude that the perform an ce  o f  wheat after 1949 was one 
o f  the signal fa ilu res  o f  agricultural p o licy  in Kiangsu. H owever, although 
the data certa in ly  support that conclusion  som e qualifications need to be 
m ade.
F o r  exam ple, Chao Kang has proposed  that available in form ation
exaggerates the gap between wheat production be fo re  and after 1949.
Although part o f  his argument relates to the question o f  re liab ility  o f  p r e -
(36)war data, his m ost  interesting contention is that the statistics  o f  the
two periods  lack  a com m on  base becuase of the use o f  d ifferent y ie ld  c o n ­
cepts . Thus, the yields estim ated by Buck and Chang and the N .A .  R. B. 
are "harvest  r a te s " ,  defined as output per unit o f  the harvested  area
while those supplied by  o f f ic ia l  data after 1949 are c rop  y ie lds , o r  output
(37)per unit o f  sown area. This means that any land which failed to yield
a harvest - say, because  of natural d isasters  - is excluded from  the p r e -w a r  
calculations but included in those o f  the 1950 's. The result is o f  cou rse  to 
inflate p r e -w a r  yield  estim ates .
A  second  point which should be considered  is that part o f  the long -run  
decline in wheat production  m ay  have been due to deliberate  governm ent 
p o licy  o f  contracting wheat in favour o f  h igher yielding food  c r o p s .  This 
is a question which w ill be examined la ter  in this chapter, but fo r  the present 
it is sufficient to say that there is evidence o f  such a trend in the 1950's .
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Its m ost  obvious e ffect  was seen  in the falling sown area of wheat; but 
y ields w ere  also l ik e ly  to be affected. F o r  it can be assum ed that the land 
tra n s ferred  fr o m  wheat to other crop s  was o f  re la tive ly  high quality and that 
the average yields on the land that rem ained under wheat w ere ,  ce ter is  
p ar ibu s , d ep ressed .
N everth e less , we would suggest that our or ig ina l conclusion  that wheat's 
p er form an ce  m arked  a fa ilure  o f  agricultural p o l icy  in the 1950's still holds 
true. Even accepting that the decline in production re flected  governm ent 
p o licy  and the use o f  d ifferent conceptual fram ew orks  in the two p er iods ,  
it is unlikely that these fa c tors  could have accounted fo r  a fall of alm ost 
30% in yields and certa in ly  there is no reason  to suppose that they could 
explain the even la r g e r  decline in total output.
The broad  conclusions  which em erge  fro m  the soya  data are consistent 
with the findings o f  the previous chapter. Given that soya  was a 'r ich '  
c ro p ,  there was like ly  to be a d irect  co rre la t ion  between changes in its 
sown area and the general state of the agricultural econom y. On the 
evidence o f  chapter five agricultural conditions in Kiangsu in the 1950's 
w ere  fa r  f r o m  healthy and in such c ircu m stan ces  a contraction  o f  soya 
production was to be expected . This was p r e c is e ly  what seem s to have 
happened and as a result the p r e -w a r  leve l o f  production  o f  this crop  was 
not re-atta ined  in the prov ince .
In m any ways the cotton estim ates are the m ost  interesting of all those
shown. They exem plify  w ell the constraints upon planners during the F irs t
Plan p er iod  and the way in which such p re ssu re s  could frustrate attempts
to regain and surpass p r e -w a r  levels  o f  production. On average, p rov incia l
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(by som e 6%). H ow ever, because  o f  the com petition  fo r  arable land
(38)between food  grains and econ om ic  crops  the potential fo r  extending 
the sown area under cotton was lim ited . In fact, at the end of the F F Y P  
there was a contraction  o f  the existing sown area. Although yields w ere 
higher than in the p r e -w a r  period  the in crease  was not sufficient to o ffset  
the decline in area  and the net result was that total output rem ained below 
that o f  the 1930 's . But against this failure has to be set the v e r y  large 
r ises  in yields o f  1955 and 1957 which showed that even with a declining 
sown area cotton production could still surpass the p r e -w a r  leve l.
So far  the com parisons  we have made have been  in term s of total 
output and som e attempt m ust now be made to examine p er  capita lev e ls .  
P e r  capita output during the 1930's can be estim ated by using the rural
(39)population figure o f  32 ,640 , 000 which was derived  in chapter one.
The results are presented  in the following table side by  side with figures 
showing production  p er  head of rural population during the 1950's;
yields of cotton were higher during 1952-57 than they were in the 1930's
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Table VI. 17; Output per  head o f  rural population o f  r ice ,  
wheat, soya and cotton in Kiangsu in the 
1 9 3 0 's and 1 95 0 's .
P e r  capita Index with
1930's
___________  average = 100,
( chin)
RICE:
1933-37 330 .90  100.00
1952-57 314 .38  95.01
1952 291 .75  88.17
1957 336 .05  101.56
WHEAT:
1931-37 175.77 100.00
1952-57 90 .43  51.45
1952 91 .02  51.78
1957 78 .82  4 4 .84
1955 102.86 58.52
SOYA;
1931-37 65 .96  100.00
1952 36 .50  55.34
1957 3 2 .95  49 .95
COTTON:
1931-37 10.67 100.00
1952-57 8 .59  80.51
1952 7 .17  67 .20
1957 9 .72  91.10
1955 12.47 116.87
Source ; As Table VI. 15 and Appendix B.
The table serv es  m ainly to add another d im ension  to the conclusions
drawn fro m  the com parative  indicators  of total output. Thus, even when
account has been taken o f  d iffering statistical concepts  and deliberate
changes in the structure o f  production, the enorm ous gaps between the
per capita production  o f  the 1930's and 1950's highlight the extrem ely
poor  p er fo rm an ce  of wheat and soya. By contrast, the r ice  estim ates
admit of a m o r e  favourable interpretation. Although average per capita
-515 -
output during the 1950's appears to have rem ained below  the p r e -w a r  leve l,  
in view  of the uncertainty o f  the production and population data fo r  the 
1930's the d ifferentia l o f 8. 5% m ust be con s idered  sm all enough to lie  
within the m arg in  o f  statistical e r r o r .  The com p a r ison  between the 1957 
figure and the 1933-37 average lends further support to our ea r l ie r  
op tim istic  assessm en t  o f  the p er form an ce  o f  r ice  during the p o s t - 1949 
y e a rs .  On this basis  and bearing in mind the n e c e s s a r y  upward adjustment 
o f  r ic e  yields in the 1950's to com pensate fo r  the d iscre p a n cy  between 
harvest and crop  yields and the la r g e -s c a le  con vers ion  o f  land fro m  
glutinous to non-glutinous r ice  production, we would argue that by the end 
o f  the F F Y P  per  capita  availability of r ice  fo r  human consum ption had 
reached a new peak.
It is  d ifficult to know whether the p er form an ce  o f  cotton should be 
c la ss if ied  as p oor ,  alongside that o f  wheat and soya, o r  placed  m o re  fa v o u r ­
ably with that o f  r i c e .  The p er  capita data suggest s trong ly  that p r e -w a r  
leve ls  o f  output w ere  not re-attained during the p o s t -w a r  period  (except 
b r ie f ly  in 1955). But to put this into p ersp ective  it needs to be reiterated  
that the sown area  was con s iderab ly  le ss  in the 1950's while unit area 
yields w ere  h igher. Further, it is arguable that the susceptib ility  o f  cotton 
production  to fluctuations in the face o f  natural d isa sters  resulted in a 
significant d ifferen ce  between crop  and harvest y ie ld s .  In sum , the gap 
between p er  capita output leve ls  shown in VI.17 m ay  w ell overstate  the 
true position .
F inally , notice  that a low er  per  capita output m ust not be equated with 
low er  p er  capita consum ption. Although in form ation  is insufficient to
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make an em p ir ica l  investigation , a p r io r i  we would suggest that consum ption 
leve ls  fo r  the m a jo r ity  w ere probably  higher during the F F Y P  period . The 
institutional fra m ew ork  of agriculture be fore  1949, with its high rates o f  
tenancy, heavy fragm entation, deteriorating in fra -s tru ctu re  and high 
indebtedness fo r  m any peasants, can only have resu lted  in an uneven 
distribution o f  production. But after 1949, although regional d ifferences  
w ere still con s iderab le , the introduction o f  the CPCS system  seem s to have 
worked quite w ell in ensuring that all peasants re ce iv e d  adequate supplies 
o f  food. If this is so the econ om ic  lo s se s  im plied  by  declining long -run 
trends in production  w ere partia lly  o ffset  by  the w elfare  gains of im proved  
distribution.
Changes in the structure o f  agricultural production  have so far been 
viewed only in the lim ited  context o f  the four c rop s  we have been examining. 
We shall now broaden  that fram ew ork  by considering  changes in a much 
la r g e r  varie ty  of c r o p s .  The relevant in form ation  is set out in the table 
on the following page;
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d iffer  fr o m  those shown in e a r l ie r  tables . Sun Ching-chih  alone gives a
com plete  breakdown o f  the sown areas and total output of the m ost  important
(40)crops  in 1957 and they are reproduced  without com m ent. In the 1930's
Chang H sin - i  and the N. A. R. B. both provided detailed in form ation  on area 
and output o f  all the m ain crops  and except as noted above we have taken 
the average of the estim ates in these two s o u rce s .
The sown areas of cotton, peanuts and rapeseed  are included fo r  their 
own interest .  H ow ever, in the absence o f  in form ation  fo r  other e con om ic  
crops  it is obv iou sly  difficult to draw any genera l conclusions  from  them. 
That the cotton acreage  declined in the 1950's in response  to the demand 
fo r  m o re  land to grow  food  grains has already been  established. But it 
would be interesting to know if  the decline was also o ffset  by  an in crease  
in the cultivation o f  other e con om ic  cro p s .
The data fo r  food  grains reveal a much c le a r e r  pattern; although the 
total sown area was only 2% higher in 1957 than in the p r e -w a r  yea rs ,  som e 
v e r y  significant changes o c c u rr e d  within individual ca tegor ies  o f food  c ro p s .  
S pec if ica lly ,  the sown area and output o f  wheat, b a r ley ,  kaoliang (sorghum ) 
and soya  all declined , while the cultivation o f  r ic e ,  m a ize ,  sweet potatoes 
and oats was extended. The question which m ust now be asked is ; given 
that these changes represented  deliberate governm ent d e c is io n s ,  what 
was their  e co n o m ic  rationale?  Did the shifts in the com posit ion  o f  output 
o f fe r  any contribution to solving the agricultural p rob lem s  that w ere 
em erging in Kiangsu during the 1950's?
The point has a lready been made that the estim ates o f  output presented
Because of the use of different sources some of the estim ates in VI. 18
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in e a r l ie r  tables tell us nothing about d istribution. Even if  they did they
would only provide  one m easu re  o f  consum ption, that o f  weight. A  m o re
useful m easu re  is that o f energy  as given by the ca lo r ie  content o f  production.
Thus, Chang H s in - i ,  com m enting on som e o f  his Kiangsu data: . . one
m ou o f  paddy can produce 278 chin, whereas the sam e m ou can only y ie ld
132 chin o f  wheat. F o r  e v e ry  hundred chin o f  r ice  it is  poss ib le  to m ill
70 chin o f  hulled r ice ;  fo r  wheat the corresponding  amount is only 75 chin
o f  f lou r . Thus, a m ou o f  land can produce about 200 chin o f  hulled r ice
com pared  with le s s  than 100 chin o f  f lour  in the case o f  wheat (one chin o f
hulled r ice  and one chin o f  w heat-flour  having approxim ately  the same
(41)nutritional value). ,,v '  In these c ir cu m sta n ce s ,  w here land was s ca rce
and there was a high m an-land  ratio r ice  was naturally to be p re fe r re d  to 
whe at.
What Chang was re ferr in g  to was the ca lo r ie  y ie ld  o f  d ifferent cro p s .
In the following table we illustrate his point by  showing the ca lo r ie  yields 
o f  the four m ost  im portant food  crops  grown in Kiangsu during the 1950's;
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The greatest num ber o f  ca lo r ie s  per hectare  is supplied by  r ice ,  
fo llow ed by  m aize  and sweet potatoes. Wheat, gen era lly  cons idered  the 
second m ost  im portant crop  in China, gives the low est  ca lo r ie  yield - only 
28 .77%  o f  that o f  r ic e .  The im plications of these d ifferentia ls  are extrem ely  
im portant, fo r  they suggest that a rational p o l icy  would shift the cropping 
pattern towards the cultivation o f  m o re  r ic e ,  m aize  and sweet potatoes 
and away f ro m  that o f  wheat and other grains.
In these term s  the real e con om ic  significance o f  the trends shown in 
Table VI. 18 b e co m e s  c le a r .  In the context o f a rapidly expanding population 
(and with output growing only slowly) the use o f  a large  amount of land to 
grow  lo w -e n e r g y  c rop s  such as wheat and b a r ley  made little e con om ic  
sense . Of co u rse ,  the econ om ic  im plications o f  the data in VI. 19 should 
not be allowed to concea l the fact that switching f r o m  the cultivation o f  one 
crop  to another was not an e ffor t less  operation. Natural conditions, fa ctor  
supplies and even cultural fa c tors  (the question o f  taste) could all obstruct 
the attempt to rationalize cropping patterns. But even with such lim itations 
the magnitude o f  the changes in the com position  o f  output which had taken 
place s ince  the 1930's was im p re s s iv e ,  as the f igures  below  suggest:
Table VI. 20: The trend towards high energy -y ie ld ing
crops  in Kiangsu._________________________
Sown area; 1930's Sown area; 1957
R ice ,  m aize  and
sweet potatoes 3 6 ,237 ,2 12  m ou 47, 390, 000 m ou
Wheat, kaoliang, 61, 296 ,375 45 ,950 , 000
and b a r ley
S ource ; Table VI. 18.
C lea r ly ,  planning had brought about a m o re  e con om ica lly -ra t ion a l
cropping pattern. By 1957 not only had the im balance between high and
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low energy -y ie ld ing  crops  had been la rge ly  rem oved , but crops  such as 
r ice  and m aize  also occup ied  a la rg e r  proportion  o f  the arable area.
The e con om ic  rationality of the p o licy  is c le a r ly  seen  in the following data 
showing the changes which took place in the sown areas o f  four individual 
c r o p s ;
Table VI. 21; Changes in the sown area  o f  r ic e ,  wheat, 
m aize  and sweet potatoes between the 
1930's and 1957.____________________________
SOWN AR EA OF THE INDIVIDUAL CROPS AS A P E R C E N ­
TAGE OF THE T O TA L FOOD GRAIN SOWN AR EA:*
R ice  Wheat Maize Sweet potatoes
1930's 24 .38  31 .52  4 .22  2 .68
1957 27 .66  26.77 7 .9 4  4 .50
* Sown area as shown in VI. 18.
Source: Table VI. 18.
In other w ord s ,  the prediction  that r ic e ,  m aize  and sweet potatoes
should be extended by the greatest amount (and in that o rd e r  ) is apparently
entire ly  borne out by  what happened in Kiangsu after 1949.
A c ro p  whose fortunes experienced  a dram atic  change between the
1930's and the 1950's was oats. Even when the n e c e s s a r y  upward adjust-
(42)
ment o f  the sown area has been made it seem s c le a r  that in percentage 
term s the expansion o f  this crop  was greater  than fo r  any other. The 
explanation is c le a r  enough; one o f  the m ost seriou s  constraints on a g r i ­
cultural growth during the F F Y P  was the c r it ica l  shortage o f  draft animals. 
In turn, there is  evidence that one of the principal fa c tors  limiting an 
in cre a se  in their  num bers was a shortage o f  fodder . It is this, we would 
suggest, that was responsib le  fo r  the enorm ous extension of the oats sown 
area between the two p er iod s .
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This leads naturally to a brief examination of draft animal supplies
in the 1930’ s and 1950 's. Table VI. 22 contains the relevant data:
Table VI. 22; The supply o f  draft animals in Kiangsu 
during the 1930 's, 1940's and 1950's.
Total num ber 
of draft animals 1934-35 popu­
lation = 100.00
Index with A verage  burden 
o f  arable land 
per  draft animal
1934-35 3 ,302 , 000
1946-47 2 ,3 9 0 ,0 0 0
1952 1 ,790 , 000
1957 1 ,880 , 000
1 0 0 . 0 27. 77 mou
72. 38
54.21 51. 97
56. 94 50. 00
Sources : Total num bers fr o m  Tables V. 57 and VI. 13.
Arable  area estim ates based  on total arable 
area data in Tables V. 4 and VI. 3.
The figures graph ica lly  d escr ib e  the c r it ica l  situation. At the end of 
the F irs t  Plan draft animal num bers w ere little m o r e  than half that o f  the 
m id -1 9 3 0 's .  M o re o v e r ,  the decline was a secu lar  one; far fro m  re c o v e r y  
having taken place after 1949, the downward trend which had begun during 
the war continued into the 1950's .
The e con om ic  im plications o f  this are seen in the final colum n. If
the m axim um  amount o f  land that could be s e rv ice d  by  an animal was 30
(43)m ou, the estim ates indicate that the situation was transform ed  from  
one in which supplies o f  draft animals w ere about adequate to one in which 
there existed  a grave d e fic ien cy . In fact, because  o f  the fa ilure  to d ist in ­
guish between total and working beasts o r  to co n s id er  regional d ifferentials  
talk o f  "adequate" supplies o f  draft animals in the 1930's is o v e r -o p t im is t ic .  
H ow ever, in view of the high rate o f  s ickness in 1956 and 1957 it is l ike ly  
that taking these factors  into account would m e r e ly  heighten the long-run  
deterioration  shown in the table.
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There remains a f in a l  question: what was the impact o f  the changing 
cropping pattern upon per capita leve ls  o f  grain output and per capita ca lo r ie  
a v a ila b i l i ty ?  The following table provides a tentative answer:
Table 22a: Grain output and c a lo r i f i c  a v a i la b i l i ty :  
the s ituation  in the 1930’ s and 1950's.
1990’ s 1951 1957
Total output o f  
a l l  food grains 
(m illion  chin)
Output o f  a l l  food 
grains per head o f  
to ta l population 
(chin)
Output o f  a l l  food 
grains per head o f  
rural population 
(chin)
Total potentia l 
a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  
ca lo r ies  from a l l  
food grains per day 
(based on composi­
tion  o f  output) 
(m ill ,  ca lo r ie s )
Potential availa­
b i l i t y  o f  ca lor ies  
per head o f  to ta l 
population 
(ca lo r ies )
Potential availa­
b i l i t y  o f  ca lo r ies  
per head o f  rural 
population 
(ca lo r ies )
Calories per chin 
of a l l  food grains
26,894 24,414 28,244
771
824
609
683
629
720
96,732 86,441 98,656
2,772 2,156 2,195
2,964 2,419 2,516
1,559 1,557 1,550
Index o f  physical and 
c a l o r i f i c  output in 
1950’ s with 1930's = 100
1951
90.78
78.99
82.89
89.36
77.78
81.61
99.87
1957
105.02
81.58
87.38
101.99
79.18
84.89
99.42
It  is  a p ity  that data are not available which would permit us to show 
the s ituation  in 1952, the eve o f  the FFYP. However, as long as i t  is
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remembered that the 1951 figures do not fu l ly  r e f le c t  the recovery from the 
depressed wartime leve ls  o f  production, they may s t i l l  serve as a useful 
benchmark.
The figures suggest that although aggregate food grain output rose by some 
5% between the 1930s and 1957, the change in the composition o f  grain output 
only succeeded in bringing about a marginal r ise  in the to ta l  "output" o f  
ca lo r ie s .  The most outstanding success was in the case of r i c e ,  tota l ca lo r ie  
a v a ila b i l i ty  from this crop having increased by 57.6%. But this  very 
s ign if icant gain was o f fs e t  by the decline in the number o f  ca lo r ies  from 
wheat and barley, so that overall the improvement wrought by the changes in 
the composition of output was minimal. Indeed, as the f in a l  l in e  of Table VI.22a 
shows, the number o f  ca lo r ies  per chin o f  a l l  food grains was v ir tu a lly  
unchanged over the entire period.
In any case, the most strik ing feature o f  the table is  that any gain in 
aggregate terms was n u l l i f ie d  by the growth in population, p articu larly  between 
1951 and 1957. Although tota l c a l o r i f i c  a v a i la b i l i ty  in 1957 was more than 14% 
higher than in 1951, improvements in per capita terms were barely noticeable . 
Between the 1930s and 1957 physical grain output per head o f  to ta l and rural 
population in Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai) actually f e l l  by 18.4% and 12.6% 
respectively  and despite the very s light  r is e  in to ta l  ca lo r ie  a v a i la b i l i ty ,  
the lower ca lo r ie  cotitent per chin combined with the r ise  in population caused 
an even sharper f a l l  in the number o f  ca lor ies  available per head (by 20.8% 
and 15.1% for  to ta l  and rural population). Although i t  is  true that the 
production and population data underlying the ca lcu lations allow for  a wide 
range o f  error, the gaps are so large as to leave our conclusion in no doubt: 
between the 1930fs and the end o f  the FFYP agriculture had so far fa i led  to meet 
the demands placed upon i t  that per capita output o f  food grains (whether
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measured in physical or energy terms) had declined.
There is  one further q u a li f ica t io n :  that the data shown are province-wide 
averages which conceal possib le  regional variations. Id ea lly ,  we should have 
liked to derive per capita estimates of grain output for  each Special D is tr ic t  
in the 1930s and 1950s, but unfortunately data are not yet available to permit 
such an exerc ise . However, in the case o f  four o f  the D is tr ic ts  (Soochow, 
Sung-chiang, Yang-chou and Nan-t'ung) partiJ.l evidence is  available on the basis 
o f  which some tentative ca lcu lations  can be made. Their resu lts  are very 
suggestive, for  they indicate that in Soochow and Sung-chiang (the two richest 
areas in the province), per capita a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  ca lo r ie s  from selected food 
grains (wheat, r i c e ,  soya and sweet potatoes, information for  other crops being 
absent) had r isen  very s ig n if ica n t ly  between the 1930s and 1957, by 19.3% and 
46.7% resp ect ive ly .  By contrast, in the two 'medium-output' regions the 
s ituation  had apparently deteriorated dramatically: in Yang-chou per capita 
a v a i la b i l i ty  had declined by 31.6% and in Nan-t'ung, by 45.5% (a figure which 
lends added perspective to Nan-t'ung's decis ion  to expand i t s  grain area in 
1956-57). Whatever the weaknesses o f  the data which underlie these resu lts  -  
and they are many -  they are s t i l l  o f  the greatest in te re st .  For not only do 
they support the existence o f  the familiar economic dichotomy between north 
and south Kiangsu, but they also suggest that i t  was becoming more, not le s s ,  
pronounced over time.
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V Conclusion: The Agricultural Sector in Kiangsu on the Eve of the
"G reat Leap F o rw a rd ".
Much o f  this thesis has been devoted to d escr ib in g  the cou rse  o f  the 
various campaigns designed to bring about a g rea ter  degree  o f  fo rm al 
co -o p e ra t io n  among peasants in the agricultural s e c to r  o f  Kiangsu. The 
land re fo rm , the M AT m ovem ent, the co -op era t iv iza t ion  and co llectiv iza tion  
cam paigns w ere  all m eans towards this end. We have also analyzed in 
som e detail the econ om ic  (and other) effects  o f  these changes upon the 
p er form an ce  o f  the agricultural s e c to r .  The determ ination  and p u rp o se ­
fulness with which the institutional ob ject ives  w ere  pursued undoubtedly 
re flect  the w idespread  confidence that agricultural socia liza tion  provided 
an answer to agricultural stagnation and a key to future growth.
Yet in contrast to such feelings o f  optim ism , what has em erged  m ost  
strongly fro m  the analysis o f  quantitative trends in Kiangsu agriculture 
in the last two chapters has been a sense o f  stagnation and even decline . 
F ro m  the standpoint o f  1957, the final years o f  the F F Y P , the p er form an ce  
o f  agriculture in the prov ince  was disappointing. In term s  o f  the demands 
o f  e con om ic  developm ent the achievements o f  the previous five years w ere 
not im p re s s iv e .  Although there was som e sign o f  im provem ent, the lon g -  
run trends could be interpreted  hardly m ore  favourably. It is true that 
the distribution o f  available production had b ecom e  m o re  equal and there 
had been important changes in the com position  o f  agricultural output 
(e sp e c ia l ly  food gra ins) which resulted in a m o re  e ffic ient utilization o f  
land. But such gains w ere  m o re  than offset  by  the fa ilure  to generate 
sustained growth. Notwithstanding the cla im s that p r e -w a r  levels  of 
production  w ere  re-attained in 1952, the evidence presented in this chapter
-5 2 5 -
indicates that in the case  of som e important crop s  output per  head o f  rural 
population and per  unit o f  arable area w ere below  the leve l  o f the 1930's 
even at the end o f  the F irs t  Plan.
Against this background what can we say about the ro le  of institutional 
change in Kiangsu after 1949? In the ear ly  years  o f  land re fo rm  and the 
M ATs we have argued that the inherent structure o f  individual farm s and the 
teams was an insufficient basis  fo r  any significant breakthrough in agricultural 
production. To repeat the argument o f  e a r l ie r  chapters , important though 
the consequence o f  land re fo rm  and the M ATs m ay  have been fo r  peasants 
as individuals, their  e con om ic  contribution to agricultural developm ent was 
lim ited . In particu lar , their failure to reach  those peasants whose e con om ic  
status made them the m ost  effic ient fa rm e rs  p laced  a sev ere  constraint upon 
their ability to generate growth. To this extent, the team s could represent 
no m o re  than a transitional stage on the road to grea ter  and m o re  form al 
agricultural c o -o p e ra t io n .
It is idle to speculate what the e con om ic  im pact o f  the APCs (both 
low er-a n d  h ig h e r -le v e l)  would have been i f  their  developm ent had adhered 
to the princip les  o f  voluntarism  and gradualism  em phasized  by Mao in his 
speech  o f  31 July, 1955. Certain ly  there is reason  to be lieve  that the sca le  
o f  the d ifficu lties  which in fact em erged  during 1955 and 1956 would have 
been dim inished - and th ere fore  the e con om ic  gains would have been greater . 
On the other hand, perhaps the dangers o f  c la ss  polarization  and growing 
capitalist tendencies would have m anifested  them selves  m o re  c le a r ly  thereby 
creating even m o re  intractable prob lem s in the agricultural s e c tor .
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The co incidence  o f  a period  o f  extraord inary  institutional change with 
one o f  extrem e natural conditions (both favourable and unfavourable) makes 
the interpretation  o f  events between 1954 and 1957 particu lar ly  d ifficult.
It is o f  co u rse  the dynam ic in ter-re lationsh ip  of these two sets o f fa ctors  
which determ ined  the p er form an ce  of the agricultural s e c to r  of Kiangsu 
during the last half o f  the F irs t  Plan. There can be no doubt that the in c o r ­
poration o f  the vast m a jor ity  o f  peasants into a fu l ly -s o c ia l is t  fram ew ork  
within a m atter  o f  months (between the sum m er o f  1955 and the spring of 
1956) was the sou rce  o f  serious  d is location  of fa rm  operations. This was 
bound to have an adverse  effect  on agricultural productiv ity . It was u n for ­
tunate too that 1955 happened to be a year  o f  unusually favourable c lim atic  
conditions, fo r  it was too easy  to interpret the bum per harvest so le ly  as a 
v indication o f  the agricultural co -o p e ra t iv e s  and so to fee l  increasing  ju s t i ­
fication  fo r  setting up the fu l ly -so c ia l is t  c o l le c t iv e s .  By the same token, 
notwithstanding the evidence that the co llec t ives  m ay have succeeded  in 
averting the w orst  e ffects  o f  the 1956 natural d isa s te rs ,  it was just as easy  
to attribute sharply  falling production and declining living standards in that 
year  to p r e c is e ly  the sam e fa c to rs .  In both cases  preoccupation  with the 
co -op era t iv iza t ion  and co llectiv iza tion  campaigns d iverted  attention fro m  
other relevant fa c tors  and prevented a p roper  analysis o f  the situation. The 
result was that existing prob lem s w ere  m e r e ly  com pounded.
T h e re fo re ,  while hesitating to ca ll the original d ec is ion  to acce lerate
co -op era t iv iza t ion  m isco n ce iv e d  we would argue that the way in which it was
im plem ented negated the positive role  which it could have played. That
grea ter  co -o p e ra t io n  had a contribution to make is in no doubt; the traditional
fo rm s  o f  sharing and mutual help which the C C P itse lf  drew  upon in the ear ly
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1 9 5 0 's w ere evidence o f  that. What is m ore  doubtful is whether an 
elaboration  and ibrm alization o f  these form s  could on their  own lead to 
sustained growth. The bias against agriculture in the investment plans 
left institutional change as a kind o f  deus ex m achina whose appearance 
would som ehow  rem ove  all the obstacles  to agricultural growth. Yet many 
o f  those p rob lem s w ere  s im ply  not susceptible  to an institutional solution. 
Rather they arose  f r o m  agronom ic , dem ographic  and purely  econ om ic  
fa c tors  and their  solution required  not m ere  re -o rg a n iza t ion  o f  existing 
patterns of farm ing but the introduction o f  new ones .
In short, there seem s good reason  to attribute the deterioration  o f  a g r i ­
culture in Kiangsu during the 1950's to the failure o f  the planners to provide 
la r g e - s c a le  investm ent funds to that s e c to r .  The inability o f  institutional 
change on its own to generate growth, the cr it ica l  shortages of labour and 
draft animals and indeed the e f f ic ien cy  with which the traditional technology 
was a lready being exploited  all re flected  the need fo r  m odern  inputs and 
som e degree  o f  agricultural m echanization .
H ow ever, the plans published ear ly  in 1958 show that involution, not
revolution, was to rem ain  the engine o f  future agricultural developm ent in
the p rov in ce .  In the light o f  the experience  o f  the previous  five years  the
targets look  absurdly high: food grain production to r ise  by 14% in 1958 alone
and by 44% by 1962 (the en d -year  of the putative Second F ive Year Plan).
Cotton output was to in crease  by  25% in 1958; o i l -b e a r in g  crops  by 13%:
(44)and draft animal num bers by  6 .2% . Even with the d ivers ion  o f  in v est ­
ment re so u rce s  fro m  the industrial to the agricultural s e c to r  such plans 
would have appeared am bitious. But no such change in e con om ic  p r ior it ies
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was contem plated. Instead, em phasis continued to be p laced  on the m ass 
m obilization  o f  labour into irr iga tion  construction  p r o je c ts ,  the co llect ion  
and application o f  greater  amounts of organic f e r t i l iz e r s  and the further 
rationalization o f  cropping patterns. Against the background o f  agricu lture 's  
per form an ce  during the F irs t  Plan period  it seem s safe to say that even 
b e fore  the "great  leap fo rw a rd "  was under way, the evidence pointed to 
its eventual dem ise  in Kiangsu.
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Notes to Chapter Six
It is true that after 1931 (but excluding the w a r -y e a r s  1938-45) 
data relating to agricultural production throughout China w ere  
co lle c ted  and published annually by the National Agricu ltura l 
R e se a rch  Bureau. But they w ere  not com piled  on a scien tif ic  
basis  and w ere  far  fr o m  satis factory . See below .
F o r  exam ple H B, op. cit. , p. 22 gives a total arable area fo r  Kiangsu 
of 8 0 ,0 0 9 ,7 2 5  m ou, but goes on to cite another estim ate o f  9 1 ,399 ,6 80  
m ou. The d ifferen ce  o f  11 ,389 ,9 55  m ou (a lm ost 15%) is said to be 
" .  . . m ain ly  due to lack  o f  a standard system  o f  m e a s u r e s " .
Actually  it also contains som e data fr o m  the late 1920 's. In the case  
of Kiangsu fo r  example estim ates relating to I -hsing , K iang-tu (2) 
and T u ng-t 'a i  hsien re fe r  to 1925-26. See Buck, Statistical V o lu m e , 
op. c i t . , p. 468.
Ib id . ,  v o l . l ,  chapter 2.
Ib id .,  v o l . l ,  p . ix ,  Table 1.
The num ber of hsien d iffered  between the 1930's and 1950's but the 
d ifferen ce  can be ignored  fo r  the purposes o f  this chapter.
Buck, v o l . l ,  op. c i t . , p . ix .
T .C .  Liu, C. Twanmo and K. C. Yeh, Production  o f  Food  Crops on 
the Chinese Mainland; P rew ar  and Postw ar, The Rand C orporation , 
1964, p p . 53-54 .
And such hsien are in the m ajor ity .
Not that B uck 's  translation fro m  the Chinese is un iform ly  reliable ; 
in his Statistical V olum e, p. 208, a table purports to show "a  c o m ­
p arison  o f  average, norm al and m ost  frequent y ie lds . . . "  H ow ever, 
the Chinese title to this sam e table shows that the te rm  translated 
as "norm al y ie ld "  ( feng-n ien  ch 'a n -l ia n g ) is actually "production  in 
a bu m p er-h arves t  y e a r "  - a m istranslation  which is c le a r  fro m  the 
f igures given in the table.
Actually  the or ig ina l data fro m  which the N. A. R. B. estim ates w ere  
d er ived  w ere  co lle c ted  under the auspices o f  the Bureau o f  Statistics 
o f  the Leg isla tive  Yttan; and b e fore  the establishm ent o f  the N. A. R. B. 
in 1932 the w ork  o f  c rop  reporting was organ ized  by  the Department 
o f  A gricu ltura l E con om ics  in the U niversity  o f  Nanking. The N. A. R. B 
data w ere  published in a se r ies  o f  Crop Reports  (N ung-ch 'ing p a o -k a o ) , 
although they also appeared in a variety  of other s o u rce s .
(The account o f  the N. A. R. B. reports  that fo llow s is la rg e ly  based 
on Liu, Twanmo and Yeh, op. cit. , e sp e c ia l ly  Appendix B, "National 
A gricu ltu ra l R e se a rch  B ureau 's  Estim ates o f  P rew ar  Production  o f  
F ood  C r o p s ". )
Since Chang's survey  provided estim ates of total arable area and 
unit area yields in "n o rm a l"  yea rs ,  these f igures  served  as the basis  
on which the N. A. R. B. reports  w ere  drawn up. That is ,  each year 
in form ation  was sent in f r o m  all over  China giving details o f  the 
p roportion  o f  arable area under various c r o p s ,  and yields exp ressed  
as a percentage o f  the "n o rm a l"  yield. By applying these to Chang's 
orig ina l data estim ates for  every  province  could be obtained and o f  
co u rse  total output was eas ily  derived  as w ell.
Chang's orig inal survey  had included 25 p ro v in ce s .  H ow ever, after 
1931 the northeastern  provinces  o f  Manchuria w ere occup ied  by the 
Japanese fo r c e s .
Liu, Twanmo and Yeh, op. c i t . , p. 38.
Buck, Statistical V olum e, op. c i t . , pp. 21 -29 .
Ibid . , vol.  1 , p .  16 .
Liu, Twanmo and Yeh, op. c i t . , p. 38.
The total prov incia l data are given in C .C .  Chang, An Estim ate of 
China's F arm s and C r o p s , Nanking, 1932. The detailed hsien data 
can be found in his "K e-sheng  nung-yeh kai-k 'uang k u -ch i  p a o -k a o "
( "A  Statistical Report o f  the A gricu ltura l Situation in E v ery  P ro v in ce " )  
in T 'u n g -ch i  ytteh-pao (Statistical Monthly), vo l .  2, no. 7, pp. 23 -51 . 
There are som e m in or  inconsistencies  between these two sou rces  but 
it is c le a r  that they are unintended.
Chang H sin - i  in T 'u n g -ch i  ytteh-pao, op. cit. , p. 23.
Total arable and sown area are fo r  1952. See Table V. 10.
This f igure , com piled  by  the Statistical O ffice  o f  the M inistry of 
A gricu ltu re  and F o r e s t r y  fro m  data published in June, 1948 by the 
D irectora te  o f  Statistics in the National G overnm ent and fro m  data 
reported  by  the Department o f  Rural E con om ics  o f  the M inistry , is 
c ited  by  T .H . Shen, op. c i t . , p. 142, Table 7.
Chao Kang, op. c i t . , p. 217.
Liu and Yeh, op. c i t . , pp. 284-289. But note that the figure they 
derive  (400 chin p er  m ou in the case  o f  Kiangsu) is f o r  non-glutinous 
r ice  only.
Ibid . , p p . 297-298.
HB, (Chinese-language edition), p. 217.
This low  figure is presum ably  a re flect ion  o f  the im pact o f  the Sino- 
Japanese W ar. Wu T 'ieh -fen g  suggests that 5, 110,200 m ou o f  wheat 
was used fo r  m ilita ry  purposes in Kiangsu, reducing the sown area
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under this c rop  fro m  34, 068, 000 to 28, 957, 800 m ou. See his 
F e i-ch 'a n g  s h ih -ch 'i  chih nung-m in, op. c i t . , p. 87
This would o f  cou rse  have included a large  part o f  Kiangsu.
Chao Kang, op. c i t . , pp. 218-219.
That is ,  the average fo r  1931-37.
But fo r  som e background in form ation  on po lit ica l w a r -t im e  conditions 
in the prov ince  see above, chapter one.
Although relevant quantitative in form ation  is available fro m  only 
one sou rce  (N. A. R. B. ) the prob lem  o f  re liab ility  is not serious  as 
long as the bias in the figures is the sam e fo r  the 1930's and 1940 's.
Wang T zu -ch ia ,  Chan-shih Shang-hai c h in g -c h i , op. c i t .
Of c o u rse  r ice  m ay  not have been the only c ro p  to enjoy expansion.
The sown area  of other food  crops  not shown m ay also have in creased . 
In this context it is  interesting that the gain in r ice  was only 5 ,343 , 000 
m ou, while the decline in the cultivation o f  soya , wheat and cotton 
amounted to 17, 549, 000 m ou. Thus, there was plenty o f  land (over  
12, 000, 000 m ou) on which other food grains could have been grown.
"B e s t "  is s im ply  equated with the year in which total output is highest. 
Note that in the case  of r ic e ,  1957 is the best  year  in these term s and 
so only three estim ates are shown. And because  o f  lack  of in form ation  
only two estim ates are available fo r  soya in the 1950's .
HHJP, 1 0 /1 /5 8 ,  op. cit.
S pec if ica lly ,  that B uck 's  wheat y ield  estim ates are ov e r -s ta te d  for  
the reasons given in the last section  o f  this chapter.
Chao Kang, op. c i t . , p. 215.
This com petition  was of cou rse  all the m o re  intensive because  o f  the 
p oor  p er form an ce  o f  the food grain se c to r .
See above chapter one, Table I. 11.
Where his data d iffer  fro m  those used in e a r l ie r  tables the d ifferen ces  
are only m argina l.
Chang H sin - i  in T 'u n g -ch i  ytteh-pao, op. cit. , p. 49.
That is ,  because  it is  taken d irect ly  fro m  the N. A . R. B. data.
See above, chapter f ive , p. 443.
H TN Y K H TP, 1958, no. 2, op. c i t .
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APPENDIX A
Som e Tables fo r  G eneral R e feren ce .
Table A. 1; Kiangsu; a breakdown by 
Special D istr icts  and hsien
NAME OF SPECIAL 
DISTRICT
Sung-chiang
HSIEN BELONGING TO 
THAT SPECIAL DISTRICT
Sung-chiang 
Shang -hai 
C h 'uan-sha  
Nan-hui 
Feng -hsien  
Chin-shan 
C h 'in g -p 'u  
Chi a-ting 
P ao -sh an
Soochow C h 'ang-shu  
Wu
T 'a i - t s  'ang
K 'un-shan
W u-chiang
W u-chin
Wusih
Chi ang-yin
C hen-tse
Chinki ang
Y ang-chou
T an -t 'u  
T an-yang 
C h in -t 'an  
L i-yang 
K ao-ch 'u n  
L i-sh u i  
Chfi-jung 
Chi ang -ning 
I-hsing 
Yang-chung
Chiang-tu 
H an-ch i ang 
Kao -yu 
Pao -ying 
Hsing-hua 
T 'a i
T 'a i -h s in g  
C h ing-ch i ang 
L iu -ho 
I-cheng 
Chi ang-p 'u
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Table A . 1; (continued)
NAME OF SPECIAL 
DISTRICT
HSIEN BELONGING TO 
THAT SPECIAL DISTRICT
Nan-t'ung
Y en -ch 'en g
Hw ai - yin
Hsti-chou
Nan-t'ung
Ju-kao
Hai-an
Ju-tung
H ai-m en
Ch 'i-tung
Tsung -m ing
Y en -ch 'en g
Chien-hu
Fou-ning
Pin -ha i
H sieh-yang
T a-feng
T u ng-t 'a i
Hw ai - yin
Ssu-yang
S u -ch 'ien
Shu-yang
Kuan-yiin
L ien -shu i
H uai-an
Ssu-hung
Hsti-i
Hung-tse
T 'ung-shan
P 'e i
Kan-yti
Tung-hai
Feng
P 'i
H sin -che  
Sui -ning
Source; Wang W ei-p 'in g ,  op. c i t . , p. 4,
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ECONOMIC
REGION
T 'a i  Hu
N anking- 
Chinkiang
Table A . 2; The economic regions of Kiangsu
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE 
OF ECONOMIC REGION
Wu, C h 'ang-shu , K 'un- 
shan, W u-chiang, Wu- 
chin, Wusih, Chiang- 
yin and Chen-tse  hsien 
(Soochow Special 
D istr ict ) .
Sung-chiang, C h 'in g -p 'u , 
Chin-shan, Shang-hai and 
I-hsing hsien 
(Sung-chiang Special 
D istr ict ) .
C h in -t ' an hsien 
(Chinkiang Special 
D istr ict ) .
Soochow, Wusih, Ch 'ang- 
chou and C h 'ang-shu  shih 
(m unicip  alitie s ).
LO C A L
CHARACTERISTICS
F ertile  so i l .
Dense water 
network.
Lake T 'a i  Hu 
as vast ir r iga tion  
re s e r v o ir .
Double
cropping
paddy-wheat.
The high- 
output paddy 
region  o f  
Kiangsu.
An im portant 
production 
area fo r  
rapeseed
CROPPING
PATTERN
T an -t 'u , Chtl-jung, Tan- 
yang, L i-sh u i ,  Chiang- 
ning, L i-yang  and Kao - 
ch 'un hsien 
(Chinkiang Special 
D istr ict ) .
I -cheng , L iu -ho  and 
Chiang-p 'u  hsien 
(Y ang-chou  Special 
D istr ict ) .
Hstf-i hsien
(H w ai-yin  Special 
D istr ict ) .
Nanking and 
Chinkiang shih .
An area of 
hills  and diked 
f ie ld s .
Susceptible to 
frequent drought 
and flooding.
Suitable 
fo r  double 
cropping 
paddy-wheat 
(except fo r  
hills which 
favour 
f o r e s t r y )
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Table A . 2; (continued)
ECONOMIC
REGION
T 'ung - Y ang
L i -h s ia  ho
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE 
OF ECONOMIC REGION
LOCAL
CHARACTERISTICS
CROPPING
PATTERN
N an-t'ung, Ju-kao, H ai- 
an, Ju-tung, H ai-m en , 
C h 'i-tung and Tsung-m ing 
hsien
(Nan-t'ung Special 
D istr ict ) .
F en g -h s ien , Ch 'uan-sha, 
P a o -sh a n  and Chia-ting 
hsien
(Sung-chiang Special 
D istr ict ) .
Yang-chung hsien 
(Chinkiang Special 
D istr ict ) .
Ching-chiang, T ' ai - 
hsing and Chiang-tu 
hsien
(Y ang-chou  Special 
D istr ict ) .
Nan-t 'ung, Yang-chou 
and T 'a i - c h o u  shih.
Climate s im ila r  
to that o f  T 'a i  Hu.
M ostly  high- 
lying agricultural 
land.
Mixed crop  
region  o f  
grain and 
cotton .
A high- 
output area 
of other 
econ om ic  
crop s  and 
wheat.
Y en -ch 'en g , Chien-hu, 
Fou -n ing , P in -ha i, H sieh- 
yang, T a -feng  and Tung 
t 'a i  hsien
(Y en -ch 'en g  Special 
D istr ict ) .
K ao-yu , P ao-y ing  and 
H sing-hua hsien 
(Y ang-chou  Special 
D istr ict ) .
H wai-an hsien 
H w ai-y in  Special 
D istr ict ) .
Flat and low -ly ing  
ground.
High su b -su r fa ce  
water lev e l .
M ostly
double
cropping
paddy-wheat.
R ecla im ed  
coasta l land 
suitable fo r  
cotton.
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Table A . 2; (continued)
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE
REGION OF ECONOMIC REGION
Hsti-Hwai T 'ung-shan , P ’i,  Kan-yii,
Tung-hai, Feng, P ’ei, 
H sin -che  and Sui-ning 
hsien
(Hsti-chou Special 
D istr ict ) .
Ssu-yang, S u -ch 'ien ,  Shu- 
yang, Kuan-ytin, L ien -  
shui and Ssu-hung hsien 
(H w ai-yin  Special 
D istr ict ) .
Hsti-chou, H sin -h a i- l ien  
and Ch'ing -chiang shih.
LO CAL
CH ARAC TE RIS TICS
Heavy damage by 
drought and flooding 
in the past.
Unstable autumn 
crop  production.
M is c e l la -  
eous gra ins, 
soya and 
peanuts the 
ch ief c r o p s .
An im p o r ­
tant wheat 
region.
Land also 
suitable 
fo r  cotton.
CROPPING
PATTERN
Source: CKN YCCHW T, op. c i t . , p. 231, Table 20.
* Some re fe ren ce  maps will be found at the end o f  the thes is .
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APPENDIX B
An Estim ate o f  the Total, Urban, Rural and A gricu ltura l Population 
o f  Kiangsu, 1949-1957 .
The average rate o f  growth o f  total population in Kiangsu between 1950 
and 1956 was 2 .26%  p. a. ^  On the assumption that this is a compound 
figure and that it applies also to 1949-50 and 1956-57 an index o f  population 
growth in the prov ince  can e a s ily  be derived;
Table B. 1; An index o f  population growth in Kiangsu
(including Shanghai) between 1949 and 1957.
1949  1 00. 00
1950 102.260
1951 104.571
1952 106.934
1953 109.351
1954 111.822
1955 114.349
1956 116.933
1957 119.576
Source ; W en-hui p ao , 2 1 /3 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
(2 )But we also know fro m  another s o u r ce '  that K iangsu's total population 
(including Shanghai) in 1957 was 52, 130, 000. T h e re fo re ,  extrapolating fro m  
the 1957 index given in Table B. 1, population in 1949 m ust have been;
S  x 52- i 3 o - o o °
= 4 3 ,5 9 5 ,7 0 0 .
F ro m  this the full s e r ie s  o f  total population estim ates can be found;
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1949 4 3 ,5 9 5 ,7 0 0
1950 44 ,5 8 0 ,9 6 3
1951 4 5 ,5 8 8 ,4 5 9
1952 4 6 ,6 1 8 ,6 2 6
1953 4 7 ,6 7 2 ,3 3 4
1954 4 8 ,7 4 9 ,5 8 4
1955 4 9 ,851 ,2 47
1956 5 0 ,977 ,7 60
1957 52 ,1 3 0 ,0 0 0
Source : Table B . l .
In 1956 the urban population o f  Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai) was
(3)5, 600, 000. If we subtract Shanghai's population fr o m  the total figure
fo r  that year  shown in Table B. 2, we can show what proportion  o f  total
population was represented  by  urban population;
Table B .3 ;  Urban population as a proportion  of
total population in Kiangsu (excluding 
Shanghai) in 1956.______________________
Total population o f  
Kiangsu (in cl .  Shanghai), 1956; 50 ,9 7 7 ,7 6 0  a
Population o f  Shanghai, 1956; 6 ,7 5 0 , 000
Total population o f  Kiangsu (exc l .
Shanghai), 1956; 4 4 ,2 2 7 ,7 6 0
Urban population o f  Kiangsu 
(e x c l .  Shanghai), 1956; 5 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0  °
T h ere fore  urban population 
as percentage o f  total
population in 1956; 12.66
S ources ; a Table B .2 .
b C .B .  Howe, Em ploym ent and E con om ic  
Growth in Urban China, 1949-1957, 
op. c i t . , p. 34.
c W en-hui pao, 2 1 /3 /5 7 ,  op. c i t . , p. 2.
Table B .2 ; The total population of Kiangsu (including
Shanghai), 1949-57 .__________________________
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o f urban population it is also p oss ib le  to show urban population as a
p roportion  o f  total population, including Shanghai;
Table B .4 ;  Urban population as a proportion  o f  total 
population in Kiangsu (including Shanghai) 
in 1956._______________________________________
Urban population o f  Kiangsu 
(excluding Shanghai), 1956; 5 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0
Population o f  Shanghai, 1956; 6 ,7 5 0 ,0 0 0
T h ere fore  total urban 
population o f  Kiangsu
(including Shanghai), 1956; 12 ,350 ,0 00
Total population o f  Kiangsu 
(including Shanghai), 1956; 50 ,977 , 760
T h ere fore  urban population 
as percentage o f  total 
population (including
Shanghai) in 1956; 24 .23
Source ; Table B .3 .
Between 1949 and 1957 the compound rate o f  growth of population in
(4)Shanghai was 4. 66% p. a. If we use this as a p roxy  fo r  the rate o f  growth
of total urban population, the following index se r ie s  can be constructed;
Table B. 5; An index o f  urban population growth in
Kiangsu (incl. Shanghai), 1949-57.
1949  1 00 . 0 0
1950 104.66
1951 109.54
1952 114.64
1953 119.98
1954 125.57
1955 131.43
1956 137.55
1957 143.96
Sim ilarly, by summing the Shanghai and non-Shanghai components
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But given that the total urban population o f  Kiangsu (including Shanghai) 
in 1956 was 12 ,350 ,0 00  it is c le a r  that the correspond ing  figure for  1949 
m ust be 8, 978, 553. Then fro m  the index in B. 5 total urban population 
during 1949-57 m ust be as fo llow s;
Table B. 6; Total urban population in Kiangsu 
(including Shanghai), 1949-57.
1949 8 ,9 7 8 ,5 5 3
1950 9 ,3 9 6 ,9 5 4
1951 9 ,835 , 107
1952 10 ,293 ,013
1953 10 ,772 ,468
1954 11 ,274 ,369
1955 11 ,800 ,5 12
1956 12 ,350 ,000
1957 1 2 ,925 ,5 25
Source ; Table B. 5.
M o re o v e r ,  rural population is s im ply  the d ifferen ce  between the total 
and urban f igures ;
Table B .7 ;  Total rural population in Kiangsu 
(including Shanghai), 1949-57.
Total Urban T h ere fore  rural
population population population
1949 4 3 ,5 9 5 ,7 0 0 8 ,9 7 8 ,5 5 3 34 ,617 , 147
1950 44 ,5 8 0 ,9 6 3 9 ,3 9 6 ,9 5 4 35, 184, 009
1951 4 5 ,5 8 8 ,4 5 9 9, 835, 107 3 5 ,7 5 3 ,3 5 2
1952 4 6 ,6 1 8 ,6 2 6 10 ,293 ,013 3 6 ,3 2 5 ,6 1 3
1953 4 7 ,6 7 2 ,3 3 4 10 ,772 ,468 3 6 ,8 9 9 ,8 6 6
1 954 4 8 ,7 4 9 ,5 8 4 11 ,274 ,369 3 7 ,4 7 5 ,2 1 5
1 955 49 ,8 5 1 ,2 4 7 11 ,800 ,512 3 8 ,0 5 0 ,7 3 5
1956 50 ,977 ,7 60 12 ,350 ,000 3 8 ,6 2 7 ,7 6 0
1957 5 2 ,1 3 0 ,0 0 0 12,925 , 525 39 ,2 0 4 ,4 7 5
S ources ; Tables B. 2 and B. 6
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Converting the rural population figures to an index gives the following
s e r ie s ;
Table B. 8: An index o f  rural population growth in
Kiangsu (exc l.  Shanghai), 1949-57.
1949  1 0 0 . 0 0
1950 101 .64
1951 103.28
1952 104 .94
1953 106.60
1954 108.26
1955 109.92
1956 111.59
1957 113.25
Source ; Table B .7 .
In other w ord s ,  the s im ple  average rate o f  growth o f  rural population
between 1949 and 1957 was 1.66%.
If we now exp ress  the data in Table B. 7 in the fo rm  o f  an index with 
total population in each year as 100, we can give som e indication o f  the 
changing dem ographic  structure during the 1950 's;
Table B. 9: The changing dem og 
in Kiangsu.
raphic structure
Total population Urban population Rural population
1949 100.00 20. 59 79.41
1950 100.00 21. 07 78.92
1951 100.00 21. 57 78.42
1952 100.00 22. 07 77 .92
1953 100. 00 22. 59 77.41
1954 100.00 23. 12 76. 88
1 95 5 100.00 23 .67 76.33
1956 100.00 24.23 75.77
1957 100.00 24.79 75.21
Source; Table B. 7.
-5 4 2 -
excluding Shanghai. Some initial data are presented below ;
Table B. 10; Estim ates o f  total population in Kiangsu 
excluding Shanghai in 1949 and 1957.
1949 1957
Total population o f  Kiangsu 
including Shanghai 43, 595, 700 52, 130, 000
Population o f  Shanghai 5, 000, 000 7 ,200 , 000
T h ere fore  total population 
excluding Shanghai 3 8 ,5 9 5 ,7 0 0  4 4 ,9 3 0 ,0 0 0
S ources ; C .B .  Howe, op. cit. , p. 34 and Table B . 2.
Thus, the compound rate o f  growth o f  total population (excluding
Shanghai) between 1949 and 1957 was 1.92% p. a. This provides  the basis
fo r  the following index;
Table B. 11; An index o f  population growth in Kiangsu
(excluding Shanghai) between 1949 and 1957.
1949 100.000
1950 101.920
1951 103.877
1952 105.871
1953 107 .904
1954 109.976
1955 112.088
1956 114.240
1957 116.433
Source ; See Table B. 10.
Given that total population in 1949 was 38, 585, 700 a com plete  ser ies  
is eas ily  derived ;
We m ay now consider the various components of Kiangsu's population
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Table B. 12; The total population of Kiangsu
(excluding Shanghai), 1949 -57 .
1949 38, 595,700
1950 3 9 ,3 3 6 ,7 3 7
1951 4 0 ,0 9 2 ,0 5 5
1952 4 0 ,8 6 1 ,6 5 4
1953 4 1 ,6 4 6 ,3 0 4
1954 4 2 ,4 4 6 ,0 0 7
1955 4 3 ,2 6 1 ,1 4 8
1956 4 4 ,0 9 1 ,7 2 8
1957 44 ,938 , 131
Source : Table B. 11.
Further, i f  it is assum ed that the rate o f  growth of Shanghai's population
can be taken as a p roxy  fo r  that o f the urban s e c to r  excluding the m unicipality,
then the index given in Table B. 5 yields the following estim ates:
Table B. 13; The urban population o f  Kiangsu 
(excluding Shanghai), 1949-57.
1949 3 ,9 7 8 ,5 5 3
1950 4 ,1 6 3 ,5 5 6
1951 4 ,3 5 7 ,3 1 1
1952 4, 559 ,820
1953 4 ,7 7 1 ,8 7 6
1954 4 ,9 9 3 ,4 8 2
1955 5 ,2 2 5 ,8 2 9
1956 5 ,4 6 8 ,9 1 9
1957 5 ,7 2 3 ,1 4 8
Source ; a This figure is the d i fferen ce  between total
urban population given in Table B. 6 and that 
o f  Shanghai in Table B. 10. The other estim ates 
are then derived  on the basis  o f  the index in 
Table B. 5.
Once again, rural population is the d ifference  between the total and 
urban data;
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Table B. 14: Total rural population in Kiangsu
(excluding Shanghai), 1949 -57 .
Total Urban T h ere fore
population population rural population
1949 38, 595, 700 3 ,9 7 8 ,5 5 3 34 ,617 , 147
1950 3 9 ,336 ,7 37 4 ,1 6 3 ,5 5 6 3 5 ,173 ,1 81
1951 4 0 ,0 9 2 ,0 5 5 4 ,357 ,311 3 5 ,7 3 4 ,7 4 4
1952 4 0 ,8 6 1 ,6 5 4 4 ,5 5 9 ,8 2 0 3 6 ,3 0 1 ,8 3 4
1953 4 1 ,6 4 6 ,3 0 4 4 ,7 7 1 ,8 7 6 3 6 ,8 7 4 ,4 2 8
1954 4 2 ,446 ,0 07 4 ,9 9 3 ,4 8 2 37 ,452 , 525
1955 4 3 ,2 6 1 ,1 4 8 5 ,225 ,82 9 3 8 ,0 3 5 ,3 1 9
1956 4 4 ,0 9 1 ,7 2 8 5 ,468 ,91 9 38 ,6 2 2 ,8 0 9
1957 44 ,938 ,1 31 5 ,72 3 ,1 4 8 39 ,2 1 4 ,9 8 3
Sources; Tables B. 12 and B .1 3 .
The relative im portance o f  the rural and urban se c to rs  in the total
population of the province  (excluding Shanghai) can now be shown;
Table B .1 5 ;  The changing dem ographic  structure 
in Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai).
Total population Urban population Rural population
1949 100.00 10.31 89. 69
1950 100.00 10. 58 89.42
1951 100.00 10. 87 89. 13
1952 100.00 11. 16 88. 84
1953 100.00 11.46 88. 54
1954 100.00 11.76 88 .24
1955 100.00 12.08 87.92
1956 100.00 12.40 87.60
1957 100.00 12.74 ' 87 .26
Source; Table B. 14.
We m ust now attempt to make an estim ate o f  agricultural population
in Kiangsu. We shall con s ider  the situation excluding Shanghai. The
following p re lim in a ry  estim ates are derived  fro m  Table B. 14 on the
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assumption that agricultural population represented  90% o f  the rural 
popul ation;
Table B. 16; A p re lim in ary  estim ate o f  agricultural
population in Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai) 
between 1949 and 1957._____________________
1949 3 1 ,1 5 5 ,4 3 2
1950 3 1 ,6 5 5 ,8 6 3
1951 3 2 ,1 6 1 ,2 7 0
1952 32 ,671 ,6 51
1953 3 3 ,1 8 6 ,9 8 5
1954 3 3 ,7 0 7 ,2 7 3
1955 34 ,2 3 1 ,7 8 7
1956 34 ,760 , 528
1957 3 5 ,2 9 3 ,4 8 5
Source; Table B. 14.
H ow ever, these figures exclude peasants living in m u n ic ip a lit ies .
Fortunately, it is poss ib le  to allow fo r  this by  adjusting the data in B. 16
upwards by  3 .22%  - the figure which a 1958 sou rce  indicates was the p r o -
(5)portion  o f  agricultural population living in cities in the p rov in ce . The
rev ised  se r ie s  is given in Table B. 17;
Table B. 17; R ev ised  estim ates o f  agricultural 
population in Kiangsu (excluding 
Shanghai) between 1949 and 1957.
1949 3 2 ,1 5 8 ,6 3 7
1950 3 2 ,6 7 5 ,1 8 2
1951 3 3 ,1 9 6 ,8 6 3
1952 3 3 ,7 2 3 ,6 7 8
1953 3 4 ,2 5 5 ,6 0 6
1954 3 4 ,792 ,6 47
1955 35 ,334 ,0 51
1956 35 ,8 7 9 ,8 1 7
1957 3 6 ,4 2 9 ,9 3 5
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Source; B a sic  data taken fro m  Table B. 16 but
rev ised  upwards by  3. 22% in o r d e r  to allow 
fo r  that proportion  o f  agricultural population 
living in c it ies .
So far  we have not taken into account the fact that until the end o f  1952 
Kiangsu did not include H sii-chou Special D istr ict  within its boundaries.
S trictly  speaking th ere fo re  the data fo r  1949-52 shown in the e a r l ie r  tables 
are o v e r -e s t im a te s .  In o r d e r  to com pensate fo r  this d iscrep a n cy  we must 
make som e estim ates o f  H sii-chou 's  population and deduct them from  the 
total f igures  fo r  the province  derived  above.
Inform ation on labour participation in the agricultural s e c to r  o f  Kiangsu
(6)suggests that in 1957 the agricultural population o f  Hsti-chou was 4 ,3 7 9 ,7 0 0 .  
H ow ever, the population estim ates given in the sou rce  fro m  which this 
figure is taken are consistently  higher than our own by  3. 43% and it is 
th ere fore  n e c e s s a r y  to bring it into line with the data already presented in 
this Appendix. Thus, the agricultural population o f  the Special D istr ict  in 
1957 is given by;
4 ,3 7 9 ,7 0 0  x  9 6 . 57% = 4 ,2 2 9 , 500.
Further, i f  the relationship between agricultural and rural population 
is assum ed to have been the sam e as in the province  as a w hole, H sii -ch ou ‘ s 
rural population m ust be;
4, 553 ,200.
By applying the index im plic it  in the final colum n o f  Table B. 14 to 
this f igure it is p oss ib le  to make an estim ate o f  the rural population o f  Hsti- 
chou between 1949 and 1952;^^
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Table B. 18; An estim ate of rural population in Hsti-chou 
Special D istr ict  between 1949 and 1952.
Index o f  rural 
population
T h ere fore  rural 
population
1949 100.00 4 ,0 1 9 ,4 0 0
1950 101.61 4 ,0 8 4 ,1 0 0
1951 103.23 4 ,1 4 9 ,2 0 0
1952 104.87 4 ,2 1 5 ,2 0 0
1957 113.28 4 ,5 5 3 ,2 0 0
Source: The index is derived  fro m  the data in
Table B. 14. Since H stf-chou 's  rural 
population fo r  1957 has a lready been 
estim ated, the figures fo r  the ea r l ie r  
years  are then e a s ily  found.
S im ilar ly , on the assumption that the relationship between the various
com ponents of H stl-chou 's  population was the sam e as that of all Kiangsu,
urban and total population in the Special D istr ict  can also be estimated;
Estim ates of urban and total population 
in Hsti-chou Special D is tr ic t ,  1949-52 .
Urban T h ere fore  total
population population______
462 .000  4 ,4 8 1 ,4 0 0
483 ,700  4 ,5 6 7 ,  800
506.000 4 ,6 5 5 ,2 0 0
529,500 4 ,7 4 4 ,7 0 0
Rural population fr o m  Table B. 18. R e la tion ­
ship between rural and urban population is 
assumed to be the sam e as that shown in 
Table B. 14. Then the total figure is obtained 
by summing.
Finally, we can present the final rev ised  se r ie s  o f  population estim ates 
fo r  Kiangsu (excluding both Shanghai and Hsii-chou) fo r  1949-52;
Table B. 19:
Rural
population
1949 4, 019 ,400
1950 4 ,0 8 4 ,1 0 0
1951 4 ,1 4 9 ,2 0 0
1952 4 ,2 1 5 ,2 0 0
S ources;
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Table B .2 0 ;  Estim ates o f  total, rural and urban population 
in Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai and H sii-chao), 
1949-52.
Total Urban Rural
population population population
1949 3 4 ,1 1 4 ,3 0 0 3 ,5 1 6 ,5 5 3 30 ,597 ,7 47
1950 34 ,768 , 937 3 ,6 7 9 ,8 5 6 31, 089,081
1951 35 ,436 , 855 3 ,851 ,31 1 31, 585,544
1952 3 6 ,1 1 6 ,9 5 4 4 ,0 3 0 ,3 2 0 3 2 ,0 8 6 ,6 3 4
end-
1952 4 0 ,8 6 1 ,6 5 4 4 ,5 5 9 ,8 2 0 3 6 ,3 0 1 ,8 3 4
S o u r c e s ; Tables B. 14 and B. 19.
But between 1949 and 1952 Kiangsu was adm inistered  as two separate 
regions and it w ill th ere fore  be useful to make som e tentative estim ates 
o f  agricultural population in the north and south o f  the province  during these
(9)y e a r s .
Evidence suggests that if  Hsti-chou Special D is tr ic t  is excluded, 
north Kiangsu accounted fo r  63 .99%  o f total agricultural population and 
south Kiangsu, 36.01%.^ ^  The agricultural population figures in Table
B. 17 include estim ates fo r  H sii-chou which m ust th ere fo re  be subtracted 
b e fo re  we can apply these proportions . Thus, on the sim plifying assumption 
that the relationship between agricultural and rural population in Hsii-chou 
can be reasonably  represented  by  that fo r  the prov in ce  as a whole, the 
following data show agricultural population in the Specia l D istr ict  between 
1949 and 1950;
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Table B .2 1 ;  An estim ate of agricultural population in
Hsti-chou Special D is tr ic t  between 1949 and 
1952._____________________________________________
1949 3 ,7 3 3 ,6 0 0
1950 3 ,7 9 3 ,7 0 0
1951 3 ,8 5 4 ,2 0 0
1952 3 ,9 1 5 ,5 0 0
Source ; D erived  from  the data in Table B. 18 on
the assumption that agricultural as a 
proportion  of rural population was the 
sam e as in Kiangsu as a whole.
If these figures are now deducted from  the total provincia l estim ates , 
the results are as fo llow s ;
Table B .2 2 ;  The agricultural population of Kiangsu 
(excluding Hsti-chou) between 1949 and 
1952).________________
1949 2 8 ,4 2 5 ,0 3 7
1950 2 8 ,8 8 1 ,4 8 2
1951 2 9 ,3 4 2 ,6 6 3
1952 2 9 ,8 0 8 ,1 7 8
S ources ; Tables B. 17 and B .21 .
The ratio between agricultural population in north and south Kiangsu 
can now be applied to these figures in o rd e r  to obtain estim ates o f  a g r i ­
cultural population in each area;
Table B .2 3 ;  The agricultural population o f  north and south 
Kiangsu between 1949 and 1952.________________
North Kiangsu South Kiangsu
1949 18 ,189 ,181  10 ,235 ,8 56
1950 18 ,481 ,2 60  10 ,400 ,2 22
1951 1 8 ,776 ,3 70  10 ,566 ,2 93
1952 19 ,074 ,2 53  10 ,7 3 3 ,9 2 5
Source ; D erived  from  Table B .2 2  on the assumption
that north Kiangsu co m p r ise d  63. 99% and 
south Kiangsu 36. 01% o f  the total agricultural 
population.
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Kiangsu. The b a s ic  in form ation  relating to the total num ber o f  such
households in the province  (including and excluding Shanghai) is shown in
the following table:
Table B .2 4 ;  The total num ber o f  rural households in 
Kiangsu, 1950-56.__________________________
Nothing has yet been said about the size of rural households in
Kiangsu Shanghai Kiangsu + 
Shanghai
1950 8 ,4 8 5 ,8 8 2 77,599 8 ,563 ,48 1
1951 8 ,4 8 5 ,8 8 2 75,823 8 ,5 6 1 ,7 0 5
1952 8 ,4 8 5 ,8 8 2 84,200 8 ,5 7 0 ,0 8 2
1953 8 ,4 8 5 ,8 8 2 83,200 8 ,5 6 9 ,0 8 2
1954 8 ,6 1 5 ,0 0 7 82,058 8 ,6 9 7 ,0 6 5
1955 8 ,6 9 5 ,  577 84 ,345 8 ,7 7 9 ,9 2 2
1956 9 ,0 2 7 ,3 9 2 91,279 9 ,118 ,67 1
S ource ; CKNYHTHYTSL, 
p p .993-999.
op. cit. , vol.  2,
Since we already know the total rural population in the province
(including and excluding Shanghai) during these yea rs ,  the average s ize
o f  rural household can be obtained by sim ple division;
Table B .2 5  The average s ize  o f  rural household in 
Kiangsu, 1950-56.________________________
Num ber o f  persons p er  Num ber of persons per
rural household (exc lu -  rural household ( inclu -
ding Shanghai)_________  ding Shanghai)_________
1950 4. 109
1951 4. 176
1952 4.239
1953 4. 345 4. 306
1954 4. 347 4. 309
1955 4. 374 4 .334
1956 4 .278 4 .236
S ou rces ; Tables B. 7, B. 14 and B. 21. 
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N otes:
(1) W en-hui pao (Shanghai), 2 1 /3 /5 7 ,  p . 2, "Looking at the Population 
P ro b le m  fro m  the Standpoint o f the Population Density of K iangsu".
(2) W e i- ta  ti sh ih-nien , op. c i t . , p.
(3) W en-hui p a o , 2 1 /3 /5 7 ,  op. cit. , p. 2.
(4) This is the rate of growth im plied  by  the Shanghai population data 
cited by  C .B .  Howe, op. c i t . , p. 34.
(5) HHJP, 5 /1 /5 8 ,  p. 1.
(6) Ib id .
(7) The assumption on which this figure is based  is admittedly v e ry  
s im p lis t ic .  But in the absence o f  m o re  detailed in form ation  it is 
d ifficult to find a m o re  acceptable form ula .
(8) The point m ade in the preceding note m ay  also apply here .
(9) Estim ates o f  rural and urban population in north and south Kiangsu
could also be m ade but in the absence o f  in form ation  of the p re c is e
d em ographic  structure in each region it seem s best to confine our 
analysis to agricultural population.
(10) Which o f  cou rse  it m ust be between 1949 and the end o f  1952.
(11) HHJP, 1 5 /1 /5 8 ,  p . 2.
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APPENDIX C
The m ost  usefu l observations o f  sown area and total output o f  grain in 
south Kiangsu f ro m  con tem porary  reports  (1950-52) are shown below:
An Estim ate of the Average Yield of Food Grains in South Kiangsu in
1 9 5 1 -5 2 .
1950 plan
1950 actual
1951 plan 
1951 actual
Increased  A gricu ltura l Production  This Y ear" .
b SNJP, 3 /3 /5 1 ,  p . 3, "D irect ive  Sum m arizing 
A gricu ltura l Production  in 1950 and Concerning 
A gricu ltura l Production  in 1951".
c SNJP, 3 /3 /5 1 ,  p. 1, "Sum m ary Plans for  
Agricu ltura l Production  in South Kiangsu in 
1951".
d SNJP, 9 /2 /5 2 ,  p. 2, "Sum m ary of Plans fo r  
A gricu ltura l Production  in 1952".
If the planned sown area estim ate is accepted  as a reasonable indicator 
o f  south Kiangsu 's  area  under food  grains, then by applying it to the two 
figures fo r  actual grain output it will be p oss ib le  to obtain two estim ates o f  
average yield;
Table C .2 ;  Estim ates of average grain  yield in south 
Kiangsu: 1950 and 1951.___________________
1950; 7 ,613  m il l ,  chin 4- 30, 711, 176 mou
= 247. 89 chin per m ou
1951: 8,161 m i l l . chin 4- 3 0 ,7 1 1 ,1 7 6  mou
= 265. 73 chin per  m ou
Table C. 1; Estim ates of sown area and total output of 
food  grains in south Kiangsu in the ear ly  
1950's taken from  con tem p orary  sou rces .
Total output
7 ,613 m i l l . chin 
8 ,010  m i l l . chin °
8,161 m ill ,  chin ^
S ources ; a SNJP, 23/1 /5 0 ,  p. 1, "E stab lish  Plans fo r
Sown area 
30 ,711 , 176 mou
Source; Table C. 1. 
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It w ill be useful to c a r r y  out s im ila r  calculations fo r  north Kiangsu. 
Thus, i f  we take the total output and sown area data published in the 1951 
agricultural plans as an indication o f  the true situation in the north, we can 
d erive  the following estim ate of average grain yield;
Table C. 3; An estim ate o f  the average yield of 
food grains in north Kiangsu, 1951.
3.Total output (planned) 9 ,290  m ill ,  chin
Total sown area (planned) 6 6 ,6 9 4 ,0 0 0  m ou ^
T h ere fore  average yield  139.29 chin per mou
Sources ; a SPJP, 2 0 /2 /5 1 ,  p. 2, "Sum m ary Plans
fo r  Agricu ltura l Production  in North Kiangsu 
in 1951".
b Ib id .
And o f  co u rse  by  com bining the data in Tables C. 2 and C. 3 it is 
p oss ib le  to obtain an average yield  of food  grains fo r  the whole o f  the 
province ;
Table C. 4; An estim ate of the average yield of 
food  grains in all Kiangsu, 1951.
Total output 8, 161 -f 9 ,290  m il l ,  chin
= 17,451 m ill ,  chin
Total sown area 30 ,711 ,1 76  + 66 ,694 , 000 m ou
= 97 ,405 , 176 m ou
T h ere fore  average
yield  179. 16 chin per  m ou.
S ources ; Tables C .2  and C .3 .
The reason  fo r  making an estimate of the average yield in Kiangsu 
as a whole is that it can be com pared  with a figure d er ived  fro m  inform ation 
published in the late 1950‘ s. If, as seem s likely , this la ter  figure is m ore  
reliab le  (because o f  im provem ents  in the statistical system ), it will provide 
a useful check  on the va lidity  o f  the estim ate based on con tem porary  reports .
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The relevant information is presented below;
Table C. 5; Another estim ate o f  the average yield o f  
grains in Kiangsu; 1951.__________________
Total grain  output (incl. soya) 
Total grain output (exc l .  soya)
20 ,455  m illion  chin 
1 9 , 130 m illion  chin
Total grain sown area (incl. soya) 
Total grain  sown area (exc l.  soya)
119, 557, 145 m ou 
105, 507, 145 m ou
Average  y ield  (incl.  soya) 
Average  yield  (e x c l .  soya)
171. 09 chin per m ou 
181.31 chin per m ou
Sources ; See chapter f ive , Tables V. 8, V. 9 and V. 11.
Since there can be little doubt that the average grain  yield derived  
fr o m  1950-52 reports  excludes soya, it is the final figure in Table C. 5 in 
which we are interested . H ow ever, there is one further com plication ; 
the data based  on the e a r l ie r  sou rces  exclude grain  produced  in Hsti-chou 
Special D istr ict  (s ince  H sti-chou was not returned to Kiangsu until late 1952), 
while those shown in C. 5 do include estim ates o f  grain  production in this 
area. The figures in C. 5 m ust there fore  be adjusted accord in gly .
Unfortunately, sp e c i f ic  in form ation  relating to Hstichou's grain  output 
and sown area in the ea r ly  1950 !s appear to be totally  lacking and we must 
make our own estim ates . This we shall do by making the following sim plifying 
assum ptions ;
(1) 80% o f  the total arable area of H sti-chou Special D istr ict  was
sown under food  grains.
(2) The yield o f  food grains in Hsti-Hwai (Hsti-chou and H wai-yin
Special D istr ic ts )  as a proportion  o f  the average yield  fo r  all
Kiangsu in 1957 can be used as a p roxy  to obtain a yield fo r  Hsti-
chou Specia l D istr ict  in 1951.
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Then i f  H sti-chou 's  arable area is taken as 1 5, 770, 000 m ou, ^   ^ the 
grain sown area  m ust be;
80% o f  15, 770, 000 = 12, 616, 000 mou.
M o re o v e r ,  if  the average grain  yield in Hsti-chou is assumed to be
(2 )51. 8% o f  the figure fo r  the whole p rov in ce , the estim ate m ust be:
51. 8% o f  181.31 chin = 92. 8 chin p er  m ou.
It fo llow s that the total output o f  grain in H sii-chou Special D istr ict  
in 1951 was 1, 170 .8  m illion  chin, which we round o ff  to 1,171 m illion  chin.
The H sii-chou  estim ates can now be deducted fro m  the data in Table
C. 5 in o r d e r  to obtain estim ates fo r  Kiangsu, excluding Hsii-chou;
Table C. 6; An estim ate o f  the average yield  o f  food
grains in Kiangsu (excluding H sii-chou S .D . ), 
1951.______________________________________________
Total grain  output (excl.  soya) 17,959 m illion  chin
Total grain  sown area (exc l.  soya) 9 2 ,8 9 1 ,1 4 5  m ou
T h ere fore  average yield (exc l .  soya) 193.33 chin per  m ou
Source; See text above.
If this yield  is com pared  with the estim ate derived  fro m  the planned 
figures published in north and south Kiangsu during the ear ly  1950's 
(see  Table C .4 ) ,  it will be seen to exceed  that estim ate by  7 .9% .
In fact, there is good reason  to believe  that the data published by the
Chinese during the e a r ly  1950's w ere  u n d e r -e s t im a te s . The methods o f
data co l le c t ion  w ere  crude and there were also various p re ssu re s  upon
(3)peasants to u n d er -rep or t  their sown area and output o f  grain . It th e r e ­
fore  seem s reasonable to accept the higher estim ate as a truer  re flect ion
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A cco rd in g ly  we shall assume that the average grain  yield o f  265 .73 
chin per  m ou derived  e a r l ie r  fo r  south Kiangsu u nder-states  the true 
f igure by  7. 5%. As a result, our final rev ised  estim ate b ecom es  285 .66 
chin per  m ou (rounded o ff  to 285 chin) and this is the grain  yield used in 
the calculations o f  chapter two.
It m ust be admitted that the way in which this figure  has been obtained 
is far fro m  sat is fa ctory .  H ow ever, so far as I have been able to d is c o v e r ,  
no in form ation  in any sou rce  can help us to reach  a m o re  acceptable 
estim ate. If anything, m y  feeling is that the figure m ay  be on the high side; 
but if  this is so ,  the conclusions  drawn in chapter two are m e r e ly  underlined 
m o re  strongly. To those who would argue that our estim ate is too low it is 
as well to point out that even an average yield of 300 chin per  m ou would not 
invalidate those conclusion s .
of grain production in Kiangsu in 1951.
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N otes:
HHJP, 1 9 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "Strive Hard fo r  the Next Ten Years and Make 
D ream s a R ea lity " .
HHJP, 1 9 /1 2 /5 7 ,  "A  Simple Introduction to the Construction Plans 
f o r  the Hstf-Hwai R eg ion" cites this f igure of 51.8%
P o o r e r  peasants would under-state  production in the hope of 
rece iv ing  m o re  land through re - allocation; the b e t te r -o f f  peasants 
fo r  fear  that their land would be con fiscated . M o re o v e r  cadres  
might d e liberate ly  depress  agricultural production  in o rd e r  to 
exaggerate the d ifficu lties  o f  r e co v e ry .
APPENDIX D
The C hronology and Implementation of the Two MH ig h -T id e s M o f 
C o -op era t iv iza tion  and C ollect iv ization  in Kiangsu.
No single sou rce  provides  a com prehensive  p icture  o f  the expansion 
of l o w e r - le v e l  co -o p e ra t iv e s  in Kiangsu. But throughout the period  of 
the "h igh -t id e"  provincia l newspapers ca rr ie d  reports  o f the c o -o p e r a t i ­
vization m ovem ent and fro m  these it is poss ib le  to gain a reasonably c le a r  
and consistent im p re ss io n  o f  developm ents in the p rov in ce .
The f irs t  table shows the developm ent o f  s e m i - s o c ia l i s t  c o -o p s  in
Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai) between m i d - 1955 and the beginning of 1956;
Table D. 1; The developm ent o f  lo w e r - le v e l  APCs 
in Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai).________
M id -1 9 5 5 ^
20 Septem ber, 1955 
20 Septem ber, 1955
24 Septem ber, 1955
(iv)
(ii)
(Hi)
4 O ctober , 1955 
26 O ctober , 1955 (v)
(vi)27 D e ce m b e r ,  1955 
21 January, 1956 
29 January, 1956
S o u r c e s ;
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Number o f  
APC s
Num ber of 
agricultural 
households 
belonging to 
the APCs
As percentage 
of total 
agricultural 
households
34,867 b 974 ,526 11.21
59,112 ° 1 ,558 ,891 17. 93
92,900  d 2 ,4 6 4 ,4 9 7 28. 34
101,859 2 ,9 0 7 ,0 0 0 33.43
121,494 3 ,4 6 7 ,8 4 1  6 39.88
145,000 f 4 ,2 8 6 ,9 7 5  g 49. 30
n. a. 4 ,5 2 1 ,7 5 9  h 52. 00
n. a. 5 ,2 1 7 ,4 1 4  1 60. 00
n. a. 7 ,3 0 1 ,5 3 0 83.97
CKNYHTHYTSL, vo l.  2, op. cit. , p. 1011.
HHJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  p . l ,  "Im prove  Hsiang Planning 
Work fo r  the A gricu ltu ra l C o -op erativ iza tion  
M ovement and W elcom e a New H igh-T ide in 
the S ocia list  Mass M ovem ent".
HHJP, 1 /1 0 /5 5 ,  p . l ,  "The Rich Developm ent 
of the C o-op era t iv iza tion  M ovem ent in K iangsu".
-5 5 9 -
(iv) TK P (Tientsin), 1 0 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "The Peasants
A re  Demanding to Set Up C o -o p s ;  the C o -  
operativization  M ovem ent is Entering a 
H igh -T id e" .
(v) HHJP, 2 9 /1 0 /5 5 ,  p . l ,  "Peasants Enthusi­
astica lly  Join in the C o -op era t iv iza tion  Move 
m ent".
(v i) C h iang-su  nung-m in pao, 2 7 /1 2 /5 5 ,  "F u lly -
S ocia lis t C o llectiv iza tion  W ill be C om pleted 
in Kiangsu in 1958".
(vii) HHJP, 2 1 /1 /5 6 ,  "We Must Certain ly  Set Up
Higher-Stage A P C s " .
(viii)  C h 'ang-chou  kung-jen  pao (C h 'ang-chou
W o rk e rs '  D aily ) , 2 /2 /5 6 ,  "Kiangsu Has 
B a s ica lly  Com pleted A gricu ltura l 
C o -op e r ativi z ation''.
Sources; (continued)
N otes ;
F o r  the purposes of the calculations in this 
colum n the total num ber o f  agricultural h ou se ­
holds in Kiangsu (excluding Shanghai) is  assumed 
to be 8, 695, 690. See CKN YHTHYTSL, vo l.  2, 
op. c it .  , p. 1011.
TK P (Tientsin), 1 0 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. cit. , p . l  gives 
the num ber o f  lo w e r - le v e l  APCs in Kiangsu in 
July, 1955 as 35 ,773 , but we have p re fe r re d  
to use the figure in CKN YHTHYTSL. In any 
ca se ,  the d ifference  between the two estim ates 
is negligible  and does not alter the general 
pattern shown in the table.
HHJP, 2 5 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p. 1 states that as o f  
20 /  9 / 55 24 ,245  new c o -o p e ra t iv e s  had been 
established. If the 34 ,867 c o -o p s  existing 
be fo re  this are added in, the total is 59, 112.
The la rg e r  figure includes the 33, 788 c o -o p s  
just in the p ro ce ss  of being set up.
TK P (Tientsin), 1 0 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l  states 
that the 121,494 c o -o p s  in existence on 4 /1 0 /5 5  
contained 39.88%  o f  all agricultural households. 
39 .88%  o f 8 ,695 , 690 is 3 ,4 6 7 ,8 4 1 .
HHJP, 2 9 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l  states that as of 
2 6 /1 0 /5 5  there w ere  121,300 new and 35 ,000  
old co -o p s  in Kiangsu. But the total figure 
given is 146,000 (yet 121,300 + 35, 000 =
156, 000). We know fro m  other sou rces  that the
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N otes ; (continued)
(f) f igure o f  35, 000 old c o -o p s  is about right;
there fore  either the num ber o f  new c o -o p s  or  
the total figure m ust be w rong. The prob lem  
is reso lved  by  HHJP, 2 6 /1 1 /5 5 ,  "C onference  
o f  the Kiangsu C C P Com m ittee  D ecides that 
S em i-S oc ia lis t  A gricu ltu ra l C o -op erat iv iza tion  
Will Be B a s ica lly  C a rr ied  Out Next Y ear"  
which states that o v e r  110, 000 new APCs had 
been set up in Kiangsu during the autumn; 
adding in the 34, 867 old ones gives a total o f 
about 145, 000 and this is the figure shown in 
Table D. 1. It is also c lo se  to the total in 
HHJP, 2 9 /1 0 /5 5  and T K P , 3 1 /1 0 /5 5 .
g D erived  fro m  data in HHJP, 2 9 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. c i t ,p  1,
which stated that 49. 3% o f  all households w ere 
in A P C s .
h That is ,  52% o f 8 ,6 9 5 ,6 9 0  = 4, 521 ,759.
i That is ,  60% o f 8 ,6 9 5 ,6 9 0  = 5 ,2 1 7 ,4 1 4 .
Although as the notes indicate, we could argue about the p re c is e  
accu racy  o f  som e o f  the f igu res ,  there is no doubt that the overa ll  trends 
that they show are c o r r e c t .  Events in Kiangsu soon ou t-str ipped  all 
e a r l ie r  plans fo r  co -o p e ra t iv e  expansion. It w ill be reca lled  fro m  chapter 
four that at the May C on ference  o f  Party S ecreta r ies  it had been decided  to 
double the num ber o f  lo w e r - le v e l  APCs in the province  and incorporate  
25% o f  all agricultural households into them b e fore  spring, 1956. At the 
tim e o f  its adoption this d ec is ion  looked ex trem ely  ambitious: but by the
end o f  Septem ber, 1955 this target had already been fu lfilled  and surpassed . 
Indeed so rapidly w ere  c o -o p s  being set up that plans tended to becom e  
redundant alm ost as soon as they w ere published. Thus, on 24 August the 
'Fukien D aily ' fo re ca s t  on the basis  o f  statistics  furnished by Party 
Com m ittees throughout Kiangsu that by spring-ploughing, 1956 the number 
o f  c o -o p s  in the province  would have r isen  fro m  35, 000 to 100, 000 em bracing 
about 32% o f  agricultural households.^  ^ But accord ing  to a report in
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K iangsu 's own new spaper, this plan was fu lfilled  within le s s  than a m onth. v
In O ctober  Chiang W e i-ch 'in g ,  S ecreta ry  o f  the Kiangsu Party  Com m ittee ,
was quoted as saying that 22 ,000  m o re  co -o p e ra t iv e s  w ere  to be established
in Kiangsu during the winter and spring o f  1955-56, so bringing the total
(3)
to o v e r  140, 000. v Only four days later  it was announced in another source
that there w ere  already m o re  than 146, 000 lo w e r - le v e l  APCs in the
• , ( 4 ) prov ince !
Within the prov ince  the m ost  rapid expansion took p lace  in H wai-yin
(5)and Y ang-chou  S pecia l D is tr ic ts . H w ai-yin  had the greatest num ber o f
co -o p s  and by  e a r ly  O ctober  their m em bersh ip  co m p r ise d  o ver  54% of all
peasant households, a figure that was considerab ly  in advance o f  the p r o -  
(6 )vincia l average. By contrast, Soochow Special D is tr ic t  was said to have
established only 4, 500 lo w e r - le v e l  A P C s , containing a m e re  10% o f a g r i-
(7)
cultural households. H ow ever, this evidence is not entire ly  conclusive ,
fo r  two e a r l ie r  sou rces  indicated that m ore  than 42% o f  Soochow households 
w ere  m em b ers  o f  13, 705 c o -o p s .
(2)
If the higher Soochow estim ates had appeared in the la ter  sou rces  
it would have been easy  to put down the d iscrep an c ies  to differences in the 
availability o f  quantitative in form ation  between the various dates. But this 
is not the case  and som e other explanation must be sought. The tentative 
suggestion put forw ard  here  is that the differences in the published estim ates 
re flect  som e difficu lty  in the im plementation o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion  in 
Soochow. S p ec ifica lly ,  it seem s p oss ib le  that as inhabitants of the r ichest 
agricultural reg ion  in Kiangsu, peasants in Soochow w ere  fearfu l that the 
high leve ls  o f  output to which they w ere accustom ed would fall i f  they joined
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support to such an argument and it is interesting too that in the other sou rce
which cited the low er  estim ates , a lot o f space was devoted to showing why
conditions in Soochow favoured agricultural c o -op era t iv iza t ion  - the sort
(9)
of approach that signalled the existence of dissenting v o ic e s .
Unfortunately, m o re  detailed in form ation  is not available and it is 
im p oss ib le  to do m ore  than speculate in this way. In any ca se ,  whatever 
the truth o f  the m atter, doubtless the delay in Soochow was only tem p orary . 
F o r  the overw helm ing general response to M ao 's  July speech  and the 
p ressu re  to set up m o re  and m ore  co -o p e ra t iv e s  generated its own m o m e n ­
tum which u ltim ately  can only have erased  such regional d if fe ren ces .  
Certain ly , by  January, 1956 attention in all the Special D istr icts  was 
turning to a new task; the creation  o f  fu l ly -so c ia l is t  c o l le c t iv e s .
B e fore  leaving this ch ron o log ica l account o f  the f irs t  "h igh -t id e"  in
Kiangsu something should be said about its p ro g re ss  in Shanghai. Between
the m iddle and end o f  1954 the num ber o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e s  in the Municipality
( 10 )had r isen  fro m  395 to 909, but during the next s ix  months there was
little further expansion and as o f  m id -1955  the num ber o f  l o w e r - le v e l
A PC s stood at 978, with a m em bersh ip  o f  27 .95%  o f  peasant households.^ ^
H ow ever, the halt was tem p ora ry  and at the end o f  Septem ber it was
announced that 538 new c o -o p s  had been set up, bringing the proportion  o f
( 12 )agricultural households in them to 58. 5%. C learly , the pattern o b ­
served  e lsew here  in the province  was being repeated, fo r  only a few days 
e a r l ie r  a news report broadcast  in T ung-t 'a i hsien (north Kiangsu) had stated 
that Shanghai was planning to achieve a 60-70% rate o f  participation by
autumn harvest, 1 9 5 6 . ( ^ )  M oreover ,  the lull which ch a ra cter ized  the
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the new co -o p s. The title of the second article cited in note (7) would give
co -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent in the rest  o f Kiangsu between the end o f  
O ctober  and end o f  D ecem b er  was apparently not repeated in Shanghai and 
be fo re  the end o f  the year  it was being c la im ed that s e m i -s o c ia l i s t
co -op era t iv iza t ion  had been ba s ica l ly  com pleted  in the Shanghai suburbs.
(15)
The 1,808 co -o p e ra t iv e s  em braced  m ore  than 80% o f  agricultural households.
C onsideration  was given in chapter four to the d ifferent c lass  attitudes 
towards the institutional changes o f  1955 and e a r ly  1956. One of the m ost  
interesting illustrations o f  this aspect o f the co -op era t iv iza t ion  m ovem ent 
was contained in a report of an investigation o f  l o w e r - le v e l  APCs in Shu- 
yang hsien (H w ai-y in  Special D istr ict ) .  The findings are sum m arized  in 
the following table;
(14)
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p oor  and lo w e r -m id d le  peasants requires  little com m ent. These were
the peasants who w ere  encountering the m ost seriou s  production d iff icu lt ies ,
su ffered  the m ost  acute shortages o f  draft animals and tools  and had the
low est living standards. A ccord in g ly ,  they stood to gain m ost fro m
co -op era t iv iza t ion .  What is m o re  surprising is that their  upper-m idd le
counterparts showed only slightly less  enthusiasm. As the Shu-yang
artic le  i t s e l f  pointed out, their favourable e con om ic  c ircu m stan ces  made
these peasants m o r e  l ik e ly  to adopt a negative o r  even hostile  attitude
towards c o -o p e ra t iv e  farm ing because o f  the p o ss ib il ity  that their incom e
(16)and living standard would decline after joining an A P C .
How m uch weight should be a ccorded  these data is difficult to say: 
there is no way o f  knowing how representative Y i -t 'a o  hsiang was in its 
exper ience  and no other com parable  data appear to be available. H ow ever, 
the rest o f the table m ay provide a clue to the explanation, fo r  it shows 
that whereas w ell o ver  half o f  poor  and lo w e r -m id d le  peasants continued to 
show their  enthusiasm after becom ing m em bers  o f  a c o -o p ,  b a re ly  30% 
o f the up p er-m id d le  peasants shared these fee lings .
Although the artic le  does not attempt to explain why this transform ation  
should have o c c u rr e d  it is not difficult to suggest an answer. The ability 
o f  c o -o p e ra t iv e s  to ra ise  output above that o f  not only individual peasants 
but also M ATs m ay  have encouraged the up p er-m id d le  peasants in the 
b e l ie f  that they too could benefit f ro m  participating in co -o p e ra t iv e  farm ing. 
If this w ere  the ca se ,  the high rate o f  enrolm ent shown in Table D. 2 is 
e a s ily  understood . But once in the APC their expectations might be swiftly
The high degree of enthusiasm for low er-level APCs displayed by
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dampened. If the lo o k e d - fo r  in crease  in output did not m ater ia lize  they 
might find them selves  w orse  o ff  than when they w ere  working on their  own. 
And even i f  output w ere  in creased , the gains might be m o re  than o ffset  by 
disincentive e ffects  arising out o f  the way in which the c o -o p s  w ere managed. 
Bearing in mind the p rob lem s occas ion ed  by the v e r y  rapid in crease  in 
APCs after the m iddle o f  1955 that w ere  m entioned in chapter four , it is 
c le a r  that there is no lack  o f  evidence to support this thes is .
In Kiangsu then there is a good deal o f  evidence to suggest that c lass
con flict  was the sou rce  o f  m any prob lem s in the new ly -estab lished  A P C s.
It is interesting that in O ctober , 1955 it should have been considered
n e c e s s a r y  to reprin t in the 'New China D aily ' an ed itoria l from  the previous
d ay 's  'P e o p le 's  D a ily ' ca lling fo r  the s tr ic t  im plem entation  o f the c la ss  -
(17)line during co -op era t iv iza t ion .  In Fukien, Shantung and Hopeh the
failure to do this had alienated large  num bers o f  peasants; in som e areas
partiality  towards p oor  peasants made the m iddle peasants reluctant to
, (18)participate in the c o -o p s ;  e lsew here  " o n e -s id e d n e s s "  m e r e ly  e x a c e r ­
bated c lass  antagonisms with the result that u p p er-m id d le  peasants refused 
to jo in  in w ork with the poor  peasants.
Even i f  these d ifficu lties  w ere  o v e rco m e ,  other factors  contained the
seed  o f  c la ss  con flict  once the APC was in operation . One such was the
accounting system . Past experience  had shown that w here rentals on land 
(19)
o r  working capital w ere  set too high o r  too low , it was difficult to 
maintain unity between the p oor  and m iddle peasants. But despite 
exhortations to make rational payments fo r  the use o f  assets belonging to 
c o -o p  m em b ers  it is c le a r  that this princip le  was not w holly  adhered to.
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It was admitted that peasants ' working capital was taken into co l le c t iv e
ownership with precip itate  h a s t e ^ ^  and that som e (m ostly  "m idd le ")
peasants held back fro m  joining APCs because o f  uncertainty about future 
(2 1 )dividends. They w ere also concerned  that once in the hands o f  the
c o -o p e ra t iv e  authority, their  tools  and draft animals would be m ism anaged.
A s p e c i f ic  case  which illustrates  well the d ifficu lties  o f  finding a 
d istribution system  to satisfy  all m em bers  is that o f  San-sheng APC,
x (22)L i-yang  hsien  (Chinkiang Special D istr ict ) .  The c lass  com posit ion
o f  this co -o p e ra t iv e  was as fo llow s:
Table D .3 ;  The c lass  com posit ion  of San-sheng 
A P C , L i-yang hsien._________________
N um ber o f  households 
P o o r  peasants 17
Middle peasants 6
P rosp erou s  m iddle peasants 1
Source ; CKNTTSHCIKC, vo l .  2, op. c i t . , p. 635.
When San-sheng APC was f irs t  established in spring, 1954 45% o f
net incom e cam e fro m  dividends on land and 55% fro m  wages paid to
(23)labour. In the eyes o f  som e of the m iddle peasants and the upper-m idd le  
m em b er  who had m o re  land than labour, this ratio was unfair and in his 
capacity  as a com m ittee  m em b er  of the co -o p e ra t iv e  the upper-m idd le  
peasant petitioned that the relative shares of land and labour be adjusted. 
Although not d iscu ssed  publicly  this was agreed to and a 50;50 land-labour 
ratio was adopted.
This d ec is ion  m et with less  than unanimous approval and as relations 
between the p oor  and m iddle peasants began to b e co m e  strained, it was
decided  to undertake an investigation to review  the situation. Its conclusion
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was that what was justified  was a r ise  in wages (not dividends on land).
The reasoning was as fo llow s; during 1953 w ork to com bat drought had
been ca rr ie d  out worth an average o f  17 w ork -p o in ts .  But on the basis  of
the 50;50 distribution system  each w ork -point was worth only ten o r  so
chin o f  r ic e ,  a wage which som e o f  the c o -o p  m e m b e rs  w ere quick to
(24)point out was . . le s s  than we can get fo r  p art -t im e  w o rk " .  The
outcom e was that 18 m em b ers  o f  the APC (including all 17 poor  peasants) 
ca lled  fo r  a further adjustment of the land-labour ratio.
Despite the coo l  reception  o f  this cou n ter -p rop osa l  by  the remaining
(25)six  peasants, who fo resaw  that it would depress  their  own in com es .
Detailed calculations w ere  made in an effort  to arr ive  at the m ost  ben e -
(26)f ic ia l  and equitable d istribution system . The following three poss ib le
form ulae  w ere  presented  fo r  consideration;
Table D. 4; P rop osed  form ulae fo r  in com e distribution 
in San-sheng A P C , L i-yan g  hsien; 1954.
I  I I  i n
Dividend p er  share 180 chin 192 chin 200 chin
P ercentage  o f  incom e 
com ing fro m  land 58 40 42
Wage per  labour day 3 0 .8  29 28
Percentage  o f  incom e 
com ing fro m  labour 62 60 58
LAND
SHARES
LABOUR
DAYS
Number o f  households 
COMPARISON with a r ise  in incom e 23 20 19
WITH 1952 Num ber o f  households 
with a fall in incom e 1
Source ; CKNTTSHCIKC, vo l.  2, op. c i t . , p. 637.
The com parative  data show c le a r ly  that the f ir s t  fo rm u la  was the 
m ost  acceptable in so fa r  as it guaranteed an in cre a se  in incom e fo r  23
of the 24 c o -o p  m e m b e rs  and this was in fact the form ula  chosen by
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San-sheng A PC.
But how ever equitable the new form ula  m ay have been it can hardly 
have been enthusiastically  rece ived  by  the m iddle peasants, fo r  as the 
following table suggests , the return to a system  o f  d istribution which 
favoured the labour input had serious  im plications fo r  levels  o f in com e;
Table D. 5; Returns to land and labour under the 'o ld ' 
and 'new' distribution system s in San - 
sheng A PC, L i-yang  hsien.________________
LAND
SHARES
LABOUR
DAYS
Dividend p er  share
Percentage  o f  incom e 
com ing fro m  land
Wage p er  labour day
Percentage  o f  incom e 
com ing fro m  labour
'Old '
system
237 chin 
50
25 chin 
50
'New*
system
180 chin 
38
30 .8  chin 
62
S ources; CKNTTSHCIKC, vo l .  2, op. c i t . , p. 639
and Table D. 4.
The e ffect  o f  introducing the new land-labour ratio was to depress  
dividends on land by alm ost a quarter, while the value o f  a labour day 
rose  by o ver  23%. Even i f  the new form ula  was unanim ously accepted 
(as was rep orted ly  the case  in San-sheng APC) it is not hard to imagine 
other instances in which the fall in dividends led to further c lass  con flict  
and even the co llapse  of the c o -o p e ra t iv e .  Certain ly  the declining m iddle 
peasant enthusiasm such as was observed  in Table D. 2 would be u n d er­
standable in these c ircu m sta n ces .
The case  o f  this single c o -o p e ra t iv e  is a v e r y  instructive one. It 
shows v e r y  c le a r ly  how difficult the search  fo r  a distribution system  which 
would sa tis fy  all parties could be and how the fa ilure  to find this ideal 
could lead to c lass  con flict .  L ess  obviously , the exper ience  o f  San-sheng
APC also illustrates  the know-how and im m ense  care  that was required
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to reach  a sa t is fa ctory  solution. Detailed calculations o f  eve ry  m e m b e r  
household 's  in com e and expenditure (including n on -fa rm  in com e, dividends 
and expenses on all item s used in agricultural and subsid iary  operations) 
had to be m ade b e fo re  the various alternatives could be assessed . In San- 
sheng APC the ability to do this was evidently not lacking. But in view o f  
the high rate of i l l i te ra cy  in the countryside and the unfam iliarity  with 
methods o f  accounting it is reasonable to suppose that in m any m ore  cases  
the d ifficu lties  o f  im plementing a distribution system  based  on ownership 
o f  assets as w ell as on physical labour w ere insurm ountable. In such 
cases  the outcom e m ay  not have been as happy as in San-sheng C o -op era t iv e .
Lack  o f  quantitative in form ation  makes it im p oss ib le  to analyze the 
co llect iv iza t ion  cam paign in Kiangsu in such great detail and there is little 
that we can add to the b r ie f  chronology  given in chapter four. H owever, 
it m ay be o f  in terest to extend that d iscu ss ion  by  setting down som e o f  the 
initial plans fo r  the establishm ent o f  h ig h e r -le v e l  AP C s that w ere drawn 
up at the end o f  1955;
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Table D. 6: The planned developm ent o f  h igher -
leve l APCs in 7 Specia l D is tr ic ts .
Target num ber 
o f  co llectives
Planned date 
o f  com pletion
aSung-chiang 120 W in ter -sp r in g ,  
1955-56
, b Y en -ch 'en g 147 W in ter -sp r in g ,  
1955-56
1,300 Autumn, 1956
cY ang-chou 100 W in ter -sp r in g , 
1955-56
dH sti-chou 288 Spring, 1956
eH w ai-yin 162 S p rin g , 1956
Nan-t'ung 76 Spring, 1956
Soochow ^ 300 M arch, 1956.
Sources;
a B roadcast  report, 1 1 /1 2 /5 5 ,  (Sung-chiang
News).
b B roadcast report, 2 6 /1 2 /5 5 ,  (Y e n -c h ’eng
News).
c B roadcast report, 2 9 /1 2 /5 5 ,  (Yang-chou
News).
d HHJP, 8 /1 /5 6 ,  "H sti-chou and H wai-yin
Enthusiastically Set up T r ia l  H igh er -L eve l  
A P C s " .
e Ibid .
f HHJP, 2 3 /1 /5 6 ,  "Y e n -ch 'e n g  Special D istr ict
D ecides to B a s ica lly  Com plete F u lly -S oc ia lis t  
C o llectiv ization  This Y ea r" .
g B roadcast  report ,  1 0 /1 /5 6 ,  (Soochow News).
The fact that these plans w ere being drawn up in D ece m b e r  and 
January is o f  som e in terest, fo r  it indicates that co llect iv iza t ion  was 
being d iscu ssed  be fo re  the com pletion  o f  co -op era t iv iza t ion .  N everthe less , 
in this initial stage the targets rem ained quite m od est ,  the intention being 
to set up a sm all num ber o f  key units on an experim ental bas is .  Even the
P rov in c ia l  C om m ittee 's  call to establish  co l le c t iv e s  in eve ry  hsien and
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ch'ti during the f irs t  half o f  1956 and in eve ry  hsiang during the second
(27)
half and its demand that co llectiv iza tion  should be com pleted  by 1958 
w ere  in line with the p rogram m e o f  institutional change outlined in the 
Tw elve Year Plan (Draft vers ion ) .
H ow ever, at a low er  leve l plans w ere m o re  am bitious. E a rly  in
January, 1956 Chiang-p 'u , L iu -ho  and Ssu-yang hsien  announced their
(28)intention to com plete  co llectiv iza tion  in 1957. E a r l ie r  still it was
reported  that the c o -o p e ra t iv e s  in H eng-t 'ang hsiang , Tan-yang hsien 
(Chinkiang Specia l D istr ict )  w ere  already m erg ing  into la rg e r  units and 
that the transition  to fu l ly -so c ia l is t  APCs would be ca rr ie d  out in spring,
1956. <29>
Developm ents appear to have been m o re  rapid in urban areas; fo r  
exam ple, although the rate o f  participation in lo w e r - le v e l  AP C s in T 'a i -  
chou M unicipality at the beginning o f  January was no higher than the p r o ­
v incia l average, it was planned that by  the sum m er o f  1956, 60% o f
(30)agricultural households would be in c o l le c t iv e s . v ' In Nan-t'ung 
M unicipality 80% o f peasant households w ere  expected  to be incorporated
( 3 1 )into h ig h e r - le v e l  AP C s by the end o f  the sam e year.
M ost outstanding o f  all was the case  o f  Shanghai. At the end o f
D ecem b er  434 c o -o p s  w ere  demanding to "m e rg e  o r  expand and leap
(32) , ,forw ard  to b e co m e  h ig h e r -le v e l  A P C s " .  L ess  than two weeks later
52% o f all agricultural households in the suburbs had reg is tered  their
(33)nam es to jo in  co lle c t iv es  and on 18 January it was announced that
". . . the h igh-tide o f  fu l ly - s o c ia l i s t  co -o p e ra t iv iz a t io n "  had arr ived  in
(34)
the suburbs. It was anticipated that within a few days 809 co -o p e ra t iv e s
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would be m erged  into 28 co l le c t iv e s ,  m ost  o f  them com pris in g  o v e r  a
thousand households and m any up to three thousands. Finally, still in
the third week o f  January, a con feren ce  o f  APC representatives  revealed
(35)that co l lect iv iza t ion  had been com pleted  in the suburbs!
We m ay  conclude by  considering  further som e o f  the issues  underlying
the d ec is ion  to im plem ent full co llectiv iza tion  in 1956. There is little
doubt that one im portant fa c tor  was the b e l ie f  that the sm all average s ize
o f the c o -o p e ra t iv e  unit was preventing the full potential o f  co -o p e ra t io n
fro m  being rea lized . Mao h im se lf  argued*.
"M ost o f  our present s e m i-s o c ia l is t  c o -o p e r a t iv e s  contain 
only 20 o r  30 households because units o f  this s ize  are easy  
to run and give adm inistrative personnel and m em bers  alike 
an opportunity to gain experience  quickly. But sm all c o ­
operatives  have few er  m e m b e rs ,  le s s  land and not much 
m oney. They cannot operate on a large  sca le  o r  use 
m ach in ery  and the developm ent o f  their f o r c e s  o f  production 
is ham pered. They should not stay in this posit ion  too long, 
but should go on to com bine with other c o -o p s .  11 (36)
Mao was in fact calling fo r  the establishm ent o f  " la rge  c o - o p s "
though c le a r ly ,  s im ila r  arguments could be m ade in favour of the
co l le c t iv e s .  Advocates of these la rg e r  units could point out that they alone
provided  a suitable fram ew ork  fo r  consolidating the sm a ll ,  fragm ented
plots , planting the m ost  rational cropping patterns, extending dou b le -
cropping and im plem enting other technical r e fo r m s .  M o re o v e r ,  there
was the im portant consideration  that in co l le c t iv e s  private ownership
need no lon ger  hold back agricultural production (as it did even in the
"la rge  c o - o p s " ) .  Thus, Mo Jih-ta, writing in the general context of
China, m ade the point;
". . . B ecau se  in the lo w e r - le v e l  c o -o p e ra t iv e s  m em b ers  retained 
ow nership  rights to their  land there was a definite lim it to the
rational utilization o f  land. The im plem entation  o f  certa in  bas ic
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construction  plans on the land might always be prevented through 
the inability o f  landowners within the c o -o p  to reach  agreem ent.
This contradiction  becam e p articu larly  apparent when the co -o p s  
becam e la r g e r  . . . B ecause contradictions o f  unified management, 
co l le c t iv e  labour and private ownership o f  production m ateria ls  
still  existed  in the lo w e r - le v e l  A P C s , the continued developm ent 
o f  productive fo r c e s  was hindered. 11 (37)
To condem n the private ownership system  was to condemn the method
o f  d istribution in the co -o p e ra t iv e s  and another argument put forw ard  in
favour o f  co llectiv iza tion  was its elim ination o f  dividends to land and
working capital. Mo Jih-ta  again;
"B ecau se  u pper-m idd le  peasants contributed a lot o f  production 
m ateria ls  to the c o -o p e r a t iv e s ,  even though they did le ss  work 
than the p oor  and low er -m id d le  peasants, the value o f  the 
dividends they rece ived  was still greater  than the wages paid to 
the latter . This affected the upper-m idd le  peasants ' rate o f  
w ork attendance and the labour enthusiasm of the poor  and 
lo w e r -m id d le  elem ents. It also affected the unity between the 
d ifferent c la s s e s .  " (38)
The v e r y  fact that co l lectiv iza tion  was advocated as a means o f  
realizing potential labour productiv ity  was an acknowledgement o f  the 
inadequacies o f  the existing distribution system . Indeed although there 
seem s to have been a certa in  reluctance to concede  the adverse effects  
o f  that system  while the c o -o p s  rem ained the m ost  im portant institutional 
fo rm  in agricu lture , once co llectiv iza tion  had been c a rr ie d  out, the extent 
to which c la ss  antagonisms had been in creased  by  the d ichotom y between 
dividends and wages was m o re  readily  admitted. One report spoke of
(39)the inability o f  the c o -o p e ra t iv e s  to prevent polarization  of the peasantry, 
while others p ra ised  the co l le c t iv es  fo r  having strengthened the alliance b e t ­
ween p oor  and m iddle p e a s a n t s ^ ^  and put an end to c la ss  s t r a t i f i c a t io n .^   ^
Such is the evidence behind our argument that the d ifficu lties  o f  sa t is fa ctor i ly  
im plementing a p art-w age , part-d iv idend system  o f  d istribution and the
class  antagonism which it engendered w ere  the principa l fa ctors  behind
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the decis ion  to co l le c t iv ize  in Kiangsu.
Notes;
F u -ch ien  jih -p ao  (Fukien D aily ), 2 4 /8 /5 5 ,  "The C o -o p e r a t iv i ­
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2 6 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. cit.
HHJP, 2 9 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "Peasants Enthusiastically  Join the C o -o p e r a t iv i -  
zation M ovem ent".
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co -op era t iv iza t ion  in these areas is to be found in data fo r  one o r  
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revealed  that 42% o f  all agricultural households in Chiang-tu 
hsien  (Y ang-chou  S. D. ) w ere in APCs and another broadcast  on 
the sam e day cited a figure of 48 .7%  fo r  S u -ch 'ie n  hsien (Hwai- 
yin S .D . ). HHJP, 3 0 /9 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , gave an even m o re  im p re ss iv e  
f igure o f  66. 17% fo r  Ssu-yang hsien (a lso  in H wai-yin  S .D . ) as o f 
1 7 /9 /5 5 .
T K P , 1 0 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . , p . l  stated that there w ere  23, 271 
c o -o p s  in Hwai-yin .
H HJP, 1 6 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "We Must Set Up M ore  and Better C o -o p e r a t iv e s " .  
The sam e figure was given in TKP (T ientsin), 2 8 /1 1 /5 5 ,  "It is 
E ntire ly  P oss ib le  fo r  the High-Output A reas  to Go Ahead with 
Co -operat iv iza t ion " .
T K P , 1 0 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. c i t . And C h 'ang-chiang jih -pao  ( Yangtze 
R iv er  D aily ), 1 1 /1 0 /5 5 ,  "The A gricu ltura l C o -op erativ iza tion  
M ovem ent in Kiangsu Has Revealed a H igh -T id e " .
See H HJP, 1 6 /1 0 /5 5 ,  op. cit.
H sin -w en  jih -p ao  (Shanghai), 1 /1 1 /5 5 ,  "P reparations  are 
Enthusiastically  Going Ahead in the Suburbs".
CKN YHTHYTSL, v o l . 2, op. c i t . , p . 1011.
C F JP , 3 /1 1 /5 5 ,  "Begin  O verall Planning fo r  A gricu ltura l 
C o -op era t iv iza t ion " .
The sam e plan is set out in H sin-w en j ih -p a o , 1 /1 1 /  55, op. c i t .
C F JP , 2 8 /1 2 /5 5 ,  "The V illages in the Shanghai Suburbs Have 
B a s ica lly  Com pleted  Agricu ltura l C o -o p e ra t iv iza t io n " .  This 
com pa res  with a planned com pletion  date o f  w inter, 1 9 5 7 , given
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in H sin -w en  j ih -p a o , 1 /1 1 /5 5 ,  op. cit. (Although we have not 
looked  in any detail at the situation in other urban areas o f  the 
p rov in ce ,  one p iece  of inform ation indicates that the speed with 
which co -op era t iv iza t ion  was com pleted  in Shanghai was not 
unique; a news broadcast  as ear ly  as 1 /1 2 /5 5  stated that c o -o p e r a -  
tivization  had a lready been im plem ented in the suburbs o f  Nanking, 
with 82% of agricultural households in A P C s .  )
Ib id . The sam e figures are given in JM JP, 3 0 /1 2 /5 5 .  It is worth 
noting that events in Shanghai are quite consistent with the suggestion 
m ade in chapter three that the behaviour o f  the Municipality was a 
m o re  sensitive b a rom eter  o f  p o licy  changes than that o f  the rest  o f 
Kiangsu.
Thus one u p p er-m idd le  peasant, MI have a good life  working on m y  
own. When o th e rs ' land fa ils ,  mine still produces  a yield . I don't 
want to jo in  with them / i . e .  the p o o re r  p e a s a n ts / .  Let m e wait 
two o r  three years and then see how things look  . . . "
CKNTTSHCIKC, op. c i t .
HHJP (ed itor ia l) ,  "In the Developm ent o f  A P C s We Must Give 
Attention to Quality".
P  'ien -m ien  -hs in g .
O r, where such assets w ere bought outright by  the c o -o p ,  the 
absolute p r ice .
H HJP, 1 8 /9 /5 5 ,  "M ob ilize  the Old C o -o p s  to Lead the N ew ".
See "This  Hsiang Was C o -op era t iv ized  in Two Y e a r s "  in 
CKN TTSHCIKC, op. c i t . , p. 593.
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Ibid.
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APPENDIX E
Sown area Average  yield
(mou) (ch in /m ou )
STATISTICAL OFFICE 
OF THE CHINESE 
COTTON INDUSTRY:
1926  8 , 1 2 9 , 0 0 0
1927 7 ,3 2 8 ,0 0 0
1928 8 ,8 2 4 ,0 0 0
1929 9 ,5 1 1 ,1 7 9
1930 8 ,6 2 5 ,2 3 5
1931 7 ,6 5 6 ,2 4 4
1932 8 ,2 5 4 ,8 2 9
Av. 1926-32 8 ,3 2 2 ,7 2 9 .4 3
COTTON M ILL OWNERS'
ASSOCIATION:
1929
1930
1931
1932
Estim ates of Sown A rea, Average Yields and Total Output of
Cotton (Ginned) in Kiangsu Before 1949.
TSINLING UNIVERSITY: 
"N o rm a l"  year
Average p. a. f rom  
1926/27 to 1932/33
1931
1932
N. A. R. B. :
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
Av. 1931-37
1946
1947
11 .353 .000
11 .704 .000
12.066.000
12 .488 .000
11 .998 .000  
11 ,166 ,000  
10 ,429 ,000
11 ,614 ,860
8 .6 5 3 .0 0 0
8 .7 4 0 .0 0 0
26.99
32. 99
33. 99 
27. 00
31. 09
32. 63
29. 50
30. 56
35. 00 
29. 00
Total output
(m illion chin)
227.66 
108.48 
62 .65  
166.87
542.00
335. 00
274.00 
345. 00
306.50
386.20
410.20
337.20 
373 .10 
364 .40 
307 .70
355. 04
302.86 
253 .46
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Sown area 
(mou)
Average  y ield  Total output
(ch in /m ou ) (m illion  chin)
J .L .  BUCK:
1929-33 11 ,258 ,498  33 .59  378 .14
CHANG HSIN-I:
"A v e ra g e "  year
(un corrected )  12 ,010 ,0 00  28 .00  336 .28
(co r re c te d )  11 ,091 ,000  28 .10  311 .62
WANG TZU -C H IA:
1932 8 ,5 1 5 ,0 0 0  20 .88  177.80
1933 9 ,8 7 7 ,0 0 0  20 .70  204 .50
1934 10 ,207 ,0 00  16.31 166.50
1935 10 ,258 ,000  19.28 197.80
1936 10 ,401 ,0 00  23 .32  242 .60
1937 12 ,830 ,0 00  15.22 195.30
1938 9 ,5 6 8 ,0 0 0  17.35 166.00
1939 9 ,3 2 7 ,0 0 0  15.01 140.00
1940 9 ,1 4 9 ,0 0 0  12.02 110.00
1941 7 ,3 5 5 ,0 0 0  11.75 86.40
1942 6 ,9 2 0 ,0 0 0  18.28 126.50
1943 5 ,60 1 ,0 0 0  18.26 102.30
Av. 1932-37 10 ,348 ,000  19.08 197.42
S o u r c e s ;
Statistical O ffice  o f  the Chinese Cotton Industry, (Chung- 
hua m ien -yeh  t 'u n g -ch i-h u i); f r o m  HB (Chinese language 
v ers ion ) ,  op. cit. The data are fo r  25 hsien plus Shanghai.
Cotton M ill O w ners ' A ssocia tion ; fro m  HB, op. cit. , p. 203. 
Tsinling U niversity : CNYK, op. cit. , N ovem ber, 1932.
N. A. R. B . ; 1931-37 total output and sown area fro m  CN YK,
vo l.  8, no. 5, May, 1947, op. c i t . , pp. 87-90 . A ll yields 
are derived  fo r  these years .
1946 - 47 sown area and yields fro m  CN YK, vo l.  7, no. 1, 
and vol.  9, no. 3. Total output is derived .
J. L. B uck ; Statistical Volum e, op. cit. The data shown are 
weighted by his lo ca l it ie s .  Note too that his figures fo r  
the Yangtze r ice -w h eat  region show a 2. 93; 1 .00 ratio between 
unginned and ginned cotton and this has been used to derive  
the yield and output o f  ginned cotton given in the table.
Chang H sin -i;  the "u n co rre c te d "  figure is from  An E s t i ­
mate of China's Farm s and C r o p s , op. cit. The " c o r r e c t e d "  
estim ate is obtained by summing the sown area and total 
output in T 'u n g -ch i  ytteh-pao, v o l . 7, n o . 2, op. cit.
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Wang T zu -ch ia ; f ro m  his Chan-shih Shang-hai ch ing -ch i 
(Shanghai's W artim e E con om y ), 1945. Yields are derived  
f r o m  total output and sown area.
Sources; (continued)
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Mo Jih-ta , W o-kuo nung-yeh h o -tso -h u a  ti fa -ch a n  (The D evelopm ent 
o f  C o -op era t iv iza tion  in China), Statistical Publishing House,
Peking, June, 1957.
Nan-hui Hsien Com m ittee o f  the CCP, S su -n ien -la i  nung-ts 'un  ti 
chti-ta pien (Great Changes in the V illages  o f  Nan-hui During the 
Past F ou r Y e a r s ) , East China P e o p le 's  Publishing Co. , F ebru ary , 
1954.
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P 'an  Kuang-tan and Ch'tian W e i-t 'ie n ,  Su-nan t 'u - t i  ka i-ko  fang -wen 
chi ( Investigations o f  Land R eform  in South K iangsu), Peking, 1952.
Shih Ching-t 'ang, Chang Lin, Chou Ch 'ing-ho  and Hua Chung-chie, 
(ed itors ) ,  Chung-kuo nung-yeh h o -tso -h u a  yifn-tung sh ih -liao  
(S ource  M aterials  on the A gricu ltural C o-op era t iv iza tion  M ovem ent 
in China), 2 vo lu m es , Peking, 1957.
Shih -yeh-pu  k u o -ch i  liu -y ih -chti  (Bureau o f  F ore ig n  Trade, M in istry  
o f  Industry), Chung-kuo shih-yeh chih; C h iang-su -sheng (China 
Industrial Handbooks; Kiangsu P r o v in c e ), Shanghai, 1933.
State Statistical Bureau, W e i-ta  ti sh ih-nien  ( Ten Great Y e a r s ) , 
P e o p le 's  Publishing House, Peking, 1959.
State Statistical Bureau, Nung-yeh h o -tso -h u a  ho 1955-nien nung-yeh 
sheng-ch 'an  h o - t s o -s h e  shou -i  fen p 'e i  ti t 'u n g -ch i  tzu -liao  
(Statistical M aterials  on A gricu ltura l C o -op era t iv iza tion  and the 
D istribution of the Product in the C o -o p e ra t iv e s  During 1955), 
Peking, 1957.
Sun C hing-chih , Hua-tung t i - c h 'u  ch in g -ch i  t i - l i  (An E con om ic  
G eography o f  East China), Science Publishing House, Peking, 1959.
U pper-M iddle  School Texts , Chung-kuo ch in g -ch i  t i - l i  (An E con om ic  
G eography o f  China), 2 vo lu m es , Peking, July, 1956.
Wang T zu -ch ia ,  Chan-shih Shang-hai ch in g -ch i  (Shanghai's W artim e 
E conom y), 1945.
Wang W e i-p 'in g ,  Shui-hsiang Chiang-su (W atery  Kiangsu), New 
Knowledge Publishing House, Shanghai, 1956.
Wu T 'ie h - fe n g ,  F e i-ch 'a n g  s h ih -ch 'i  chih nung-m in ( The Peasants 
in N orm al T im e s ), Shanghai, 1936.
2. Journals ;
Chi-hua ch in g -ch i  (Planned E conom y).
Ch ing-ch i yen -ch iu  (E conom ic  R esearch ).
Chung-hang ytieh-k'an (Bank o f  China M onthly).*
Chung-nung ytteh-k'an (Chinese Farm ing Monthly). *
Hsin-hua pan-ytteh k 'an (New China Sem i-M onthly ).
H sin-hua ytfeh-pao (New China Monthly).
Hstfeh-hsi (Study).
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Hua-tung nung-yeh k 'o-hstteh t 'ung-pao (East China A gricu ltura l 
Scientific  Bulletin).
Nung-hang ytfeh-k'an (Monthly Journal o f  the F a r m e r s '  Bank o f  
China). *
Nung-pao (A gricu ltural Journal).*
She-hui ch in g -ch i  ytieh-pao (Socia l E con om y M onthly).*
T i - l i  ch ih -sh ih  (G eographical Knowledge).
T i - l i  hstieh-pao (G eographica l Studies).
T s 'u n -ch ih  (Rural A dm in istra tion ).*
T 'u n g -ch i  kung-tso t'ung-hsitn (Statistical W ork Report). 
T 'u n g -ch i  ytteh-pao (Statistical M onthly).*
* A ll these journals w ere  published b e fo re  1949.
3. N ew sp ap ers ;
Ch 'ang-ch iang jih -p ao  (Yangtze R iver  D aily), Wuhan, Hupeh.
C h 'ang-chou  kung-jen  pao (C h 'ang-chou  W o r k e rs '  Daily), Ch'ang 
chou, Kiangsu.
Chieh-fang jih -p ao  (L iberation  Daily), Shanghai.
H sin-hua jih -p ao  (New China Daily), Nanking, Kiangsu.
Hsin Soochou pao (New Soochow Daily), Soochow , South Kiangsu. 
H sin -w en  jih -p ao  (D aily  News), Shanghai.
Jen-m in  jih -p ao  (P e o p le 's  Daily), Peking.
Kuang-ming jih -pao  (Enlightenment Daily), Peking.
Su-nan jih -p ao  (South Kiangsu Daily), Wusih, South Kiangsu. 
Su-pei j ih -p ao  (North Kiangsu Daily), Y ang-chou , North Kiangsu. 
Ta-kung pao (Impartial Daily), Tientsin.
W en-hui pao (Cultural Contact Daily), Shanghai.
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C. Legal D ocum ents, Yearbooks and Other C o l le c t io n s .
Chung-hua je n -m in  kung-ho-kuo k 'a i-kuo  wen hsien  (Documents on 
the Establishm ent o f  the P eop le 's  Republic o f  China), New D e m o cra cy  
Publishing House, Hong Kong, 1949.
Current Background, U .S. Consulate G eneral, Hong Kong.
H ua-tung-ch 'ii t s 'a i -ch e n g  ch ing -ch i fa -ling  hui-p ien  (E con om ic  and 
Financial Regulations fo r  the East China R eg ion ) , 2 vo lu m es ,
P e o p le 's  Publishing H ouse, Shanghai, 1951.
Jen -m in  s h o u -ts 'e  1950 . . . (P e o p le 's  Handbook), Peking.
M odel Regulations fo r  Advanced Agricu ltura l P r o d u c e r s '  C o -o p e r a t iv e s , 
F ore ign  Languages P r e s s ,  Peking, 1956.
Survey o f  the China Mainland P r e s s , Hong Kong.
The A grarian  R e form  Law of the P eop le 's  Republic o f  China and Other 
Relevant D ocu m en ts , F ore ign  Languages P r e s s ,  Peking, 1950.
The China Yearbook, 1929-30, Tientsin P r e s s ,  T ientsin.
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A SELECTED  GLOSSARY OF CHINESE WORDS AND
PHRASES USED IN THE T E X T .
c h 'a - ts u  t 'uan t /k s 
cheng-shui 2 -  t i b
chi-kung ytian
c h i - t ' i  m ai-kung ^  X-
c h i - t ' i  sh en g -ch 'an  ^  4 3 . / -
Chi ang -nan wu fen g -ch ien  f t  M . &  &
ch ing -ch ' ang -hsing .* £  $  + 1
ching-keng h s i - t s o  m  4
ch 'iung -pang-ch 'iung  $  ^
c h 'u -ch i  nung-yeh sh eng-ch 'an  h o - t s o -s h e  %/) ^  f t
chui fei iL »
feng - c h 'e  j f L  i  
feng-n ien  ch 'an -liang  
fu -shu i n
fu-yti chung-nung ^  ^ ^
h s i - t ' ie n
hsia-chung-nung T t  A
hsiao t 'u - t i  ch 'u -tsu  che ±  He. i i  h L  %
hsien  4tl»
h s in -sh ih  p u -l i  * f  i  f  f  
h sing-sh ih  ch u -i  M  &  i . % .  
h u -l i  JT
huang-niu *  4  
huang-ti
huo-yang-n iu  ^‘/C ^  ^
i - c h ia -  i - t ' i a o  n iu -t 'u i  — &  — ^  ^  Jjjife.
k a o -ch i  nung-yeh sh eng-ch 'an  h o - t s o -s h e  %) k A  A ,  *  L  f -  -S’ 4
k e n g 4 £ .
k eng-che  yu c h ' i - t ' i e n  
k 'o u -ta  m a o -tzu
-5 9 0 -
kuan-liao chu -i  i i  >c 
kuan-m en ch u -i  k  f i  I  
k u n g-ch i-ch in  '<X 4 ^  ^  
kung-p 'iao  X  ^  
k ung-tso -tu i
la o -tzu  pu t 'u an -ch ie
l ia n g -l i
lu - fe i  jt|:
m ing-ling  ch u -i  ^  ^
n « M
nung-hui tsu -ch ih  £  £iL 
nung-m in ch iu -kuo hui {tj ^
nung-ts 'un  kung-hsiao h o -ts o -s h e  
nung-ts 'un  kung- tso -t 'u a n  & At * 4  til
p ang -n iu -t 'u i  9 1 m
pao-kuan ytian
p ao-kung- chih &  r
pao-kung p a o -ch 'a n  ^  I. fiL f~
p 'in g -h a n -t i  ^  ^
s a n -ch 'a ,  szu -fan , w u -p 'ie n -y e n  X. , £7 
s hang-chung-nung Ji.  ^
sh a o -k 'ou  tuo -fen  /)
sheng-ch 'an  tao-ting It- ^  £*J T I  
s h u i-ch 'e  ^  ^  
shui-niu ^
sh u o-l i  tou -cheng t i b  A  H -  $
Su-pei l in -sh ih  hsing-cheng wei-y iian-hui
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ta -h u n -tso  i t  1 %  Q  
ta -p 'an -kung A  1 *  i  
ten g -ch ia  chiao-huan $  ' f t  £
t i -y a
A  &tien-tang -“■? #
t 'ie n - fu  fu -ch ia  &  t t t  t i t *
t 'ien -fu -nung  m  i  *
t 'ie n -m ie n  ch'tian a  ss 4 *  
t ' ie n -t i  ch'tian a  j t  &  
tsa -liang
tsu -chan  4 1
tsu -ch ih  c h 'i - la i
t 'u - t i  h o - t s o -s h e  X  &  ' f t  H  
tuan-ch 'u i l i f t
tzu-keng chung-nung 4 £ a  i  # < -
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Map A . Kiangsu; Physical Geography.
H €  «  / a a/
Map B. The Economic Regions of Kiangsu.
Map C. Kiangsu: The Eight Special D is tr ic ts .
HSU -'CHOU
